#bushlied4bulletpoints
Original source (h/t).
Tweets on 28FEB22:
... To clarify [the 4 bullet points]:Tweets on 22MAY22:
1. WMD stocks estimates were based on UNSCOM analysis rather than US intel-sourced "specific info" as such. US intel supported UNSCOM's mission & incorporated UNSCOM data. [The "massive stockpiles" reference is from Bush's 07OCT02 speech.]
...
2. The Dec 2002 [31DEC02] press Q&A Bush answer is apparently an off-the-cuff outlier since the Bush admin position was consistently in line with "we don't know...how close Saddam Hussein is to developing a nuclear weapon" (Bush 07OCT02).
...
3. Rice's [08SEP02 CNN] statement re aluminum tubes was consistent with CIA & majority intel analysis.
4. Cheney's [14NOV01, 09DEC01, 10SEP06] statements re Atta were consistent with [the Czech] intel. And, "He said this after the CIA and FBI concluded this meeting never took place" is incorrect b/c CIA & FBI didn't conclude that. [Notice that Cheney's statements re Atta were in response to media inquiries about the 27OCT01 New York Times report on the Czech intel on Atta in the 1st place.]
Clarifications:
1st bullet point: The "massive stockpile" of BW in Bush's O7OCT02 speech https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html was not "literally just made up". Bush clearly cites UNSCOM, not US intel-sourced "specific information", consistent w/ US intel analysts' reliance on UNSCOM analysis.
...
2nd bullet point: The quote from a 31DEC02 press Q&A https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021231-1.html is a non-representative off-the-cuff answer that's understandably close to the intel & regular Bush admin position of "we don't know...how close Saddam...is to developing a nuclear weapon"(Bush 07OCT02).
...
3rd bullet point: Rice's 08SEP02 statement http://cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/08/le.00.html on the proscribed high-grade aluminum tubes was consistent with the majority analysis of the 2002 NIE https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/iraq-wmd.html DOE's partial dissent was an outlier & 'possible use' isn't the same as 'suitable use'.
...
4th bullet point: US relied on foreign intel re terrorism, eg, Czech intel re Atta-IIS meeting. The timeline of Cheney's evolving view on it matches US intel's investigation. US intel did not conclude the "meeting never took place", only that it was unconfirmed & seemed unlikely.
...
More on the 2nd bullet point: Setting aside that 'don't know if any' is an understandable off-the-cuff contraction of 'don't know how close to any', 'don't know if any' is right too if we factor the AQ Khan WMD network, which we know at least tried to sell ready WMD tech to Iraq.
...
More on the 4th bullet point: For better context re the Czech intel Atta-IIS Prague meeting https://nytimes.com/2001/10/27/world/nation-challenged-investigation-czechs-confirm-iraqi-agent-met-with-terror.html controversy, I recommend reviewing @KyleWOrton's exceptional write-up https://kyleorton.co.uk/2015/06/21/saddam-al-qaeda-stephen-hayes-the-connection/, which Orton has newly updated. Read the whole post. Excerpt:
#ellemanunmovic
A striking 19MAR18 tweet from UNMOVIC inspector and Director of Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy at IISS, Michael Elleman:
We acted on the best intelligence provided by "member states" including the US. But nothing found. We were prepared to state there were no WMD in Iraq, but needed another 3-6 weeks to resolve residual issues from the 1990s. The rush to war prevented a conclusive finding. 2/xMy response to Elleman's admission:
March 19, 2018
Tweet, 21DEC20:
Why do you believe you only "needed another 3-6 weeks to resolve residual issues from the 1990s" given those issues included the verified total declaration of Iraq's WMD program--the baseline step of the UNSCR 687 disarmament process--that Iraq failed to provide through 12 years?Tweet, 21DEC20:
The kernel of truth in @EllemanIISS's "3-6 weeks" is Iraq could&should have disarmed w/in weeks of the ceasefire. Yet in 12 yrs & 4 mo under Res1441 Iraq refused even the basic disarm step--a verified total declaration--that was required w/in 15 days of Res687's 03APR91 adoption.Tweet, 21DEC20:
Given UNMOVIC & ISG's reports are rife with UNSCR 687 violations, including IIS's large covert procurement program & chem&bio labs Iraq hid from UNSCOM&UNMOVIC, your admission "We were prepared to state there were no WMD in Iraq" in "3-6 weeks" is terrifying malfeasance averted.Tweet, 25DEC20:
I assume the 15 days mandated by Res687 for the verified total declaration of Iraq's WMD program is the basis for @EllemanIISS's claim he needed only "another 3-6 weeks". That might be plausible if Iraq immediately took the 1st&2nd disarm steps. But Iraq "never intended"(ISG) to.Note: To clarify Elleman's disinformation, "nothing found", see the 25JAN99 UNSCOM report that set the baseline WMD status for Iraq's "final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" (UNSCR 1441) and the 06MAR03 UNMOVIC report that confirmed Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) on WMD.
#schwarztheintercept
I criticized the faulty premises of Jon Schwarz's 10APR15 The Intercept article, Twelve Years Later, US Media Still Can’t Get Iraqi WMD Story Right, in response to this tweet:
Are you referring to the weapons described here regarding saddam? Would be interested to hear a different side.Tweet, 25JAN23:
https://t.co/c8aGReqHhC
January 25, 2023
FYI, contra The Intercept, in fact, UNSCOM/UNMOVIC lost oversight of the al Muthanna site upon the 1998 expulsion & Duelfer's claim that Iraq innocently lost track of WMD is 1, not an excuse under UNSCR 687 & 2, speculation not evidenced by ISG findings.Tweet, 25JAN23:
@ https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#duelferreport
[Screenshot from the [Chemical] subsection]
...Also, The Intercept misrepresents the poor control & unreliability of UNSCOM's oversight of the al Muthanna site even before UNSCOM was expelled in 1998, eg, ISG marks 1994 for possible Iraqi abuse of the site.Tweet, 26JAN23:
Excerpt from the ISG report's CW section re the al Muthanna site:
...A 4th misleading premise by The Intercept is its cherry-picked reliance on ISG finding Saddam ordered cooperation w/ inspectors. In fact, UNMOVIC & ISG found the order was false: Iraq "concealment & deception" continued "up to OIF & beyond" (ISG).
@ ISG https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#duelferreport
[Screenshot from the [Biological] subsection]
#congressviewbeforebush
Tweet, 28SEP21:
Your Reddit Leitenberg paper [link], whose citations imply is end 2000, early 2001, juxtaposed w/ the 22MAR00 Senate hearing on Iraq https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67659/html/CHRG-106shrg67659.htm, illustrates the crisis w/ Iraq matured long before 9/11, even before Bush became POTUS. Eg, Senator Biden at the 22MAR00 hearing:Tweet, 28SEP21:
Relevant insight on Senator Biden's position on the Iraq crisis from the 22MAR00 Senate hearing on Iraq https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67659/html/CHRG-106shrg67659.htm: Biden believes President HW Bush made a "fundamental mistake" at the outset by suspending Desert Storm short of Iraqi regime change.Tweet, 28SEP21:
Excerpt:
Relevant insight from 22MAR00 Senate hearing on Iraq https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67659/html/CHRG-106shrg67659.htm: Contra the narrative re 2002 AUMF that Congress was negligent, tricked or bullied into accepting Bush's view on Saddam's WMD, in fact POTUS only echoed Congress's standing view on Saddam's WMD. Excerpt:Tweet, 30SEP21:
Interesting insight from the 22MAR00 Senate hearing on Iraq https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67659/html/CHRG-106shrg67659.htm:Tweet, 30SEP21:
Congress's view that Saddam was likely hiding nuclear weapon capability was largely based on testimony from Scott Ritter, the same Scott Ritter made famous for disputing the US re Iraq.
Excerpt:
Relevant insight from the 22MAR00 Senate hearing on Iraq https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67659/html/CHRG-106shrg67659.htm:
Congress knew the fundamental difference b/w mandated Iraqi compliance vs "report that no evidence of violations had been detected". Bush's Iraq enforcement applied the compliance criteria.
Excerpt:
#pnacconspiracy
PNAC is Project for a New American Century.
Tweet, 17JUN23:
The underlined phrase in https://web.archive.org/web/20130817122719/http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf is cited out of context to accuse PNAC of exploiting (maybe orchestrating) 9/11 to invade the Middle East, particularly Iraq. Yet the actual context of the phrase is a discussion of DoD reforms, not a conspiracy to invade anyone.Tweet, 17JUN23:
+
Moreover, the PNAC source for the "like a new Pearl Harbor" phrase is focused on peer/near-peer nation-v-nation conventional armament, not counter-terrorism/insurgency. The DoD adjustments compelled by 9/11 were CT/COIN-focused & dissimilar to the DoD reforms advocated by PNAC.Tweet, 17JUN23:
+
To be sure, PNAC did call for Iraq regime change, but that advocacy was distinct from its advocacy of DoD reforms whence stated the "like a new Pearl Harbor" phrase. PNAC called for Iraq regime change based on Iraq's festering noncompliance w/ UNSCR 687, not a 9/11-level event.
=
#sasonotequalcoin
Tweet, 13MAY24:
"methods are more important than force size" & "Bigger force-COIN+guerilla insurgency=more KIA" sum up my disagreement with Stephan on this point: SASO≠COIN. More, pre-surge, exceptions like Petraeus made a difference with good method even w/ fewer troops.Tweet, 12MAY24:
@StephanAJensen tweet, 12MAY24:
I might be oversimplifying this massively, but at the end of the day, I think it's even more "micro" than that: Rumsfeld and the people around him rejected the idea that a large number of troops are needed for stabilisation and peacekeeping after an initially successful military intervention. The lack of sufficient troops (by at least a factor of 10) for stabilisation in the immediate aftermath of the toppling of the Taliban and then Saddam was, more than any other factor, what led to failure in both wars.
"The lack of sufficient troops...for stabilisation in the immediate aftermath of the toppling of...Saddam" was not "more than any other factor, what led to failure" with Iraq.Tweet, 15MAY24:
The top factor is Obama's deviation contra SFA. The 2nd factor was underestimating Saddam's terrorism.
"The lack of sufficient troops...for stabilisation in the immediate aftermath of...toppling...Saddam was, more than any other factor, what led to failure" overlooks 1, Iraq was on track by 2008 w/ SFA & 2, post-2008 errors w/ Iraq. @joel_rayburn points out https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2024/03/review-of-aei-iraq-war-series-20-years-later.htmlTweet, 13MAY24:
Here's elaboration on my "SASO≠COIN" criticism of @StephanAJensen's "lack of sufficient troops" for SASO:Tweet, 13MAY24:
1. US troops aren't magical peacekeepers. If the issue was simply "lack of sufficient troops" for SASO, more Iraqi troops would've met the need better than more US troops.
+
2. Pre-COIN Iraqi forces trained & deployed for SASO were beat by insurgents. More US troops deployed for SASO pre-COIN would've been beat by insurgents too.Tweet, 13MAY24:
3. Post-invasion looting & lawlessness did not create the insurgency. Saddamists created it like the Taliban did in AFG.
+
4. Adding US troops made sense when tied to OIF strategic adjustments. From the initial 'light footprint' plan, as OIF adjusted vs the insurgency, US troops were added as needed. Including the COIN surge, OIF's US troop level never needed to multiply "by at least a factor of 10".Tweet, 14MAY24:
Add: Top experts state @StephanAJensen's view, but it's contradicted when scrutinized. For a more-detailed commentary abt "SASO≠COIN" vs "lack of sufficient troops", see my review of 14APR23 AEI panel "The Iraq War Series: The Conduct of the War" https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2024/03/review-of-aei-iraq-war-series-20-years-later.html#conductofwarpanel Excerpt:Tweet, 20MAY24:
I guess Stephan's math for "lack of sufficient troops (by at least a factor of 10)" re SASO w/ AFG in 2003 is based on 5K ISAF in 2003 vs 50K KFOR in 2000. But again, in 2003, the 10-13K OEF force also did SASO w/ AFG.Tweet, 20MAY24:
Next, compare the value of the typical OEF/ISAF trooper...
+
...Compare the practical value of the typical OEF/ISAF special forces soldier in 2003 to the typical KFOR regular-army soldier in 2000. For OEF/ISAF SASO in 2003 vs KFOR SASO in 2000, was 1x SF soldier in Afghanistan equivalent to 3, 4, even 10x regular-army soldiers in Kosovo?Tweet, 20MAY24:
+
...Finally, what was the ratio of front-line soldiers to support soldiers in ISAF/OEF's 15-18K in 2003 vs KFOR's 50K in 2000? Generally speaking, SF is significantly leaner re support staff on the ground than regular forces. I assume that held true for OEF/ISAF 2003 vs KFOR 2000.
#oeflearningcurvenotnegligence
Tweet, 16MAY24:
B/c setback—esp early shortfalls—is normal in military history, Stephan's thesis blaming early setbacks in AFG for ultimate failure, in spite of OEF's midstream adjustments, sets a standard that obviates US & West entering any military contest requiring normal setback-adjustment.Tweet, 17MAY24:
Sure, we take preemptive perfection if we can get it. But that's rare in military history and rarer for extreme tasks like AFG. Per NATO, Kosovo lessons were applied to AFG—AFG was just harder. The early shortfalls look like normal develop/learn process.Tweet, 17MAY24:
@ https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#postwarmil
[Screenshot from the OIF FAQ retrospective #postwarmil section]
Your own narrative of pre-9/11 AFG points up why AFG proved harder than the 'state of the art' Kosovo peace ops. That wasn't going to be solved quickly & smoothly. The learning curve for AFG was always going to take time—eg, the 2010s adjustments you hold up followed OIF lessons.Tweet, 17MAY24:
Re "2010s adjustments you [Stephan] hold up followed OIF lessons", there's a reason Petraeus was put in command of OEF/ISAF at that time. Criticizing OEF in 2003 w/ 2010s adjustments is ahistorical. They needed 'proof of concept' from Iraq—that meant 08-09 earliest for AFG surge.Tweet, 19MAY24:
BTW, the answer to "Dunno why US wasn't counted w/ ISAF number in 2003," yet US was counted w/ ISAF in 2007, is ISAF & OEF were distinct missions in 2003: ISAF:Kabul—OEF:rest-of-AFG (not ISAF:SASO—OEF:CT). In 2007, US was counted w/ ISAF b/c ISAF mission expanded & merged w/ OEF.Tweet, 19MAY24:
FYI for Stephan's project, roundup of ex-OIF FAQ sources I've cited in the thread:Tweet, 19MAY24:
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/afghanistan/
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020417-1.html
https://nato.int/docu/review/articles/2023/06/20/nato-s-engagement-in-afghanistan-2003-2021-a-planners-perspective/index.html
https://nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69366.htm
https://nato.int/isaf/placemats_archive/2007-01-29-ISAF-Placemat.pdf
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf
https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/pdd25.htm
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/somalia
Add to roundup: https://understandingwar.org/provincial-reconstruction-teams-prtsTweet, 19MAY24:
Stephan's thesis that US initially eschewed SASO & neglected to project new AFG to the provinces is incorrect. Actually, US's PRT-based SASO "originated in AFG in early 2002". PRTs were all-in-one SASO units that rep'd AFG in the provinces.
Stephan blames US & NATO negligence on SASO based on the Kosovo standard per 2003 snapshot. Yet in fact, there was no OEF:CT—ISAF:SASO division & in 2003 the SF-heavy 10-13K US + 5K NATO forces' SASO in AFG ≥ KFOR's SASO.Note: In the same thread, be sure to read the 22MAY24 tweets from @StephanAJensen and me that follow up the 19MAY24 tweets.
It fell short, but that's learning curve, not negligence.
#humanitarianliberalparadigmvsiraqsyndrome
Tweet, 12MAY24:
Yeah, that was key: HW Bush hopefully envisioned the UNSCR 660-series enforcement as the new paradigm & baseline for the international community coming together for the post-Cold War liberal world order. In that regard, I'm angrier at France's complicity w/ Saddam than at Russia.Tweet, 12MAY24:
To circle back to @StephanAJensen, given his age (he says he was a child in the 90s), I'm not sure he realizes that the essential premises of his thesis on AFG are not universal & in fact depend on the primacy of the paradigm reified by the UNSCR 660-series enforcement with Iraq.@StephanAJensen tweet, 12MAY24:
Hey - not 100% what you mean here (which may be, at least in part, evidence that you are correct).Tweet, 12MAY24:
Care to elaborate?
Your thesis & ethical appeal for what we owe Cold War proxy AFG depend on the humanitarian liberal paradigm based on the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement that culminated w/ OIF. The Iraq Syndrome displaces that paradigm w/ defaults inimical to your thesis.Tweet, 12MAY24:
@ https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#americanprimacy
[Screenshot from the OIF FAQ retrospective #americanprimacy section]
The humanitarian nation-building, peace ops standard you witnessed w/ the Balkans interventions & carried out & now advocate for AFG is based on the UNSCR 688 enforcement https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#unscr688 Its roots aren't deeper than that. The 'realist' standard it replaced is the default.Tweet, 13MAY24:
And, as I said, your advocacy depends on reinstating the corrective Bush Doctrine that competed for the humanitarian liberal paradigm in its essential test w/ Iraq & your mission w/ AFG. That means curing the Iraq Syndrome.
Excerpt https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040602.htmlTweet, 10MAY24:
"US was in a position to provide this"—ie, AFG nation-building—did not exist in the 1990s. It only came to be after 9/11 with the Bush Doctrine, in policy terms https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/freedomagenda/. Your advocacy requires reinstating the Bush Doctrine, which requires curing the Iraq Syndrome.
#timwalzopposediraqsurge
Tweet, 08AUG24:
.@Tim_Walz's Army retirement b/c of Iraq is less relevant to his VPOTUS fitness than the disqualifying fact he is [on record] opposing the Iraq "surge" as a House Armed Services Committee member, a litmus test for any prospective V/POTUS which Walz failed.
@ https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2014/01/infuriating.html@JDVance tweet, 07AUG24:
You know what really bothers me about Tim Walz?
When the US Marine Corps asked me to go to Iraq to serve my country, I did it.
When Tim Walz was asked by his country to go to Iraq, he dropped out of the Army and allowed his unit to go without him. I think that's shameful.
[Embedded Youtube video]
#weaponizeiraqissueagainstmaga&dems
Tweet, 30AUG24:
You should weaponize the law & facts of the Iraq issue in the politics against both MAGA GOP & the Democrats b/c both factions depend on the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative at their base & use it to discredit anti-MAGA GOP. And, OIF's justification manifests your core principles.Follow-up direct message to @QuinHillyer:
@QuinHillyer tweet, 30AUG24:
I go back and forth between desperate fear that Trump wil get elected and desperate fear that Harris will -- and then desperate fear that whichever of them gets in will need to step down, to be replaced by either Vance or Walz, both of whom inspire desperate fear.
One of them is going to be elected. You can't help that. But you have it in your power to turn the tables on both MAGA Republicans and the Democrats by taking the Iraq Syndrome, on which they both depend at their base, from its current factor as a policy and political premise that they nakedly wield to discredit and marginalize your political faction, and transforming the Iraq Syndrome into an exposed fundamental metastatic lie that you can wield to hold both factions to account, restore credit to anti-MAGA GOP, and establish Bush's historic resolute principled corrective necessary leadership on Iraq as the standard and landmark to correct our nation's course.Tweet, 29AUG24:
Really, you don't have a choice: Your core principles are manifested in and inseparable from the UNSCR 678 Iraq intervention. As the political value of the Iraq intervention goes in the politics, so goes the political value of anti-MAGA GOP--MAGA Republicans and Democrats have made sure of that. You can and should use that against them. It's your path to save the nation.
Aug 30, 2024, 7:45 PM
Notice that the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative is @willchamberlain's go-to move to discredit anti-MAGA GOP—in this case the falsehood that Saddam's confirmed ties to al Qaeda are a @stephenfhayes "conspiracy theory". Anti-MAGA GOP needs to clarify the Iraq issue. cc @QuinHillyerTweet replying to @willchamberlain and @stephenfhayes, 29AUG24:
@willchamberlain tweet, 28AUG24:
Replying to @stephenfhayes
You were saying something about conspiracy theories?
[Cover of Stephen Hayes's The Connection: How al Qaeda's Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America]
Saddam did in fact have operational ties with al Qaeda. See @KyleWOrton's analysis of @stephenfhayes's book https://kyleorton.co.uk/2015/06/21/saddam-al-qaeda-stephen-hayes-the-connection/ & the Iraqi Perspectives Project's post-war investigation of Saddam's terrorism, which I cover at https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#ippTweet, 19JUL24:
@ https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2022/01/critique-iraq-portions-miller-center-december-2021-revised-georgewbush-foreign-affairs.html
[Screenshot of the post's section on Saddam's terrorism]
Re the @dcexaminer article, see my "Comment on Timothy Carney's answer to "What is the most important lesson of the Iraq War?"" https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2023/03/review-of-washington-examiner-symposium-what-is-most-important-lesson-of-iraq-war.html#carney-we, where @TPCarney does "define a neocon" sophistically. When addressing Carney's views, it's essential to clarify the Iraq issue.Tweet, 12SEP24:
[Screenshot of my "Comment on Timothy Carney's answer to "What is the most important lesson of the Iraq War?""]
@bstewart1776 tweet, 16JUL24:
I’d like to see them try to define a neocon.
@dcexaminer tweet, 16JUL24:
‘I’m tired of the neocons’: Republicans embrace Trump-Vance turn on foreign policy [by @TPCarney]
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/beltway-confidential/3083893/tired-of-neocons-republicans-embrace-trump-vance-turn-foreign-policy/
Here's another case of a MAGA world builder, @tabletmag's @Jacob__Siegel, who depends on the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative as an essential premise of his thesis: https://x.com/tabletmag/status/1641029719935033346
* You can read the excerpted clarification of the Iraq WMD issue at https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2024/03/review-of-aei-iraq-war-series-20-years-later.html#operationiraqifreedompanel
No comments:
Post a Comment