PREFACE:
Gary Gregg holds the Mitch McConnell Chair in Leadership at the University of Louisville and is director of the McConnell Center. He authored the Miller Center
history, "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs".
Sheila Blackford is the Scripps librarian and managing editor of the Miller Center’s
American President. I
entreated Professor Gregg and Miller Center to correct the substantial
flaws in the original
essay. In December 2021, Ms. Blackford revised the essay. This is my critique of the December 2021 revised
version. Enjoy:
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Sheila Blackford]
date: Jan 15, 2022, 3:12 AM
subject: Critique of the Iraq-related portions of Miller Center's revised "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs"
Sheila,
I appreciate your consideration of my feedback on the draft revisions of Miller Center's "life in depth essay"
George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs. I hope it helped to clarify the justification of President Bush's
determination to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (
Public Law 107-243) and resolve "the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles pose[d] to international peace and security" (
UNSCR 1441).
This is a fresh review of the Iraq-related portions of the revised essay, which presumes the conceit of ignoring Professor Gregg's original version, my
criticism of the original version, your draft revisions, and my feedback on the draft revisions.
Nonetheless, you should find the substance to be consistent with my criticism of the original essay and feedback on the draft revisions. My commentary embodies the basic
law, policy, precedent, and facts that define the Iraq issue, and they can't change.
Please share this review with Professor Gregg,
Dr. Antholis, and
Dr. Perry. You're welcome to share it with others as well. I look forward to your feedback.
Miller Center:
The United Nations approved a resolution for rigorous new arms inspections in Iraq in November 2002, and inspectors began working in Iraq at the end of that month; they left the country shortly before the invasion began. On March 17, 2003, Bush ordered Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq within 48 hours. In a speech to the nation, Bush noted: “Should Saddam Hussein choose confrontation, the American people can know that every measure has been taken to avoid war, and every measure will be taken to win it.”
To clarify "inspectors began working in Iraq at the end of that month; they left the country shortly before the invasion began", see the OIF FAQ
answer to "Did Bush allow enough time for the inspections".
The order of my comments generally correspond to the order of their excerpts in the essay.
However, I placed this excerpt first because of the key position it occupies in the Iraq issue, i.e., the fact finding that principally established
casus belli and President Bush's official determination on Iraq, and the excerpt's glaring omission of the primary sources.
In place of the fact finding that by procedure principally triggered OIF, i.e., the 06MAR03 UNMOVIC
Clusters document, the essay substitutes the uninformative "they left the country shortly before the invasion began".
In place of President Bush's official determination on Iraq, i.e., the President's 18MAR03
letter and 21MAR03
addendum to Congress per AUMF, the essay substitutes the uninformative "Bush ordered Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq within 48 hours" and "the American people can know that every measure has been taken to avoid war" (Bush,
17MAR03).
The absence of UNMOVIC's determinative fact finding and President Bush's official determination on Iraq from the Miller Center history of President Bush's determination on Iraq is an obvious fundamental flaw. The glaring omission is all the more puzzling given that the primary sources are public domain and readily accessed on-line.
Miller Center:
The CIA had developed an operation to quietly neutralize bin Laden prior 9/11, but it was never implemented as bin Laden had not been considered a threat to homeland security.
"[Osama] bin Laden had not been considered a threat to homeland security" is incorrect.
According to the
9-11 Commission, bin Laden and al Qaeda were considered a threat to homeland security by the Clinton and Bush administrations, which had "significant continuity in counterterrorism policy" (9-11 Commission).
The 9-11 Commission describes the sundry reasons that counterterrorism policy was inadequate prior to the 9/11 attacks despite the threat assessment. Relevant to Iraq, one reason that "neutralize bin Laden" was not a singular priority for counterterrorism officials is they understood that neutralizing bin Laden could not by itself solve the terrorist threat.
The pre-9/11 understanding was corroborated by the post-war Iraqi Perspectives Project investigation that revealed the pre-war
analysis significantly underestimated Saddam's terrorism. IPP
found that Saddam and bin Laden's respective terrorist "cartels" "increased the aggregate terror threat" by "seeking and developing supporters from the same demographic pool". More, "the Saddam regime regarded inspiring, sponsoring, directing, and executing acts of terrorism as an element of state power", "the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda", and "Saddam’s use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime" (IPP).
In effect, bin Laden's terrorists were simultaneously Saddam's terrorists. The dramatic growth of bin Laden's terrorist threat largely owed to its "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with Saddam's state-level development of the "same demographic pool" (IPP) that supplied al Qaeda.
We know now that Saddam's illicit investments in "regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations" (IPP) and "conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs" (
Iraq Survey Group) were escalating with his
victory over the UN sanctions.
Albeit bin Laden was "considered a threat to homeland security", "neutraliz[ing] bin Laden prior 9/11 [sic]" would not have solved the "aggregate terror threat" (IPP) as long as the Saddam regime remained in power and noncompliant with paragraph 32 of
UNSCR 687.
Miller Center:
His cabinet was divided on the issue [the scope of the military response to 9/11], even within itself: Colin Powell publicly opposed expansion to Iraq, but Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld favored ousting Saddam Hussein as part of the reaction.
This is one of several suspect characterizations, including "bin Laden had not been considered a threat to homeland security", that highlight the shortfall of sources, let alone
primary sources, cited in the essay.
I want to see the reference for "Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld favored ousting Saddam Hussein as part of the reaction" because the 9-11 Commission
history does not show that.
Rather, within the limited scope of the immediate military reaction to the 9/11 attacks, the 9-11 Commission shows the Bush cabinet considered including Iraq due to "Iraq's long-standing involvement in terrorism...along with its interest in weapons of mass destruction" (9-11 Commission) but only if Saddam had a direct hand in the 9/11 attacks.
That being said, the 9-11 Commission shows that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, did advocate for including Iraq in the immediate military reaction to the 9/11 attacks. However, Dr. Wolfowitz was not a cabinet-level official.
Miller Center:
After 9/11, the war cabinet quickly acted to target al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, but, by late September, the Bush administration had yet to determine the scope of the military response to 9/11. Some of his advisors argued for broad military action in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
... Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the use of force against those responsible for the September 11 attacks, and Bush signed it on September 18, 2001.
I clarify the link between 9/11 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in the
#911 section of my retrospective "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts".
The ambiguous characterization "by late September, the Bush administration had yet to determine the scope of the military response to 9/11" is compounded by the reductive characterization of the 2001
authorization as "the use of force against those responsible for the September 11 attacks".
In fact, the US mandate induced by 9/11 set immediate and broader objectives "to determine the scope of the military response to 9/11".
"Bush initially ruled out expanding the war to Iraq" is consistent with the immediate objective to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he [the President] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001" (
P.L. 107-40).
At the same time, "Some of his advisors argued for broad military action in both Afghanistan and Iraq" is consistent with the broader objective to "deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States" (P.L. 107-40), which encompassed Saddam's terrorist threat:
In the period after the 1991 Gulf War, the regime of Saddam Hussein supported a complex and increasingly disparate mix of pan-Arab revolutionary causes and emerging pan-Islamic radical movements ... many terrorist movements and Saddam found a common enemy in the United States. At times these organizations worked together, trading access for capability. [IPP]
In other words, although Dr. Wolfowitz improperly lumped Iraq into the immediate objective, the Saddam regime was properly considered for the broader objective of the US mandate induced by 9/11.
Miller Center:
Bush initially ruled out expanding the war to Iraq, but he expected to revisit the question once the situation in Afghanistan was under control.
The "expanding the war to Iraq" framing in the "Afghanistan" section is not wholly wrong because the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions were related in the broader War on Terror rubric based on Saddam's UNSCR 687 terrorism violations. However, the framing is misleading due to the essay's neglect to clarify and distinguish the immediate and broader objectives of the US mandate induced by 9/11 and the older standing
US mandate to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (
P.L. 105-235), including paragraph 32 of UNSCR 687.
Historically, Operation Iraqi Freedom could not be an 'expansion' of Operation Enduring Freedom because the UNSCR 660-series, Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement was founded over a decade before the 9/11 attacks. President Bush's enforcement of Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) with the Gulf War ceasefire mandates was the coda of the decade-plus continuum to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L. 105-235), which had
come to a head by 2001 in its own right.
Miller Center:
In his State of the Union speech in January 2002, President Bush called out an “Axis of Evil” consisting of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, and he declared all a threat to American security. British and French allies did not receive Bush’s declaration enthusiastically because they believed Bush’s language to be overly aggressive.
The 2002
State of the Union is often misrepresented in the politics.
The Miller Center ought to clarify that "Bush's declaration" merely reiterated the standing view of north Korea, Iran, and Iraq's respective illicit activities and warned about each rogue state separately. Despite the "axis of evil" phrase, Bush did not characterize an alliance between them.
In fact, contrary to "British and French allies...believed Bush’s language to be overly aggressive", the 2002 SOTU undersold the collective threat posed by the three rogue states. We know now that north Korea, Iran, and Iraq were illicitly cooperating to a greater degree than Bush discussed. north Korea and Iran still are.
For example, ISG found:
Iran had reportedly assisted Iraq’s oil smuggling operations in the Arabian Gulf region throughout the 1990s and up to OIF.
... Illicit trade between Iraq and Iran was also problematic. Smuggling occurred on the road linking the Iraqi city of Al-Basrah and the Iranian city of Khorramshahr. ... A former employee of the MIC [Iraq military-industrial complex] declared that the smuggling was under the protection of both the Iraqi SSO and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
See the Iraq Survey Group's
Regime Finance and Procurement section, Congressional Research Service report
Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation, and Professor
Christopher Clary's paper
The A. Q. Khan Network: Causes and Implications.
Miller Center:
Before a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush declared a new approach to foreign policy in response to 9/11: “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” Bush declared that the United States considered any nation that supported terrorist groups a hostile regime.
... These remarks later matured into the policies known as the Bush Doctrine, officially traceable to September 2002, when the White House released the National Security Strategy of the United States. The doctrine generally focused on three points. The first was preventive war in which the United States would strike an enemy nation or terrorist group before they had a chance to attack the United States. It focused on deterring any potential attacker. The second point was unilateral action in which the United States would act alone if necessary to defend itself either at home or abroad. The third point embraced spreading democracy and freedom around the world, focusing on concepts such as free markets, free trade, and individual liberty.
... Neoconservatives within and outside his administration strongly supported the idea of the United States acting on its own to ensure the country’s security and to protect the American people—preemptively, if necessary. Some opponents believed the doctrine was overly bellicose and its emphasis on preemptive war was unjust. Others believed the emphasis on spreading democracy around the world was naïve and unrealistic.
"President Bush declared a new approach to foreign policy in response to 9/11" is inaccurate.
The characterization of the "Bush Doctrine" as novel policy "officially traceable to September 2002" contradicts that its "three points" are 'traceable' to standing US law and policy and international convention established prior to the Bush administration. Preventive counterterrorism, the inherent right of defense, and liberal international leadership -- also known as post-WW2, post-Cold War American leadership of the free world -- were not novel policy in September 2002.
Rather than "a new approach to foreign policy", an accurate description of the "response to 9/11" would be 'reinforcement' of the "significant continuity" (9-11 Commission) between the Clinton and Bush administrations.
For example, "Bush declared that the United States considered any nation that supported terrorist groups a hostile regime" reiterates President Clinton's 21JUN95
Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39:
Furthermore, the United States shall seek to identify groups or states that sponsor or support such terrorists, isolate them and extract a heavy price for their actions.
... The United States shall seek to deter terrorism through a clear public position that our policies will not be affected by terrorist acts and that we will act vigorously to deal with terrorists and their sponsors.
Also see President Clinton's 24APR96
statement on signing
P.L. 104-132, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
As for the "naïve and unrealistic...emphasis on...spreading democracy and freedom around the world, focusing on concepts such as free markets, free trade, and individual liberty", that was standing US policy that pre-dated the Clinton, let alone Bush, administration.
President HW Bush,
01OCT90:
The world remains a dangerous place; and our security and well-being often depends, in part, on events occurring far away.
... But the world also remains a hopeful place. Calls for democracy and human rights are being reborn everywhere, and these calls are an expression of support for the values enshrined in the United Nations Charter. They encourage our hopes for a more stable, more peaceful, more prosperous world.
... The United States is committed to playing its part, helping to maintain global security, promoting democracy and prosperity. ... International peace and security, and international freedom and prosperity, require no less.
Professor
Chin-Kuei Tsui's
The Myth of George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy Revolution, which aligns President Bush's foreign policy with Presidents Clinton, HW Bush, and Reagan's foreign policies, provides a helpful illustration of the in reality orthodox nature of the "Bush Doctrine".
Miller Center:
The Bush administration inherited a policy toward Iraq that was shaped by the country’s refusal to abide by the ceasefire agreement that went into effect in the early 1990s after the Persian Gulf War.
The Miller Center ought to clarify that the ceasefire
resolution did not "[go] into effect in the early 1990s
after the Persian Gulf War" because technically there was no "
after the Persian Gulf War...in the early 1990s".
The Gulf War was only
suspended in 1991 and remained live until Iraq fulfilled the conditions mandated to convert the conditional suspension of the Gulf War into a permanent ceasefire.
President HW Bush
explained at inception:
I am pleased to announce that at midnight tonight eastern standard time, exactly 100 hours since ground operations commenced and 6 weeks since the start of Desert Storm, all United States and coalition forces will suspend offensive combat operations. It is up to Iraq whether this suspension on the part of the coalition becomes a permanent cease-fire.
Coalition political and military terms for a formal cease-fire include the following requirements:
... Iraq must comply fully with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.
Twelve years later:
UNSCR 1441:
Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein ... Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991) ...
President Bush,
18MAR03:
On April 6, 1991, Iraq communicated to the UNSC its acceptance of the conditions for the cease-fire. ... Since almost the moment it agreed to the conditions of the cease-fire, Iraq has committed repeated and escalating breaches of those conditions.
Saddam chose war by denying the "acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution [UNSCR 687]" in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441).
Clarifying that the Gulf War was only suspended, not ended, is a key to understanding the continuum of the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement across the HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations and that Operation Iraqi Freedom was not in fact a new war but rather a resumption of the Gulf War caused by Iraq's ultimate failure to accept the ceasefire terms mandated for "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687).
Miller Center:
Since Iraq refused to comply with U.N. disarmament requirements and had the potential to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the administration considered Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq a dangerous threat.
"Since Iraq refused to comply with U.N. disarmament requirements and had the potential to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the administration considered Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq a dangerous threat" is not wrong, but it is critically omissive.
Iraq's Gulf War ceasefire obligations were purpose-designed to resolve Iraq's Gulf War-established manifold threat. So all of Iraq's ceasefire violations, not limited to its WMD-related violations, each added to the threat evaluation of the categorically noncompliant Saddam regime.
That being said, a minimum fair representation of the US threat evaluation of noncompliant Iraq must include Saddam's UNSCR 687 terrorism and disarmament violations.
President Clinton,
17FEB98:
[T]his is not a time free from peril -- especially as a result of reckless acts of outlaw nations and an unholy axis of terrorists, drug traffickers and organized international criminals. We have to defend our future from these predators of the 21st century. ... And they will be all the more lethal if we allow them to build arsenals of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and the missiles to deliver them. We simply cannot allow that to happen.
There is no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein's Iraq. His regime threatens the safety of his people, the stability of his region, and the security of all the rest of us.
... In the next century, the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now: a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals, who travel the world among us unnoticed.
President Bush,
28JAN03:
Before September the 11th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. ... Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option.
Public Law 107-243:
Whereas the United States is determined to prosecute the war on terrorism and Iraq’s ongoing support for international terrorist groups combined with its development of weapons of mass destruction in direct violation of its obligations under the 1991 cease-fire and other United Nations Security Council resolutions make clear that it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced, including through the use of force if necessary;
For more detail on the evaluation of Saddam's distinctive combined terrorism-WMD threat, see part three of the OIF FAQ
answer to "Why did Bush leave the ‘containment’ (status quo)".
Miller Center:
In the Gulf War, the United States had successfully driven Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, but stopped short of crossing into Iraq, leaving Saddam Hussein’s regime in power.
"[United States forces] stopped short of crossing into Iraq" is incorrect.
US air and ground forces invaded Iraq proper during Desert Storm, e.g., "By midafternoon on the first day of battle, elements of the 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions were
deep into Iraq, in one case just twenty-four miles south of the Euphrates River" (
US Army).
After US ground forces were withdrawn from Iraq, US air and naval forces continued to invade Iraq mainly to enforce the UNSCR 688
humanitarian and UNSCR 687 disarmament mandates.
Miller Center:
Many senior policymakers had wanted to include Iraq in the immediate response to the attacks of 9/11, but President Bush decided to focus on Afghanistan.
I want to see the reference for "Many senior policymakers had wanted to include Iraq in the immediate response to the attacks of 9/11" because that's inconsistent with the 9-11 Commission history.
With the noted exception of Dr. Wolfowitz, the 9-11 Commission shows "senior policymakers" only considered "includ[ing] Iraq in the immediate response to the attacks of 9/11" if Iraq had a direct hand in the 9/11 attacks.
Miller Center:
The administration temporarily put Iraq on the back burner while it turned its attention to al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Once the Taliban was in retreat by November 2001, Bush and his advisers returned to their concerns about Iraq.
Again, the Miller Center ought to clarify and distinguish the immediate and broader objectives of the US mandate induced by 9/11 and the older standing US mandate to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L. 105-235), including paragraph 32 of UNSCR 687.
Miller Center:
Although Bush denied that a specific invasion plan for Iraq was underway, he began receiving briefings from U.S. Central Command on a war plan.
I want to see the reference for "Bush denied that a specific invasion plan for Iraq was underway" because I haven't seen that denial in my study of the Iraq issue.
The notion that "Bush denied that a specific invasion plan for Iraq was underway" doesn't make sense because it contradicts the operative precedent constantly affirmed throughout the UNSCR 660-series enforcement that credible threat and military action were necessary to induce any measure of Iraq's cooperation.
President Bush,
18MAR03:
Diplomatic efforts have not affected Iraq's conduct positively. Any temporary changes in Iraq's approach that have occurred over the years have been in response to the threat of use of force.
Obviously, if Bush had denied the military planning, that would have undercut the credibility of the threat needed to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (P.L. 107-243) in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441).
I suspect the assertion "Bush denied that a specific invasion plan for Iraq was underway" misconstrued a statement that conditioned military action on Iraq's behavior, which was standard form in the UNSCR 660-series, Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement.
President HW Bush,
08JAN91:
Let me be clear about the upcoming deadline. January 15 is not a ``date certain'' for the onset of armed conflict; it is a deadline for Saddam Hussein to choose, to choose peace over war. The purpose of declaring this deadline was to give Saddam fair warning: Withdraw from Kuwait, without condition and without delay, or -- at any time on or after that date -- face a coalition ready and willing to employ ``all means necessary'' to enforce the will of the United Nations.
Every one of us, each day of this crisis, has held out hope for a peaceful solution. Even now, as the deadline draws near, we continue to seek a way to end this crisis without further conflict.
President Clinton,
19MAY99:
We will continue to maintain a robust posture and have established a rapid reinforcement capability to supplement our forces in the Gulf, if needed ... to deter Iraq and respond to any threat it might pose to its neighbors, the reconstitution of its WMD program, or movement against the Kurds in northern Iraq.
President Bush,
07OCT02:
America is challenging all nations to take the resolutions of the U.N. Security Council seriously. And these resolutions are clear. In addition to declaring and destroying all of its weapons of mass destruction, Iraq must end its support for terrorism. It must cease the persecution of its civilian population. It must stop all illicit trade outside the Oil For Food program. It must release or account for all Gulf War personnel, including an American pilot, whose fate is still unknown. By taking these steps, and by only taking these steps, the Iraqi regime has an opportunity to avoid conflict. Taking these steps would also change the nature of the Iraqi regime itself. America hopes the regime will make that choice. ... I hope this will not require military action, but it may. ... I have asked Congress to authorize the use of America's military, if it proves necessary, to enforce U.N. Security Council demands. Approving this resolution does not mean that military action is imminent or unavoidable. The resolution will tell the United Nations, and all nations, that America speaks with one voice and is determined to make the demands of the civilized world mean something.
Miller Center:
Blair preferred to wait for additional U.N. weapons inspections, but those could not take place without Saddam’s cooperation.
The Miller Center ought to clarify the requirement to induce "Saddam’s cooperation": "Finally and only under threat of military action, Saddam permitted Inspectors to return" (Prime Minister Blair,
06JUL16).
Miller Center:
Cheney argued for a quicker move to war while Powell, the former U.S. Army General, counseled an approach involving the United Nations. ... Bush opted for further U.N. action with the knowledge that Iraq would likely not comply and then the United States would pursue war with Iraq.
The Miller Center ought to clarify that with or without another redundant UNSC resolution added to the pile "stretching back over 16 previous resolutions and 12 years" (Secretary of State Powell,
05FEB03) the United Nations was inherently involved in any US military action with Iraq because the
US mandate was to enforce the UN mandates for Iraq "Acting under
Chapter VII of the Charter" (
UNSCR 678). And, Saddam's failure to accept Iraq's ceasefire obligations
necessitated the "war with Iraq" to fulfill the US mandate to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L. 105-235).
Miller Center:
The Bush administration asserted that the United States could not trust Saddam Hussein with WMDs as Iraq continued to violate U.N. Security Council Resolution 687...
The Miller Center ought to clarify that the reasons the US and international community could not trust Saddam Hussein with WMDs were not based on assertion by the Bush administration but rather on premises codified in UNSCR 687 and restated by the Bush administration, particularly the "threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to make use of terrorism against targets outside Iraq" (UNSCR 687) and "the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of its prior use of chemical weapons" (UNSCR 687).
Miller Center:
...Iraq continued to violate U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 that required the country to destroy its weapons capabilities, among other requirements.
"Iraq continued to violate U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 that required the country to destroy its weapons capabilities, among other requirements" is unclear.
The Miller Center ought to clarify the "other requirements" and that the mandate to "destroy its weapons capabilities" was joined with the "other requirements".
UNSCR 707:
3. Demands that Iraq
... (iii) cease immediately any attempt to conceal, or any movement or destruction of any material or equipment relating to its nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or ballistic missile programmes, or material or equipment relating to its other nuclear activities without notification to and prior consent of the Special Commission,
Richard Butler (UNSCOM),
25JAN99:
3. For the conduct of this work [mandated by "Paragraphs 8 and 9, in section C of resolution 687 (1991)"], the resolutions of the Council established a three-step system: full disclosure by Iraq; verification of those disclosures by the Commission; destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all proscribed weapons, materials and facilities.
4. From the inception of the relevant work, in 1991, Iraq's compliance has been limited. Iraq acknowledges that, in that year, it decided to limit its disclosures for the purpose of retaining substantial prohibited weapons and capabilities.
5. Actions by Iraq in three main respects have had a significant negative impact upon the Commission's disarmament work:
Iraq's disclosure statements have never been complete;
contrary to the requirement that destruction be conducted under international supervision, Iraq undertook extensive, unilateral and secret destruction of large quantities of proscribed weapons and items;
it also pursued a practice of concealment of proscribed items, including weapons, and a cover up of its activities in contravention of Council resolutions.
Hans Blix (UNMOVIC),
27JAN03:
The substantive cooperation required relates above all to the obligation of Iraq to declare all programmes of weapons of mass destruction and either to present items and activities for elimination or else to provide evidence supporting the conclusion that nothing proscribed remains.
Paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002) states that this cooperation shall be "active". It is not enough to open doors. Inspection is not a game of "catch as catch can".
[UNMOVIC Clusters document,
06MAR03:
UNMOVIC must verify the absence of any new activities or proscribed items, new or retained. The onus is clearly on Iraq to provide the requisite information or devise other ways in which UNMOVIC can gain confidence that Iraq’s declarations are correct and comprehensive.
... Little of the detail in these [Iraq's] declarations, such as production quantities, dates of events and unilateral destruction activities, can be confirmed. Such information is critical to an assessment of the status of disarmament. Furthermore, in some instances, UNMOVIC has information that conflicts with the information in the declaration.]
Especially with a trusted public resource like Miller Center, it's important to be a stickler about clarifying the disclosure, verification, and supervision elements of the UNSCR 687 disarmament "three-step system" (Butler) and correct the disinformation that Iraq's unverified unsupervised unilateral destruction of proscribed items constitutes proof of false accusation by President Bush and exoneration of Saddam. In fact, Iraq's unverified unsupervised unilateral destruction was a critical ceasefire breach that prevented the mandated account of Saddam's WMD.
Miller Center:
The President went to Congress with his case to have the power to go to war if he found it necessary. A passionate debate ensued that ended with Congress passing a resolution authorizing the President to go to war with Iraq if Iraq did not comply with the terms of the U.N. resolutions.
The Miller Center ought to clarify that the 2002 AUMF was redundant with the 1991 "
resolution authorizing the President to go to war with Iraq if Iraq did not comply with the terms of the U.N. resolutions".
See my
Clarification of the Iraq issue in Congressional Research Service report "Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications".
Miller Center:
The international community later learned that the regime had disposed of much of its WMD capabilities, but had not been open about its actions.
"The international community later learned that the regime had disposed of much of its WMD capabilities, but had not been open about its actions" is not wrong, but it is critically omissive.
The Miller Center ought to clarify that "The international community later learned",
inter alia, that "In addition to preserved capability, we have clear evidence of his [Saddam's] intent to resume WMD" with "reconstitution efforts starting in 1997" (ISG), "By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their international support" (ISG), "As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (ISG), "The IIS ran a large covert procurement program" (ISG), "until he was deposed in April 2003, Saddam’s conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs steadily grew in scale, variety, and efficiency" (ISG) under cover of "denial and deception operations" (ISG), "Prohibited goods and weapons were being shipped into Iraq with virtually no problem" (ISG), "the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories" (ISG), "The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council" (ISG), and "The data reveals that firms in Germany and France outstripped all others in selling the most important thing — specialized chemical-industry equipment that is particularly useful for producing poison gas. Without this equipment, none of the other imports would have been of much use" (
Iraq Watch).
As far as "the regime had disposed of much of its WMD capabilities", "The international community later learned" that systematic Iraqi "concealment and deception activities" (ISG), much unfettered, later rid evidence of proscribed armament, e.g., "many of these [WMD-related] sites were either sanitized by the [Saddam] Regime or looted prior to OIF", "M23 [Directorate of Military Industries] officers also were involved in NMD [National Monitoring Directorate] document concealment and destruction efforts", and "extensive looting and destruction at military facilities during OIF" (ISG).
Furthermore, David Kay (ISG),
28JAN04:
I regret to say that I think at the end of the work of the [Iraq Survey Group] there's still going to be an unresolvable ambiguity about what happened. A lot of that traces to the failure on April 9 to establish immediately physical security in Iraq -- the unparalleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program and their other programs as well, a lot of which was what we simply called Ali Baba looting.
The inference of "A lot of that traces to the failure on April 9 to establish immediately physical security in Iraq" (Kay) is that the "regime had disposed of much of its WMD capabilities"
after the regime change.
Miller Center:
Critics charged that the Bush administration did not have an adequate plan for Iraq after the initial war was won and Saddam Hussein was ousted from power.
See the
#postwar and
#postwarmil sections of my retrospective "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts" for exposition about the initial post-war plan, insurgency setback, and COIN adjustment.
The US entered post-war Iraq with a credible "
humanitarian reconstruction"
plan. But as usual the axiom proved true: "No plan survives first contact with the enemy."
"Critics" have obfuscated that the demanding learning curve the US experienced in post-war Iraq is normal in military history. The modern analogue for the Iraq intervention is the Korea intervention in which US soldiers continue to serve. Comparing the two missions, all the competitive challenges of OIF combined are dwarfed by any single really hard week or even the single hardest days that the US-led coalition experienced in the Korean War.
Victory over capable adversaries has typically followed grim perseverance and in-competition adaptation compelled by harsh setbacks, not preemptive perfection. Whereas the standard of perfect preemptive anticipation, preparation, cost accounting, and execution that "critics" apply to OIF is ahistorical. I agree we should do what we can beforehand to prepare. However, that the
learning curve for victory in post-war Iraq was driven by necessity on the ground is consistent with military history.
The defeat of the initial post-war plan by the terrorist insurgency and the recovery of the mission via the
COIN adjustment to the early setback followed a normal competitive pattern. The only fundamental strategic blunder that the US
committed in OIF was President Obama's
irresponsible exit in contravention of the US-Iraq
Strategic Framework Agreement.
Miller Center:
Yet the goal [reduce the U.S. military presence as Iraq’s stability improved] proved unattainable, owing in part to the power vacuum left by the dismantling of the Iraqi army and the rise of sectarian violence within the two dominant strains of Islam in Iraq.
The Miller Center ought to clarify that the Coalition Provisional Authority did not really 'dismantle' the Iraqi army. The Iraqi army dissolved on its own.
Dan Senor and Walter Slocombe (CPA),
17NOV05:
When the American-led coalition "disbanded" the Iraqi Army in May 2003, it was simply recognizing the fact that the army had long since dissolved itself -- in the Pentagon's jargon, "self-demobilized" -- as the mass of (mostly Shiite) conscripts fled the brutality of their (mostly Sunni) officers.
The CPA's choice was not actually between retaining or demobilizing the Iraqi army. The choice was between building the post-Saddam security forces anew or trying to reconstitute the security forces that had applied Saddam's extreme tyranny to the Iraqi people.
What if the CPA had chosen to try reconstituting Saddam's security forces instead? The microcosm case is the 2003
assassination of United Nations envoy to Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello. Vieira opted to retain the guards assigned by the Saddam regime in lieu of American military protection. It was a fatal mistake.
It's likely that the US choosing to reconstitute Saddam's security forces would have been an exponentially greater mistake as well as a conflict with the Gulf War ceasefire
humanitarian mandates.
Miller Center:
After the United States toppled the government, Iraq soon began to descend into chaos with increasing instability and violence from suicide attacks, car bombs, kidnappings, and beheadings. Sectarian violence racked the country as religious and ethnic sects battled for control.
Correlating "Sectarian violence racked the country" and "chaos with increasing instability and violence" to "the United States toppled the government" is problematic.
Based on what "The international community later learned", the "Sectarian violence [that] racked the country" and "chaos with increasing instability and violence" were caused by Saddam's "government", not by toppling the Saddam regime.
"The international community later learned" that the Saddam regime converted from secular Baath to radical sectarian Islamist.
See Professor
Amatzia Baram's
From Militant Secularism to Islamism: The Iraqi Ba’th Regime 1968-2003 and Kyle Orton's
The Islamic State Was Coming Without the Invasion of Iraq.
"The international community later learned", as I commented above, Saddam's terrorism was significantly worse than it was estimated before OIF, including its "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with al Qaeda. To identify the root cause of the "chaos with increasing instability and violence from suicide attacks, car bombs, kidnappings, and beheadings", note that IPP
found "The predominant targets of Iraqi state terror operations were Iraqi citizens, both inside and outside of Iraq".
"The international community later learned" that Saddam's rule by “systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and
widespread terror” (UN Commission on Human Rights,
19APR02) -- already assessed as
genocidal by outside observers -- was actually "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq,
18MAR04) than had been believed outside of Iraq.
Even expert Iraqi expats like Professor
Kanan Makiya, who advised the US planning for post-war Iraq, talk about their shock at the extreme corruption of Iraqi society that had been inflicted by Saddam, degrading the nation far from Iraq of the 1970s and 1980s.
In short, the "Sectarian violence [that] racked the country" and "chaos with increasing instability and violence" were not caused by "the United States toppled the government" or "power vacuum left by the dismantling of the Iraqi army". Rather, based on what "The international community later learned" about the Saddam regime's governance, they were caused by Saddam's extreme corruption of Iraqi society, exploited by Saddamists who smoothly converted their radical sectarian terrorist rule of Iraq and "regional and global terrorism" (IPP) to their radical sectarian terrorist insurgency against Iraq.
Inasmuch "the Bush administration did not have an adequate plan for Iraq", that was not due to lack of planning. Rather, the initial post-war plan was overwhelmed by the surprising terrorist insurgency in part because pre-war analysts like Richard Clarke and Daniel Byman severely underestimated Saddam's radical sectarian turn, extreme corruption of Iraqi society, and deep domestic, regional, and global terrorism.
Based on what "The international community later learned", we should not have allowed the noncompliant Saddam regime to fester as long as we did. In hindsight, knowing what we know now, the solution is the Iraqi regime change should have happened as soon as it became apparent that Saddam would not comply with Iraq's Gulf War ceasefire obligations.
-----
Beyond the Miller Center page for President Bush, I assume the UNSCR 660-series, Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement is featured in the Miller Center pages for at least Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Obama. However, I deliberately have not surveyed the Miller Center's representation of the Iraq issue outside of "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs".
Instead, I hope you utilize the
OIF FAQ and my critical reviews of "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs" and feedback on the draft revisions to learn the defining elements of the Iraq issue. I hope you utilize that knowledge to inspect and correct the representation of the Iraq issue throughout Miller Center's public interface.
I hope when I do read the Miller Center more widely, I won't see the misrepresentation by omission and commission of the Iraq issue that degraded "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs".
It matters: As I said, the Miller Center's on-line resource is the kind of reputable, assumed credible, readily accessible source that high school students typically cite with the approval of their social science teachers, college underclassmen often cite with the approval of their instructors, and the public in general relies upon to be accurate.
Again, I look forward to your feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [
William Antholis], [
Barbara Perry]
cc: [
Gary Gregg]
date: Oct 25, 2021, 2:35 PM
subject: Please correct flaws in Iraq portion of Miller Center's George W. Bush Presidency Page
Dr. Antholis, Dr. Perry, and Miller Center,
I clarify the Iraq issue at
Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ by organizing the primary source authorities, i.e., the set of controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts that define OIF's justification, to lay a proper foundation and correct for the prevalent conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.
As such, I am writing you to entreat the Miller Center to correct the flaws in the Iraq portion of "life in depth essay"
George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs by Gary L. Gregg II on your
George W. Bush Presidency Page. The Miller Center's on-line resource is the kind of reputable, assumed credible, readily accessible source that high school students typically cite with the approval of their social science teachers, college underclassmen often cite with the approval of their instructors, and the public in general relies upon to be accurate.
In 2017, I reached out to Professor Gregg with corrective criticism of his work, which you may read at OIF FAQ post
Correcting the Iraq section of Miller Center's "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs" (20OCT17). Professor Gregg recently responded that he'll "rewrite the work they [Miller Center] contracted with me to do" only if the Miller Center requests it. So, for the public good, I'm asking you to make that request of Professor Gregg, or else correct the flaws in "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs" without him.
I won't repeat all my corrective criticism of Professor Gregg's work. Again, you may read it in the afore-linked 20OCT17 OIF FAQ post.
Rather, I'll point out that the pervading flaw seems to be a basic misconception of the operative context of the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement. And I'll highlight two representative examples that stand out for their misleading character and ready correctability: "President Bush had personally decided on the need to go to war,
long before congressional or U.N. action" and "It later was discovered that the regime had
actually disposed of its WMD stockpile
as requested, but had hid its actions from the world."
For detailed clarification of the former, see the
#ultimatumoptions section of the OIF FAQ's retrospective survey, "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts". For detailed clarification of the latter, see my "Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 11:44 AM" e-mail to Professor Gregg appended in the afore-linked 20OCT17 OIF FAQ post.
The OIF FAQ at large should be helpful. If you have questions about my work or revising Professor Gregg's work, please ask.
...
P.S. I will repeat this entreaty on the Miller Center's contact form.