Critique of Tara Copp and Lolita Baldor's "Why US troops remain in Iraq 20 years after ‘shock and awe’"

PREFACE: Tara Copp is the Pentagon Correspondent for the Associated Press. Lolita Baldor is the National Security/Pentagon Reporter for the Associated Press. I critically responded to their 15MAR23, 20th anniversary of OIF Associated Press article, Why US troops remain in Iraq 20 years after ‘shock and awe’. (h/t) Neither Ms. Copp nor Ms. Baldor responded to my e-mail, so I don't know whether they've read it.

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from: [Eric LC]
to: [Tara Copp], [Lolita Baldor]
date: Mar 17, 2023, 7:10 AM
subject: Critique of "Why US troops remain in Iraq 20 years after ‘shock and awe’"

Ms. Copp and Ms. Baldor,

I clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ by organizing the primary source authorities, i.e., the set of controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts that define OIF's justification, to lay a proper foundation and correct for the prevalent conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.

With that, I am writing to you with a critical response to your 15MAR23, 20th anniversary of OIF Associated Press article, Why US troops remain in Iraq 20 years after ‘shock and awe’.

Copp, Baldor:

The invasion was based on what turned out to be faulty claims that Saddam Hussein had secretly stashed weapons of mass destruction. Such weapons never materialized.

Your characterization of the basis or casus belli for Operation Iraqi Freedom is incorrect on law and fact.

The American law and precedent to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (Public Law 107-243), the United Nations resolutions to "use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 678), President Bush's case against Saddam, and his determination for OIF plainly show that "the invasion was based on" the Saddam regime's evidential "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) with "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 1441), not on "faulty claims that Saddam Hussein had secretly stashed weapons of mass destruction".

In fact, there was no such thing as "faulty claims that Saddam Hussein had secretly stashed weapons of mass destruction" in the Gulf War ceasefire disarmament process. Saddam's WMD was presumed in UNSCR 687 and established as baseline fact by UNSCOM. Saddam was armed with WMD until Iraq proved it disarmed in accordance with UNSCR 687.

The Saddam regime never proved it disarmed in accordance with UNSCR 687. Instead, in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), the determinative fact findings confirmed Iraq's noncompliance with the Gulf War ceasefire disarmament mandates.

By the operative enforcement procedure, casus belli was established by the UNMOVIC Clusters document, which confirmed Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) just as the UNSCOM Butler report triggered Operation Desert Fox with President Clinton's determination "Iraq has abused its final chance". The Iraq Survey Group subsequently corroborated UNMOVIC — "ISG judges that Iraq failed to comply with UNSCRs" — and found many "secretly stashed" UNSCR 687 WMD violations. Excerpt:

On January 28, 2004, David Kay, who preceded Charles Duelfer as head of the Iraq Survey Group, reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee:

In my judgment, based on the work that has been done to this point of the Iraq Survey Group, and in fact, that I reported to you in October, Iraq was in clear violation of the terms of [U.N.] Resolution 1441. Resolution 1441 required that Iraq report all of its activities -- one last chance to come clean about what it had. We have discovered hundreds of cases, based on both documents, physical evidence and the testimony of Iraqis, of activities that were prohibited under the initial U.N. Resolution 687 and that should have been reported under 1441, with Iraqi testimony that not only did they not tell the U.N. about this, they were instructed not to do it and they hid material.

The findings show an active program in violation of UNSCR 687. As well, "Such weapons never materialized" did not mean "Such weapons" never existed. It meant that rather than declare and present "Such weapons" to the UN inspections as mandated by UNSCR 687, Iraqi counter-intelligence systematically rid WMD evidence with "denial and deception operations" (ISG) that in and of themselves breached the Gulf War ceasefire for casus belli. Excerpt:

The Iraq Survey Group heavily qualified its findings in the report's Transmittal Message, Scope Note, and various sections by cautioning that the Saddam regime was expert at hiding proscribed items and activities, much evidence was lost prior to, during, and after the war, key Saddam regime officials were not forthcoming, statements conflicted, there were clear signs that suspect areas were "sanitized", and other practical factors, such as the terrorist insurgency, limited its investigation. For example, on January 28, 2004, David Kay informed the Senate Armed Services Committee:

I regret to say that I think at the end of the work of the [Iraq Survey Group] there's still going to be an unresolvable ambiguity about what happened.
A lot of that traces to the failure on April 9 to establish immediately physical security in Iraq -- the unparalleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program and their other programs as well, a lot of which was what we simply called Ali Baba looting. "It had been the regime's. The regime is gone. I'm going to go take the gold toilet fixtures and everything else imaginable."
I've seen looting around the world and thought I knew the best looters in the world. The Iraqis excel at that.
The result is -- document destruction -- we're really not going to be able to prove beyond a truth the negatives and some of the positive conclusions that we're going to come to. There will be always unresolved ambiguity here.

An example of the "unresolvable ambiguity" (Kay) is that "ISG cannot determine the fate of Iraq’s stocks of bulk BW [biological weapon] agents ... There is a very limited chance that continuing investigation may provide evidence to resolve this issue" (ISG).

We simply can't know the actual extent that Saddam's WMD was retained and reconstituted. Beyond the WMD evidence that was found, we can only speculate about the "unparalleled" (Kay) mass of WMD evidence that Iraqi counter-intelligence kept from UNMOVIC and ISG. We can reasonably assume it included higher value items than the scraps left behind. Notice Dr. Kay's inference that Saddam's forces rid much, perhaps even most, of the evidence after the regime change.


Copp, Baldor:

While many Iraqis welcomed Saddam’s ouster, they were disappointed when the government failed to restore basic services and the ongoing battles instead brought vast humanitarian suffering.

The solution can't be understood if the problem is obscured.

Your characterization obscures that the actors that carried out the Saddam regime's “systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror” (UN Commission on Human Rights, 19APR02) were also the primary cause for "the government failed to restore basic services and the ongoing battles instead brought vast humanitarian suffering".

The Saddam regime was required to prove compliance with the humanitarian mandates of UNSCR 688, disarmament mandates of UNSCR 687, and terrorism mandates of UNSCR 687, among other obligations, in order to make the Gulf War ceasefire permanent. Instead, Saddam violated the mandates in combination: "The predominant targets of Iraqi state terror operations were Iraqi citizens, both inside and outside of Iraq" (Iraqi Perspectives Project), "The former Regime also saw chemical weapons as a tool to control domestic unrest" (ISG), and "the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert [chemical and biological] laboratories" (ISG). IIS managed Saddam's "regional and global terrorism" (IPP) as well as his covert WMD program.

We know now that Saddam's "regional and global terrorism" (IPP), which included "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with al Qaeda, and Saddam's rule — already assessed as genocidal by outside observers — were actually "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, 18MAR04) than had been believed outside of Iraq. Thus underestimated, the Saddamists' extreme zeal and expertise at inflicting "vast humanitarian suffering" on the Iraqi people caught the American-led coalition off guard until it adapted and caught up with the counterinsurgency "surge".

Ultimately, the only cure for the Saddamist cancer in both its genocidal regime and terrorist insurgency forms was the American commitment to the welfare of the Iraqi people established by President HW Bush, carried forward by President Clinton, mandated by US law and UN resolution pursuant to UNSCR 688, and resolutely upheld by President Bush.


Copp, Baldor:

Resentment and power struggles between the Shiites and the Sunnis fueled civil war, leading ultimately to America’s complete withdrawal in December 2011.

There was no civil war. The Saddamist insurgents and their Iran-sponsored counterparts can be credited for creating a semblance of civil war pursuant to their insecurity-based strategy. However, an actual civil war would not have been deflated so expeditiously by the counterinsurgency adjustment. In fact, the success of the COIN "surge" depended on the cooperation of supposed "civil war" combatants, e.g., the Sahwa "awakening".

"America's complete withdrawal in December 2011" followed neither a civil war that never was nor the short-lived semblance of civil war that was dispelled by the "surge" and Sahwa before the close of the Bush administration.

President Obama observed in May 2011:

Indeed, one of the broader lessons to be drawn from this period is that sectarian divides need not lead to conflict. In Iraq, we see the promise of a multiethnic, multisectarian democracy. The Iraqi people have rejected the perils of political violence in favor of a democratic process, even as they’ve taken full responsibility for their own security. Of course, like all new democracies, they will face setbacks. But Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress. And as they do, we will be proud to stand with them as a steadfast partner.

Unfortunately, the US did not "stand with them [Iraq] as a steadfast partner" (Obama) as President Obama committed the profoundly inhumane, still-compounding strategic blunder of contravening the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement and the cardinal precedent — what was SOP — for American leadership of the free world à la Korea, Japan, and Germany in order to cut off the vital peace operations with Iraq, which Obama officials including President Biden perversely hold up as a signature achievement.


Copp, Baldor:

. . . The rise of the Islamic State group — its roots were in al-Qaida affiliates — and its expanding threat to the U.S. and allies across Europe sent the U.S. back into Iraq at the invitation of the Baghdad government in 2014.

To be clear, based on the conditions in and around Iraq, the Baghdad government had 'invited' the US to not leave in the first place per the conditions-based US-Iraq SFA.

"The rise of the Islamic State group — its roots were in al-Qaida affiliates" is partially correct. The main roots of ISIS were the Saddam regime's radical Islamism and terrorism, particularly its "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with al Qaeda. See Professor Amatzia Baram's From Militant Secularism to Islamism: The Iraqi Ba’th Regime 1968-2003 and Kyle Orton's The Islamic State Was Coming Without the Invasion of Iraq.


Copp, Baldor:

WHY THE U.S. PRESENCE CONTINUES
The much-stated reason for the continued U.S. troop presence is to help Iraq battle the remnants of the Islamic State insurgency and prevent any resurgence.
But a key reason is Iran.
Iran’s political influence and militia strength in Iraq and throughout the region has been a recurring security concern for the U.S. over the years.
. . . In a recent visit to Baghdad to meet with Iraqi leaders, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said U.S. forces are ready to remain in Iraq, in a noncombat role, at the invitation of the government. “We’re deeply committed to ensuring that the Iraqi people can live in peace and dignity, with safety and security and with economic opportunity for all,” he said.

The US presence with Iraq continues because of the US-Iraq SFA, according to which the US presence with Iraq should never have been broken to begin with. Iraq should have improved to a much better condition by now, except for President Obama's deviation from President Bush that betrayed the then-two-decade American commitment to Iraq and led to the errors that enabled ISIS and Iran to harm Iraq.