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Saturday, December 29, 2007

GEN David Petraeus' year-end letter to the troops

GEN Petraeus' letter is copied from the excellent Small Wars Journal.

HEADQUARTERS
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE – IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09342-1400

28 December 2007


Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Civilians of Multi-National Force-Iraq:

As 2007 draws to a close, you should look back with pride on what you, your fellow troopers, our Iraqi partners, and Iraqi Coalition civilians have achieved in 2007. A year ago, Iraq was racked by horrific violence and on the brink of civil war. Now, levels of violence and civilians and military casualties are significantly reduced and hope has been rekindled in many Iraqi communities. To be sure, the progress is reversible and there is much more to be done. Nonetheless, the hard-fought accomplishments of 2007 have been substantial, and I want to thank each of you for the contributions you made to them.

In response to the challenges that faced Iraq a year ago, we and our Iraqi partners adopted a new approach. We increased our focus on securing the Iraqi people and, in some cases, delayed transition of tasks to Iraqi forces. Additional U.S. and Georgian forces were deployed to theater, the tours of U.S. unites were extended, and Iraqi forces conducted a surge of their own, generating well over 100,000 more Iraqi police and soldiers during the year so that they, too, had additional forces to execute the new approach. In places like Ramadi, Baqubah, Arab Jabour, and Baghdad, you and our Iraqi brothers fought—often house by house, block by block, and neighborhood by neighborhood—to wrest sanctuaries away from Al Qaeda-Iraq, to disrupt extremist militia elements, and to rid the streets of mafia-like criminals. Having cleared areas, you worked with Iraqis to retain them—establishing outposts in the areas we were securing, developing Iraqi Security Forces, and empowering locals to help our efforts. This approach has not been easy. It has required steadfastness in the conduct of tough offensive operations, creative solutions to the myriad problems on the ground, and persistence over the course of many months and during countless trying situations. Through it all, you have proven equal to every task, continually demonstrating an impressive ability to conduct combat and stability operations in an exceedingly complex environment.

Your accomplishments have given the Iraqi people new confidence and prompted many citizens to reject terror and confront those who practice it. As the months passed in 2007, in fact, the tribal awakening that began in Al Anbar Province spread to other parts of the country. Emboldened by improving security and tired of indiscriminate violence, extremist ideology, oppressive practices, and criminal activity, Iraqis increasingly rejected Al Qaeda-Iraq and rogue militia elements. Over time, the desire of Iraqis to contribute to their own security has manifested itself in citizens volunteering for the police, the Army, and concerned local citizen programs. It has been reflected in citizens providing information that has helped us find far more than double the number of arms and weapons caches we found last year. And it has been apparent in Iraqi communities now supporting their local security forces.

As a result of your hard work and that of our Iraqi comrades-in-arms—and with the support of the local populace in many areas—we have seen significant improvements in the security situation. The number of attacks per week is down some 60 percent from a peak in June of this year to a level last seen consistently in the early summer of 2005. With fewer attacks, we are also seeing significantly reduced loss of life. The number of civilian deaths is down by some 75 percent since its height a year ago, dropping to a level not seen since the beginning of 2006. And the number of Coalition losses is down substantially as well. We remain mindful that the past year’s progress has been purchased through the sacrifice and selfless service of all those involved and that the new Iraq must still contend with innumerable enemies and obstacles. Al Qaeda-Iraq has been significantly degraded, but it remains capable of horrific bombings. Militia extremists have been disrupted, but they retain influence in many areas. Criminals have been apprehended, but far too many still roam Iraqi streets and intimidate local citizens and Iraqi officials. We and our Iraqi partners will have to deal with each of these challenges in the New Year to keep the situation headed in the right direction.

While the progress in a number of areas is fragile, the security improvements have significantly changed the situation in many parts of Iraq. It is now imperative that we take advantage of these improvements by looking beyond the security arena and helping Iraqi military and political leaders as they develop solutions in other areas as well, solutions they can sustain over time. At the tactical level, this means an increasing focus on helping not just Iraqi Security Forces—with whom we must partner in all that we do—but also helping Iraqi governmental organizations as they endeavor to restore basic services, to create employment opportunities, to revitalize local markets, to refurbish schools, to spur local economic activity, and to keep locals involved in contributing to local security. We will have to do all of this, of course, while continuing to draw down our forces, thinning our presence, and gradually handing over responsibilities to our Iraqi partners. Meanwhile, at the national level, we will focus on helping the Iraqi Government integrate local volunteers into the Iraqi Security Forces and other employment, develop greater ministerial capacity and capability, aid displaced persons as they return, and, most importantly, take the all-important political and economic actions needed to exploit the opportunity provided by the gains in the security arena.

The pace of progress on important political actions to this point has been slower than Iraqi leaders had hoped. Still, there have been some important steps taken in recent months. Iraq’s leaders reached agreement on the Declaration of Principles for Friendship and Cooperation with the United States, which lays the groundwork for an enduring relationship between our nations. The United Nations Security Council approved Iraq’s request for a final renewal of the resolution that authorizes the Coalition to operate in Iraq. Iraq’s leaders passed an important Pension Law that not only extends retirement benefits to Iraqis previously left out but also represents the first of what we hope will be additional measures fostering national reconciliation. And Iraq’s leaders have debated at length a second reconciliation-related measure, the Accountability and Justice Bill (the de-Ba’athification Reform Law), as well as the 2008 National Budget, both which likely will be brought up for a vote in early 2008. Even so, all Iraqi participants recognize that much more must be done politically to put their country on an irreversible trajectory to national reconciliation and sustainable economic development. We will, needless to say, work closely with our Embassy teammates to support the Iraq Government as it strives to take advantage of the improved security environment by pursing political and economic progress.

The New Year will bring many changes. Substantial force rotations and adjustments already underway will continue. One Army brigade combat team and a Marine Expeditionary Unit have already redeployed without replacement. In the coming months, four additional brigades and two Marine battalions will follow suit. Throughout that time, we will continue to adapt to the security situation as it evolves. And in the midst of all the changes, we and our Iraqi partners will strive to maintain the momentum, to press the fight, and to pursue Iraq’s enemies relentlessly. Solutions to many of the tough problems will continue to be found at your level, together with local Iraqi leaders and with your Iraqi Security Force partners, in company and battalion areas of operation and in individual neighborhoods an towns. As you and your Iraqi partners turn concepts into reality, additional progress will emerge slowly and fitfully. Over time, we will gradually see fewer bad days and accumulate more good days, good weeks, and good months.

The way ahead will not be easy. Inevitably, there will be more tough days and tough weeks. Unforeseen challenges will emerge. And success will require continued hard work, commitment, and initiative from all involved. As we look to the future, however, we should remember how far we have come in the past year. Thanks to the tireless efforts and courageous actions of the Iraqi people, Iraq’s political and military leaders, the Iraqi Security Forces, and each of you, a great deal has been achieved in 2007. Thus, as we enter a new year, we and our Iraqi partners will have important accomplishments and a newfound sense of hope on which we can build.

As always, all or your leaders, our fellow citizens back home, and I deeply appreciate the dedication, professionalism, commitment, and courage you display on a daily basis. It remains the greatest of honors to serve with each of you in this critical endeavor.

Sincerely,

David H. Petraeus

Wednesday, July 25, 2007

Violence works

"Violence works" was Professor Thad Russell's repeated mantra in his Barnard history class, "American Civilization after the Civil War". His point was about American activist history and that diplomatic means of political advocacy could not match the change wrought by insurgent tactics.

My gut reaction is that the removal of humanitarian people and organizations from places like Afghanistan and Iraq is devastating to the greater political process because they — perhaps more than our military civil affairs and government-based aid/development orgs — embody the positive (progressive) promise of the Western relationship in its most interactive form.

Further, I believe their introduction, relationship-building, and then removal under threat has been more damaging to our mission and empowering to the insurgents than if they had been absent from the beginning. The tactic of targeting "non-combatants" has been repeatedly validated as effective, and more significantly, the gap left by the aid groups' removal has severely undermined the full-spectrum interactions necessary to bring about the so-called "political" solution in the peace-building process.*

Read this and despair: YONHAP NEWS: Afghanistan kidnappings keep Korean missionaries from going overseas

Excerpt:

Rev. Park Eun-jo of Sammul Church in Seongnam, south of Seoul, to which all the hostages belong, said Monday that the church will stop volunteer services unwanted by the Afghan government and is taking steps to pull the remaining volunteers out of the war-torn country. "Some already began preparations to return home," a church official said.

In Afghanistan, volunteer workers affiliated with about 10 nongovernmental organizations were to soon close their medical and educational aid activities and return home. "The South Korean Embassy in Afghanistan sent a public document recommending we immediately leave the country, but we have yet to decide when to leave," a medical aid worker operating in Kandahar told Yonhap News Agency by phone, requesting anonymity.

According to the Middle East Team, a Seoul-based Christian group working to help evangelical missionaries and volunteer workers abroad, seven teams had plans to leave for Afghanistan and other Islamic countries in late July, but three cancelled the planned trips and four postponed trips indefinitely in the wake of the kidnapping.

"They already finished reserving air tickets between April and May, but cancelled or indefinitely postponed their trips after learning about the Taliban's kidnapping of Koreans," said Kim Do-heon, a manager of the group. "We persuaded them to make the decision to cope with a possible recurrence of the kidnapping crisis even if they intended to stay in relatively safer regions."

Four Christian evangelical churches in Seoul and its suburbs also changed their plans to dispatch missionary and volunteer teams composed of 10 to 20 members each to such Middle East countries as Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan, according religious sources.

* Update: For what it's worth, the SMEs at Small Wars Journal assure me that the actual impact by private aid groups like the Korean missionary group has been minor to the point of insignificance.

Thursday, February 15, 2007

When Anti-war is Anti-peace (2007)

I'm back in the Columbia Spectator today (15FEB07) with my column, When Anti-war is Anti-peace. I have mixed feelings about it because the version that's printed is not the preferred version I revised with the Spec editor assigned to me, but rather a rougher edited-not-with-me version of my original draft that I didn't approve. The substance of the message didn't change that much from the original submission to the unpublished revision, and I did submit the original draft, so I can't cry foul (too loudly). The upside is that the article is more timely in today's Spec given the anti-war protests on campus, and that was my original hope and intent.

Here's my preferred yet unpublished revised version of the article — enjoy:

UNPUBLISHED REVISION:

When Anti-War is Anti-Peace
By [Eric LC]

The calls for the United States to leave Iraq are reaching a frantic crescendo, and the precedent they most often cite is how Congress ended support for South Vietnam. However, while the Vietnam precedent for withdrawing from war is widely known, less understood has been the damage to peace caused by that retreat. The traumatic Vietnam episode convinced American leaders that peace operations in "non-permissive" environments were a misguided national security strategy. As a result, the peace-building options we needed at the outset of our current conflict were unavailable.

Since 9/11, peace building has returned to our strategic thinking, and the Iraq mission has become our greatest test for peace operations in "non-permissive" environments. What are peace operations? Essentially, they are the full-spectrum processes that transform failed regions into viable states that are secure, can sustain development and integrate into the international community, and are stable and effectively governed. Peace operations also encompass the organizations—private sector, government, international, and military civil affairs—that engage in humanitarian intervention, development, and aid.

If we make the deliberate decision to abandon Iraq, then we can forget about peace building in other "non-permissive" environments. Our peace-building capability will be swept away in the political fall-out, just as it was after the Vietnam War. Leading "anti-war" Congressman John Murtha, for example, is actually very hawkish . . . about China. He just vehemently opposes peace operations, whether they are in 2003 Iraq or 1993 Somalia.

I'm not as hard on President Bush's administration for our post-war planning failures in Iraq because I understand much of it was due to the lack of pre-mission capability. After all, how do you fix a country with an absence of tools and know-how for doing it? The easy answer is that you call someone else to fix it, and that's basically how we planned for the post-war in Iraq. We've learned the hard way that there is no one else to call and we are responsible for completing the job we started.

The solution to the mess depends on whether the peace operations community, thrown into the deep end of the pool since 9/11, can struggle out from the legacy of the Vietnam War. Doing so requires a bloody, expensive learning curve. Unfortunately, too many people we mean to help and protect, as well as our own peace operators, have died as the price for learning fundamental lessons while opposed by enemies who expertly attack our weaknesses.

But, are we learning? I contend that we are. Recently, I had the privilege of attending two peace operations conferences, the first in Washington DC and the second in SIPA. I was impressed by the dedication of both military and civilians to win the war by building peace and struck by the degree to which the Vietnam War had undermined the ability of peace agencies to handle the "operations other than war" that are center-stage in the War on Terror. Nonetheless, I was buoyed by the candid admissions of failure and the progress that has been made toward reforming everything from personnel to doctrine to institutional cultures. Participants spoke about the General Petraeus-led troop surge, with its accompanying strategic shifts, as a necessary re-orientation for the peace process in Iraq. It was hammered home – mostly by civilian peace operators humbled in Iraq — that in "non-permissive" environments, the military must be the main agent of peace. As a senior USAID representative stated, "if you [the military] expect a follow-on civilian force to replace you, don't. It's not coming."

My final impression was more emotional. My heart broke as I listened to the lessons learned by peace operators and their hopes for the future while knowing that outside, the "anti-war" movement was tearing down their mission. I especially was moved by the desire of the military officers to secure a better future for the Iraqi people — all the military participants had served in Iraq and expected to return. During the Washington conference, I studied the reactions of two Iraqi embassy liaisons while they listened intently to Americans taking personal responsibility for the fate of Iraq. I wondered how they reconciled the peace operators with the "anti-war" activists who accuse coalition forces of "[refusing] to even validate the lives of Iraqis." At the end of the Columbia conference, a United Nations representative asked whether the American commitment to peace operations would outlast a "regime change" in the next presidential election. Her fear was a massive, and most likely untenable, shift of responsibility to the UN in Iraq should the United States abandon our peace operations there.

Retreat from Iraq won't end the American commitment to peace around the world. However, our success or failure in Iraq sets the benchmark for intervention anywhere, such as Darfur, defined by violent opposition. Today, I am afraid the rising tide of the "anti-war" movement will destroy our capability to build peace, gained through so great a sacrifice, in the places of the world that need our help the most.

Related: 15DEC06 US Army counterinsurgency FM (field manual) 3-24.

ADD: Also see my 2002 Spec article, Weighing in on Iraq, the sources and commentary at An irresponsible exit from Iraq, my expository commentary on the post-war planning, setbacks, and adaptations, and the explanation why upholding the Iraq intervention is vital to reviving American leadership of the free world (US-led liberal world order).