from: [Eric LC]
to: [George F. Will]
date: Jul 9, 2019, 3:54 PM
subject: Clarification of Operation Iraqi Freedom's justification re The Conservative Sensibility (George F. Will)
Dr. Will,
I use the primary source authorities — i.e., the set of controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts that define OIF's justification — to clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ. The eponymous OIF FAQ post synthesizes the primary source authorities into a coherent narrative form that is purpose-designed to lay a proper foundation and provide a study guide for the Iraq issue.
With that, I am writing you to clarify the justification of the Iraq intervention in response to your portrayal of it in Chapter 8, "Going Abroad", of your new book, The Conservative Sensibility.
George F. Will:
This was a justification for the invasion that was quite independent of the prudential justification ... Bush began with the idea that American liberty is made insecure by all deprivations of liberty elsewhere ...
Actually, President Bush "began" with the "prudential justification" inherited from Presidents HW Bush and Clinton of resolving Iraq's Gulf War-established manifold threat, which included the "continuing threat" of the Saddam regime's human rights violations, with "the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution[s 687 and] 688" (Public Law 102-190).
This excerpt is from Public Law 102-190, enacted December 5, 1991:
SEC. 1096. IRAQ AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 688.Also see the correspondingly formulated "SEC. 1095. IRAQ AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687" of Public Law 102-190.
(a) FINDING- The Congress finds that the Government of Iraq, through its ongoing suppression of the political opposition, including Kurds and Shias, continues to violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 which demanded that Iraq `ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected'.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS- It is the sense of the Congress that--
(1) Iraq's noncompliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region;
... (3) the Congress supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 consistent with all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1).
The "idea that American liberty is made insecure by all deprivations of liberty elsewhere" does speak to the Freedom Agenda, which embraced the Iraq intervention. However, as you alluded, the fundamental justification for Operation Iraqi Freedom was international law enforcement to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (P.L. 107-243), particularly Iraq's mandated compliance with the terms of the Gulf War ceasefire.
The diagnostic-cum-prescriptive Gulf War ceasefire measures were purpose-designed to resolve Iraq's manifold threat, which included the "systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror" (UN Commission on Human Rights, April 19, 2002).
The "continuing threat" evaluation of Iraq's noncompliance with the Gulf War ceasefire measures was assigned by the US law and policy on Iraq before George W. Bush was President. This excerpt is from President Clinton's report to Congress on July 28, 2000:
The crisis between the United States and Iraq that led to the declaration on August 2, 1990, of a national emergency has not been resolved. The Government of Iraq continues to engage in activities inimical to stability in the Middle East and hostile to United States interests in the region. Such Iraqi actions pose a continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.Saddam's intransigence exhausted the lesser enforcement measures with Presidents HW Bush and Clinton. By the time President Clinton handed off "the crisis between the United States and Iraq" (Clinton) to President Bush, the 'containment' of Iraq was broken, and the mandate for the "use of all necessary means" (P.L. 102-190) to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L. 105-235) included the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-338). By procedure, Operation Iraqi Freedom was triggered when Hans Blix and UNMOVIC confirmed Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441), which established casus belli, in Saddam's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441).
George F. Will:
America invaded Iraq to disarm a rogue regime thought to be accumulating weapons of mass destruction. When no such weapons were found,
Actually, the UNSCOM/UNMOVIC and ex post Iraq Survey Group findings, not to mention Operation Avarice, are rife with WMD violations, despite (and due to) the systematic, much unfettered ridding of evidence over the UN inspections, OIF invasion, and even the ISG investigation itself by Iraqi counter-intelligence. And, again, while Iraq's WMD disarmament per UNSCR 687 was enforced as the principal step of the ceasefire compliance process, WMD disarmament was not Iraq's only ceasefire-mandated obligation.
This excerpt is from the #casusbelli section of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts":
From the outset of the Gulf War ceasefire in 1991, the priorities for enforcement among Iraq's obligations were disarmament in compliance with UNSCR 687 and humanitarian reform in compliance with UNSCR 688. The 9/11 attacks added weight to Saddam's terrorist threat combined with the WMD threat, which increased the urgency of Iraq's obligation to renounce terrorism in compliance with UNSCR 687.George F. Will:
...
At the decision point for OIF, the Saddam regime was evidentially in material breach across the board of the Gulf War ceasefire terms. The principal cause for OIF was Iraq's failure to comply and disarm as mandated with the UNSCR 1441 inspections. In Saddam's "final opportunity to comply" with "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations" (UNSCR 1441), Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire WMD mandates was established by UNSCOM, decided by the UN Security Council, confirmed by UNMOVIC to trigger the decision for OIF, and corroborated post hoc by the Iraq Survey Group.
... the appropriate reaction would have been dismay and indignation about intelligence failures.
Indeed, the Silberman-Robb WMD Commission, which reported its findings on March 31, 2005 and was sharply critical of the pre-war intelligence on WMD, was ordered by President Bush to review the pre-war intelligence on WMD.
At the same time, albeit the pre-war estimates were predictively imprecise, the pre-war intelligence correctly indicated Saddam was illicitly reconstituting Iraq's conventional armament and WMD capabilities in violation of UNSCR 687. Much of the underlying data was sound: the baseline fact of Saddam's WMD established by UNSCOM and IAEA, the ISG-confirmed data of Iraq's illicit procurement and activities, and the UNMOVIC findings that confirmed Saddam did not disarm as mandated.
George F. Will:
Never mind the weapons of mass destruction; justification for the war was Iraq's noncompliance with various UN resolutions.
This clarification is essential for a correct understanding of the "justification for the war": The Iraq WMD issue and "Iraq's noncompliance with various UN resolutions" are in fact the same issue. Saddam's "continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States" (Clinton), including "Iraq’s continuing weapons of mass destruction programs" (P.L. 105-235), was assessed according to the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) — "Recognizing the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security" (UNSCR 1441). The casus belli was Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire. Again, the principal trigger for OIF was Hans Blix and UNMOVIC's confirmation of Iraq's "continued violations of its [UN-mandated] obligations" (UNSCR 1441) regarding WMD.
This excerpt is from the OIF FAQ answer to "Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq":
One, the prevalent myth that Operation Iraqi Freedom was based on a lie relies on a false premise that shifted the burden of proof from Iraq proving it had disarmed in compliance with the UNSC resolutions to the US proving Iraqi possession matched the pre-war intelligence estimates.George F. Will:
In fact, the US as the chief enforcer of the UNSCR 660-series resolutions held no burden of proof in the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement. From the outset of the Gulf War ceasefire, Saddam as the probationary party held the entire burden to prove Iraq was compliant with the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) that was necessary to satisfy "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687). The question of "Where is Iraq's WMD?" was never for the US and UN to answer; it was always a question Saddam was required to answer according to UNSCR 687 (1991) to prove Iraq had disarmed.
Neither demonstration of Iraqi possession nor the intelligence was an element of the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, which pivoted solely on whether Iraq proved compliance with the UNSC resolutions. The law and policy of the Gulf War ceasefire plainly show its enforcement was compliance-based and "the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441). The pre-war intelligence was not the governing standard of Iraqi compliance and thus, no matter its predictive precision, did not and could not trigger OIF. By procedure, only Iraq’s noncompliance with its ceasefire obligations could trigger enforcement, and only the "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 1441) could switch off the enforcement. .
So a conservative American administration said that war was justified by the need — the opportunity — to strengthen the UN, aka the "international community", as the arbiter of international behavior.
In fact, the last "conservative American administration" prior to President Bush was chiefly responsible for the purpose-designed Gulf War ceasefire threat-resolution measures and the US law and policy that enforced Iraq's UN-mandated compliance. Though to give credit where credit is due, President Bush's immediate predecessor was not a conservative, yet President Clinton upheld his determination that "Iraq has abused its final chance" (Statement on Operation Desert Fox, December 16, 1998) by acting with evident foresight to meticulously refine the operative set of law, policy, and precedent, i.e., the case and procedure, that President Bush carried forward to enforce Saddam's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441).
Note, not all UN resolutions are like. The UN-mandated Gulf War ceasefire measures together with the US and UK-led compliance enforcement with Iraq comprised a modern gold standard for resolving international security threat.
George F. Will:
It was then counted as realism in Washington to say that creating a new Iraqi regime might require perhaps two years.
In fact, sovereignty was officially restored to post-Saddam Iraq in a little over a year with UNSCR 1546, adopted June 8, 2004, while the OIF peace operations that administered the Gulf War ceasefire compliance process continued.
George F. Will:
Would two years suffice for America to teach Iraq to elect good men?
No, according to President Bush: "Democratic institutions in the Middle East will not grow overnight; in America, they grew over generations." (Remarks at Air Force Academy graduation, June 2, 2004)
I suggest the commentary about the post-war planning, early setbacks, and COIN adjustment in the #postwar and #postwarmil sections of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts".
In line with your point, this excerpt is from the commentary section of An irresponsible exit from Iraq:
Building a nation to secure the peace does not happen faster than raising a child. Based on America's experience as leader of the free world, just the opening stage of building a nation even in relatively straightforward conducive conditions should normally and reasonably be expected to require a decade. See the World War 2 nation-building examples, where US military forces continue to serve in evolving roles, and more contemporary to Iraq, the peace operations with Kosovo and Afghanistan, which both pre-date OIF and are also ongoing. Indeed, long before OIF and the discovery that Saddam's rule was in fact "far worse" (UNCHR) than outsiders realized, the international community understood Iraq required comprehensive rebuilding on a generational scale. Yet despite normal nation-building expectations heightened by the particular challenges of Iraq, President Obama cut short the peace operations with Iraq at a severely premature 8 years. Imagine the consequences if the US had withdrawn peace operations from Europe and Asia in the late 1940s or early 1950s like the US pulled out of Iraq at the 8-year mark. President Obama should have stayed the course from President Bush like President Eisenhower stayed the course from President Truman. Instead, Obama fumbled away the possibility of a reliable, long-term American partner in Iraq with an astonishingly passive-aggressive approach to the SOFA negotiation.I hope the OIF FAQ helps you clarify the Iraq issue for your readers. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
In January 2009, President Bush handed President Obama a hard-won turnaround success in strategically critical Iraq to build upon. The US was fulfilling the principal objective of bringing Iraq into compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions stemming from UNSCR 660 (1990). Looking ahead from the COIN "Surge", post-Saddam Iraq was clearly headed the way of Germany, Japan, and South Korea as a key regional strategic partnership. In May 2011, at the dawn of the Arab Spring, Obama described the historic opportunity for peace in the Middle East where "Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress".
Concurrently, OIF had set up a better stable and ethical path to deal with Iran that relied on 3 prongs: stabilize Iraq as an American ally, increase sanctions pressure, and support civil reform in Iran. President Obama, instead, did the opposite of all three.
Commentary:
George F. Will's "conservative" thesis discrediting contemporary British and American humanitarian liberal foreign policy in The Conservative Sensibility is overall a rambling pedantic harangue.
However, per the norm, the substantive cornerstone of Will's argument — his QED and literal coup de grâce to humanitarian liberal advocacy — is the blatantly faulty and readily rebutted, yet politically prevalent narrative stigmatizing the Iraq intervention. Excerpt:
Three weeks before the March 20, 2003, invasion of Iraq, President Bush said, "Human culture can be vastly different, yet the human heart desires the same good things everywhere on Earth ... freedom and democracy will always and everywhere have greater appeal than the slogans of hatred and tactics of terror."Like Prime Minister Gordon Brown's readily rebutted memoir argument against OIF, George F. Will's polemic is a gift-wrapped opportunity to turn the tables on anti-liberal advocates with corrective counterattack on their keystone premise. Simply put, as they rely upon the specious stigmatization of OIF to discredit liberal advocates and validate their inhumane anti-liberal advocacy, clarifying the Iraq issue would discredit anti-liberal advocates and enable the revival of British and American humanitarian liberal foreign policy. Setting the record straight on Iraq is not a magical cure-all, of course; but it is a necessary step to re-lay the foundation and reset the frame needed to effectually advocate for humanitarian liberal foreign policy.
...
The "human heart theory" of foreign policy died in Iraq.
The political power of the specious stigmatization of OIF that Will relies upon to validate his anti-liberal thesis is not based on its substantive merit. As with PM Brown, Will's sophistry is blatant and the points of rebuttal are readily apparent. Rather, its political power is fueled by the self-abnegating concession of the OIF stigma by liberal advocates who are discredited by it.