Monday, November 20, 2017

Rebuttal of Prime Minister Brown's memoir argument against Operation Iraqi Freedom

PREFACE: Gordon Brown served as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 2007 to 2010. My rebuttal criticizes Prime Minister Brown's claim of American conspiracy on Saddam's WMD, assertion the Iraq intervention was unjustified, and choice to end British peace operations with Iraq. A comment for liberal advocates regarding PM Brown's argument against OIF follows the rebuttal. Enjoy:



In his November 5, 2017 The Guardian article, Gordon Brown says Pentagon misled UK over case for Iraq invasion, Michael Savage relates "an explosive new claim from [former UK prime minister] Gordon Brown" that the "US defence department knew that Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction but kept Britain in the dark".

The "explosive new claim" that the Pentagon secretly knew Saddam had no WMD and kept that knowledge from the UK is the premise for Prime Minister Brown's new memoir argument that Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was unjustified:
Brown states that had the evidence been shared, history could have been different. ... ["]If I am right that somewhere within the American system the truth about Iraq’s lack of weapons was known, then we were not just misinformed but misled on the critical issue of WMDs.

“Given that Iraq had no usable chemical, biological or nuclear weapons that it could deploy and was not about to attack the coalition, then two tests of a just war were not met: war could not be justified as a last resort and invasion cannot now be seen as a proportionate response.”

However, Brown's premise for his argument, the "US defence department knew that Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction" (Savage), is flawed.

First, on its face, the evidence cited by Brown does not support the notion that the Pentagon knew the status of Saddam's WMD. Rather, the The Guardian article describes a Pentagon report that assessed pre-war intelligence estimates as "analysis of imprecise intelligence. These assessments, the report said, relied ‘heavily on analytic assumptions and judgment rather than hard evidence.[']" (Brown).

In other words, as described in the article, the cited Pentagon report made no statement on the status of Saddam's WMD. Rather, it amounted to a 2nd-derivative assessment of pre-war intelligence estimates. Equivalent 2nd-derivative assessments of British pre-war intelligence estimates, such as Dr. Brian Jones's dissent, are discussed in the UK 2004 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction chaired by Lord Butler. Furthermore, the Butler review shows that British decision-makers relied on British intelligence estimates rather than American intelligence estimates. Brown neglects to explain why an American 2nd-derivative assessment would have swayed UK leaders above the British 2nd-derivative assessments that said practically the same thing.

The Butler review and its American counterpart, the Silberman-Robb Commission, explain that the extreme difficulty of gathering "hard evidence" about Saddam's WMD was familiar to British and American leaders tasked with the duty of enforcing Iraq's Gulf War ceasefire-mandated compliance. The operative role of the intelligence in the UNSCR 687 disarmament process was assisting the UN weapons inspections that tested Iraq's compliance with the UNSCR 687 disarmament mandates. As Iraqi counter-intelligence expertly adapted, intelligence analysts depended on data from the UN weapons inspections, which were also well opposed by Iraqi counter-intelligence. When the UN weapons inspections were cut off in 1998, so was the principal source of data on Saddam's WMD. As such, in the operative context of the decision for OIF, intelligence estimates based on "analysis of imprecise intelligence" were understood to be necessitated by Iraq's effective "denial and deception operations" (Iraq Survey Group), which in and of themselves violated UNSCR 687, not as evidence of Brown's conspiracy.

Second, Brown's premise that "Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction" contradicts the operative context of the OIF decision and the fact record.

In the operative context of the OIF decision, Iraq's guilt of proscribed armament was established fact by UNSCOM and IAEA in the UNSCR 687 disarmament process and presumed until Iraq proved it disarmed in accordance with the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441). The mandated question of Saddam's WMD was never for the US, UK, and UN to answer. Iraq was obligated to answer the question in accordance with UNSCR 687. The intelligence was weighed in the operative context of the established fact of Saddam's WMD with the burden on Iraq to prove the mandated compliance and disarmament.

As such, Brown's premise elides that the determination "Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction" was not for the Pentagon to make in the first place. The determination of disarmament could only be made by Iraq proving it had disarmed as mandated. Gauging Iraq's compliance with UNSCR 687 and related resolutions was the necessary measuring stick for Iraq's WMD-related threat due to Saddam's commitment to "concealment and deception activities" (ISG) throughout the Gulf War ceasefire, including the final UNSCR 1441 inspection period. Iraq's proscribed items and activities that could be demonstrated in hand were not the main WMD-related threat because the violations that could be demonstrated could be corrected as mandated. Rather, Iraq's main WMD-related threat was the proscribed items and activities that could not be accounted for due to Saddam's "denial and deception operations" (ISG). Answering the question of Iraq's proscribed items and activities was not guesswork. It was not even intelligence work, where Western intelligence was evidently outmatched by Iraqi counter-intelligence. Gauging Iraq's compliance with the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) was the mandated way to answer the question.

For Saddam's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), Hans Blix and UNMOVIC asked Iraq to answer for Saddam's WMD as mandated, and Iraq answered that Saddam did not disarm as mandated, e.g., "With respect to stockpiles of bulk agent stated to have been destroyed, there is evidence to suggest that these was [sic] not destroyed as declared by Iraq." Iraq was obligated to prove "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 1441) in order to switch off the capacitating threat of regime change, yet in 2003, the UNSCR 1441 UNMOVIC inspections found Iraq made no significant disarmament progress from the UNSCR 1205 UNSCOM inspections that had triggered Operation Desert Fox (ODF) in 1998. UNMOVIC's confirmation of Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" in Saddam's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) thus triggered OIF. Following the regime change, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) corroborated Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the UNSCR 687 mandates.

Brown's assertion "Iraq had no usable chemical, biological or nuclear weapons that it could deploy" elides that Saddam did not account for his WMD stocks with the UNSCR 1441 inspections, and subsequently in his stead, ISG was unable to account for Saddam's WMD stocks as mandated, e.g., "ISG cannot determine the fate of Iraq’s stocks of bulk BW [biological weapon] agents ... There is a very limited chance that continuing investigation may provide evidence to resolve this issue." In fact, in many instances where ISG cited a lack of evidence, it meant the evidence required for a definite determination was missing or lost, not that absence of evidence was evidence of absence.

ISG's non-findings, which are prevalently interpreted in the politics as unequivocal evidence of absence, are in fact predominantly attributed to evidentiary gaps due to rigorous regime operations and information security practice that prevented evidence, "many of these [WMD-related] sites were sanitized by the Regime", and other "concealment and destruction efforts" before and during the ISG investigation. The UNSCR 687 disarmament process placed the burden of proof on Iraq and hence was not like a crime-scene forensic investigation that searched for evidence while guarding carefully against the contamination or loss of physical evidence in a controlled area. Carrying the burden to prove the mandated disarmament upon the established fact of Iraq's proscribed armament, Saddam was in effect allowed by the UN weapons inspections to hide, alter, or destroy evidence of proscribed armament. Iraq's "concealment and deception activities" (ISG) only hindered Iraq from proving it disarmed according to the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441). Therefore, despite its name, the ISG report should be read as a floor, not a complete survey of Saddam's WMD.

The notion of demonstrating that Saddam's WMD matched pre-war estimates was always unrealistic since, as a practical matter, the UNSCR 687 disarmament process, OIF invasion, and post-war occupation were not designed for that kind of proof. If legitimacy pivoted on ISG proving the pre-war intelligence estimates were predictively precise, rather than the operative context of Iraq proving it complied and disarmed as mandated, then of course the Iraq intervention likely would be de-legitimated given that Saddam's forces had a long, practically free hand to manipulate the evidence before and during the ex post investigation. And in fact, the ISG report is heavily qualified with caveats about significant limitations to its reach and scope, including that much evidence of Iraq's specific armament was missing or lost.

For example, although the chemical weapon (CW) munitions missed by ISG and confiscated under Operation Avarice are often devalued as older stocks, they nonetheless were still dangerous, were proscribed under UNSCR 687 and further corroborated Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441), and bore out ISG's caveat "ISG cannot discount the possibility that a few large caches of munitions remain to be discovered within Iraq."

Brown's premise that "Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction" also contradicts that the ISG findings are rife with violations across the board of the UNSCR 687 mandates. Comparison of the ISG report to the pre-war intelligence and 2nd-derivative assessment described by Brown shows that much of the "analysis of imprecise intelligence" has been substantiated and areas where Saddam's WMD-related activity was underestimated. Despite evidentiary gaps and other practical limitations, ISG was able to confirm Saddam's rearmament intent and Iraq had in fact been undertaking WMD-related activity for years, including a clandestine active program run by the Iraqi intelligence services (IIS) with a "large covert procurement program" and a secret chemical and biological laboratory network that "provided an ideal, compartmented platform from which to continue CW agent R&D or small-scale production efforts" (ISG), chemical and biological "dual-use" capabilities (including an obviously suspect "BW agent simulants" capability) that were readily convertible for larger production, illicit missile and nuclear development, and "fragmentary and circumstantial" evidence of greater WMD-related activity, including indications of BW production.

In short, Brown's argument is premised on evidence, i.e., a 2nd-derivative assessment, that fails on its face to substantiate his conspiracy theory. Further, Brown's notion the Pentagon "knew that Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction" contradicts the operative context of the UNSCR 687 disarmament process, the UNSCOM-established fact of Saddam's WMD, the UNMOVIC-established fact that Saddam did not disarm his WMD, other nations' intelligence on Iraq, and the ISG findings of Saddam's WMD intent and capabilities. Brown's assertion "Iraq had no usable chemical, biological or nuclear weapons that it could deploy" also elides that Iraq failed to account for Saddam's WMD with UNMOVIC and ISG's non-findings are heavily qualified.

If for the sake of argument one accepts the unproven notion that Iraq secretly unilaterally eliminated all its "militarily significant WMD stocks" (ISG) outside of the Gulf War ceasefire-mandated disarmament process before the pre-war intelligence estimates were formulated, that still leaves intact the primary threat assessment of noncompliant Saddam's unaccounted for armament and Iraq in breach of the ceasefire. Practically speaking, too, there is thin threat margin between battlefield-ready WMD stockpile and Saddam's confirmed WMD intent and capabilities. Iraq's WMD threat was measured by the UNSCR 687 mandates, which proscribed more items and activities than battlefield-ready WMD stockpile, notwithstanding that Brown's arbitrary standard for Saddam's WMD is considerably more permissive than the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441).

The thin threat margin shrinks further with the IIS's previously undetected WMD and terrorism capabilities that were found by the Iraq Survey Group and Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP) investigations. The post-war assessments of Saddam's IIS substantiate President Bush's warning in the 2003 State of the Union, "Before September the 11th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained." The criteria for "usable chemical, biological or nuclear weapons that it [Iraq] could deploy" (Brown), such as the CW munitions confiscated under Operation Avarice, are different for military and terrorist methods. The IIS's "ideal, compartmentalized platform from which to continue ... small-scale production efforts" (ISG) may not have been scaled for production on the military level, but it was scaled for production on the terrorism level. Counter-terrorism is intrinsically preventive because terrorist threat is not detected and tracked as readily as military threat, yet Brown's judgement "two tests of a just war were not met" ignores Saddam's vastly underestimated IIS-run "regional and global terrorism" (IPP), which included "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with the al Qaeda network and "the top ten graduates of each Fedayeen Saddam class were specifically chosen for assignment to London, from there to be ready to conduct operations anywhere in Europe" (IPP). Of course, Saddam's "regional and global terrorism" (IPP) and deployment of terrorists to London violated the aggression and terrorism-related terms of the Gulf War ceasefire to add on to the justification for OIF.

Alongside his flawed conception of the WMD aspect of the Iraq issue, Prime Minister Brown also evinces a flawed conception of "just war" and "proportionate response" in the context of the OIF regime change that successfully brought Iraq into its mandated compliance after Saddam declined his "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441):
“I am convinced that if resolutions of the United Nations are approved unanimously and repeatedly they have to be upheld if we are to have a safe and stable world order,” he writes. “On this basis, Saddam Hussein’s continuing failure to comply with them justified international action against him.

“The question is whether it required war in March 2003. ...

“Given that Iraq had no usable chemical, biological or nuclear weapons that it could deploy and was not about to attack the coalition, then two tests of a just war were not met: war could not be justified as a last resort and invasion cannot now be seen as a proportionate response.”

The basic premise of the manifold ceasefire terms was "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait" (UNSCR 687). Brown elides that the de jure and essential threat was the noncompliant Saddam regime, not the WMD in and of itself. Brown's arbitrary standard for his judgement "two tests of a just war were not met" obfuscates the operative context of the OIF decision wherein UNSCR 1441 "Recogniz[ed] the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security". The set condition meant Saddam's threat, including his WMD-related threat, was measured by Iraq's evidential noncompliance with the ceasefire terms purpose-designed to resolve Saddam's Gulf War-established manifold threat, not by Brown's misrepresented 2nd-derivative assessment. The US, UK, and UN were not obligated to predict and demonstrate any of Saddam's WMD to justify enforcement. At the decision point, the WMD-related "threat [of] Iraq's non-compliance" (UNSCR 1441) was confirmed by Hans Blix and UNMOVIC's measurement of "about 100 unresolved disarmament issues".

WMD was not the only "critical issue" (Brown) that weighed on the OIF decision. "Saddam Hussein's continuing failure to comply with them" (Brown) equated to the continuing "threat [of] Iraq's non-compliance with Council resolutions" (UNSCR 1441) related to aggression (UNSCR 949), WMD and conventional armament (UNSCR 687), terrorism (UNSCR 687), and repression (UNSCR 688). Today, with corroboration of Iraq's noncompliance piled high from the UNSCR 1441 inspections and post-war ISG, IPP, IIC, and UNCHR investigations — e.g., "[i]n addition to preserved capability, we have clear evidence of his [Saddam's] intent to resume WMD" (ISG), "the Saddam regime regarded inspiring, sponsoring, directing, and executing acts of terrorism as an element of state power" (IPP), and "[t]he new evidence, particularly that of eyewitnesses, added another dimension to the systematic crimes of the former regime, revealing unparalleled cruelty" (UNCHR) — Iraq's threatening breach of the Gulf War ceasefire can now be seen as categorical.

At the same time, the modern theory of just war is not limited to defensive action. Modern just war theory also encompasses the "use [of] all necessary means" (UNSCR 678) for the international compliance enforcement of the UNSCR 660 series and humanitarian intervention per UNSCRs 688 and 1483 that defined OIF. Brown's judgement "two tests of a just war were not met" is inapposite on its face since his arbitrary standard mismatches the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441). According to the operative enforcement procedure for the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), the OIF decision was triggered by Hans Blix and UNMOVIC's confirmation of Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" in Saddam's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), which confirmed the UNSC decision "Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687" (UNSCR 1441). Saddam failed his "final" compliance test well short of the mandated "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 1441). Iraq's UNMOVIC-confirmed UNSC-decided breach of the Gulf War ceasefire was casus belli.

Therefore, in the operative context of the OIF decision, proportionate response to the "threat [of] Iraq's non-compliance with Council resolutions" (UNSCR 1441) was marked by the measures needed to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235). In that regard, Brown's assertion, according to Savage, that “peaceful options for disarmament” had not been exhausted contradicts that Saddam had exhausted the non-military and lesser military enforcement measures over a decade-plus of intransigent noncompliance with the UNSCR 660 series, conclusively failed his "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) with the UNSCR 1441 inspections, and ISG confirmed Saddam "never intended" to comply and disarm as mandated. By 1998, President Clinton and Congress had concluded regime change was the only realistic way to bring Iraq into its mandated compliance. In fact, the UNSCR 1441 "final opportunity to comply" in 2002-2003 marked Saddam's second final chance after Clinton had pronounced "Iraq has abused its final chance" when Saddam triggered ODF in 1998.

Blair officials, unlike Bush officials, were on duty for the 1998 penultimate compliance push with UNSCRs 1154, 1194, and 1205 that ran aground with ODF and the aftermath of Saddam's increased intransigence. As the veteran ceasefire enforcers on Blair's team would (or should) have understood better than the newer Bush team, by the point of ODF in 1998, military threat of regime change was requisite to induce even a deficient degree of Saddam's mandated cooperation because he was already well on his way to breaking the sanctions. After Saddam successfully called the ceasefire enforcers' bluff with ODF and then nullified the ceasefire, including (and especially) UNSCR 687, in Iraqi law, the bar was raised for mustering the credible threat of regime change that was prerequisite for restoring the UN inspections-centered compliance process.

Saddam established from the outset of the UNSCR 660 series that the negotiatory "spiral" model of defusing conflict only encouraged his malfeasance. Drawing out even deficient cooperation from Saddam required leveraging with credible threat according to the "deterrence" model. Yet the ODF bombing campaign used up the penultimate military enforcement measure in 1998 and the non-military threat of sanctions was de facto neutralized by 2000-2001. "As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (ISG) even before UNSCOM failed in 1998 with "military reconstitution efforts starting in 1997" (ISG). The post-ODF ad hoc 'containment' relied chiefly on the constraint of sanctions and thus was collapsed by 2000-2001, if it ever worked at all. Saddam was on the verge of victory and knew it because he had earned it. ISG found "The Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council." UNSC members that opposed OIF were implicated in the Oil For Food scandal and complicit with Saddam breaking the UNSCR 687 arms embargo.

For British and American leaders confronting the festering "threat [of] Iraq's non-compliance" (UNSCR 1441) in 2002, there were no other expedients left to apply leverage with Saddam except the ultimate measure of unsuspending the Gulf War in response to Iraq's breach of ceasefire. The UNSCR 678 mandate to "use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area" did not obligate the US, UK, and UN to exhaust the lesser enforcement measures over a decade-plus in the face of noncompliant Saddam's escalating intransigence, threat, and harm until the UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement was on the verge of defeat. But that's what they did. Ultimately, in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" with "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 1441), Saddam recycled his "tactics of delay and deception" (Clinton) in concert with his accomplices on the Security Council to undermine the capacitating threat and foreclose reliance on further diplomatic efforts to enforce all relevant UNSC resolutions regarding Iraq.

Given the real alternatives at the decision point, Brown's view that OIF "could not be justified as a last resort and invasion cannot now be seen as a proportionate response" contradicts his simultaneous view that the Gulf War ceasefire "resolutions ... ha[d] to be upheld if we are to have a safe and stable world order". The decision point for Bush and Blair was in effect a binary choice: regime change to bring Iraq into its mandated compliance or else give in to Saddam's intransigent noncompliance. Once the despot responded to Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) by again calling the ceasefire enforcers' bluff, the effective real alternative to OIF was compromising the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) and discrediting the last remaining leverage to let noncompliant and unreconstructed, ambitious and aggressive, practically uncontained and rearming, sectarian terrorist and tyrant Saddam slough off Iraq's international obligations.

The real alternative to OIF at the decision point was not available to President Bush under the operative US law and policy to "ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (Public Law 107-243). Accommodation with the "threat [of] Iraq's non-compliance" (UNSCR 1441) was not an option. I assume the same is true in the UK mandate for Prime Minister Blair who had helped President Clinton build the operative enforcement procedure that President Bush faithfully carried forward to enforce Saddam's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441).

Finally, Prime Minister Brown should be taken to task for his admission that "the moment he [Brown] took office in 2007, he planned to pull British troops out of Iraq well before the Americans" (Savage). It's striking that Brown concocted his abandonment of the Iraqi people in the same historical moment, i.e., the heart of the counterinsurgency "surge" and Sahwa "awakening", that the coalition's peace operations were the most needed by the Iraqi people and doing the most good versus the vicious illiberal forces attacking post-Saddam Iraq. Brown fingers himself as the British leader responsible for the profoundly inhumane mistake that paved the way for current Middle East crises: the premature withdrawal of the necessary peace operations from Iraq. Incredibly, Brown comes off as self-righteous about his course-setting error:
“At this time I made another decision: not to use our future departure from Iraq as an occasion to draw a contrast with Tony or score points against him either,” he writes.

That being said, it's possible that President Obama was committed regardless of British input to his disastrous radical course deviation of contravening the Strategic Framework Agreement and removing the essential US peace operations from Iraq, and dropping President Bush's Freedom Agenda and reneging Obama's own pledge to the Arab Spring activists. Nonetheless, we can speculate what difference it might have made had Brown strategically positioned the UK where it could have at least tried to stop the US from Obama's deviation.

As it happened, Brown led the way in taking the wrong turn with Iraq. He has the least excuse because Brown, unlike Obama, was on duty for the heart of the counterinsurgency "surge" and Sahwa "awakening", so Brown should have understood what was at stake. Yet Brown still chose to make the profoundly inhumane, course-setting error of prematurely withdrawing UK peace operations from Iraq, which at least encouraged and possibly enabled Obama's subsequent US error with Iraq. Which, along with the defamation of the Iraq intervention, set the path for the feckless Western response to the illiberal actors who hijacked the Arab Spring by avidly exploiting the vacuum created first by Brown and followed by Prime Minister Cameron and President Obama.

Prime Minister Brown should have stayed the course. Instead, his inhumane commitment to abandoning the Iraqi people "well before the Americans" empowered illiberal actors to generate a destructive ripple effect in and outside Iraq. Brown ought to be held to account for his fundamental error of prematurely withdrawing UK peace operations from Iraq to which he has added a fundamental misrepresentation of the Iraq issue to rationalize his mistake.

The OIF decision demonstrably was correct on the law and facts. The actual case against Saddam is validated. Prime Minister Blair and President Bush were right on Iraq; not perfect, which would have been abnormal for leadership in a world-changing contest of war and peace, but they were strategically wise, ethically humane, and competitively resolute. Operation Iraqi Freedom was justified.

By-line: Eric LC is a graduate of Columbia University and Rutgers School of Law, and clarifies and relitigates the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ.

Postscript:

The Guardian's article about Prime Minister Brown's argument against OIF was jarring. On the substance, his argument is readily rebuttable. Which makes it jarring that a UK PM that close to OIF — indeed, the UK PM on duty for the heart of the Surge and Sahwa — would proffer that kind of argument in the 1st place. It shows the problem growing worse. Keeping in mind the OIF stigma is the purposeful strategic heir to the still powerfully influential Vietnam War stigma, it's not going to scab over and heal on its own. The revisionist stigmatization of the Iraq intervention is a progressive cancer that's spreading at the premise level of politics and policy with no immune response fighting it. Brown's argument is bad enough within the Iraq issue, but it also broadly implicates the Pentagon, the US, the US-UK relationship, and the effectual reach of liberal international enforcement.

His premature withdrawal of UK peace operations from Iraq was profoundly inhumane and harmfully course-setting, yet incredibly, Brown appears to be perversely proud of his error. His new memoir position on the Iraq issue ought to be setting off alarm bells for IR liberals everywhere, let alone the US and UK. It ought to function as a call to action for concerted, resolute, sufficient corrective on the Iraq issue in the politics — now.



Related: Criticism of Prime Minister Blair's response to the Chilcot report and Critical response to John Rentoul's "Chilcot Report: Politicians".

No comments:

Post a Comment