PREFACE:
Matt Latimer served as deputy director of speechwriting to President George W. Bush and chief speechwriter to former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. My critique of Mr. Latimer's treatment of the Iraq issue in his 30JUN21
Politico article,
The Don Rumsfeld the Obituaries Won’t Write About, followed up my
recommendation to Mr. Latimer and the
Rumsfeld Foundation on how to effectively advocate for Secretary Rumsfeld's legacy. Neither Mr. Latimer nor the Rumsfeld Foundation responded to my e-mails, so I don't know whether they've read them.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Matt Latimer], [
Sarah Tonucci]
cc: [
Rumsfeld Foundation], [
Keith Urbahn]
date: Jul 7, 2021, 4:54 PM
subject: Follow-up critique of Matt Latimer Re: To advocate for Secretary Rumsfeld's legacy, you need to clarify Operation Iraqi Freedom's justification
Ms. Tonucci, Mr. Latimer, and the Rumsfeld Foundation:
These critical comments respond to Mr. Latimer's treatment of the Iraq issue in
The Don Rumsfeld the Obituaries Won’t Write About and follow up my 02JUL21 recommendation (e-mail below).
I use a quote and comment format.
Latimer:
To be sure, he was not blameless over the Iraq War and its management. These are arguments that will outlive us all. But it also wasn’t true that it was solely his idea to invade Iraq— constitutionally it wasn’t even his decision ...
. . . When Rumsfeld left government in 2006, he took all the weight of the Bush administration’s failure in Iraq onto his shoulders and bore it into exile. Though he offered some defense of his actions, he also protected colleagues by refusing to reveal in his books some of the more damning information he knew that could have justified some of his decisions. He refused many opportunities to make a McNamara-esque apology for Iraq that would make him look good or to fault President Bush or others for the decisions he took part in.
Effective advocacy of Secretary Rumsfeld's legacy requires you to explain to the public that Operation Iraqi Freedom was justified. That President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld were right on Iraq in the first place and their detractors have been wrong all along. Setting that keystone premise establishes the necessary frame for vindicating Rumsfeld while simultaneously discrediting his detractors.
Whereas your current tack of making excuses for Rumsfeld and spreading blame in accordance with the specious narrative of "the Bush administration’s failure in Iraq" only validates his detractors and exacerbates their smear. Stop accepting their misinformation and empowering them. Turn the tables on them instead and politically prosecute their cynical adoption of misinformation.
For example, my
Critical response to John Rentoul's "Chilcot Report: Politicians" criticizes Professor Rentoul's self-defeating tack of making excuses for Prime Minister Blair and spreading the blame in accordance with the same specious narrative used against Secretary Rumsfeld.
Latimer:
Joyce spoke first. She pointed out that her husband had taken heat for a lot of people over the Iraq War. She didn’t mention any names, but she asked, “Where are they now?” None were coming to his defense or taking any share of the blame.
. . . No one, after all, was exactly jumping to his defense as he became the premier target of a barrage of books and publicity critical of the conduct of the Iraq War, as if every senior official on the national security team hadn’t been closely involved in it. The Iraq War? Oh, that was just Rumsfeld and Cheney’s deal.
This criticism of Bush officials is basically right and applies to Secretary Rumsfeld. Effective defense has required President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Powell, Secretary Rice, Secretary Gates, Secretary Rumsfeld, and "every senior official on the national security team" to immediately, constantly, persistently, and zealously set the record straight versus the specious narrative of "the Bush administration’s failure in Iraq". However, they inexplicably have not, and their negligence has allowed otherwise readily correctable misinformation to metastasize in the politics and policy.
I'm mystified by the failure of Bush officials to clarify the Iraq issue because it's straightforward. The elements are practically pre-assembled. To set the record straight, I simply synthesized the primary sources of the mission. Excerpt from the preface to the
OIF FAQ post:
Here is my latest attempt to set the record straight on Operation Iraqi Freedom by synthesizing the primary sources of the mission, including the Gulf War ceasefire UN Security Council resolutions that set the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), the US law and policy to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L. 105-235), the conditions and precedents that set the stage for OIF, and the determinative fact findings of Iraq's breach of ceasefire that triggered enforcement, to explain the law and policy, fact basis — i.e., the why — of the decision for OIF.
Anyone with a basic legal and policy background, let alone Mr. Latimer and other experts at the Rumsfeld Foundation, can reproduce what I did. The controlling law, policy, precedent, and determinative facts that define OIF's justification are public, plain, and readily accessible. They're compiled in the OIF FAQ's comprehensive table of sources,
Perspective on Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Forewarned: Clarifying the Iraq issue for the public involves correcting Bush officials, including President Bush. For example, OIF FAQ post
Decision Points suggests President Bush has not read key fact findings on Iraq carefully.
Latimer:
They blamed him for pushing for the invasion of Iraq in the first place (regime change had been official U.S. policy since the late 1990s, and numerous Democrats and Republicans in Congress called for and voted to authorize Saddam Hussein’s removal. If there’s guilt on that score, it’s a collective one).
Clarify that the regime change policy codified by the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998,
Public Law 105-338, did not mandate regime change for the sake of regime change. Rather, P.L. 105-338 enforced Iraq's compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (
UNSCR 1441) with the standing authorization for "the use of all necessary means" (
P.L. 102-190) to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (
P.L. 105-235).
Excerpt from President Clinton's
signing statement on P.L. 105-338:
My Administration has pursued, and will continue to pursue, these objectives through active application of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. The evidence is overwhelming that such changes will not happen under the current Iraq leadership.
The regime change measure was necessary to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L. 105-235) because every non-military and lesser military enforcement measure was used up during the Clinton administration with Iraq intransigently noncompliant. Saddam's
attack on Irbil in August 1996 effectively broke the US-backed Iraqi threat to his regime. When the Saddam regime triggered
Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 by
failing to comply and disarm with the
UNSCR 1205 inspections, the bombing campaign "on Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programs, on the command structures that direct and protect that capability, and on his military and security infrastructure" (Clinton) used up the penultimate military enforcement measure. President Clinton determined with ODF that "Iraq has abused its final chance".
Saddam
defeated the sanctions-based 'containment' by 2000-2001 with "concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (Iraq Survey Group): "From 1999 until he was deposed in April 2003, Saddam’s conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs steadily grew in scale, variety, and efficiency ... Prohibited goods and weapons were being shipped into Iraq with virtually no problem" (ISG).
President Bush entered Office with one last enforcement measure remaining, the
credible threat of regime change, to compel Iraq's compliance with the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441). With the heightened assessment of Saddam's terrorist threat after the 9/11 attacks, Bush activated the last enforcement measure in 2002-2003 to enforce Saddam's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) with the Gulf War ceasefire terms.
In March 2003, with Iraq already in categorical breach of the Gulf War ceasefire, Saddam chose to not comply and disarm in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" (UNSCR 1441). Instead, with the encouragement of his accomplices on the UN Security Council, Saddam chose to call the ceasefire enforcers' bluff with "about 100 unresolved disarmament issues" (
UNMOVIC) in violation of
UNSCR 687. At the decision point for OIF, the real alternative to regime change was compromising the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) and discrediting the last remaining leverage to let noncompliant and unreconstructed, ambitious and aggressive, practically uncontained and rearming, sectarian terrorist and tyrant Saddam slough off Iraq's international obligations, which was not an option permitted by the US law and policy on Iraq.
See the OIF FAQ
answer to "Did Iraq failing its compliance test justify the regime change" and the
#ultimatumoptions section of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts" for exposition about the credible threat of regime change that enforced Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441).
Latimer:
They blamed him for claiming there were Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq (an assertion also made by the Clintons, by foreign leaders with their own intelligence agencies, by foreign policy experts like Joe Biden, to the U.N. by Colin Powell, who personally examined the intelligence himself, and by almost all the punditry who would later pretend they hadn’t said that).
. . . But somehow their [State Department and National Security Council] leaders largely escaped the condemnation of their friends in the pundit class when WMD weren’t found and Iraq descended into a vicious civil war ...
I unpack Secretary Powell's 05FEB03 UNSC speech at
Regarding Secretary of State Powell's speech at the UN Security Council on February 5, 2003. The main points are validated nearly across the board.
"They blamed him for claiming there were Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq":
Clarify that Saddam's WMD was
established fact by UNSCOM in the UNSCR 687 disarmament process. Upon the established fact, Saddam was presumed armed until Iraq proved it disarmed in accordance with UNSCR 687. In Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), UNMOVIC took up from UNSCOM and
confirmed Iraq did not disarm as mandated, which by procedure established
casus belli.
"when WMD weren’t found":
Clarify that the 06MAR03 UNMOVIC
report that principally triggered OIF and the ex post Iraq Survey Group
findings are rife with UNSCR 687 WMD violations. Also clarify that ISG's non-findings are heavily qualified, often evidentiary gaps rather than evidence of absence. See the OIF FAQ
answer to "Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq" and note especially parts 5 to 7 of the answer.
"Iraq descended into a vicious civil war":
Apparently not. The vicious Saddamist insurgents and their Iran-led counterparts can be credited for creating a semblance of civil war pursuant to their insecurity-based plan. However, an actual Iraqi civil war likely would not have been deflated so expeditiously by the counterinsurgency adjustment. In fact, the success of the COIN "surge" depended on the cooperation of supposed "civil war" combatants, e.g., the
Sahwa "awakening".
Latimer:
... democracy did not take root across the Middle East as was promised ...
. . . Privately he didn’t believe the Middle East could be turned into a democracy almost overnight, as some ideologues in and out of the administration naively did.
Clarify that President Bush's
policy statements do not show an expectation, let alone a promise, that the "Middle East could be turned into a democracy almost overnight" via the Iraq intervention like the expectation for "democracy [to] take root across the Middle East" via the 2010-2011 Arab Spring.
Rather, Bush carried forward the hope from his predecessors that a democratically reformed Iraq would set a constructive example for the Middle East. Indeed, that hope was being realized before President Obama deviated course. To wit, President Obama's
remarks on the Middle East and North Africa, 19MAY11:
Indeed, one of the broader lessons to be drawn from this period is that sectarian divides need not lead to conflict. In Iraq, we see the promise of a multiethnic, multisectarian democracy. The Iraqi people have rejected the perils of political violence in favor of a democratic process, even as they’ve taken full responsibility for their own security. Of course, like all new democracies, they will face setbacks. But Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress. And as they do, we will be proud to stand with them as a steadfast partner.
At first, I guessed you mixed up the post-9/11
Freedom Agenda with the policy on Iraqi democratic reform per UNSCR 688 that President Bush
carried forward from Presidents HW Bush and Clinton. However, the Freedom Agenda was also more measured than your characterization.
Perhaps Bush officials independently speculated that "the Middle East could be turned into a democracy almost overnight". But that expectation wasn't an element of President Bush's actual policy on Iraq.
Latimer:
And that’s what most every obituary or essay on Rumsfeld you will read in the wake of his death will get wrong. They’ll tell you the story of the ferocious, take-no-prisoners Washington operator whose headstrong tactics got us into an unwinnable war.
Correct the false premise that the Iraq intervention was an "unwinnable war". Demonstrate that OIF was succeeding while it lasted. Focus on the consequences of President Obama's pivotal decision to end the OIF peace operations prematurely.
When Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush left office, respectively, the contest for Iraq was winnable. The major combat operations that deposed the ceasefire-breaching Saddam regime were successful. Then the peace operations that began under Secretary Rumsfeld, adapted to the competition, and evolved to the counterinsurgency "surge" were succeeding until President Obama's course deviation.
The only way to make the Iraq intervention seem "unwinnable" was for the American president to contravene seven decades of hard-earned wisdom and normal practice by the American leader of the free world, two decades of US law and policy on Iraq, and the US-Iraq
Strategic Framework Agreement by prematurely ending the vital OIF peace operations and leaving nascent post-Saddam Iraq to the avid competition. Unfortunately, President Obama chose to do just that with
An irresponsible exit from Iraq.
For a model correction of the false "unwinnable war" premise, see the OIF FAQ
epilogue answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory", which features the 15DEC10 United Nations victory statement,
Security Council Takes Action to End Iraq Sanctions, Terminate Oil-For-Food Programme as Members Recognize 'Major Changes' Since 1990.
Latimer:
Contrary to the image he cultivated as a tough micromanager, he had perhaps to his peril learned from LBJ’s experience in Vietnam to trust and often defer to the generals on the ground in overseeing a war. Those generals, or many of them, told him to stay the course even when a course correction seemed obvious. I heard this myself. Rumsfeld had a habit of forming strong opinions of people. When he liked you, he let you get away with almost anything, and he liked some of the generals running the war in Iraq a lot.
Secretary Rumsfeld was not wrong to heed the generals on the ground.
The "stay the course" recommendations were consistent with the initial postwar plan and concomitant 'light footprint' approach, which were designed to prioritize the civil political aspect of nation-building. In that light, recall that Iraq met its early political benchmarks, e.g., elections and restored sovereignty, sooner than expected. In other words, Rumsfeld and his generals were succeeding according to plan.
But the enemy competes, too. The problem is our civil political-based postwar plan was effectively counteracted by the enemy's insecurity-based plan. Once it became clear that the enemy's plan was outmatching our initial postwar plan, the US adjusted the mission -- successfully -- with a security-based plan and concomitant 'heavy footprint' approach: the counterinsurgency "surge".
Secretary Rumsfeld suffered politically for the insurgency setback versus the initial postwar plan. It wasn't his fault, but such is the nature of competition.
To defend Rumsfeld, clarify that the COIN adjustment didn't start from scratch. He adjusted to the competition, too. Achievements with Rumsfeld, albeit overshadowed, laid the groundwork for the success of the COIN "surge". Emphasize that setback and adjustment are the normal path to success and the standard of preemptive perfect victory applied by Rumsfeld's detractors is abnormal. Clarify that the adaptive course from the early postwar setbacks to the COIN "surge" matched a normal competitive pattern.
In terms of assigning "share of the blame" for the early postwar setbacks, the US officials who bear the most responsibility are analysts like Richard Clarke and Dan Byman who significantly underestimated Saddam's "regional and global terrorism" (
Iraqi Perspectives Project), which included "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with al Qaeda.
The extent of Saddam's human rights violations was also underestimated. UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq Andreas Mavrommatis
found Saddam's
sectarian tyranny was "far worse" than we knew.
The Saddamist insurgents knew what we did not. Clarke and Byman's deep underestimation of Saddam's terrorism, which was converted to the insurgency with surprising rapidity and reach, and the underestimation of Saddam's corruption of Iraqi society were exploited by the enemy and undermined the initial postwar plan.
Of course, Saddam's worse-than-known terrorism and human rights violations also breached the Gulf War ceasefire in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) and added to the urgent justification for regime change.
See the
#postwar and
#postwarmil sections of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts" for exposition about the initial postwar plan, insurgency setback, and COIN adjustment.
Latimer:
... it certainly wasn’t his plan to stay there forever.
As I like to
say, building a nation to secure the peace does not happen faster [or with less trial and error] than raising a child. US forces continue to serve in Europe and Asia in the wake of World War II. Contemporary to Iraq, US forces served in Kosovo and Afghanistan before and after OIF. In other words, the OIF peace operations were cut off historically early.
For decades around the world, the military of the American leader of the free world has stayed as long as needed to secure the peace while evolving prudently with the host nation's progress. The US was following the same constructive course with Iraq until President Obama broke from that cardinal precedent with disastrous consequences.
Latimer:
They were masters at toppling the regimes in Kabul and Baghdad, which they did brilliantly and quickly, but none of them were—nor was Rumsfeld —cut out for a long drawn out occupation of a foreign land. Neither, it turns out, were the members of the State Department and National Security Council who played major roles in that occupation, or were supposed to.
The World War II leaders who laid the foundation for American leadership of the free world were "cut out for a long drawn out occupation of a foreign land". If OIF exposed that the stuff of American leadership has diminished since then, then Operation Iraqi Freedom served as an essential crucible for America to relearn the fundamentals of international leadership.
See the
#americanprimacy section of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts" where I explain that the ethical, principled, resolute, adaptive leadership that rose to the competition in Iraq constituted a critical corrective for American international leadership. However, the constructive lessons of Iraq can only be ingrained if the public understands that President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld were right on Iraq in the first place and their detractors have been wrong all along.
I hope you find the
OIF FAQ and these comments useful. Again, if you have questions about my work, please ask.
On Fri, Jul 2, 2021 at 4:43 AM Eric LC ... wrote:
Ms. Tonucci, Mr. Latimer, and the Rumsfeld Foundation:
I clarify the Iraq issue at
Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ by organizing the primary source authorities, i.e., the set of controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts that define OIF's justification, to lay a proper foundation and correct for the prevalent conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.
As such, I am writing you in reaction to the self-defeating treatment of the Iraq issue in the Rumsfeld Foundation's 30JUN21 statement,
American Statesman, 13th and 21st Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld Dies, and Mr. Latimer's 30JUN21
Politico article,
The Don Rumsfeld the Obituaries Won’t Write About.
The prevalent, yet readily correctable, misrepresentation of OIF's justification is keystone premise in the commentary castigating Secretary Rumsfeld on his passing. For example, George Packer's 30JUN21
The Atlantic article,
How Rumsfeld Deserves to Be Remembered.
Logically therefore, you need to clarify the Iraq issue at the premise level of the public discourse in order to effectively advocate for Secretary Rumsfeld's legacy. Demonstrate, as
I do, that President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld's
determination on Iraq was correct in the first place: That in fact the
actual case against Saddam is
substantiated.
Yet the Rumsfeld Foundation statement conspicuously ignores the Iraq issue and thus utterly neglects to counteract the Iraq-based degradation of Secretary Rumsfeld's legacy.
Mr. Latimer's
Politico article does worse. Where the Rumsfeld Foundation passively failed to vindicate Secretary Rumsfeld, Mr. Latimer actively abased Secretary Rumsfeld by adopting -- thereby validating -- the specious stigmatization of the Iraq intervention used to damn him.
If you're sincere about competing for Secretary Rumsfeld's legacy, then utilize the OIF FAQ's
3 methods to clarify the Iraq issue to the public.
In addition, I recommend explaining that the early post-war setback and adjustment under Secretary Rumsfeld matched a normal pattern for any competitive endeavor, let alone an epochal contest of war and peace. For reference we need look no further than the comparatively greater setbacks and adjustments featured in victories throughout our military history, including for the post-World War II American leader of the free world. See the
#postwar and
#postwarmil sections of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts".
Further, explain that the abnormal, anti-competitive, harmful deviation was the historically premature end of the vital OIF peace operations under President Obama. See the sources and commentary at
An irresponsible exit from Iraq.
Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ should provide the basic corrective content necessary to reconstruct the Iraq-based narrative defining Secretary Rumsfeld's legacy. I may follow up this e-mail with a detailed criticism of Mr. Latimer's treatment of the Iraq issue. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
P.S. Make sure to read the OIF FAQ
epilogue answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory".
Related:
How Republicans should talk about the Iraq issue.
