My response to study co-author Frank Sobchak regarding his 08MAR19 Defense One article, "The US Army Is Trying to Bury the Lessons of the Iraq War", is additionally included.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Strategic Studies Institute Webmaster], [Christopher Bolan], [Steven Metz]
cc: [U.S. Army War College Public Affairs Office]
date: Jan 31, 2019, 6:28 PM
subject: To Director, Strategic Studies Institute: Critical response to The U.S. Army in the Iraq War study
Dr. Wilson, Dr. Metz, Dr. Bolan, and Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College [Press],
I use the primary source authorities — i.e., the controlling law, policy, and precedent, and determinative facts — that define the Iraq issue to clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ. With that, I am writing you in response to The U.S. Army in the Iraq War study (OIF study) published on 17JAN19 per the invitation, "Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College [Press]".
I was moved to respond in particular by this statement from "Conclusion: Lessons of the Iraq War" in Volume 2:
The Iraq War has the potential to be one of the most consequential conflicts in American history. It shattered a long-standing political tradition against preemptive wars. John Quincy Adams’s presumption that America should not go “abroad searching for monsters to destroy” was erased, at least temporarily. In the conflict’s immediate aftermath, the pendulum of American politics swung to the opposite pole with deep skepticism about foreign interventions.
That speaks to the essential purpose of my work on the Iraq issue. This excerpt is combined from the preface to the OIF FAQ's titular post and my explication of the preeminent need to set the record straight and embrace the Iraq intervention:
My take in the debate over Operation Iraqi Freedom is the mission cannot be judged properly until the misconceptions about its law and policy, fact basis are corrected. Because the Iraq intervention is epochal, the prevalent misrepresentation of the grounds for OIF, such as "invading Iraq was based on cooked up intelligence", has corrupted American politics and undermined our national interests. Competitors like Russia understand stigmatizing OIF discredits the fundamental principles of American leadership in the paradigmatic mission, which subverts the premise of American leadership of the free world. Therefore, although President Obama withdrew the US-led peace operations from Iraq in 2011, setting the record straight remains vital because judgement of OIF in the zeitgeist continues to bear underlying influence on American affairs.While I am conversant with the strategic aspect, my work on the Iraq issue focuses on clarifying the mission's law and policy, fact basis — i.e., the why of OIF — per its relevance in the political aspect. A principal reason for the "problems that stemmed from assuming the coalition’s contributing nations held a common understanding of and commitment to the strategic objective[ — t]hey did not" is that the global politics were flooded with the same zealous misinformation and mischaracterization that pervasively undermined the Iraq mission and caused the alliance-fraying "British Government and public’s deeply negative view of the Iraq War" and the "deep skepticism about foreign interventions" in American politics. Now as then, clarifying the Iraq issue at the premise level of the politics is critical to lay the foundation necessary for sufficient strategic and policy solutions to take root.
. . .
Rather than build on the hard-earned lessons of Iraq to reset the baseline for effectual American leadership of the free world, OIF stigma has driven American politics towards a weak-willed American leadership that invites the competition to exploit a gaping self-imposed strategic vulnerability.
The keystone premise needed to revitalize US-led enforcement of liberal world order is a competitive embrace of the Iraq intervention by policy makers, like US leaders built on the Korea intervention to suit America for the global contest. Repudiation of the Iraq intervention undermines effectual American leadership of the free world and devalues the essential international norms the US enforced with Iraq, which encourages and enables the advance of avid illiberal competitors.
...
But if US policy is to enforce the liberal international order, then the Iraq intervention, like the Korea intervention, sets the bar for effectual American leadership of the free world. Properly matching US strategy to US policy requires the political embrace of the Iraq intervention in order to constructively apply the essential lessons of Iraq, like US leaders applied the lessons of Korea.
To that end, basic law-and-policy errors that have impaired the public discourse have pervaded even the OIF study. Notably, it mischaracterizes the casus belli as Iraq's demonstrated WMD and criticizes OIF as a "preemptive war". In fact, the casus belli was Iraq's confirmed "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire. The Iraq intervention was primarily an international (law) compliance enforcement in the same genus as but at a higher level than the Balkans intervention, albeit remedying Iraq's standing Gulf War-established manifold threat was intrinsic in the prescriptive-cum-diagnostic Gulf War ceasefire terms that Saddam categorically breached in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) to trigger OIF.
Casus belli is a legal derivation and is identified as such with the operative set of law, policy, precedent, and facts. I guess the shortfall of primary sources cited in the OIF study from a legal perspective is to blame for the elision of the fundamental compliance enforcement context. The mischaracterization of OIF's casus belli is a foundational error by the OIF study. Fortunately, the error is readily corrected using the bedrock law, policy, precedent, and facts that define the Iraq issue.
To clarify, the US-mandated enforcement procedure for the UN-mandated "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) plainly shows the casus belli was Iraq's "material breach" of the Gulf War ceasefire in its "final opportunity to comply" with "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 1441). Unfortunately, in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply", Saddam again chose war via noncompliance with Iraq's UNSCR 660-series obligations over peace via compliance as mandated.
Contra the OIF study, neither the 75th Field Artillery Brigade's Exploitation Task Force nor the Iraq Survey Group needed to demonstrate Saddam's WMD "to verify the casus belli of the Iraq invasion". Hans Blix and UNMOVIC principally verified OIF's casus belli with the 06MAR03 confirmation of Iraq's noncompliance with the UNSCR 687 WMD mandates. Nonetheless, ISG and other ex post investigations did additionally corroborate the casus belli, e.g., "ISG judges that Iraq failed to comply with UNSCRs", while confirming that strident opponents of OIF including Security Council members France and Russia were complicit with Saddam.
The OIF study is also remiss in misrepresenting the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement. This excerpt is taken from the addenda to the #postwar section of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts" post:
My criticisms are the Army study overall is short of primary sources, Volume 1 mischaracterizes the casus belli as Iraq's demonstrated WMD stockpiles (the casus belli was Iraq's confirmed ceasefire breach), Volume 2 mischaracterizes OIF as a preemptive war (OIF was primarily a compliance enforcement), the Volume-2 executive summary wholly omits reference to the overarching conditions-based Strategic Framework Agreement, and the study report itself only briefly cites the "broader SFA" and incorrectly implies the SFA does not cover security. In fact, the SFA was the fail-safe. While the short-term 2008-2011 Status of Forces Agreement is predominantly cited, the long-term conditions-based SFA is why there was a follow-on SOFA negotiation under President Obama rather than a set-in-stone exit, why the 2011 withdrawal was "unexpected" in spite of the 2008-2011 SOFA, why Obama promised (though then reneged) a compensatory civilian presence, and why the US military subsequently effected a conspicuously simple return to Iraq.Preemptive perfection is of course welcome, but that's not typical for any kind of real competition, whereas the setbacks and adjustments described by the OIF study conform to a normal competitive pattern. History shows us that US military successes have typically followed costly adjustments to often-devastating setbacks, e.g., the battles of New York, First Manassas, Kasserine Pass, and Chosin Reservoir. Comparatively, the shortcomings and learning curve in the analogous Korea intervention were far worse and harsher, respectively, than the shortcomings and learning curve in the Iraq intervention. Unfortunately however, President Obama did not constructively follow President Bush at the dawn of the 9/11 era like President Eisenhower followed President Truman at the dawn of the Cold War era. President Obama's radical course deviation with Iraq was not normal, and I disagree with the OIF study's misrepresentation of the SFA that enables the conflation of the presidents' disparate policies.
I hope this is helpful. If you have questions about my work on the Iraq issue, please ask.
---------------
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Steven Metz]
cc: [Isaiah Wilson, III], [Christopher Bolan]
date: Feb 1, 2019, 1:14 PM
subject: Re: [Non-DoD Source] To Director, Strategic Studies Institute: Critical response to The U.S. Army in the Iraq War study
Dr. Metz,
Thank you for the response. I understand the purpose of the OIF study. Nevertheless, as the narrative structure of the OIF study itself demonstrates, the aspects are interdependent; operations serve strategy serves policy. Operations are understood in the operative context of strategy, which in turn is understood in the operative context of the controlling law, policy, and precedent.
Moreover, the disclaimer up front states, "Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not ... misrepresent official U.S. policy." Yet among its basic law-and-policy errors, the OIF study misrepresents a foundational element of the official U.S. policy on Iraq:
The focus on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the casus belli for war would require additional forces to secure Saddam Hussein’s suspected WMD sites ... (Volume 1, p. 55);
CENTCOM and CFLCC did not assign an organization to secure Iraq’s presumed WMD until 3 months before the invasion, even though the Iraqis’ alleged nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons stockpiles were the U.S. casus belli (Volume 1, p. 60);
On June 22, the ISG formally took charge of the WMD mission, and the 75th Field Artillery Brigade redeployed in frustration, bringing an unceremonious end to the unit’s abortive mission to verify the casus belli of the Iraq invasion (Volume 1, p. 139);
Even the effort to locate the Iraqi regime’s WMD, the very casus belli for the U.S.-led coalition, was treated almost as an afterthought, tasked to a U.S. Army organization that was unequipped to accomplish the mission and had to be replaced by the hastily formed, ad hoc Iraq Survey Group (Volume 1, p. 248).
CENTCOM and CFLCC did not assign an organization to secure Iraq’s presumed WMD until 3 months before the invasion, even though the Iraqis’ alleged nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons stockpiles were the U.S. casus belli (Volume 1, p. 60);
On June 22, the ISG formally took charge of the WMD mission, and the 75th Field Artillery Brigade redeployed in frustration, bringing an unceremonious end to the unit’s abortive mission to verify the casus belli of the Iraq invasion (Volume 1, p. 139);
Even the effort to locate the Iraqi regime’s WMD, the very casus belli for the U.S.-led coalition, was treated almost as an afterthought, tasked to a U.S. Army organization that was unequipped to accomplish the mission and had to be replaced by the hastily formed, ad hoc Iraq Survey Group (Volume 1, p. 248).
This excerpt is from the introduction of the OIF FAQ answer to "Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq":
[T]he prevalent myth that Operation Iraqi Freedom was based on a lie relies on a false premise that shifted the burden of proof from Iraq proving it had disarmed in compliance with the UNSC resolutions to the US proving Iraqi possession matched the pre-war intelligence estimates.The basic law-and-policy errors in the OIF study aren't a difference of opinion. They misrepresent official U.S. policy in the face of incontrovertible plain official US law, policy, and precedent.
In fact, the US as the chief enforcer of the UNSCR 660-series resolutions held no burden of proof in the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement. From the outset of the Gulf War ceasefire, Saddam as the probationary party held the entire burden to prove Iraq was compliant with the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) that was necessary to satisfy "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687). The question of "Where is Iraq's WMD?" was never for the US and UN to answer; it was always a question Saddam was required to answer according to UNSCR 687 (1991) to prove Iraq had disarmed.
Neither demonstration of Iraqi possession nor the intelligence was an element of the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, which pivoted solely on whether Iraq proved compliance with the UNSC resolutions. The law and policy of the Gulf War ceasefire plainly show its enforcement was compliance-based and "the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441). The pre-war intelligence was not the governing standard of Iraqi compliance and thus, no matter its predictive precision, did not and could not trigger OIF. By procedure, only Iraq’s noncompliance with its ceasefire obligations could trigger enforcement, and only the "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 1441) could switch off the enforcement.
Those errors have (had) political implications that redound on the OIF study's purpose. The OIF study rightfully advocates for the primary preservation and constructive application of OIF's hard-earned lessons. As do I. But as the debilitating Vietnam War stigma demonstrates, the OIF study's purpose can only be fulfilled if the political conditions are conducive. As I said, clarifying the Iraq issue at the premise level of the politics is critical to lay the foundation necessary for sufficient strategic and policy solutions to take root.
[The OIF FAQ post functions as a cheat sheet as well as a study guide by synthesizing the primary source authorities into a coherent, assimilable narrative to help readers learn the why of the Iraq intervention for themselves. I understand though that once they know what to look for, SSI-AWC scholars likely prefer diving directly into the source material.
Again, I hope this helps to set the record straight, and if you have questions about my work on the Iraq issue, please ask.]
PREFACE: Frank Sobchak is a PhD candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who co-authored “The U.S. Army in the Iraq War,” the U.S. government’s longest and most detailed study of the Iraq conflict. (source)
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Frank Sobchak]
date: Mar 19, 2019, 1:10 PM
subject: To advocate OIF's lessons, first clarify OIF's justification and exit
Colonel Sobchak,
I use the primary source authorities — i.e., the controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts — to clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ. With that, I am writing you in response to your 08MAR19 article, "The US Army Is Trying to Bury the Lessons of the Iraq War":https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/03/us-army-trying-bury-lessons-iraq-war/155403/, with recommendations.
As I expound here, I squarely agree with you on the vital importance of upholding the hard-earned lessons of the Iraq intervention, which are analogous to the essential lessons of the Korea intervention that set the baseline for American leadership in the Cold War. The primary challenge for your advocacy is political: counteract the stigmatization of Operation Iraqi Freedom and constructively reframe the Iraq issue versus competitors who use the policy-shaping OIF stigma to empower inimical agenda.
My first recommendation is to reach out to Nadim Shehadi, who was the director of The Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University until August 2018. Nadim is like-minded, but he'll need your convincing to rejoin the cause because he's discouraged.
My second recommendation is to use the OIF FAQ to clarify OIF's actual justification in the politics. The OIF FAQ is purpose-designed to lay a proper foundation with the operative law and facts. It synthesizes OIF's primary source authorities to correct the conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.
At the same time, critically highlight President Obama's radical course deviation with Iraq, and demarcate the constructive progress with counterinsurgency versus the degeneration that resulted from Obama's premature reduction, then withdrawal of OIF's peace operations. For reference, see the sources and commentary at An [i]rresponsible exit from Iraq.
It's necessary to clarify OIF's actual justification on the front end, or else the prevalent obfuscation of the Iraq issue enables the quarantine of OIF's essential lessons as aberrant fruit of an outlier, mistake, or conspiracy that's best forsworn. And, it's necessary to hold President Obama's choices to account on the back end, or else the elision of Obama's radical course deviation with Iraq enables the harm that resulted from the premature reduction, then withdrawal of OIF's peace operations to be ascribed to the failure of COIN as a disproof of concept.
On the other hand, if you do not zealously compete in the politics to lay a proper foundation and clarify the Iraq issue on either end framing the lessons of Iraq, then your advocacy will fail.
Note per above that the The U.S. Army in the Iraq War study presently undercuts your advocacy with its basic law-and-policy errors regarding President Bush and President Obama's respective decisions on Iraq.
I hope this is helpful. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
