from: [Eric LC]
to: [Melvyn Leffler]
date: Dec 6, 2025, 4:25 PM
subject: Criticism of your commentary on Iraq in "An Illuminating Hand-off" (revised)
Professor Leffler,
I clarify and relitigate the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ using the law and facts that define the Iraq issue.
I am writing to you to criticize your commentary on Operation Iraqi Freedom in "An Illuminating Hand-off" in Hand-off: The Foreign Policy George W. Bush Passed to Barack Obama.
The purpose of criticizing your commentary on Iraq is to provide the corrective content that's necessary for your preeminent ethical responsibility to clarify the Iraq issue to the public. I have previously criticized your commentary in my review of the 27MAR23 AEI panel discussion, "The Iraq War Series: Operation Iraqi Freedom", and my review of the 27MAR23 CFR panel discussion, "Lessons From History Series: The U.S. Invasion of Iraq—Twenty Years Later". I encourage you to read my previous criticism since they cover the same ground of your commentary in Hand-off and more. Given that your scholarly work on Iraq relies on material from the UK Iraq Inquiry, I recommend that you review my critical examination of the Chilcot report, Critical notes on the UK Iraq Inquiry Chilcot report, which also covers the same ground and more.
Leffler:
It [the Freedom Agenda] was not simply a rationalization for the failure to assess the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat correctly.
To clarify, the standing "Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat" was defined, presumed, and established in the baseline of the UNSCR 687 disarmament process. The operative procedure and burden to "assess the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat" was on Iraq to prove it disarmed in accordance with paragraphs 8 to 13 of UNSCR 687 and related resolutions, not on the UNSCR 678 enforcers to prove Iraq was armed matching intelligence estimates that were largely based on UNSCR 687 inspection data in the first place.
In order to resolve the standing Iraqi WMD threat, Iraq's provision of a "currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes" (UNSCR 1441) to the United Nations was required "to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations" (UNSCR 1441) per UNSCR 687. The UNSCR 687 deadline was April 18, 1991, yet through Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) in 2002-2003, Iraq did not provide the "currently accurate, full, and complete declaration" (UNSCR 1441) that was required to begin proving it disarmed Saddam's WMD program. Subsequently, the Iraq Survey Group was unable to account for Saddam's WMD program per UNSCR 687 due to the Iraqi "denial and deception operations" (Iraq Survey Group) that also sabotaged the UNSCR 687 inspections and the intelligence efforts that assisted them.
Nonetheless, while the pre-war intelligence estimates did not precisely predict the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction threat, the Iraq Survey Group confirmed Saddam's WMD threat. ISG's findings show a reconstituting WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687 with covert ready capability and ready capacity to scale up that was markedly compatible with Saddam's terrorism. And that's just a floor given the "unparalleled" (Kay) mass of WMD evidence that ISG was unable to account for, including Iraq's biological and chemical stocks, due to the Iraqi "denial and deception operations" (ISG) that violated UNSCR 707.
Based on ISG's findings, the "failure to assess the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat correctly" likely underestimated Saddam's WMD threat. Taken together, "the unparalleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program" (David Kay, 28JAN04) and the large pile of WMD evidence that the Iraq Survey Group managed to find despite Iraq's "denial and deception operations" (ISG) strongly suggest Saddam possessed a vaster WMD program than we can know.
Leffler:
Did policymakers "have to assume—with some confidence—that a catastrophic attack involving WMD was within the reach and capability of al Qaeda or associated terrorist groups"? Al Qaeda quested for such weapons, but was it within its reach? Was there reason to assume that rogue states would hand off such weapons to terrorist groups?
Based on the post-war Iraq Survey Group and Iraqi Perspectives Project investigations, the answers to Professor Leffler's questions are yes, maybe, and yes.
The confirmed reasons to "assume—with some confidence—that a catastrophic attack involving WMD was within the reach and capability of al Qaeda or associated terrorist groups" and "assume that rogue states would hand off such weapons to terrorist groups" are the Iraq Survey Group finding "clear evidence of his [Saddam's] intent to resume WMD" with "preserved capability", including "undeclared covert laboratories" and a "large covert procurement program" for "military reconstitution efforts [that] ... covered conventional arms, dual-use goods acquisition, and some WMD-related programs" (ISG), coupled with the Iraqi Perspectives Project finding "the Saddam regime regarded inspiring, sponsoring, directing, and executing acts of terrorism as an element of state power", "the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda", and "Saddam’s use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime" (IPP).
In other words, the ISG confirmation of Saddam's WMD program meant that "WMD was within the reach and capability of al Qaeda or associated terrorist groups" and "rogue states would hand off such weapons to terrorist groups" were ipso facto because the Saddam regime was a world-leading terrorist organization in its own right.
In terms of "al Qaeda or associated terrorist groups", IPP found "considerable operational overlap" between the Saddam and bin Laden terrorist "cartels" (IPP). The Saddam and bin Laden terrorist "cartels" "increased the aggregate terror threat" by "seeking and developing supporters from the same demographic pool" (IPP), which meant, in effect, bin Laden's terrorists were simultaneously Saddam's terrorists. We know now that the dramatic growth of bin Laden's terrorist threat largely owed to its "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with Saddam's state-level development of the "same demographic pool" (IPP) that supplied al Qaeda.
Not surprisingly, when IPP co-author James Lacey weighed ISG's WMD findings with his IPP terrorism findings, he concluded, "Given the evidence, it appears that we removed Saddam’s regime not a moment too soon."
Leffler:
In the Transition Memorandum and postscript on the Freedom Agenda and the one in Iraq, Hadley and his colleagues outlined the evolution of the president's thinking. He did not begin with a freedom agenda.
... After the invasion, when "security virtually collapsed," the president and his advisers could have chosen "a Western-friendly autocrat" to carry out the policies desired by the United States. But Bush, emphasizes O'Sullivan, chose not to follow this route. He made a choice to nurture the development of democratic institutions and to encourage Iraqis "to build a democratic political system as the only way a traumatized nation could peacefully manage the competition for power and resources among Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurds, and the many other groups within Iraq."
... After the invasion, when "security virtually collapsed," the president and his advisers could have chosen "a Western-friendly autocrat" to carry out the policies desired by the United States. But Bush, emphasizes O'Sullivan, chose not to follow this route. He made a choice to nurture the development of democratic institutions and to encourage Iraqis "to build a democratic political system as the only way a traumatized nation could peacefully manage the competition for power and resources among Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurds, and the many other groups within Iraq."
The repeated assertion in Hand-off that "the president and his advisers could have chosen "a Western-friendly autocrat"" but impromptu "made a choice to nurture the development of democratic institutions and to encourage Iraqis "to build a democratic political system["] ... After the invasion" plainly contradicts the law and policy that define the Iraq issue.
To clarify, see the OIF FAQ answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom about WMD or democracy", the OIF FAQ answer to "Was the invasion of Iraq perceived to be a nation-building effort", and the OIF FAQ retrospective #unscr688 section.
Professor Leffler is correct that "He [President Bush] did not begin with a freedom agenda" for Iraq in terms of the specific policy named Freedom Agenda. However, Professor Leffler and Hand-off's authors are incorrect that "He did not begin with a freedom agenda" insofar 'freedom agenda' is a fair description of the standing law and policy on Iraqi democratic reform that President Bush carried forward from Presidents HW Bush and Clinton, which enforced the Gulf War ceasefire human rights mandates of UNSCR 688 (1991) per Public Law 102-190 (1991) long before the specific policy named Freedom Agenda was born following 9/11.
Preceding OIF, Congress reiterated the standing law on Iraqi democratic reform in Public Law 107-243, which "expected...those actions described in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–338)", i.e., "once the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power in Iraq, the United States should support Iraq’s transition to democracy by providing immediate and substantial humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, by providing democracy transition assistance to Iraqi parties and movements with democratic goals" (Public Law 105-338). President Bush concurrently reiterated the standing policy on Iraqi democratic reform, e.g., "If military action is necessary, the United States and our allies will help the Iraqi people...create the institutions of liberty" (Bush, 07OCT02) and "United States objectives also support a transition to democracy in Iraq, as contemplated by the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–338)" (Bush, 21MAR03).
Hand-off's authors misconceive the Iraq issue by bifurcating the Iraqi national security threat and Iraqi democratic reform. In fact, UNSCR 688 and Public Law 102-190 defined Iraqi UNSCR 688 human rights violation as a threat, and Iraqi democratic reform was the standing solution for the UNSCR 688 aspect of the Iraqi national security threat.
Leffler:
Most of all, the global War on Terror encouraged the administration to adopt practices that blatantly transgressed the Freedom Agenda. ... In the Iraq memorandum, there is no mention of Abu Ghraib and the torturous practices that went on there.
To fill the hole in the Iraq memorandum, see the OIF FAQ retrospective #abughraib section.
The Freedom Agenda postscript provides important context for the Abu Ghraib scandal with the lesson learned, "Providing security is the precondition for allowing democracy to take root and thrive. This necessary precondition is something the Bush administration struggled to establish in Iraq and Afghanistan" (Gerson, Wehner).
While keeping in mind the Freedom Agenda lesson, "Providing security is the precondition", understand that the guilty Abu Ghraib personnel were not abusive for the sake of committing abuse. While wrong in practice, they were not wrong in intent: They were trying to help stop aggressive mass murderers who were zealously committing daily atrocities on the Iraqi people.
The fundamental problem of Abu Ghraib is that early in the contest for post-Saddam Iraq, the Saddamist insurgents' zeal and world-leading expertise at wrecking Iraq and terrorizing and killing Iraqis on a genocidal scale, which were carried over from their governance of Iraq, substantially outclassed the Coalition's ability to protect the Iraqi people from Saddamists. The contemporary peace operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan could not prepare coalition forces to deal with Saddamists. The Abu Ghraib scandal came as a result of our peace operators on the ground, outclassed by the Saddamists, desperately trying to close the gap in order to protect the Iraqi people.
The Bush administration did not "adopt [the] practices" of the Abu Ghraib scandal as the governing standard for the OIF peace operations. Rather, they worked on the fundamental problem of Abu Ghraib by developing ethical and effective ways for our peace operators to compete against the Saddamist insurgents in order to protect the Iraqi people. In relatively short order the competitive adjustment bore fruit with the counterinsurgency "surge" and Sahwa "awakening", which blatantly progressed the Freedom Agenda.
Leffler:
Policymakers assumed they had more power than they actually possessed.
Limiting policy to the "power...actually possessed" at the start of a major international competition is abnormal in US history. Constructing the "power" that policymakers need to win the contest through the learning curve of competition is normal. When President Kennedy ordered America to go to the moon in 1961, policymakers did not actually possess the "power" to make that journey. The US forces that President Truman ordered into Korea in 1950 did not actually possess the "power" to push back the north Korean invasion. Whether it's the space program or the Cold War, the United States has not usually entered a major international competition with everything for the whole contest perfectly planned and prepared beforehand. Rather, starting from a basic footing, America has constructed the "power" over time as policymakers learned to win from the competition itself.
The learning curve in OIF that developed the "power" that the United States needed to win in Iraq is not unusual and should set the standard of in-competition innovation for policymakers moving forward. But the constructive lessons of Iraq can fulfill their vital role as a hard-earned corrective baseline for American leadership of the free world for the 9/11 era—analogous to the much harsher lessons of Korea for the Cold War era—only if Operation Iraqi Freedom is upheld and embraced by policymakers.
Leffler:
Meghan O'Sullivan acknowledges that the administration did not allocate the funds or prepare the personnel to meet the challenges it encountered in Iraq.
To clarify, "the administration did not allocate the funds or prepare the personnel to meet the challenges it encountered in Iraq" because the "challenges it encountered in Iraq" were surprises that compelled substantial adjustments to the initial post-war plan and concomitant adjustments to personnel, funding, and preparation in order to continue pursuing the US, Coalition, and UN nation-building mandates for Iraq.
The initial post-war plan, funding, and preparation were reasonably calibrated to the prevalent conception of Iraq. The problem is the prevalent conception of Iraq was obsolete because the growth of Saddam's terrorism and human rights abuses since 1991 had been severely underestimated outside of Iraq. The severe underestimation of Saddam's terrorism enabled the pre-assembled Saddamist insurgency to catch the Coalition by surprise, and it caused the Coalition to misdiagnose the insurgency early on. Saddam's human rights abuses, also highly underestimated, created the very corrupted and corroded condition of Iraqi society that also surprised the Coalition.
The actual condition of Saddam's Iraq was "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, 18MAR04) than the international community realized. The Iraqi regime change was necessary to learn the actual condition of Iraq so that the occupation and peace operations could adjust accordingly with the funds and preparation that OIF personnel needed "to meet the challenges it encountered in Iraq".
Leffler:
In both these countries—Iraq and Afghanistan—writes Richard Hooker in the postscript to the memorandum on stabilization and reconstruction, the administration's ambitious goals were not realized because of inadequate funding, bureaucratic conflicts, mistaken priorities, partisan divisions, and the intractable indigenous difficulties.
I'm curious, how do the "administration's ambitious goals" and the challenging factors of "inadequate funding, bureaucratic conflicts, mistaken priorities, partisan divisions, and the intractable indigenous difficulties" of the Iraq intervention compare to the Korea intervention or even the Germany and Japan interventions at the same points on their respective timelines?
Having served as an American soldier in Korea (decades after World War Two and the Korean War of course), I appreciate that the challenging factors that the United States struggled with and overcame in Korea were far greater than the challenging factors we were overcoming in Iraq at the analogous point that President Obama took away the necessary peace operations.
As we learned in the 20th century, building a nation to secure the peace does not take less time, or less trial and error, than raising a child. The key difference between the Iraq and Korea interventions is that America stayed in Korea long enough to work through the challenges while developing the building blocks and capabilities to achieve the "administration's ambitious goals". We simply did not stay nearly long enough in Iraq. New York senator Daniel Moynihan famously counseled, "If you don't have 30 years to devote to social policy, don't get involved," which was about local reforms within the United States, let alone the time needed to rehabilitate Saddam-wrecked Iraq. President Obama's choice to take away the necessary peace operations from Iraq at the extremely premature eight-year mark (while degrading the mission before that) was grossly inhumane and irresponsible.
The "indigenous difficulties" we encountered in Iraq stemmed from the Saddam regime's "systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror" (UNCHR, 19APR02). The COIN "surge" and Sahwa "awakening" show the "indigenous difficulties" were not "intractable" once the Saddamist insurgency was properly diagnosed and adjustments to the peace operations caught up to the Saddamist terrorists' beginning competitive advantage. It was the Obama administration's radical deviation with Iraq that proved to be "intractable" rather than Iraqi "indigenous difficulties".
Knowing what we know now about Saddam's UNSCR 687 terrorism and UNSCR 688 human rights violations does not argue against the Iraqi regime change. What we learned about Saddam's Iraq argues that the Iraqi regime change should have happened years earlier, with Operation Desert Fox in 1998 at the latest, to stop the Saddam problem from festering to the extreme condition that we found in Iraq when we finally acted to solve it.
Leffler:
Far from disdaining NATO, they labored to heal the wounds caused by the invasion of Iraq ...
In order to "heal the wounds caused by the invasion of Iraq", Saddam's accomplices on the United Nations Security Council in France, Russia, and China, plus Germany, should have been censured for "The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council" (ISG). Instead, they were celebrated and enabled by their corruption of the Security Council.
President Bush and Prime Minister Blair's diplomatic decision to not hold Saddam's accomplices to account for their culpability in Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441)—casus belli—was an error that has allowed the degenerative Iraq Syndrome to metastasize in our politics and policy.
Professor Leffler, again, the purpose of my criticism of your commentary on Iraq is to provide the corrective content that's necessary for your preeminent ethical responsibility to clarify the Iraq issue to the public. I invite your critical feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
Related: Criticism of Hal Brands's commentary on Iraq in Hand-Off: "Reassessing Bush's Legacy: What the Transition Memoranda Do (and Don't) Reveal".
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