Ms. Setrakian, Professor Anderson, Professor Zelikow, and Professor Leffler didn't respond to my e-mail, so I don't know whether they've read it.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Lara Setrakian], [Philip Zelikow], [Lisa Anderson], [Melvyn Leffler]
cc: communications@cfr.org
date: Mar 21, 2025, 8:21 AM
subject: Review of Council on Foreign Relations panel "Lessons From History Series: The U.S. Invasion of Iraq—Twenty Years Later"
Ms. Setrakian, Professor Anderson, Professor Zelikow, and Professor Leffler,
I clarify and relitigate the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ using the law and facts that define the Iraq issue: methodology.
I critically reviewed your 27MAR23 Council on Foreign Relations panel discussion, Lessons From History Series: The U.S. Invasion of Iraq—Twenty Years Later, for the 22nd anniversary of Operation Iraqi Freedom. I hope my comments help you understand OIF's justification and in turn help you clarify the Iraq issue to the public.
In the panel discussion's endnote, Professor Leffler said, "they were unwilling to reexamine fundamental assumptions and axioms ... one of the lessons is to reassess fundamental axioms". I present this review with the expectation that you practice what you preach and the hope that you will use my criticism to reexamine your fundamental assumptions and axioms. It matters because it is essential that you and your affiliates repair the compounding harm and misguidance of the Iraq Syndrome at the premise level of our politics and policy. The way to cure the Iraq Syndrome is to correct the false narrative it's based on.
(Note: You can go directly to the comments that respond to your remarks by searching for your last name colon, e.g., 'Anderson:'. Of course, I encourage you to read the whole review.)
Setrakian:
I will be presiding over today’s discussion. ... We’re here to discuss what we’ve learned from history ... Our well-esteemed and well-informed speakers today will help us draw wisdom from the facts and find our way forward. There are also extraordinary resources available on CFR.org, including a comprehensive article on lessons learned by CFR Fellow Linda Robinson.
The substantive role of experts is subordinate to the primary sources. As presider, Ms. Setrakian should have laid a proper foundation with the law and facts that define the Iraq issue in order for the panel's "well-esteemed and well-informed speakers" to constructively "discuss what we've learned from history". She did not do that. Whether the speakers can "help us draw wisdom from the facts and find our way forward" depends on whether they credibly accord with the operative law and facts. If they contradict the operative law and facts, that means their "fundamental assumptions and axioms" (Leffler) are fundamentally flawed, which means they cannot "help us draw wisdom from the facts and find our way forward"; they can only obfuscate the Iraq issue and misguide the public.
Case in point: CFR senior fellow Linda Robinson's "comprehensive article on lessons learned" is discredited by its law and fact errors and fundamental misconception of OIF's justification. See my Review of Linda Robinson's "The Long Shadow of the Iraq War: Lessons and Legacies Twenty Years Later".
Setrakian:
Mel, should there be accountability for poor decision making over the course of the Iraq War? And what would that look like?
Leffler:
I definitely think there should be accountability. It would be nice to think that we might have a sort of 9/11 Commission Report. Philip, do you want to sort of go to work again on another report, looking into the causes of American intervention in Iraq and the reasons for the tragedy that ensued? Interestingly, of course, as you’ve just alluded, the British carried out an incredibly comprehensive assessment of why Tony Blair went to war on the side of George W. Bush. The interviews and the documents released from that investigation are extraordinarily illuminating and helped me tremendously in writing my own book.
For any American counterpart to the UK Iraq Inquiry "looking into the causes of American intervention in Iraq and the reasons for the tragedy that ensued", the UK Iraq Inquiry is a cautionary tale because the Chilcot report is a fraud. See my Critical notes on the UK Iraq Inquiry Chilcot report where I examine how the Chilcot report distorts the Iraq issue.
I hope Professor Leffler took care to law-and-fact check the "extraordinarily illuminating ... interviews and the documents released from that investigation" before he included any of the Chilcot material in his book because the UK Iraq Inquiry did not credibly vet the material in the Chilcot report.
For example, Hans Blix's testimony to the UK Iraq Inquiry is a keystone premise of the Chilcot report. Yet Dr. Blix's ex post facto assertions plainly contradict UNSCR 1441 and the UNMOVIC reports that established casus belli. In effect, Blix gave the UK Iraq Inquiry a fake Iraq WMD issue which the UK Iraq Inquiry substituted for the operative Iraq WMD issue in OIF's justification. The Chilcot report misrepresents the Iraq Survey Group findings on Saddam's WMD and omits the Iraqi Perspectives Project findings on Saddam's terrorism. The list goes on. When its legal and factual misconceptions are corrected, the Chilcot report falls apart.
If Professor Leffler did not law-and-fact check the Chilcot material in his book, then he should vet all of it now and revise his book accordingly after expunging the discredited material. Better yet, he should purge the discredited Chilcot material from his analysis but keep the specious material in his book and hold the UK Iraq Inquiry and the sources to account. My Chilcot criticism is purposed to help Professor Leffler make his Chilcot criticism.
Publicly criticizing the Chilcot report is a good place to start curing the Iraq Syndrome as it's a primary embodiment of the Iraq Syndrome.
Setrakian:
When you try to tally the cost of the Iraq War, any dollar value comes up cheap. There’s a solemn moral reckoning that is due. At the outset today, we should note with great respect and dignity the more than nine thousand U.S. soldiers and civilian contractors who lost their lives, the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis directly killed in the fighting or by its consequences, and the 282 journalists who died in the course of the war, all of them individuals who could have otherwise been seated around this virtual table today. And while Iraq no longer lives with the heinous regime of Saddam Hussein, we must recognize what came with the breakdown in general security over the past twenty years: the sectarian civil war and growing influence of Iran, the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the genocide of Yazidis in Sinjar province, a generation of Iraqis growing up in a highly corrupt and deadly violent country—roughly half of Iraq’s population today has grown up in this war; it has been twenty years of generational loss.
The "cost of the Iraq War", of dollar and the "more than nine thousand U.S. soldiers and civilian contractors who lost their lives, the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis directly killed in the fighting or by its consequences, and the 282 journalists who died in the course of the war", is the accreted cost of allowing Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) to grow immeasurably over twelve years contra UNSCR 678. Add the still-growing cost of President Obama's choice to prematurely end OIF.
Among the international community, the "solemn moral reckoning that is due" is for the nations led by France and Russia that were complicit in the Saddam regime's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441). As Charles Duelfer has often reminded us, Saddam's accomplices on the UN Security Council were instrumental in his choice to breach the Gulf War ceasefire for casus belli.
Among American leadership, the "solemn moral reckoning that is due" is for HW Bush and Clinton officials who allowed the problem to fester despite recognizing from the start that Saddam's intransigence necessitated Iraqi regime change and for everyone who advocated leaving Iraq.
The "solemn moral reckoning that is due" is for Obama officials most of all who radically deviated with Iraq. When President Obama came into office, the annealed OIF peace operations were on track helping Iraq to heal from the generational trauma of the Saddam regime and Saddamist insurgency in accordance with the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement. Iraq's rehabilitation depended on long-term American presence analogous to the post-World War Two American missions in Germany, Japan, and Korea. President Obama merely had to stay the course from President Bush like President Eisenhower stayed the course from President Truman in far less conducive conditions than Obama inherited with Iraq. But instead of securing the next status of forces agreement per section III and section X of the SFA, as had been expected, President Obama chose to contravene the SFA and end the peace operations that were vital to protect and heal Iraq. Obama's 'lead from behind' approach to the Arab Spring and removal of the necessary American protection enabled Saddamists to reform in the degenerating Arab Spring and ravage Iraq again, including the characteristically Saddamist "genocide of Yazidis in Sinjar province". President Obama's radical deviation with Iraq further enabled the "growing influence of Iran" that has exploited the vital gap that Obama left behind.
Ms. Setrakian is incorrect that there was a "breakdown in general security" insofar she equates "general security" with the radical sectarian, terrorist, genocidal Saddam regime. The "general security" of the Saddam regime's "systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror" (UN Commission on Human Rights, 19APR02) didn't break down: it was converted to the Saddamist insurgency. Other than the "growing influence of Iran" whose fault belongs primarily to President Obama, "the more than nine thousand U.S. soldiers and civilian contractors who lost their lives, the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis directly killed in the fighting or by its consequences, and the 282 journalists who died in the course of the war ... the sectarian civil war ... the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the genocide of Yazidis in Sinjar province, a generation of Iraqis growing up in a highly corrupt and deadly violent country" are Saddam's inheritance.
Ms. Setrakian's "twenty years of generational loss" frame is too limited to understand OIF's justification. The 20th anniversary of OIF marked thirty-two and a half years of "generational loss" from Saddam's choice to not comply with the UNSCR 660 series, in particular the Gulf War ceasefire mandates purpose-designed for "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687). A 'thirty-two and a half years' frame is also too limited since the "generational loss" from Saddam's noncompliance with the UNSCR 660 series followed the ten years of "generational loss" from the Iran-Iraq War. The United States tried to help Iraq recover from the Iran-Iraq War in an orderly way, but Saddam took America's care as an opening to brutally annex Kuwait. Saddam's distinctive aggression and lack of restraint in 1990-1991 on top of the Iran-Iraq War were a watershed that redefined Iraq's international status and threat status, which could only be renormalized by Iraq's compliance with the reconstructive Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) with or without the Saddam regime.
Setrakian:
Do you believe this war was inevitable, or does this go down in history as a war of choice?
That "this war was inevitable" is confirmed by the Iraq Survey Group finding that "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" (ISG). The matching Clinton administration policy was "a change of regime in Baghdad is inevitable" (Clinton, 02AUG99), which of course the Bush administration inherited. Saddam's choice to overcome every non-military and lesser military enforcement measure and breach the Gulf War ceasefire made resumption of the Gulf War inevitable, unless the UNSCR 678 enforcers chose to surrender. That choice was not permitted to the President by the controlling law and policy on Iraq.
Zelikow:
I don’t think the war was inevitable, but I think the “war of choice” phrase is very misleading even though it was coined by the president of the Council under whose auspices we meet today. The war of necessity/war of choice binary is not helpful.
... Then, on the issue of whether, then, the war was inevitable and we—since we agree that it was a product of choice, it is really important to focus on what the key choices were and what was distinct about the Bush administration.
Leffler:
... Then, on the issue of whether, then, the war was inevitable and we—since we agree that it was a product of choice, it is really important to focus on what the key choices were and what was distinct about the Bush administration.
The policymakers in the Bush administration nowadays, like Steve Hadley, also object to the binary war of choice/war of necessity, and Steve Hadley and others like to call it now a “war of last resort,” quote/end quote.
I disagree with Professor Zelikow that Richard Haass's "war of necessity/war of choice binary is not helpful". And, Professor Zelikow is incorrect "that it [OIF] was a product of choice" in terms of Dr. Haass's taxonomy. Analysis of the operative law and facts according to Dr. Haass's taxonomy is helpful in showing that Operation Iraqi Freedom was a war of necessity. Excerpt from my Correction of Richard Haass's "Revisiting America’s War of Choice in Iraq":
Regarding Dr. Haass's first element, "when vital interests are at stake", the reason that "some contend that vital interests were indeed at stake" is that the vital national security interests with Iraq were mandated by the controlling law and policy on Iraq since 1990-1991.
...
"Iraq's noncompliance with [the Gulf War ceasefire terms] constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region" (P.L. 102-190) meant the threat of Iraq's noncompliance was by definition a vital national security interest per the Reagan corollary to the Carter doctrine that impelled President HW Bush to remedy the Saddam problem in the first place.
On the law and policy, Congress and Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush reiterated that the mandate to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L.105-235) was a vital national security interest — "We are convinced that as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, he will continue to threaten the well-being of his people, the peace of the region, and vital U.S. interests...Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security. I remain determined to see Iraq fully comply with all of its obligations under Security Council resolutions" (Clinton, 02AUG99), "it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced" (P.L. 107-243).
...
Regarding Dr. Haass's second element, "there are no other viable options available to defend them", that was the situation of the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement by 1998, let alone 2002-2003. Saddam exhausted the diplomatic non-military and lesser military enforcement measures over a decade-plus of intransigent noncompliance with the UNSCR 660 series. President Clinton and Congress assessed by 1998 that regime change was the only realistic way to bring Iraq into its mandated compliance. ...
...
UNMOVIC found in real-time and the Iraq Survey Group subsequently confirmed that credible threat of regime change was necessary to capacitate Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). UNMOVIC also found and ISG confirmed that even the credible threat of regime change, while necessary, was insufficient to convince Saddam to comply as mandated. ISG found that "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions", which confirmed President Clinton and Congress's assessment that regime change was necessary to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L.105-235).
...
"Iraq's noncompliance with [the Gulf War ceasefire terms] constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region" (P.L. 102-190) meant the threat of Iraq's noncompliance was by definition a vital national security interest per the Reagan corollary to the Carter doctrine that impelled President HW Bush to remedy the Saddam problem in the first place.
On the law and policy, Congress and Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush reiterated that the mandate to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L.105-235) was a vital national security interest — "We are convinced that as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, he will continue to threaten the well-being of his people, the peace of the region, and vital U.S. interests...Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security. I remain determined to see Iraq fully comply with all of its obligations under Security Council resolutions" (Clinton, 02AUG99), "it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced" (P.L. 107-243).
...
Regarding Dr. Haass's second element, "there are no other viable options available to defend them", that was the situation of the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement by 1998, let alone 2002-2003. Saddam exhausted the diplomatic non-military and lesser military enforcement measures over a decade-plus of intransigent noncompliance with the UNSCR 660 series. President Clinton and Congress assessed by 1998 that regime change was the only realistic way to bring Iraq into its mandated compliance. ...
...
UNMOVIC found in real-time and the Iraq Survey Group subsequently confirmed that credible threat of regime change was necessary to capacitate Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). UNMOVIC also found and ISG confirmed that even the credible threat of regime change, while necessary, was insufficient to convince Saddam to comply as mandated. ISG found that "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions", which confirmed President Clinton and Congress's assessment that regime change was necessary to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L.105-235).
I recommend reading the full analysis in my Haass criticism since the excerpt leaves out most of the substantive details.
As Professor Leffler observes, "policymakers in the Bush administration nowadays, like Steve Hadley, also object to the binary war of choice/war of necessity, and Steve Hadley and others like to call it now a “war of last resort”". Which is curious given that Stephen Hadley's explanation that OIF is a "war of last resort" is consistent with my analysis that OIF is a Haassian war of necessity. Indeed, "last resort" is more or less Dr. Haass's second element of a war of necessity. Mr. Hadley may have a general disagreement with the taxonomy itself, regardless that in the specific case, Operation Iraqi Freedom qualifies as a war of necessity.
Zelikow:
Second, after securing actually a(n) unanimously approved UN resolution to reinstate inspectors, the Bush administration made decisions in the end of 2002 and early ’03 to cut short the inspections process and proceed towards war.
Professor Zelikow is incorrect that "the Bush administration made decisions in the end of 2002 and early ’03 to cut short the inspections process". To clarify, see the OIF FAQ answer to "Did Bush allow enough time for the inspections".
The "decisions" that "the Bush administration made ... in the end of 2002 and early ’03" clearly did not "cut short the inspections process" given that the UNSCR 1441 inspections stretched past the due dates in the "unanimously approved UN resolution to reinstate inspectors".
UNSCR 1441's first due date was December 8, 2002 when "in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations ... the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council ... a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems ..., including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, subcomponents, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material" (UNSCR 1441).
UNSCR 1441's second due date was January 26, 2003 for "UNMOVIC and ... IAEA ... to update the Council" (UNSCR 1441). The reporting date was effectively the deadline for Saddam's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) since the UNSCR 678 determination for the "serious consequences as a result of its [Iraq's] continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) was based on UNMOVIC and IAEA's update on whether Iraq provided "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 1441).
UNMOVIC director Hans Blix updated the UN Security Council on January 27th and weeks past the reporting date on February 14th and March 7th reiterating that Iraq failed the UNSCR 687 compliance test. UNMOVIC left no doubt that Iraq did not even "begin to comply with its disarmament obligations" (UNSCR 1441) as Iraq never provided the "currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems" (UNSCR 1441) that was due on December 8, 2002 per UNSCR 1441 and originally due on April 18, 1991 per UNSCR 687.
Nevertheless, the US and UK tried to stretch the UNSCR 1441 inspections one more time. However, Saddam's accomplices on the UN Security Council "cut short the inspections process" in two ways. First, they blocked the UK's proposed "second resolution" that upheld the integrity of the UNSCR 1441 "enhanced inspection regime" for UNSCR 687. Second, they pushed a nebulous ad hoc 1441-replacement that would have "cut short the inspections process" mandated by UNSCR 1441 and started over with a fundamentally altered standard and procedure. The UNSCR 678 enforcers could not agree to the ad hoc 1441-replacement as it compromised the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441).
The US and UK decision to "proceed towards war" pursuant to UNSCR 678 responded to the 06MAR03 UNMOVIC Clusters document in accordance with UNSCR 1441's test standard: For Iraq's "final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" (UNSCR 1441), Iraq was obligated to provide "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 1441) or else "it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441).
Zelikow:
And third, the Bush administration devised a plan for the war that was singularly ill judged, as Professor Leffler points out, and actually because it was so obviously ill judged if one looked at it properly that itself might in turn have caused an American government under another administration to hesitate, stay with inspections longer perhaps. And of course, had they done that more and more doubts would have grown about whether the war was necessary at all. So I do think that there are some really distinct moments having to do with the Bush administration and its choices, making choices that not any administration would have made.
Professor Zelikow's "third" point doesn't make sense. The "plan for the war" clearly was not "ill judged if one looked at it properly" given the remarkable speed and relatively low coalition and collateral casualties with which the OIF invasion deposed the Saddam regime. Perhaps Professor Zelikow subscribes to the Charles Dunlap theory that by successfully minimizing the trauma to the Iraqi populace, the OIF invasion's humanitarian design counterintuitively encouraged and enabled the insurgency. (I disagree with Major General Dunlap's theory.)
Professor Zelikow's suggestion that "had they done that more [stay with inspections longer] and more doubts would have grown about whether the war was necessary at all" doesn't make sense. The UNMOVIC Clusters document is packed with UNSCR 687 violations. The UNMOVIC findings that triggered Operation Iraqi Freedom are virtually the same as the UNSCOM findings that triggered Operation Desert Fox. The Iraq Survey Group corroborated UNMOVIC and found many UNSCR 687 violations. ISG confirmed Iraq used "denial and deception operations" (ISG) against UNMOVIC just as it had against UNSCOM. Since casus belli was Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire, the only way that "doubts would have grown about whether the war was necessary at all" due to "stay[ing] with inspections longer" is if the UN inspectors somehow erased the UNMOVIC findings on record and lied that Iraq was compliant with UNSCR 687 when in fact the Saddam regime, as UNMOVIC reported, never began to comply with UNSCR 687 and, as ISG confirmed, never intended to comply with UNSCR 687.
Professor Zelikow's hypothetical in which an "ill judged" war plan "might in turn have caused an American government under another administration to hesitate, stay with inspections longer perhaps" is a scenario of an American president deliberately begetting the failure of the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement. After 1998, with the coercive leverage of UN sanctions neutralized and Saddam interpreting the ODF bombing campaign as proof that the US was a paper tiger, the credible threat of regime change was the only coercive leverage left to compel Saddam. President Clinton's experience with UNSCOM taught that a credible and sufficient threat and a strictly enforced time limit were necessary to counteract Iraq's "tactics of delay and deception" (Clinton, 17FEB98). But a military deployment that was sufficient to present Saddam a credible threat of regime change had a finite practical window before it disintegrated. To "stay with inspections longer perhaps" in accordance with the indefinite timeframe of the nebulous ad hoc 1441-replacement would have enabled Iraq's "tactics of delay and deception" (Clinton) and neutralized the coercive leverage needed to compel Saddam. For context, President Clinton ordered Operation Desert Fox based on a three-week UNSCR 687-compliance test per UNSCR 1205. As it happened, President Bush did "hesitate" and came perilously close to straying from President Clinton's UNSCOM lesson by permitting the UNSCR 1441 UNSCR 687-compliance test to stretch nearly two months beyond UNSCR 1441's reporting date while Saddam recycled his "tactics of delay and deception" (Clinton) from the UNSCOM inspections.
Zelikow:
I had written a passage having to do with using preemption against terrorist groups. In June [2002], right in the middle of this period, Condi Rice basically says, how about moving that passage on preemption against al-Qaeda into the section on weapons of mass destruction? I complained: Well, wait. That would—that’s a whole concept of preventive war. I objected to it. Objection overruled, draft was taken away from me, pulled into the NSC.
Professor Zelikow's account of a June 2002 encounter with then-National Security Advisor Rice is odd given that "The United States shall give the highest priority to developing effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons use by terrorists. ... There is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of this [WMD] capability or removing this capability from terrorist groups potentially opposed to the U.S." (Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39, 21JUN95) had been policy for seven years by then. Granted, it was Clinton policy that President Bush could keep or drop, but according to Professor Zelikow's 9-11 Commission, the Clinton and Bush administrations had "significant continuity in counterterrorism policy" (9-11 Commission), or in this case, significant continuity in counterterrorism and WMD policy. NSA Rice wasn't introducing a novel "whole concept of preventive war", and it didn't need to be taken from Professor Zelikow and "pulled into the NSC". At most, Rice was recycling or updating NSC-39, which was already in the NSC.
Zelikow:
I think that intelligence had a singular role. ... At no time in American history, though, has there been another war more prompted by the quality of intelligence estimates than this war.
Professor Zelikow is correct that "intelligence [has] had a singular role" in the false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome. However, Professor Zelikow is incorrect that "At no time in American history, though, has there been another war more prompted by the quality of intelligence estimates than this war."
According to the controlling law and policy, the "quality of intelligence estimates" could not have "prompted" OIF since the intelligence estimates were not an element of casus belli. The WMD element of casus belli was Iraq's violation of UNSCR 687, which was incontrovertible, established by UNSCOM, decided by the UN Security Council, confirmed by UNMOVIC for casus belli, and for good measure, corroborated by the Iraq Survey Group.
Iraq Survey Group director David Kay at the Senate Armed Services Committee, 28JAN04:
In my judgment, based on the work that has been done to this point of the Iraq Survey Group, and in fact, that I reported to you in October, Iraq was in clear violation of the terms of [U.N.] Resolution 1441. Resolution 1441 required that Iraq report all of its activities -- one last chance to come clean about what it had. We have discovered hundreds of cases, based on both documents, physical evidence and the testimony of Iraqis, of activities that were prohibited under the initial U.N. Resolution 687 and that should have been reported under 1441, with Iraqi testimony that not only did they not tell the U.N. about this, they were instructed not to do it and they hid material.
As Dr. Kay reported to SASC, the Iraq Survey Group corroborated UNMOVIC that Iraq did not comply with UNSCR 687 in its "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) and further confirmed Iraq possessed a reconstituting WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687. In intelligence analyst terms, the "quality of intelligence estimates" was not predictively precise; nonetheless, the intelligence correctly indicated the Saddam regime was doing proscribed nuclear, biological, chemical, missile, conventional armament, and terrorist activity.
Leffler:
But I think it’s important to realize a couple of things about the intelligence assessments, especially with regard to weapons of mass destruction. The intelligence was based on evidence that was far from incontrovertible. The policymakers, in fact, were absolutely aware of this. I have a—I think a very illuminating and evocative description in October 2002 when Donald Rumsfeld asks his chief of intelligence on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shaffer—he asks him, what do we really know about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction? And in a ten-page memo or so, the chief of intelligence on the Joint Staff writes back that: Well, with regard to chemical weapons, we know about 30 percent. With regard to biological weapons, 40 percent. With regard to nuclear issues, we know about 25 percent. So on and so forth. ... what is compelling is that there is no overall reassessment within the administration of the quantity and quality and reliability of the intelligence.
Professor Leffler leaves out that the intelligence was considered in the operative context of the UNSCR 687 disarmament. Ipso facto according to the controlling law and policy, it's "important to realize" that "The policymakers, in fact, were absolutely aware" that the Iraq WMD issue was defined by Iraq's violation of UNSCR 687, which was incontrovertible.
Professor Leffler's observation that "The intelligence was based on evidence that was far from incontrovertible" actually upholds the WMD element of casus belli since "The intelligence was based on evidence that was far from incontrovertible" due to Iraq's "denial and deception operations" (ISG), which in and of themselves violated UNSCR 687.
In the operative context of the UNSCR 678 enforcement, there was no burden of proof on US intelligence agencies and policymakers to prove that Iraq was armed as estimated. The burden of proof was on Iraq to prove it disarmed per UNSCR 687. Iraq's guilt on WMD was presumed per UNSCR 687 and established fact by UNSCOM/UNMOVIC and IAEA. That meant the "30 percent", "40 percent", "25 percent", "So on and so forth" referred to by Professor Leffler was considered on top of the 100-percent fact of Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441).
While "that there is no overall reassessment within the administration of the quantity and quality and reliability of the intelligence" is "compelling" to Professor Leffler, it's irrelevant to the Iraq WMD issue whose determinative fact basis was the UNSCOM/UNMOVIC and IAEA record. For OIF's justification, the intelligence is relevant only for its input on Iraq's violation of UNSCR 687. In fact, "intelligence assessments" were overtly based on the UNSCOM/UNMOVIC and IAEA record consistent with the ancillary role of the intelligence in the UNSCR 687 disarmament process.
Leffler:
And some people—of course, critics of the war—say this [no overall reassessment within the administration of the quantity and quality and reliability of the intelligence] is purposeful and it reveals the fact that the policymakers, including President Bush, were committed to go to war from the onset.
Professor Leffler and "some people—of course, critics of the war" are incorrect. For casus belli, the UNSCR 1441 inspections provided the "overall reassessment within the administration" and UN Security Council that confirmed Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) in "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire.
Professor Leffler should explain to "some people—of course, critics of the war" that the pre-war intelligence estimates were not the WMD element of casus belli. That policymakers, including President Bush, were committed from the onset to the "use of all necessary means" (Public Law 102-190) to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (Public Law 107-243) and "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235). That President Clinton's precedential determination for ODF and President Bush's determination for OIF plainly demonstrate that the WMD element of casus belli was established by UNSCOM/UNMOVIC's confirmation of Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441). And that in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) in 2002-2003, the same as it was since 1990-1991, the choice to violate Iraq's international obligations for war or comply for peace was Saddam's to make. Saddam chose war.
Leffler:
I think what was missing, and perhaps is the most salient point to your question, is that there was an absence of systematic assessments of costs and consequences of going to war. So I think there was ample motivation to think that going to war might be a good idea, but there was a systematic absence of careful assessment of costs and consequences. ... Secretary of State Powell and Condi Rice, who probably also saw the memo, should have asked for a thorough assessment of costs and consequences. And as far as I know, that never happened. And so any decision would be unwise if you haven’t carefully and systematically analyzed costs and consequences.
Is this type and degree of "systematic assessments of costs and consequences of going to war" normal? Is it even realistic? Looking ahead to a war isn't like submitting a proposal to the mayor's office for a new shopping center downtown.
Are there "carefully and systematically analyzed costs and consequences" by the Franklin Roosevelt administration for the US forces still in Germany, Japan, and Korea in 2025? Is there an HW Bush administration "thorough assessment of costs and consequences" for suspending the Gulf War with comprehensive ceasefire conditions, which Saddam immediately violated, and allowing the noncompliant-Saddam problem to fester for twelve years, instead of resolving it on the spot?
Until I learn otherwise, based on what I know, the Bush administration looked ahead normally to OIF for a war administration.
Knowing what we know now, Professor Leffler's "systematic assessments of costs and consequences of going to war" would not have helped anyway, because, in addition to confirming Saddam had a reconstituting WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687, the post-war investigations found that Saddam's UNSCR 687 terrorism violation and UNSCR 688 human rights violation had been substantially underestimated. The reason that the nation-building project proved more costly and difficult than expected is that the Saddam regime was far more "heinous" (Setrakian) and had degraded Iraqi society "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, 18MAR04) than we thought.
Hypothetically, if we had Professor Leffler's "systematic assessments of costs and consequences of going to war" with accurate detailed knowledge of Saddam's ceasefire violations, I like to think that as principled leaders of the liberal international order, the US and UK would have been more resolute about strictly enforcing Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), not less. Ethically, finding out that the noncompliant-Saddam problem was worse than we thought should justify a sooner and more urgent intervention, not rationalize a deliberate avoidance so the problem keeps festering.
Anderson:
But the United States didn’t look like it was thinking through the costs and consequences.
Professor Anderson is incorrect. From UNSCR 660 in August 1990 onward, the President and Congress gravely weighed the costs and consequences of allowing the baseline, paradigmatic enforcement of post-Cold War liberal international order to fail against an unreconstructed noncompliant Saddam. Excerpt from the OIF [FAQ] retrospective #americanprimacy section:
The Gulf War ceasefire terms were purpose-designed to resolve Saddam's manifold threat established with the Gulf War. The scope of the ceasefire terms meant that enforcing Iraq's mandated compliance resonated beyond the 4 corners of the Saddam problem or even the Iraq intervention itself. In 1991, at the dawn of the post-Cold War, the Gulf War ceasefire was invested with all the essential international norms, including strict aggression, disarmament, human rights, and terrorism-related mandates, and vital enforcement principles that were required to reify the aspirational "rules" of the post-Cold War world order.
Due to the historical context, threats and interests at stake, comprehensive spectrum of the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), model enforcement procedure, and US-led UN-based structure, the UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement was tantamount to the flagship and litmus test of the US-led post-Cold War liberal international order.
In other words, the resolution of Saddam's probation with Iraq's mandated compliance per the Gulf War ceasefire represented the primary test case for US-led international enforcement with a readily measured pass/fail gauge. The paradigmatic set of international norms that defined Iraq's ceasefire obligations was enforced with a clear UN-mandated compliance standard and a strict US-led compliance process. Iraq's mandated compliance set the gold standard for enforcing post-Cold War liberal international order, whereas Saddam's noncompliance risked a model failure for US-led enforcement of the liberal international order, a theme that permeated the US law and policy on Iraq through the HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations.
Due to the historical context, threats and interests at stake, comprehensive spectrum of the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), model enforcement procedure, and US-led UN-based structure, the UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement was tantamount to the flagship and litmus test of the US-led post-Cold War liberal international order.
In other words, the resolution of Saddam's probation with Iraq's mandated compliance per the Gulf War ceasefire represented the primary test case for US-led international enforcement with a readily measured pass/fail gauge. The paradigmatic set of international norms that defined Iraq's ceasefire obligations was enforced with a clear UN-mandated compliance standard and a strict US-led compliance process. Iraq's mandated compliance set the gold standard for enforcing post-Cold War liberal international order, whereas Saddam's noncompliance risked a model failure for US-led enforcement of the liberal international order, a theme that permeated the US law and policy on Iraq through the HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations.
We know that the UN sanctions and 'containment' failed by 2000-2001, and that made President Bush and Prime Minister Blair's response to the UNMOVIC Clusters document a binary choice. We know that Saddam's UNSCR 687, 688, and 949 violations, which defined Iraq's threat, were substantially worse than we thought. With the benefit of hindsight, has Professor Anderson thought through the costs and consequences of allowing the noncompliant Saddam regime to fester any longer? Or allowing the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement to fail altogether?
Anderson:
I’d like to suggest, in fact, that when we think about the lessons, lots of people drew lessons here, not just people who were in Washington. And in fact, it’s not clear yet to me what exactly the lessons in Washington have been. It may be that we could do better at middle-level management debates and so forth. I think that’s probably the case. But it would be worthwhile, looking at this from the perspective of the United States, really stepping back and saying, were we to find ourselves in a comparable position, would we make the same mistakes? And have we learned more lessons? ...
But in the meantime, certainly people drew lessons about the United States in the region. And I think it is indisputable that the Iraq debacle contributed to the declining estimation of the United States in the region, across the board. It was by no means the only thing that contributed to that. ... The debates around whether Iraq was involved didn’t strike anyone in the region as particularly sophisticated.
But in the meantime, certainly people drew lessons about the United States in the region. And I think it is indisputable that the Iraq debacle contributed to the declining estimation of the United States in the region, across the board. It was by no means the only thing that contributed to that. ... The debates around whether Iraq was involved didn’t strike anyone in the region as particularly sophisticated.
Given the misconceptions propagated by the "well-esteemed and well-informed speakers" in this panel discussion, it's easy to see why in the Middle East, our "debates around whether Iraq was involved didn’t strike anyone in the region as particularly sophisticated" and "contributed to the declining estimation of the United States in the region, across the board". The vital importance of constructive lessons of Iraq for the United States and United Kingdom as well as the Middle East informs the urgent need to cure the Iraq Syndrome by correcting the false narrative it's based on. Constructive lessons of Iraq are impossible as long as the Iraq Syndrome is the premise.
For constructive lessons of Iraq that are grounded on the law and facts that define the Iraq issue, see the OIF FAQ retrospective #americanprimacy section.
Anderson:
Keep in mind that Iraq had been under sanctions since—all the way through the 1990s. It had already been degraded by American policy quite systematically and significantly.
Professor Anderson should explain that "Iraq had been under sanctions since—all the way through the 1990s" because Iraq's threat was defined by Saddam's intransigent noncompliance with the Gulf War ceasefire mandates for conventional and WMD disarmament (UNSCR 687), terrorism (UNSCR 687), aggression (UNSCR 949), and human rights (UNSCR 688). The UN sanctions were the non-military alternative for the coercive leverage needed to compel Iraq's mandated compliance. If Iraq did not comply of its own volition and the UN sanctions failed to compel Iraq's compliance, that left military action "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 678). Which is what happened: Saddam stayed intransigent and the UN sanctions failed by 2000-2001.
Professor Anderson should also clarify that "It [Iraq] had already been degraded by American policy" only applies to the parts of Iraqi society where the Saddam regime redirected the pressure of the UN sanctions. However, "It had already been degraded by American policy" does not apply to the Gulf War ceasefire violations where the Saddam regime "systematically and significantly" invested the illicit funds from the Oil For Food scandal: "As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (ISG) and "Saddam’s use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime" (IPP).
Anderson:
And, of course, in the event didn’t manage the aftermath of the military invasion at all effectively. ... But I also think there was an undermining of confidence in American competence which was equally damaging to American standing.
Leffler:
There was a failure to examine the planning for so-called Phase Four, the postwar stabilization phase. There were inadequate troops assigned, inadequate both in terms of their capabilities and in terms of their numbers. In my book, I hold Donald Rumsfeld responsible for a lot of these failures.
Professor Anderson is wrong that the United States "didn’t manage the aftermath of the military invasion at all effectively". Under President Bush, the peace operations with Iraq were historically well managed.
The "undermining of confidence in American competence which was equally damaging to American standing" is largely due to the myth that the occupation and de-Baathification caused the insurgency. In fact, the insurgency was pre-assembled before the occupation by Saddam and his army of terrorists. Excerpt from American Enterprise Institute panel discussion, "The Iraq War Series: The Conduct of the War":
Jack Keane:
The fact of the matter is, we were dealing with an enemy force that Saddam Hussein had before the invasion, that planned to do what he was doing. And we were conducting likely the most formidable insurgency the West has ever encountered. Why am I saying that? Human capital is usually an issue for insurgents. Sometimes they get it outside. But human capital, they had somewhere in the neighborhood, if you add up the Fedayeen, the Ba’ath Party militia, special Republican Guard, excuse me, and [inaudible 01:10:58] intelligence service, the numbers 130,000. I’m not suggesting that we’re all involved. But I’m suggesting to you that was a good place to start. Remember, this is Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-based insurgency to start with. He had an unlimited amount of money, billions and billions of dollars. Normally, in the typical Mao based insurgency, they’re starving for what? For capital. They had an unlimited amount of money. They had unlimited amount of arms and ammunition. ... And what else did they have? Well, hell, they ran the country for 35 years, and they wanted to take it back.
The fact of the matter is, we were dealing with an enemy force that Saddam Hussein had before the invasion, that planned to do what he was doing. And we were conducting likely the most formidable insurgency the West has ever encountered. Why am I saying that? Human capital is usually an issue for insurgents. Sometimes they get it outside. But human capital, they had somewhere in the neighborhood, if you add up the Fedayeen, the Ba’ath Party militia, special Republican Guard, excuse me, and [inaudible 01:10:58] intelligence service, the numbers 130,000. I’m not suggesting that we’re all involved. But I’m suggesting to you that was a good place to start. Remember, this is Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-based insurgency to start with. He had an unlimited amount of money, billions and billions of dollars. Normally, in the typical Mao based insurgency, they’re starving for what? For capital. They had an unlimited amount of money. They had unlimited amount of arms and ammunition. ... And what else did they have? Well, hell, they ran the country for 35 years, and they wanted to take it back.
Another myth, alluded to by Professor Leffler, is that the US was negligent in planning for the post-war. In fact, the US planned conscientiously for the post-war. See the OIF FAQ retrospective #postwar section.
The initial post-war plan was valid in theory based on the pre-war conception of Iraqi society and underestimation of Saddam's terrorism. The plan would have needed adjustment regardless once applied on the ground, but that's to be expected. Unfortunately, the pre-war underestimation of Saddam's terrorism all but guaranteed that coalition forces would be surprised and confused by the Saddamist insurgency ambush. No post-war plan would have survived the Saddamist insurgency ambush that broke the security foundation.
What happened to the initial post-war plan is not unusual. In any kind of real competition, an opening plan is derailed as often as not by a capable adversary who has the advantage of surprise, and Saddamists are the world's top experts at terrorizing and mass-murdering Iraqis. Professor Leffler's narrow focus on "a failure to examine the planning for so-called Phase Four, the postwar stabilization phase" overlooks that setbacks and adjustments are normal in competition. While keeping the nation-building standard of Public Law 105-338, UNSCR 1483, etc., the coalition stood fast when the Saddamists executed their attack, and responded with the necessary adjustments.
As Professor Leffler alludes to, with the conditions altered by the Saddamist insurgency, the troop numbers and force capabilities needed adjusting. The Bush administration delivered on the necessary adjustments. The initial post-war structure was overhauled on the fly. Although Professor Leffler "hold[s] Donald Rumsfeld responsible for a lot of these failures", it should be noted that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's leadership was instrumental in the accelerated learning curve on the ground that matured into the counterinsurgency "surge". The COIN "surge" effectively counteracted the Saddamist insurgency and its Iran-driven counterpart in about three years, which is a fast adjustment in counterinsurgency context, especially considering that COIN was not in the coalition's toolbox at the start of OIF. Much of the credit for the accelerated learning curve goes to Secretary Rumsfeld.
In US military history, the episodes of "American competence" that most elevated "American standing" have usually been adjustments to setbacks, often disastrous, from Valley Forge to Fredericksburg to Kasserine Pass to Chosin Reservoir. The COIN "surge" exemplified "American competence" with an invaluable modern [case study] of resolute leadership, resilient mission, and adaptation in competition. The COIN "surge" with Iraq would have elevated "American standing", too, but for President Obama's radical deviation that prematurely ended OIF.
Leffler:
They actually did want—you know, most Iraqis, unquestionably, wanted to get rid of Saddam Hussein. ... And by time I mean just weeks and months, when the Americans could not preserve order and stability, which was totally disillusioning to the Iraqis. And the Americans seemed to think—American policymakers seemed to think that Iraqis cared more about freedom and democracy than they cared about order, and stability, and security of their personal lives.
The setbacks in the first "weeks and months" clearly were not "totally disillusioning" given the fact of the Sahwa "awakening". However, President Obama's radical deviation that contravened the SFA, removed the necessary OIF peace operations, and delayed the American response to Iraq's frantic requests for help per SFA against ISIS after the Iraqis had stood shoulder to shoulder with the Americans in the COIN "surge" and Sahwa "awakening" would be totally disillusioning.
That being said, it makes sense that the Saddamist insurgency would be disillusioning after Iraqis watched the OIF invasion steamroll the Saddam regime. Professor Leffler should explain to the Iraqis that the hard reality is Saddamists were simply far more expert at wrecking Iraq and terrorizing and killing Iraqis than the coalition's beginning ability to protect the Iraqi people from Saddamists. Kosovo and Afghanistan could not prepare US forces for the Saddamist insurgency. The only realistic way for the coalition to learn how to stop Saddamists from doing what they know best, terrorizing and killing Iraqis like they ruled Iraq, was to adapt in competition. While the COIN adjustment wasn't fast enough for the Iraqis, the three-year learning curve was fast.
It was also a hard reality that the Iraqis needed the Americans to depose Saddam, which they understood from the bitter lesson of 1991.
Professor Leffler is incorrect that "American policymakers seemed to think that Iraqis cared more about freedom and democracy than they cared about order, and stability, and security of their personal lives". It wasn't either/or. The theory of the initial post-war plan was that liberal pluralistic political reform would defuse sectarian flashpoints and spread civic ownership stakes in post-Saddam Iraq, and that would lay the foundation for a population-based order and stability that could do away with foreign peacekeepers sooner rather than later. Knowing what we know now, the fatal flaw in the theory is that it was designed to prevent an insurgency from materializing from the normal Iraqi populace, but it did nothing to counteract the ready insurgency that Saddam and his army of terrorists pre-assembled before the occupation.
A reason that the CPA and coalition forces struggled to achieve order, stability, and security is peacemaking efforts were focused on the normal Iraqi populace when the disorder, instability, and insecurity were being generated by the Saddamist insurgency, not the normal Iraqi populace. The relatively rapid success of the COIN "surge" and Sahwa "awakening" exposed the divide between the Saddamist insurgency and normal Iraqi populace. Yet even today, many experts erroneously assert that the insurgency was an organic reaction by normal Iraqis to negligent planning, incompetent occupation, or de-Baathification. In fact, the insurgency was a distinct campaign by Saddam and his army of terrorists that was organized before the occupation.
Leffler:
When the original war planning began taking place, the two goals specified by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks were regime change and WMD—regime change and WMD. Notice there was no talk about democracy promotion. When George W. Bush actually decided that for security reasons that it was necessary to invade Iraq, he actually did want to promote democracy and freedom, but the planners had really not focused on what would be the key ingredients? What would be necessary? What are the requirements to carry out the goal that President Bush actually had, but that Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks did not have? That’s lack of clarity about goals, and I fault the administration for not having greater clarity before invading Iraq.
See the OIF FAQ answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom about WMD or democracy".
Professor Leffler is incorrect that "there was no talk about democracy promotion". In fact, "promote democracy and freedom" was ingrained in the law and policy of the UNSCR 688 part of the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, not an impulsive afterthought tacked on "When George W. Bush actually decided that for security reasons that it was necessary to invade Iraq, he actually did want to promote democracy and freedom". To clarify, "promote democracy and freedom" was in and of itself a security measure. As President Clinton emphasized, UNSCR 688 codified that Saddam's human rights violations "threaten[ed] international peace and security in the region" (UNSCR 688). Per HW Bush and Clinton policy and Congressional mandate, "promote democracy and freedom" was the official solution for the codified international security threat of Saddam's human rights violations.
Professor Leffler is incorrect that there was a "lack of clarity about goals". See the OIF FAQ answer to "Was the invasion of Iraq perceived to be a nation-building effort".
Tasks were divided into distinct stages, which helped to focus the clarity of the goals. The tasks for "promote democracy and freedom" were in the following stage from the major combat operations, so they weren't part of the invasion "goals specified by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks". The "promote democracy and freedom" mission was planned separately from the invasion and activated when President Bush announced the official transition from major combat operations to peace operations on May 1, 2003.
Although it was managed by Defense, in the initial post-war plan civilians were the center of gravity for the "promote democracy and freedom" mission, not uniformed soldiers. When President Bush announced OIF's transition from MCO to PO on May 1, 2003, uniformed soldiers were sidelined to support roles that focused on security, supply, medical, and other infrastructure needs. Soldiers enabled the "promote democracy and freedom" mission, but weren't responsible for it. Uniformed soldiers became the center of gravity for the "promote democracy and freedom" mission after the Saddamist insurgency broke the civilian-centered plan. So if Professor Leffler has been searching for evidence of pre-war "clarity about goals" for "promote democracy and freedom" within the invasion planning and invasion preparation for uniformed soldiers, he's been looking in the wrong place.
Anderson:
So is it the case that lessons were learned about the importance of, call it, post-invasion planning? Well, a very different president, Obama, now regrets exactly the same mistake in Libya, that we didn’t think through what would happen in Libya after the fall of the regime. So I really—at some point, it can’t simply be, well, this is a different administration. So that was Bush’s fault, and this is Obama’s fault.
The lesson of Iraq suggested by Professor Anderson of prophylactic "post-war planning" that preemptively "think[s] through what would happen" is not a normal or realistic standard. If such a plan is produced, it's welcome, but it can't be expected.
The constructive lesson of Iraq that needs to be ingrained is that in real-world competition versus capable adversaries, setbacks happen and opening plans get derailed. The key to American success is the resolute leadership, resilient mission, and adaptation in competition exemplified by the COIN "surge". It's important for that lesson not to be buried by Professor Anderson's false assertion that we "didn't manage the aftermath of the military invasion at all effectively".
It may be that the initial post-war plans for Iraq and Libya were similar or even "exactly the same". If so, that wasn't President Obama's decisive "mistake" with Libya. The decisive mistake was that the Obama administration eschewed competitive adjustments with Libya in diametric contrast to the Bush administration's resolute leadership, resilient mission, and adaptation in competition with Iraq.
Anderson:
And there has to be some way of thinking about how the United States approaches its role in the world, whether it’s going to be simply we’re going to be going around the world knocking off regimes we don’t like and going after terrorists we don’t like, and so forth and so on, and really completely ignoring the consequences of that kind of policy more broadly. So here we have two countries, Iraq and Libya, where it’s pretty clear the United States played a very important role in the collapse of those states.
Professor Anderson's mischaracterization of the Iraq and Libya interventions combines vague obfuscation, false equivalence, and conflation.
There's no comparison between the casus belli.
For Iraq, President Bush inherited the baseline post-Cold War international enforcement that had reached its culmination point in 1998 with an extraordinarily thorough set of Chapter VII international and AUMF domestic mandates and authorizations and precedents. Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) had straightforward standard, procedure, and fact findings that established casus belli to resolve "the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security" (UNSCR 1441).
UNSCR 1441: "to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions ... resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area ... in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein ... Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991) ... afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations ... it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations".
Secretary of State Powell at the UN Security Council, 05FEB03: "Iraq had already been found guilty of material breach of its obligations, stretching back over 16 previous resolutions and 12 years. Resolution 1441 was not dealing with an innocent party, but a regime this council has repeatedly convicted over the years. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance, one last chance to come into compliance or to face serious consequences. No council member present in voting on that day had any illusions about the nature and intent of the resolution or what serious consequences meant if Iraq did not comply." Iraq did not comply.
Saddam caused the Iraqi regime change because he "never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" (ISG) that required Iraq's compliance for "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687).
In contrast, for Libya, President Obama ambiguously asserted "Responsibility to Protect" as the justification, an academic theory that provided a weak stand-alone legal basis in domestic and international law to deploy the military even before Obama severely stretched an already controversial novel application of R2P for the Libyan regime change. Where the Iraq intervention enforced the highest level of Chapter VII UN Security Council and Congressional mandates and authorizations and US presidential policy and precedent, which were straightforward, reiterated, and in force for over a decade, the Libya intervention thinly cited to the general US agreement with the United Nations covenant with nothing like an Iraq-level international or Congressional authorization.
And again, there's no comparison between President Bush's post-war leadership with Iraq and President Obama's post-war leadership with Libya. President Bush stayed resolute against the complementary pressure from the Saddamist insurgency and international and domestic OIF opponents to surrender Iraq to the Saddamists. Bush honored the nation-building mandate for Iraq that he inherited. In contrast, President Obama dishonored the United States by contravening the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement. Obama's post-war record with Libya is the opposite of the resolute leadership, resilient mission, and adaptation in competition of Bush's post-war record with Iraq.
Anderson:
I think it is indisputable that the Iraq debacle contributed to the declining estimation of the United States in the region, across the board. ... Did that contribute to subsequent skittishness on the part of later American presidents? Probably. Did that, in turn, contribute to a sense that American presidents are skittish and unreliable and you can’t really tell what they’re going to do and so forth in the region? Without a doubt.
... I think what happened, however, as a result of that, and it’s been bipartisan, if you will. The Democrats can’t crow about not having made the same kinds of mistakes because during the Arab uprisings, and particularly in Libya, many of the same kinds of mistakes can be found, I think it’s fair to say.
... I think what happened, however, as a result of that, and it’s been bipartisan, if you will. The Democrats can’t crow about not having made the same kinds of mistakes because during the Arab uprisings, and particularly in Libya, many of the same kinds of mistakes can be found, I think it’s fair to say.
Professor Anderson should specify that President Obama's choice to contravene the SFA and prematurely end OIF is the "Iraq debacle [that] contributed to the declining estimation of the United States in the region, across the board".
The Obama administration could not have made "the same kinds of mistakes" as the Bush administration since the Democrats consciously deviated from Bush policy. Obama's mistakes were due to deviating from Bush. In January 2009, President Obama inherited Operation Iraqi Freedom as a winning hand that had been hard-earned by the COIN "surge" and Sahwa "awakening". Obama merely had to stay the course from Bush. Instead, President Obama's radical deviation created the "skittishness on the part of later American presidents" and "sense that American presidents are skittish and unreliable and you can’t really tell what they’re going to do and so forth in the region".
Excerpt from the OIF FAQ epilogue answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory":
President Bush handed OIF to President Obama having resolved the festering problem of Saddam's noncompliant, threatening, tyrannical, radicalized sectarian, rearming, terrorist regime (not a moment too soon based on what we now know), revitalized international enforcement in the defining international enforcement of the post-Cold War, and proved the mettle of American leadership and devastated the terrorists with the counterinsurgency "Surge".
On December 15, 2010, the United Nations declared victory in Iraq. With the adoption of resolutions 1956, 1957, and 1958, the United Nations Security Council recognized that Iraq was compliant with its major obligations under the UNSCR 660 series and lifted restrictions incurred by the Saddam regime that had been in place since 1990-1991. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon pronounced, “This meeting is a milestone for Iraq. Today we recognize how far the country has come in key aspects of its journey to normalize its status in the community of nations.” Vice President Biden, serving as the Council president at the meeting, observed Iraq was on the cusp of “something remarkable”. The emerging pluralistic, liberalizing, compliant post-Saddam Iraq provided the US with a keystone "strategic partner" in the region.
Obama should have built upon the hard-won foundational progress made under Bush in geopolitically critical Iraq. However, instead of staying the course from Bush like President Eisenhower stayed the course from President Truman at the turning point of the Cold War, Obama committed the strategic blunder of contravening the Strategic Framework Agreement (fact sheet, 2008) by disengaging from US-Iraqi affairs at a critical stage of Iraq's post-Surge development, passive-aggressively bungling the SOFA negotiation with Iraq, appeasing Iran, and abandoning the Bush Freedom Agenda. The premature departure of US forces removed America's protection at the same time Iraq's vicinity was growing dangerously unstable as the Arab Spring disintegrated, particularly in neighboring Syria. In the singular pivotal moment that sure-handed American leadership could have redirected the current course of history, Obama's irresponsible exit from Iraq and feckless 'lead from behind' approach to the Arab Spring, instead, opened great gaps for the terrorists to resurge. Iraq is suffering the consequences.
On December 15, 2010, the United Nations declared victory in Iraq. With the adoption of resolutions 1956, 1957, and 1958, the United Nations Security Council recognized that Iraq was compliant with its major obligations under the UNSCR 660 series and lifted restrictions incurred by the Saddam regime that had been in place since 1990-1991. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon pronounced, “This meeting is a milestone for Iraq. Today we recognize how far the country has come in key aspects of its journey to normalize its status in the community of nations.” Vice President Biden, serving as the Council president at the meeting, observed Iraq was on the cusp of “something remarkable”. The emerging pluralistic, liberalizing, compliant post-Saddam Iraq provided the US with a keystone "strategic partner" in the region.
Obama should have built upon the hard-won foundational progress made under Bush in geopolitically critical Iraq. However, instead of staying the course from Bush like President Eisenhower stayed the course from President Truman at the turning point of the Cold War, Obama committed the strategic blunder of contravening the Strategic Framework Agreement (fact sheet, 2008) by disengaging from US-Iraqi affairs at a critical stage of Iraq's post-Surge development, passive-aggressively bungling the SOFA negotiation with Iraq, appeasing Iran, and abandoning the Bush Freedom Agenda. The premature departure of US forces removed America's protection at the same time Iraq's vicinity was growing dangerously unstable as the Arab Spring disintegrated, particularly in neighboring Syria. In the singular pivotal moment that sure-handed American leadership could have redirected the current course of history, Obama's irresponsible exit from Iraq and feckless 'lead from behind' approach to the Arab Spring, instead, opened great gaps for the terrorists to resurge. Iraq is suffering the consequences.
Zelikow:
In this case, in Iran. This is a live issue this year, 2023. Now then you might ask yourself, will the United States, in making this decision, take the views of friends, partners, and allies into account?
And I think the answer will be, yes. I think the United States will not simply unconsciously reenact the decisions of twenty years ago. There’ll be a lot of consultations and a lot of reflections, some of it having to do with the position of Israelis, people in the Gulf, but also with Europeans and others. Because one of the alternatives has to do with things like snapback sanctions and so on, and how Europeans judge the situation. So your question is right on point, and indeed is resonant in the present day.
And I think the answer will be, yes. I think the United States will not simply unconsciously reenact the decisions of twenty years ago. There’ll be a lot of consultations and a lot of reflections, some of it having to do with the position of Israelis, people in the Gulf, but also with Europeans and others. Because one of the alternatives has to do with things like snapback sanctions and so on, and how Europeans judge the situation. So your question is right on point, and indeed is resonant in the present day.
Professor Zelikow's comparison of the Iran crisis to the Iraq crisis is a false equivalence since there is no equivalent of the UNSCR 660 series, Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), and UNSCR 678 enforcement for Iran.
Professor Zelikow overlooks that by Operation Desert Fox in 1998, the US and UK were aware and wary of Saddam's accomplices among whom were nominal "friends, partners, and allies": "The number of countries and companies supporting Saddam’s schemes to undermine UN sanctions increased dramatically over time from 1995 to 2003" (ISG) and "The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council" (ISG).
Recall our disappointment when France replaced its presence in the humanitarian UNSCR 688 no-fly zones with "the presence of French CAs [diplomatic commercial attaches] in Baghdad, working to promote the interests of French companies while assisting them in avoiding UN sanctions" (ISG). France was complicit in reconstituting Saddam's WMD program: "The data reveals that firms in Germany and France outstripped all others in selling the most important thing — specialized chemical-industry equipment that is particularly useful for producing poison gas. Without this equipment, none of the other imports would have been of much use" (Iraq Watch, 13APR03).
With Iraq, the US and UK reacted to the malfeasance of Saddam's accomplices by guarding against compromise of the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441). As Professor Zelikow observes, with Iran, the US and UK have been more malleable.
Leffler:
What I think distinguished the more hawkish Democrats from the administration, and what led some Democrats, as you’re stating correctly, to oppose the resolution, was a general feeling amongst Democrats that it would be more desirable to pursue a multilateral approach to the war. And there was fear that the administration would ultimately act unilaterally. ... But they also were extraordinarily skeptical of the tactical approach of the administration, believing that Bush and Cheney had demonstrated a penchant for unilateralism by previous decisions.
Zelikow:
There was a really interesting set of maneuvers in Congress in September of 2002, in which Joe Biden was trying to come up with a counterresolution that would open the door up in the directions that Mel just alluded to.
The disintegration of the "multilateral approach" in the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement happened during the Clinton administration. It wasn't President Clinton's fault. It was Saddam's successful strategy to corrupt the UN Security Council. But the fact is that President Clinton's UNSCR 678 military actions in partnership with the UK had been 'unilateral' for years. Operation Iraqi Freedom was decidedly multilateral in comparison.
It was cynical and hypocritical for Democrats to hold the Bush administration to a "multilateral approach to the war" given that the arguments and alignment of the international opponents and allies for Operation Desert Fox in 1998 were carried forward virtually unchanged to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. There's a reason that President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair didn't confer with the UN Security Council when the US and UK immediately responded to the UNSCOM Butler Report with Operation Desert Fox. The adoption of UNSCR 1441 was an extraordinary multilateral achievement given the divided and degraded state of the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement in the UN Security Council by 1998. The Democrats who criticized President Bush for "unilateralism", going as far as holding up Saddam's lead accomplices in France and Russia as the standard for a "multilateral approach"—when they knew full well the nations were corrupted by Saddam—, were disgusting.
Leffler:
But the truth of the matter is, ultimately, as I think Philip suggested earlier, if I recall, you know, a very substantial number of Democrats supported the resolution. And subsequently, they claimed that they were tricked into it in one way or another by the false evidence of the weapons of mass destruction. But I personally do not think that was the case. I think that many Democrats at the time, like Al Gore, were extremely—and like Joe Biden, who I, you know, talk about in my book, were extremely preoccupied with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein.
Indeed. The March 22, 2000 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing on Iraq shows that President Bush didn't tell anything about Iraq to Congressional leaders that they didn't already know. Excerpt:
Senator Biden. I do not disagree with anything any of you said except none of you have a damn solution. You do not have any idea of what you are talking as to what to do from here. You are right in the criticism. I think the criticism is dead right. We made a fundamental mistake that everybody underestimated when George Bush stopped us going into Baghdad. One of the things no one figured was that it would be read as a conclusion that possession of or the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons would hold off the giant. And that is the reason why he did not occupy Baghdad is because we had these weapons, thereby emboldening them to hang onto them closer. So, a fundamental mistake. It is easy to Monday morning quarterback now and say it, but a fundamental mistake made. And we continue to make mistakes as we go along.
Vice President Gore, 26JUN00:
The INC and the Vice President reaffirmed their joint desire to see a united Iraq served by a representative and democratic government responsive to the needs of its people and willing to live in peace with its neighbors.
The Vice President reaffirmed the Administration's strong commitment to the objective of removing Saddam Hussein from power, and to bringing him and his inner circle to justice for their war crimes and crimes against humanity. Saddam's removal is the key to the positive transformation of Iraq's relationship with the international community and with the United States, in particular.
... The Vice President reaffirmed American concern for the welfare of the Iraqi people. ... He further emphasized the US concern for the safety and security of all the Iraqi people in accordance with UNSCR 688, which condemns Saddam Hussein's repression of the Iraqi people as a threat to regional stability.
The Vice President reaffirmed the Administration's strong commitment to the objective of removing Saddam Hussein from power, and to bringing him and his inner circle to justice for their war crimes and crimes against humanity. Saddam's removal is the key to the positive transformation of Iraq's relationship with the international community and with the United States, in particular.
... The Vice President reaffirmed American concern for the welfare of the Iraqi people. ... He further emphasized the US concern for the safety and security of all the Iraqi people in accordance with UNSCR 688, which condemns Saddam Hussein's repression of the Iraqi people as a threat to regional stability.
Setrakian:
On this wider question of how we make wiser decisions about when to wage war or make critical interventions, going to the Chilcot Report, the UK’s inquiry into its role in the invasion of Iraq, it stated that the U.S. declined offers of support from the British in planning for postwar operations. Now, the British have decades of experience in Iraq, since the mandate period in the 1920s. [Do we have to rethink the way America integrates the wisdom and agency of its allies when making foreign policy decisions, plans, and, indeed, calculating cost?]
Zelikow:
But, as Professor Anderson knows, actually quite a few people who had backgrounds in the Middle East but who were academics in the United States or making arguments in the United States were actually supporters of dislodging Saddam Hussein, and were supporters of the invasion. There were some spectacular cases, including some Iraqi exiles.
I have no objection to accepting British help in planning the post-war with Iraq.
However, I disagree with Ms. Setrakian's premise that "the British have decades of experience in Iraq, since the mandate period in the 1920s" means the British had more "wisdom and agency" on Iraq than American planners.
The Chilcot report needs to be taken with a grain of salt. That being said, the Chilcot report is negative about the British performance in the post-war. It shows British peace operations performed worse than their American counterpart despite manning a relatively modest area with substantially easier conditions.
More significantly, by 2003, the United States had been continually involved with Iraq for twenty years. The US had engaged with the Saddam regime in relation to the Iran-Iraq War. Then the US engaged with Iraqi dissidents for the overall UNSCR 660-series enforcement, Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, and in particular the UNSCR 688 enforcement with "Iraqi exiles" outside of Iraq and [even inside] of Iraq in the northern safe zone. Ms. Setrakian's premise that the British had more "wisdom and agency" on Iraq makes sense until the 1970s. But her premise doesn't make sense by the 1990s.
Unfortunately, we found out that no one outside of Iraq had sufficient "wisdom and agency" to realize the full depth of the degradation and corruption of Iraqi society, terrorism, and radical sectarian turn made by the Saddam regime since Operation Desert Storm. The Iraq of 2003 was very changed from the Iraq of 1991, let alone the historic Iraq of British experience. Even "Iraqi exiles" and UN officials whose job it was to track the humanitarian situation in Iraq were shocked at what they found out about Saddam's Iraq following the regime change. UN Special Representative for Iraq Sergio Vieira de Mello lost his life from not understanding what Saddam had made of Iraq.
Again, I have no objection to accepting British help in planning the post-war with Iraq. However, there is no reason to believe Ms. Setrakian's suggestion that the British would have planned the post-war any better than we did.
Anderson:
But I do think that some of what we have seen in the intervening twenty years does suggest that a measure of stability would have been sustained by this tyrannical government, that you wouldn’t have had the opportunity for some of the things that were imagined as threats to be realized, so when you think about what happened in the development of ISIS and so forth and so on, that would have been much harder if Saddam had actually stayed in power.
Professor Anderson is incorrect that "the development of ISIS ... would have been much harder if Saddam had actually stayed in power" since ISIS is Saddamist, a descendant of Saddam's terrorism and terrorist rule. To clarify ISIS, see Kyle Orton's The Islamic State Was Coming Without the Invasion of Iraq.
Leffler:
Yes, people like Doug Feith and Scooter Libby wanted to make the argument that Saddam Hussein was linked to al-Qaeda. I show in my book that it’s pretty clear that President Bush himself did not believe that.
We know from the Iraqi Perspectives Project that Saddam's terrorism did in fact have "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with al Qaeda.
President Bush did not hold Saddam culpable for the 9/11 attacks. But I don't know that he rejected other ties between Saddam's terrorism and al Qaeda. At least Bush believed Saddam's own terrorist capability was enough of a threat to act on.
It would help for Professor Leffler to explain that there were three simultaneous counterterrorism directives per Public Law 107-40, Public Law 107-243, etc.: narrowly respond to the perpetrators of 9/11, i.e., al Qaeda, broadly deter and prevent terrorism against the United States not limited to al Qaeda, and specifically enforce paragraph 32 of UNSCR 687, i.e., the Gulf War ceasefire terrorism mandate. President Bush did not apply the first directive to Saddam, but he and Congress did apply the second directive and obviously third directive to Saddam.
They were right to do so. IPP co-author Jim Lacey, 14SEP11:
... All of this is just the tip of the iceberg of available evidence demonstrating that Saddam posed a dangerous [terrorism and WMD] threat to America. There are other reports providing specific information on dozens of terrorist attacks, as well as details of how Iraq helped plan and execute many of them. Moreover, there is also proof of Saddam’s support of Islamic groups that were part of the al-Qaeda network. ... In reality Saddam and bin Laden were operating parallel terror networks aimed at the United States. Bin Laden just has the distinction of having made the first horrendous attack.
Given the evidence, it appears that we removed Saddam’s regime not a moment too soon.
Given the evidence, it appears that we removed Saddam’s regime not a moment too soon.
Leffler:
The theme of this present book, of course, is that to understand the decision to invade Iraq, you need to grapple with three factors. Fear, threat perception, is one. Power is two. And American hubris is three. ... There was hubris there in believing that Iraqis would welcome the—welcome the American presence.
Fourth factor: Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) in "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), "Recognizing the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security" (UNSCR 1441), "Whereas the United States is determined to prosecute the war on terrorism and Iraq’s ongoing support for international terrorist groups combined with its development of weapons of mass destruction in direct violation of its obligations under the 1991 cease-fire and other United Nations Security Council resolutions make clear that it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced, including through the use of force if necessary" (Public Law 107-243).
When the justification of OIF is clarified according to the defining law and facts of the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, Professor Leffler's "American hubris" becomes indistinguishable from the essential duty and responsibility to uphold liberal international order that the American leader of the free world shouldered at the dawn of the post-Cold War. President HW Bush, 11SEP90:
The test we face is great, and so are the stakes. This is the first assault on the new world that we seek, the first test of our mettle. Had we not responded to this first provocation with clarity of purpose, if we do not continue to demonstrate our determination, it would be a signal to actual and potential despots around the world. America and the world must defend common vital interests -- and we will. America and the world must support the rule of law -- and we will. America and the world must stand up to aggression -- and we will. And one thing more: In the pursuit of these goals America will not be intimidated.
... Recent events have surely proven that there is no substitute for American leadership. In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt our staying power. We will stand by our friends. One way or another, the leader of Iraq must learn this fundamental truth.
... Recent events have surely proven that there is no substitute for American leadership. In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt our staying power. We will stand by our friends. One way or another, the leader of Iraq must learn this fundamental truth.
Ms. Setrakian, Professor Anderson, Professor Zelikow, and Professor Leffler, I appreciate the opportunity to critically review your 20th anniversary panel discussion for the 22nd anniversary of Operation Iraqi Freedom. I majored in political science-international relations at Professor Anderson's Columbia, and Professor Zelikow's 9-11 Commission colleague John Farmer was my national security law professor, so this review has affinity for two of my alma maters.
Again, constructive lessons of Iraq are impossible as long as the Iraq Syndrome is the premise. It is essential that you and your affiliates repair the compounding harm and misguidance of the Iraq Syndrome, and that starts with publicly correcting the false narrative it's based on. I hope you use my comments to reexamine your "fundamental assumptions and axioms" (Leffler) and that helps you clarify the Iraq issue to the public. I invite your critical feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
Related: Correction of Richard Haass's "Revisiting America’s War of Choice in Iraq" and Review of Linda Robinson's "The Long Shadow of the Iraq War: Lessons and Legacies Twenty Years Later".
Also see Review of the American Enterprise Institute's "The Iraq War Series 20 Years Later" and Review of Washington Examiner symposium "What is the most important lesson of the Iraq War?".
No comments:
Post a Comment