However, I've also understood that I could critically evaluate the meat of the Chilcot report because "the American and British decisions on Iraq share the predominant, international context of the enforcement of Iraq's compliance with the UNSCR 660-series, Gulf War ceasefire mandates".
I changed my mind and decided to directly evaluate the Chilcot report for three reasons: I noticed the Chilcot report uses essentially the same tricks as Council on Foreign Relations then-president Richard Haass's distortion of the Iraq issue: see my Correction of Richard Haass's "Revisiting America's War of Choice in Iraq". The similarity means the material needed for the task is already developed in the OIF FAQ; it just needs to be adapted. Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Linda Robinson's call for an American counterpart to the Chilcot report reinforces that clarifying the Iraq issue is a common cause, and largely a common task, for like-minded Britons and Americans. And, the UK Iraq Inquiry was appointed by then-Prime Minister Gordon Brown, whose own flagrant distortion of the Iraq issue attacks the Anglo-American alliance: see my Rebuttal of Prime Minister Brown's memoir argument against Operation Iraqi Freedom. Criticizing the Chilcot report is an extension of counteracting Prime Minister Brown's harmful actions on Iraq.
This post is an open work-in-progress. The critical notes will accrete as they come and take shape like a stalactite or stalagmite. The notes should help inform any public criticism of the Chilcot report. Feedback and suggestions are welcome. OIF's justification above, OIF occupation and peace operations below. Enjoy:
Chilcot report:
326. In Section 4, the Inquiry has identified the importance of the ingrained belief of
the Government and the intelligence community that Saddam Hussein’s regime retained
chemical and biological warfare capabilities, was determined to preserve and if possible
enhance its capabilities, including at some point in the future a nuclear capability, and
was pursuing an active and successful policy of deception and concealment.
327. This construct remained influential despite the lack of significant finds by inspectors in the period leading up to military action in March 2003, and even after the Occupation of Iraq.
327. This construct remained influential despite the lack of significant finds by inspectors in the period leading up to military action in March 2003, and even after the Occupation of Iraq.
UNMOVIC and Iraq Survey Group findings "in the period leading up to military action in March 2003, and even after the Occupation of Iraq" actually show that the "ingrained belief of the Government and the intelligence community" was correct on all counts: The Saddam regime did in fact retain CW and BW capabilities, it was determined to preserve and enhance its capabilities, including nuclear capability, and it did have an active and successful policy of deception and concealment that sabotaged the UN inspections, international intelligence efforts, and the ex post Iraq Survey Group investigation.
The first assertion of "the lack of significant finds by inspectors" is false and misleading since the UN inspectors' mandate per UNSCRs 687 and 1441 was not to search for Iraq's WMD, but rather to verify whether Iraq declared every proscribed item and activity and presented all of it for elimination under the inspectors' supervision per UNSCR 687. In accordance with its mandate, UNMOVIC significantly found "about 100 unresolved disarmament issues" pursuant to UNSCRs 687 and 1441 that confirmed Iraq did not disarm per UNSCR 687.
The second assertion of "the lack of significant finds ... even after the Occupation of Iraq" is false. The Iraq Survey Group found much evidence of an active WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687. ISG also reported that Iraqi counter-intelligence got rid of a lot more WMD evidence during and after the invasion than what ISG was able to get their hands on. See the ISG findings sorted by category in the OIF FAQ retrospective #duelferreport and #nuclear sections.
Excerpt from Iraq Survey Group director David Kay's report to the Senate Armed Services Committee:
In my judgment, based on the work that has been done to this point of the Iraq Survey Group, and in fact, that I reported to you in October, Iraq was in clear violation of the terms of [U.N.] Resolution 1441. Resolution 1441 required that Iraq report all of its activities -- one last chance to come clean about what it had. We have discovered hundreds of cases, based on both documents, physical evidence and the testimony of Iraqis, of activities that were prohibited under the initial U.N. Resolution 687 and that should have been reported under 1441, with Iraqi testimony that not only did they not tell the U.N. about this, they were instructed not to do it and they hid material.
The UNMOVIC and ISG "finds" confirmed and corroborated the Saddam regime's guilt on WMD per UNSCR 687—casus belli. Perhaps the UK Iraq Inquiry has an unusually narrow definition of "significant", inapposite of UNSCR 687, that explains the false assertion of "the lack of significant finds".
Chilcot report:
570. This [a formal reassessment of the JIC’s judgements] might have been prompted by Dr Blix’s report to the Security Council on
14 February 2003, which demonstrated the developing divergence between the assessments presented by the US and UK. Dr Blix’s report of 7 March, which changed the view that Iraqi behaviour was preventing UNMOVIC from carrying out its tasks, should certainly have prompted a review.
...
409. The Inquiry considers that there should have been collective discussion by a Cabinet Committee or small group of Ministers on the basis of inter‑departmental advice agreed at a senior level between officials at a number of decision points which had a major impact on the development of UK policy before the invasion of Iraq. Those were:
... A review of UK policy at the end of February 2003 when the inspectors had found no evidence of WMD ...
...
409. The Inquiry considers that there should have been collective discussion by a Cabinet Committee or small group of Ministers on the basis of inter‑departmental advice agreed at a senior level between officials at a number of decision points which had a major impact on the development of UK policy before the invasion of Iraq. Those were:
... A review of UK policy at the end of February 2003 when the inspectors had found no evidence of WMD ...
The UK Iraq Inquiry's false premise that justifying Operation Iraqi Freedom depended on the UNSCR 1441 inspections finding WMD that matched pre-war intelligence estimates explains why the Chilcot report cites Dr. Blix's February 14, 2003 briefing and ignores Blix's January 27, 2003 briefing to the UN Security Council: the January 27, 2003 briefing clarified the procedure was for Iraq to declare and present all proscribed items and activities to the UN inspectors, not for the UN inspectors to find Iraq's WMD "catch as catch can". Excerpt:
The substantive cooperation required relates above all to the obligation of Iraq to declare all programmes of weapons of mass destruction and either to present items and activities for elimination or else to provide evidence supporting the conclusion that nothing proscribed remains.
Paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002) states that this cooperation shall be "active". It is not enough to open doors. Inspection is not a game of "catch as catch can".
Paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002) states that this cooperation shall be "active". It is not enough to open doors. Inspection is not a game of "catch as catch can".
Besides clarifying the burden on Iraq, Blix's January 27, 2003 briefing was scathing. Excerpt:
The nerve agent VX is one of the most toxic ever developed. Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few tons, and that the quality was poor and the product unstable.
Consequently, it was said that the agent was never weaponized.
Iraq said that the small quantity of [the] agent remaining after the Gulf War was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.
UNMOVIC, however, has information that conflicts with this account. There are indications that Iraq had worked on the problem of purity and stabilization and that more had been achieved than has been declared. Indeed, even one of the documents provided by Iraq indicates that the purity of the agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than declared.
There are also indications that the agent was weaponized.
Consequently, it was said that the agent was never weaponized.
Iraq said that the small quantity of [the] agent remaining after the Gulf War was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.
UNMOVIC, however, has information that conflicts with this account. There are indications that Iraq had worked on the problem of purity and stabilization and that more had been achieved than has been declared. Indeed, even one of the documents provided by Iraq indicates that the purity of the agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than declared.
There are also indications that the agent was weaponized.
There was no procedural alteration to the UNSCR 1441 inspections nor a substantive breakthrough by Iraq between January 27 and February 14, 2003. The change that happened was political. Blix switched his priority from the mandated disarmament, where Iraq was clearly not complying again, to obfuscating the UNSCR 1441 inspections. Excerpt from OIF FAQ post A problem of definition in the Iraq controversy:
OIF opponents typically cite Blix's February 14, 2003 update briefing that followed Blix's scathing January 27, 2003 update briefing and preceded the March 6, 2003 UNMOVIC Clusters document. Blix was clear in his February briefing that Saddam was noncompliant; in spite of that, Blix employed subtly misleading wording that enemy propagandists exploited to obfuscate the disarmament mandates and falsely assert UNMOVIC's role was to search for WMD to disarm (as opposed to verify Iraq had disarmed as mandated), UN inspectors assessed no WMD, Iraq was sufficiently cooperating, and the timeframe for the Saddam regime to comply was open-ended.
I am puzzled as to why the UK Iraq Inquiry believes the UNMOVIC Clusters document presented to the UN Security Council on March 7, 2003 should have "prompted" a "formal reassessment of the JIC’s judgements" or before that, a "review of UK policy". The UNMOVIC findings that triggered OIF in 2003 were virtually the same as the UNSCOM findings that triggered Operation Desert Fox in 1998. In terms of "significant finds by inspectors in the period leading up to military action in March 2003", the Clusters document is packed with UNSCR 687 violations and upholds "the view that Iraqi behaviour was preventing UNMOVIC from carrying out its tasks", in particular Iraq's continued failure to provide the verified total declaration of Saddam's WMD that was required to begin the mandated disarmament.
The UK Iraq Inquiry citing Blix's February 14, 2003 briefing while ignoring his January 27, 2003 briefing to the UN Security Council is a dead giveaway of an intent to mislead the public like Dr. Blix did on the UNSCR 1441 inspections and how his findings actually justified OIF.
Chilcot report:
18. ... The inspectors reported that Iraqi co‑operation, while far from perfect, was improving.
...
337. By March 2003, however:
... • The inspectors believed that they were making progress and expected to achieve more co‑operation from Iraq.
...
805. The following key findings are from Section 3.7:
... • Dr Blix reported to the Security Council on 7 March that there had been an acceleration of initiatives from Iraq and, while they did not constitute immediate co‑operation, they were welcome. UNMOVIC would be proposing a work programme for the Security Council’s approval, based on key tasks for Iraq to address. It would take months to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant personnel and draw conclusions.
...
337. By March 2003, however:
... • The inspectors believed that they were making progress and expected to achieve more co‑operation from Iraq.
...
805. The following key findings are from Section 3.7:
... • Dr Blix reported to the Security Council on 7 March that there had been an acceleration of initiatives from Iraq and, while they did not constitute immediate co‑operation, they were welcome. UNMOVIC would be proposing a work programme for the Security Council’s approval, based on key tasks for Iraq to address. It would take months to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant personnel and draw conclusions.
See the OIF FAQ answer to "Did Bush allow enough time for the inspections".
The UN inspectors could not have made even beginning progress with Iraq given that, as UNSCOM and UNMOVIC reported and the Iraq Survey Group confirmed, the Saddam regime never provided the "currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes" that was required "to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations" (UNSCR 1441). Excerpt from the UNMOVIC Clusters document:
As earlier mentioned, after the defection of Lieutenant-General Hussein Kamal in August 1995, Iraq provided new chemical, biological and missile declarations. And on 7 December 2002, Iraq provided a further declaration that in essence repeated the information in the earlier declarations.
Little of the detail in these declarations, such as production quantities, dates of events and unilateral destruction activities, can be confirmed. Such information is critical to an assessment of the status of disarmament. Furthermore, in some instances, UNMOVIC has information that conflicts with the information in the declaration.
... With respect to stockpiles of bulk agent stated to have been destroyed, there is evidence to suggest that these was [sic] not destroyed as declared by Iraq.
Little of the detail in these declarations, such as production quantities, dates of events and unilateral destruction activities, can be confirmed. Such information is critical to an assessment of the status of disarmament. Furthermore, in some instances, UNMOVIC has information that conflicts with the information in the declaration.
... With respect to stockpiles of bulk agent stated to have been destroyed, there is evidence to suggest that these was [sic] not destroyed as declared by Iraq.
"UNMOVIC would be proposing a work programme for the Security Council’s approval, based on key tasks for Iraq to address. It would take months to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant personnel and draw conclusions" is a stark admission that the Saddam regime made negligible substantive progress towards the mandated compliance over the four months of UNSCR 1441's "final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations". Dr. Blix's proposal would have replaced the UNSCR 1441 "enhanced inspection regime" and started over with a new pliable post-1441 ad hoc procedure.
The "Iraqi co‑operation, while far from perfect, was improving" and "acceleration of initiatives from Iraq and, while they did not constitute immediate co‑operation, they were welcome" were recycled from the "tactics of delay and deception" (President Clinton, 17FEB98) that Iraq used against the military threat that enabled the UNSCOM inspections. It's unbelievable with so many years of the same tactics by Iraq that UNMOVIC inspectors and the UK Iraq Inquiry failed (or pretended not) to recognize the Iraqi tricks for what they were.
Fortunately, Prime Minister Blair, a veteran UNSCR 678 enforcer who'd seen it before, recognized what Iraq was doing again. The Iraq Survey Group confirmed that the "progress", "co-operation", and "acceleration of initiatives" were no more than a "token effort" (ISG), obviously exaggerated by Blix, and in fact, "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" (ISG).
Chilcot report:
586. The Government, still concerned about the nature of the public debate on WMD
in the UK, sought to ensure that the Status Report included existing ISG material
highlighting the strategic intentions of Saddam Hussein’s regime and breaches of
Security Council resolutions.
587. Mr Blair remained concerned about continuing public and Parliamentary criticism of the pre‑conflict intelligence, the failure to find WMD and the decision to invade Iraq. After the reports from the Hutton Inquiry, the ISG and the US Commission, he sought to demonstrate that, although “the exact basis for action was not as we thought”, the invasion had still been justified.
...
589. The explanation for military action put forward by Mr Blair in October 2004 was not the one given before the conflict.
587. Mr Blair remained concerned about continuing public and Parliamentary criticism of the pre‑conflict intelligence, the failure to find WMD and the decision to invade Iraq. After the reports from the Hutton Inquiry, the ISG and the US Commission, he sought to demonstrate that, although “the exact basis for action was not as we thought”, the invasion had still been justified.
...
589. The explanation for military action put forward by Mr Blair in October 2004 was not the one given before the conflict.
The UK Iraq Inquiry's assertion that "The explanation for military action put forward by Mr Blair in October 2004 was not the one given before the conflict" contradicts itself: a hefty part of the Chilcot report is devoted to Prime Minister Blair and other officials' arguments for "the strategic intentions of Saddam Hussein’s regime and breaches of Security Council resolutions" leading up to OIF.
The UK Iraq Inquiry is correct that UK and US officials cited pre-war intelligence estimates in their presentation, but intel estimates were not the justification for OIF because they could not be the justification for a UNSCR 678 enforcement according to its controlling law, policy, and precedent. By procedure, casus belli was always "the strategic intentions of Saddam Hussein’s regime and breaches of Security Council resolutions". For example, Secretary of State Powell at the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003:
This is important day for us all as we review the situation with respect to Iraq and its disarmament obligations under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441. Last November 8, this council passed Resolution 1441 by a unanimous vote. The purpose of that resolution was to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had already been found guilty of material breach of its obligations, stretching back over 16 previous resolutions and 12 years. Resolution 1441 was not dealing with an innocent party, but a regime this council has repeatedly convicted over the years. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance, one last chance to come into compliance or to face serious consequences. No council member present in voting on that day had any illusions about the nature and intent of the resolution or what serious consequences meant if Iraq did not comply.
And to assist in its disarmament, we called on Iraq to cooperate with returning inspectors from UNMOVIC and IAEA.
We laid down tough standards for Iraq to meet to allow the inspectors to do their job.
This council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm and not on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors; they are not detectives.
And to assist in its disarmament, we called on Iraq to cooperate with returning inspectors from UNMOVIC and IAEA.
We laid down tough standards for Iraq to meet to allow the inspectors to do their job.
This council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm and not on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors; they are not detectives.
So Blair is correct that the "invasion had still been justified". His March 18, 2003 speech in the House of Commons, his signature speech "before the conflict", was focused on "the strategic intentions of Saddam Hussein’s regime and breaches of Security Council resolutions" in line with the UNSCR 678 enforcement. See President Bush's case and determination on Iraq, which are also plainly based on Saddam's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire, pursuant to UNSCR 678. By procedure, OIF's casus belli was Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441), which are confirmed across the board, this time in Saddam's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441).
Legally speaking, any finding of a Gulf War ceasefire violation, not limited to paragraphs 8 to 13 of UNSCR 687, was a significant validation of OIF's justification. The UNMOVIC and UNCHR findings that principally triggered OIF and the ISG, IPP, UNCHR, and IIC post-war findings are overflowing with ceasefire violations.
Chilcot report:
473. Mr Rycroft replied to Mr Brummell on 15 March:
“This is to confirm that it is indeed the Prime Minister’s unequivocal view that Iraq is in further material breach of its obligations, as in OP4 of UNSCR 1441, because of ‘false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure to comply with, and co‑operate fully in the interpretation of, this resolution’.”474. It is unclear what specific grounds Mr Blair relied upon in reaching his view.
For the "specific grounds Mr Blair relied upon in reaching his view", Prime Minister Blair could have simply pointed to the cover title of the Clusters document, "Unresolved Disarmament Issues Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes", and left it at that.
The suggestiveness of "It is unclear what specific grounds Mr Blair relied upon in reaching his view" looks like a sly trick to further the UK Iraq Inquiry pretending that the Clusters document exonerated the Saddam regime when in fact, the UNMOVIC report confirmed Iraq's noncompliance with UNSCRs 687 and 1441, e.g., "Little of the detail in these declarations, such as production quantities, dates of events and unilateral destruction activities, can be confirmed. Such information is critical to an assessment of the status of disarmament. Furthermore, in some instances, UNMOVIC has information that conflicts with the information in the declaration."
Chilcot report:
285. The French President’s office issued a statement early on 18 March stating that
the US ultimatum was a unilateral decision going against the will of the international
community who wanted to pursue Iraqi disarmament in accordance with resolution
1441. It stated:
“... only the Security Council is authorised to legitimise the use of force. France appeals to the responsibility of all to see that international legality is respected. To disregard the legitimacy of the UN, to favour force over the law, would be to take on a heavy responsibility.”
If France sincerely "wanted to pursue Iraqi disarmament in accordance with resolution 1441", then it would not have crippled UNSCR 1441 by convincing Saddam by assurance and deed that France would sabotage the military threat that was necessary to compel Saddam's compliance. France would not have sabotaged the non-military coercive leverage of UN sanctions with "French CAs [diplomatic commercial attaches] in Baghdad, working to promote the interests of French companies while assisting them in avoiding UN sanctions" (ISG). France would not have rejected the UK "second resolution" proposal that upheld the strictly enforced disarmament standard and time limit for Iraqi compliance with UNSCR 1441 that the UNSCOM inspections taught were necessary. France would not have pushed a sham alternative to replace the UNSCR 1441 "enhanced inspection regime" for UNSCR 687. France's malfeasance on Saddam's behalf all but guaranteed that Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) would remain "unresolved disarmament issues" (UNMOVIC) for casus belli.
Iraq Watch, April 13, 2003:
The data reveals that firms in Germany and France outstripped all others in selling the most important thing — specialized chemical-industry equipment that is particularly useful for producing poison gas. Without this equipment, none of the other imports would have been of much use.
Iraq Survey Group:
From Baghdad the long struggle to outlast the containment policy of the United States imposed through the UN sanctions seemed tantalizingly close. There was considerable commitment and involvement on the part of states like Russia and Syria, who had developed economic and political stakes in the success of the Regime.
... The MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] formulated and implemented a strategy aimed at ending the UN sanctions and breaching its subsequent UN OFF program by diplomatic and economic means. Iraq pursued its related goals of ending UN sanctions and the UN OFF program by enlisting the help of three permanent UNSC members: Russia, France and China. ... Saddam expressed confidence that France and Russia would support Iraq’s efforts to further erode the UN sanctions Regime.
... The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council.
... The number of countries and companies supporting Saddam’s schemes to undermine UN sanctions increased dramatically over time from 1995 to 2003 (see figure 54).
... In 2001, Tariq Aziz characterized the French approach to UN sanctions as adhering to the letter of sanctions but not the spirit. This was demonstrated by the presence of French CAs [diplomatic commercial attaches] in Baghdad, working to promote the interests of French companies while assisting them in avoiding UN sanctions.
... In May 2002, IIS correspondence addressed to Saddam stated that a MFA (quite possibly an IIS officer under diplomatic cover) met with French parliamentarian to discuss Iraq-Franco relations. The French politician assured the Iraqi that France would use its veto in the UNSC against any American decision to attack Iraq, according to the IIS memo.
... The MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] formulated and implemented a strategy aimed at ending the UN sanctions and breaching its subsequent UN OFF program by diplomatic and economic means. Iraq pursued its related goals of ending UN sanctions and the UN OFF program by enlisting the help of three permanent UNSC members: Russia, France and China. ... Saddam expressed confidence that France and Russia would support Iraq’s efforts to further erode the UN sanctions Regime.
... The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council.
... The number of countries and companies supporting Saddam’s schemes to undermine UN sanctions increased dramatically over time from 1995 to 2003 (see figure 54).
... In 2001, Tariq Aziz characterized the French approach to UN sanctions as adhering to the letter of sanctions but not the spirit. This was demonstrated by the presence of French CAs [diplomatic commercial attaches] in Baghdad, working to promote the interests of French companies while assisting them in avoiding UN sanctions.
... In May 2002, IIS correspondence addressed to Saddam stated that a MFA (quite possibly an IIS officer under diplomatic cover) met with French parliamentarian to discuss Iraq-Franco relations. The French politician assured the Iraqi that France would use its veto in the UNSC against any American decision to attack Iraq, according to the IIS memo.
France, Germany, and Russia (and China) corrupted the UN Security Council with their complicity with the Saddam regime's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441). See The Regime Finance and Procurement section of the ISG report, Iraq's Suppliers at Iraq Watch, and IIC's Report on the Manipulation of the Oil-for-Food Programme to learn more about Saddam's accomplices.
Regarding "France appeals to the responsibility of all to see that international legality is respected", the Chilcot report does not provide an in-depth examination of the legal basis of OIF. Instead, it provides a superficial summary of Lord Goldsmith's legal advice to Prime Minister Blair in a way that confuses the legal basis of OIF and favors the French claim that OIF was illegal under international law.
To clarify the legal basis of OIF and compensate for the Chilcot report, see barrister Carl Gardner's The invasion of Iraq was lawful for an examination of the legal basis of OIF from a British perspective. Excerpt:
... I agree with Lord Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March 2003, first that the safer course would be to seek a second resolution authorising force; the UK did that, of course, and failed; and second, that the “revival” argument, that further material breach by Iraq would revive the authorisation of force in UNSCR 678, is a reasonable one.
I’d go further, in fact: I agree with what Lord Goldsmith seems to have concluded a few days later – that the “revival” theory is the better view, to be preferred to the alternative put forward by Elizabeth Wilmshurst, that resolution 1441 clearly required a further decision by the Security Council. She told the Chilcot Inquiry that the wording of resolution 1441 had this effect (see page 30, line 7 of the transcript) – that was what made the position different from 1998, when as I’ve said she had agreed with the revival theory (though she now thinks it was “strained” even then). I find it difficult, looking at UNSCR 1441, to find the language that she says excludes the revival theory she supported in 1998, and reserves to the Security Council alone the sole competence to act subsequently, in the sense that its inaction should preclude action by others.
It follows that I agree with what Lord Goldsmith said was the legal justification for war. Member States were always authorised to use all necessary means to restore peace and security in Iraq. The authorisation was suspended; but on condition Iraq verifiably disarm. Its repeated material breach and failure to take its final opportunity meant it was lawful for Member States to use force on the basis of UNSCR 678. Any other approach seems to me to build far too much on words such as assessment in OP4 and consider in OP12; and to empty of all practical meaning the threat of serious consequences in OP13.
I’d go further, in fact: I agree with what Lord Goldsmith seems to have concluded a few days later – that the “revival” theory is the better view, to be preferred to the alternative put forward by Elizabeth Wilmshurst, that resolution 1441 clearly required a further decision by the Security Council. She told the Chilcot Inquiry that the wording of resolution 1441 had this effect (see page 30, line 7 of the transcript) – that was what made the position different from 1998, when as I’ve said she had agreed with the revival theory (though she now thinks it was “strained” even then). I find it difficult, looking at UNSCR 1441, to find the language that she says excludes the revival theory she supported in 1998, and reserves to the Security Council alone the sole competence to act subsequently, in the sense that its inaction should preclude action by others.
It follows that I agree with what Lord Goldsmith said was the legal justification for war. Member States were always authorised to use all necessary means to restore peace and security in Iraq. The authorisation was suspended; but on condition Iraq verifiably disarm. Its repeated material breach and failure to take its final opportunity meant it was lawful for Member States to use force on the basis of UNSCR 678. Any other approach seems to me to build far too much on words such as assessment in OP4 and consider in OP12; and to empty of all practical meaning the threat of serious consequences in OP13.
To clarify Gardner's statement, "the safer course would be to seek a second resolution authorising force; the UK did that", the UK's proposed "second resolution" did not introduce a new "authorisation of force" beyond the categorical preface, "Acting under Chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations". Rather, the proposal echoed UNSCRs 687 and 1441 by "recalling" UNSCR 678.
For an examination of the legal basis of OIF from an American perspective, see the OIF FAQ answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom legal". For the US, the UNSCR 678 mandate and authorization to "use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area" was continuous since 1990-1991 for Operations Desert Storm, Vigilant Warrior, Desert Strike, Desert Fox, Iraqi Freedom, the no-fly zones, etc. and continually revived by Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) per "resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 678) that had been continuous since 1990-1991. As Gardner points out, "Member States were always authorised to use all necessary means to restore peace and security in Iraq," and per US law, "Iraq's noncompliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution[s] 687 [and 688] constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region" (Public Law 102-190). Nonetheless, while reserving the legal position and ample precedent he inherited from President Clinton, President Bush acceded to Prime Minister Blair's guidance for Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441).
Chilcot report:
18. The UK Government’s efforts to secure a second resolution faced opposition
from those countries, notably France, Germany and Russia, which believed that the
inspections process could continue. ...
19. By early March, the US Administration was not prepared to allow inspections to continue or give Mr Blair more time to try to achieve support for action. The attempt to gain support for a second resolution was abandoned.
20. In the Inquiry’s view, the diplomatic options had not at that stage been exhausted. Military action was therefore not a last resort.
19. By early March, the US Administration was not prepared to allow inspections to continue or give Mr Blair more time to try to achieve support for action. The attempt to gain support for a second resolution was abandoned.
20. In the Inquiry’s view, the diplomatic options had not at that stage been exhausted. Military action was therefore not a last resort.
"France, Germany and Russia, which believed that the inspections process could continue" is a mischaracterization. France, Germany, and Russia (and China) didn't try to "continue" the inspections process of UNSCR 1441. The UNSCR 1441 procedure had been mindfully constructed with the lessons learned from a decade-plus of intransigent Iraqi noncompliance. The lessons that informed UNSCR 1441 included the need to strictly enforce the Gulf War ceasefire disarmament standard with a time limit enabled by credible threat sufficient to compel Saddam. The UK's proposed "second resolution" stayed true to UNSCR 1441. But instead of standing with Britain and America to compel Saddam's compliance with the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), France, Germany, and Russia tried to replace the UNSCR 1441 "enhanced inspection regime" with a sham alternative that obviated the strictly enforced ceasefire disarmament standard and time limit and credible threat.
Without those features in the procedure, no alternative approach to UNSCR 687—such as the pliable UNSCR 1284 that Iraq killed in the cradle after it killed UNSCOM—could hope to bring about the Saddam regime's "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 1441).
The Chilcot report is wrong that "the US Administration was not prepared to allow inspections to continue". President Bush demonstrably was willing to extend the inspections beyond the Clusters document, but only if the integrity of the UNSCR 1441 "enhanced inspection regime" was upheld. The UK proposal qualified, so the US agreed to it. France, Germany, and Russia's alternative did not qualify, so the UK and US did not agree to it.
Prime Minister Blair is clear that "The attempt to gain support for a second resolution was abandoned" not because President Bush disallowed it. The reason that the UK proposal failed is that Saddam's accomplices on the Security Council were dug in on their sham alternative, which was intolerable to the faithful UNSCR 678 enforcers.
"In the Inquiry’s view, the diplomatic options had not at that stage been exhausted" implies the UK Iraq Inquiry agrees with France, Germany, and Russia's alternative to the UK's "second resolution" proposal. Yet supporting commentary, for example, UNMOVIC inspector Michael Elleman and UNMOVIC director Hans Blix, makes clear that their 1441-replacement would have disabled the necessary coercive threat, done away with the necessary time limit, and inverted the ceasefire disarmament standard with a nebulous procedure suited to Saddam's anti-disarmament strategy. According to its proponents, the 1441-replacement would have cleared the Saddam regime on WMD—"We were prepared to state there were no WMD in Iraq" (Elleman)—contrary to UNMOVIC finding "about 100 unresolved disarmament issues" and the Iraq Survey Group finding "hundreds of cases, based on both documents, physical evidence and the testimony of Iraqis, of activities that were prohibited under the initial U.N. Resolution 687 and that should have been reported under 1441, with Iraqi testimony that not only did they not tell the U.N. about this, they were instructed not to do it and they hid material" (Kay).
Based on the UNMOVIC Clusters document, ISG Duelfer report, and commentary by proponents of the 1441-replacement, the UK and US were responsible to keep faith with the UNSCR 1441 "enhanced inspection regime" and right to not agree to the compromised 1441-replacement. France, Germany, and Russia's sham alternative and overall complicity with Saddam's noncompliance ruined the diplomatic means to enforce the Gulf War ceasefire terms and impelled the UNSCR 678 military action that finally brought Iraq into its mandated compliance.
Chilcot report:
168. Dr Blix stated that full co‑operation was a nebulous concept; and a deadline of
15 April would be too early. ...
"[F]ull co-operation" with the UNSCR 1441 inspections meant the "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 1441), i.e., the straightforward "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), which was not a nebulous concept at all. Every UNSCR 1441 report from Dr. Blix, including his February 14, 2003 briefing, confirmed Iraq remained noncompliant with UNSCR 687. From 1991 to 2003, Iraq never took even the first step towards "full co-operation", i.e., "Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 ... (a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities; (b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities" (UNSCR 687), which had a deadline of April 18, 1991. The reason that "a deadline of 15 April [2003] would be too early" for Blix is that he reacted to Iraq's failure to comply in its "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) by proposing to start over with a new ad hoc procedure that was nebulous, unlike UNSCRs 687 and 1441.
Chilcot report:
As Sir John Chilcot said at the launch of the launch of the Inquiry on 30 July 2009, the purpose of the Inquiry was to examine the United Kingdom's involvement in Iraq, including the way decisions were made and actions taken, to establish as accurately and reliably as possible what happened and to identify lessons that can be learned. The Inquiry considered the period from 2001 up to the end of July 2009.
The UK's decisions and actions for the UNSCR 678 enforcement with OIF, the same as the US's, cannot be evaluated accurately and reliably if they're considered only from 2001 onward. Prime Minister Blair's decision-making on Iraq, the same as President Bush's, was based on the progression of the UNSCR 678 enforcement from 1990-1991 onward with the lessons learned before 2001 on what was needed to enforce UNSCR 687 against Saddam's intransigence. Thus, making 2001 the baseline enables the UK Iraq Inquiry's misrepresentation of the decisions and actions of the UNSCR 678 enforcers and Saddam's accomplices. The progression from ODF in 1998 to OIF in particular is critical to understand the UK and US's path to OIF and the opposition to it.
Excerpt from the OIF FAQ answer to "What were President Bush’s alternatives with Iraq":
The key to understand President Bush's decision to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (Public Law 107-243) with Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) lies with President Clinton's enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire as it peaked in 1998 with Operation Desert Fox (ODF).
The interplay of the intransigently noncompliant Saddam regime, the UNSCR 678 enforcers and Saddam's accomplices on the UN Security Council, and the UNSCOM and UNMOVIC findings that triggered the ODF and OIF enforcements was substantially repeated and carried forward from 1998 to 2002-2003. To get the picture, see U.N. Rebuffs U.S. on Threat to Iraq if It Breaks Pact, Allies Sit on Sidelines for Desert Fox, Hide and Seek, and The Iran Deal’s Fatal Flaw. See UNSCRs 1154, 1194, and 1205, the triggering UNSCOM Butler report, and President Clinton's announcement and determination for ODF. Compare them to UNSCR 1441, the triggering UNMOVIC Clusters document, and President Bush's determination plus addendum for OIF. 2002-2003 in the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement was a replay of 1998. Understanding ODF is the key to understanding OIF. Thus, by setting 2001 as the baseline, the UK Iraq Inquiry removed essential context from the Chilcot report.
Chilcot report:
602. As a junior partner in the Coalition, the UK worked within a planning framework
established by the US.
It should be noted that while the US was the practical leader of the partnership, Prime Minister Blair was senior to President Bush as a policy maker in the UNSCR 678 enforcement. The Chilcot report shows Bush constantly acceding to Blair's guidance. Their determination for OIF was consistent with the precedential determination for ODF made by Prime Minister Blair and President Clinton while Bush was still governor of Texas. So while the UK was "a junior partner" on the practical side of the "planning framework", on the policy side where the decision was made, the UK was the senior partner. President Bush clearly followed Prime Minister Blair's lead while upholding the precedent that Prime Minister Blair authored with President Clinton in 1998 and President Bush only inherited when he took over the White House in 2001.
Chilcot report:
The UK decision to support US military action
24. President Bush decided at the end of 2001 to pursue a policy of regime change in Iraq.
25. The UK shared the broad objective of finding a way to deal with Saddam Hussein’s defiance of UN Security Council resolutions and his assumed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes. However, based on consistent legal advice, the UK could not share the US objective of regime change. The UK Government therefore set as its objective the disarmament of Iraq in accordance with the obligations imposed in a series of Security Council resolutions.
...
318. The JIC Assessment of 10 October 2002 stated that Saddam Hussein’s “overriding objective” was to “avoid a US attack that would threaten his regime”.
24. President Bush decided at the end of 2001 to pursue a policy of regime change in Iraq.
25. The UK shared the broad objective of finding a way to deal with Saddam Hussein’s defiance of UN Security Council resolutions and his assumed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes. However, based on consistent legal advice, the UK could not share the US objective of regime change. The UK Government therefore set as its objective the disarmament of Iraq in accordance with the obligations imposed in a series of Security Council resolutions.
...
318. The JIC Assessment of 10 October 2002 stated that Saddam Hussein’s “overriding objective” was to “avoid a US attack that would threaten his regime”.
To clarify, as the Chilcot report vaguely suggests with "The UK shared the broad objective of finding a way to deal with Saddam Hussein’s defiance of UN Security Council resolutions", the "policy of regime change in Iraq" was not an end policy for the United States. Rather, President Bush inherited it from Presidents HW Bush and Clinton as a UNSCR 678 enforcement measure that responded to the "overwhelming ... evidence" (President Clinton, 31OCT98) that the Saddam regime would never comply with the Gulf War ceasefire terms with the sober acceptance that Iraqi regime change would be needed to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235). In 1998, the regime change "policy" was pushed to the fore of the UNSCR 678 enforcement by the failing sanctions and Saddam's continued unrelenting noncompliance which compelled Operation Desert Fox, defeated UNSCOM, and brought President Clinton's judgement that "Iraq has abused its final chance".
With the UN sanctions all but defeated and the feebleness of ODF telling Saddam that the UK and US military threat was too restricted to compel Iraq, it was understood that mustering a credible threat of regime change was necessary to coerce Saddam to cooperate with the Gulf War ceasefire compliance process. That understanding informed President Bush's decisions after 9/11 towards resolving Iraq's mandated compliance: see the OIF FAQ retrospective #ultimatumoptions section.
Whether or not "the UK could not share the US objective of regime change" was secondary to whether the UK shared the primary US objective of "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (Public Law 107-243). Thus, the UK "objective of finding a way to deal with Saddam Hussein’s defiance of UN Security Council resolutions" and "objective [of] the disarmament of Iraq in accordance with the obligations imposed in a series of Security Council resolutions" effectively made Iraqi regime change the UK "policy" too since, as the Iraq Survey Group confirmed, "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" (ISG). Saddam's intransigence through Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) and the complicity of some UN Security Council members with Iraq's noncompliance rendered unsuspending the Gulf War as the only viable way to achieve the UK and US's primary objective of Iraq's compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire terms pursuant to UNSCR 678.
Chilcot report:
15. But US willingness to act through the UN was limited. Following the Iraqi declaration
of 7 December 2002, the UK perceived that President Bush had decided that the US
would take military action in early 2003 if Saddam Hussein had not been disarmed and
was still in power.
16. The timing of military action was entirely driven by the US Administration.
17. At the end of January 2003, Mr Blair accepted the US timetable for military action by mid‑March. President Bush agreed to support a second resolution to help Mr Blair. ...
602. ... It [UK] had limited influence over a process dominated increasingly by the US military.
16. The timing of military action was entirely driven by the US Administration.
17. At the end of January 2003, Mr Blair accepted the US timetable for military action by mid‑March. President Bush agreed to support a second resolution to help Mr Blair. ...
602. ... It [UK] had limited influence over a process dominated increasingly by the US military.
It's misleading of the UK Iraq Inquiry to pose US military action as conflicting with UN action. In fact, the UN inspections depended on the coercive leverage of US military threat. "US willingness to act through the UN was limited" by the lesson from the UNSCOM inspections and UNSCOM's failure that a credible threat of regime change, mainly provided by the US military, was required for the UN inspections to credibly work against Saddam's intransigence. In 2002, after four years of Iraq disallowing inspections altogether, President Bush and Congress mustered the credible threat of regime change that was the prerequisite for the UN Security Council to make UNSCR 1441 and the requirement for compelling Saddam to agree to UNSCR 1441.
However, the required credible threat of regime change could be effective for only a finite window. Past that point, the US military deployment and its coercive leverage on Saddam would disintegrate. Everyone, including President Bush, had "limited influence over a process dominated increasingly by the US military" because the credible threat that was required for credible inspections was dictated by the practical reality of the deployment, "the US timetable for military action". A US military force that could be sustained indefinitely without a "US timetable for military action", such as the US military presence in the area while Iraq had disallowed inspections, could not provide the credible threat of regime change required to compel Saddam. Excerpt from OIF FAQ post A problem of definition in the Iraq controversy:
Blix acknowledges that the credible military threat presented by the build-up of the OIF invasion force was necessary to compel Saddam's cooperation. Blix also acknowledges that once the force build-up surpassed a certain mass, it could no longer be sustained thereafter as an indefinite presence. In other words, Blix understood that once the OIF invasion force had ripened to the ready condition to deploy, the credible military threat of regime change that enabled the UNSCR 1441 inspections would need to be used on schedule or lost altogether. The effective deadline for the UNSCR 1441 "final opportunity to comply" was a practical necessity as well as a response to Saddam's "tactics of delay and deception" (Clinton). To gloss over this fatal flaw in his proposed alternative, Blix observed that Iraq had begun to show signs of cooperation at about the 50,000 point of the troop build-up, so he claimed that freezing the size at 50,000 indefinitely would ensure an indefinite Iraqi cooperation. However, 50,000 was not by itself a sufficient size to pose a credible military threat of regime change. The Blix alternative relies on the unreasonable assumption that Iraq was compelled to begin cooperation with UNMOVIC by the subthreatening size of 50,000 rather than the passing of the 50,000 point on the developing trajectory of the force build-up towards the UNSCR 1441 deadline. Blix, perhaps deliberately, conflated the context and signal communicated by 50,000 with the number itself.
Blix also ignores that even at the UNSCR 1441 deadline under threat of the mature OIF invasion force poised to attack, Iraq's "token effort to comply" (ISG) matched the pattern of feints with UNSCOM and failed to meet the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441): "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions. Outward acts of compliance belied a covert desire to resume WMD activities" (ISG).
Blix also ignores that even at the UNSCR 1441 deadline under threat of the mature OIF invasion force poised to attack, Iraq's "token effort to comply" (ISG) matched the pattern of feints with UNSCOM and failed to meet the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441): "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions. Outward acts of compliance belied a covert desire to resume WMD activities" (ISG).
The UK Iraq Inquiry's failure to understand that the UNSCR 1441 inspections required a credible threat of regime change to compel Saddam, and that "the US timetable for military action" was a practical reality for a threat that was sufficiently credible to compel Saddam, is a serious flaw of the Chilcot report.
As for "the UK perceived that President Bush had decided that the US would take military action in early 2003 if Saddam Hussein had not been disarmed and was still in power", hence, Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). Credible intent to follow through if Iraq failed the UNSCR 1441 UNSCR 687-compliance test was integral to the credible threat of regime change that made the UNSCR 1441 inspections possible at all. UNSCR 1441 was also the final opportunity for the UNSCR 678 enforcers to bring Iraq into its mandated compliance. When "Iraq ... abused its final chance" (Clinton) in 1998, Operation Desert Fox used up the penultimate military enforcement measure, upon which Saddam nullified Iraq's ceasefire obligations in Iraqi law. By 1998, the non-military coercive leverage of UN sanctions had failed for the UN inspections. By 2001, the sanctions-based 'containment' had all but failed as Iraq reconstituted Saddam's WMD program and expanded his terrorism "cartel" (IPP). Credible threat of regime change was the last remaining leverage to compel the practically uncontained Saddam to comply with the Gulf War ceasefire terms. The threat of regime change would no longer have been credible if Saddam called our bluff on his "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) and exposed the threat as another ODF-like paper tiger or weaker dud. With the last coercive leverage put down, Saddam who "never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" (ISG), unreconstructed and noncompliant across the board, with his accomplices on the UN Security Council now in control and the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) compromised by their sham alternative, would have finally sloughed off the Gulf War ceasefire.
In 1998 when UNSCOM and ODF failed, Prime Minister Blair and President Clinton could still kick the can down the road with an ad hoc stopgap 'containment'. But with the UN sanctions fallen, that option was a dead end by 2002, if it ever worked at all. So in 2003, it was a binary choice for Prime Minister Blair and President Bush when Saddam called our bluff on his "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) with the UNMOVIC Clusters document. Either accept an unreconstructed Saddam moving on from the neutered Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, or unsuspend the Gulf War to bring Iraq into its mandated compliance pursuant to UNSCR 678. Since Bush was faithful in his duties as President, there was only one choice for us: The US law and policy on Iraq did not accommodate "the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions ... poses to international peace and security" (UNSCR 1441), and did not permit compromise of the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) or the failure of the UNSCR 678, Gulf War ceasefire enforcement. President Clinton, February 17, 1998:
Saddam Hussein's Iraq reminds us of what we learned in the 20th century and warns us of what we must know about the 21st. In this century we learned through harsh experience that the only answer to aggression and illegal behavior is firmness, determination, and, when necessary, action.
In the next century, the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now: a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals, who travel the world among us unnoticed. If we fail to respond today, Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity -- even in the face of a clear message from the United Nations Security Council and clear evidence of a weapons of mass destruction program.
In the next century, the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now: a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals, who travel the world among us unnoticed. If we fail to respond today, Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity -- even in the face of a clear message from the United Nations Security Council and clear evidence of a weapons of mass destruction program.
From what I gather, Prime Minister Blair was as faithful in his duties as his American counterpart, and the UK law and policy on Iraq agreed with their American counterpart.
Chilcot report:
503. Iraq’s chemical, biological and ballistic missile programmes were seen as a threat
to international peace and security in the Middle East region, but Iraq was viewed as
a less serious proliferation threat than other key countries of concern – Iran, Libya and
North Korea – which had current nuclear programmes.
The UK Iraq Inquiry overlooks that Iraq's threat was primarily defined by its noncompliance with the diagnostic-cum-prescriptive Gulf War ceasefire terms, "Recognizing the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security" (UNSCR 1441). Therefore, Iraq's WMD threat was evaluated differently than other rogue states that possess WMD not because of the WMD items in and of themselves, but because of the distinctively threatening aggressive and unrestrained "intentions" (UNSCR 687) with WMD that the Saddam regime established with the Gulf War, which assigned Iraq a unique threat status that could only be resolved through the mandated compliance with UNSCRs 687, 688, 949, etc..
Secretary of State Albright, March 26, 1997:
Under resolutions approved by the UN Security Council, Iraq is required to demonstrate its peaceful intentions by meeting a series of obligations. It must end its weapons of mass destruction programs and destroy any such weapons produced. It must cooperate with the inspection and monitoring regime established by the UN Special Commission, or UNSCOM. And it must recognize its border with Kuwait, return stolen property, account for POW/MIAs, end support for terrorism and stop brutalizing its people.
...
Our view, which is unshakable, is that Iraq must prove its peaceful intentions. It can only do that by complying with all of the Security Council resolutions to which it is subject. ... And the evidence is overwhelming that Saddam Hussein's intentions will never be peaceful.
...
Our view, which is unshakable, is that Iraq must prove its peaceful intentions. It can only do that by complying with all of the Security Council resolutions to which it is subject. ... And the evidence is overwhelming that Saddam Hussein's intentions will never be peaceful.
President Clinton, December 16, 1998:
Other countries possess weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. With Saddam, there's one big difference: he has used them, not once but repeatedly -- unleashing chemical weapons against Iranian troops during a decade-long war, not only against soldiers, but against civilians; firing Scud missiles at the citizens of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Iran -- not only against a foreign enemy, but even against his own people, gassing Kurdish civilians in Northern Iraq. The international community had little doubt then, and I have no doubt today, that left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will use these terrible weapons again.
... Heavy as they are, the costs of action must be weighed against the price of inaction. If Saddam defies the world and we fail to respond, we will face a far greater threat in the future. Saddam will strike again at his neighbors; he will make war on his own people. And mark my words, he will develop weapons of mass destruction. He will deploy them, and he will use them.
... Heavy as they are, the costs of action must be weighed against the price of inaction. If Saddam defies the world and we fail to respond, we will face a far greater threat in the future. Saddam will strike again at his neighbors; he will make war on his own people. And mark my words, he will develop weapons of mass destruction. He will deploy them, and he will use them.
Prime Minister Blair, March 18, 2003:
But first, Iraq and its WMD.
In April 1991, after the Gulf war, Iraq was given 15 days to provide a full and final declaration of all its WMD.
Saddam had used the weapons against Iran, against his own people, causing thousands of deaths. He had had plans to use them against allied forces. It became clear after the Gulf war that the WMD ambitions of Iraq were far more extensive than hitherto thought. This issue was identified by the UN as one for urgent remedy. Unscom, the weapons inspection team, was set up. They were expected to complete their task following the declaration at the end of April 1991.
The declaration when it came was false - a blanket denial of the programme, other than in a very tentative form. So the 12-year game began.
In April 1991, after the Gulf war, Iraq was given 15 days to provide a full and final declaration of all its WMD.
Saddam had used the weapons against Iran, against his own people, causing thousands of deaths. He had had plans to use them against allied forces. It became clear after the Gulf war that the WMD ambitions of Iraq were far more extensive than hitherto thought. This issue was identified by the UN as one for urgent remedy. Unscom, the weapons inspection team, was set up. They were expected to complete their task following the declaration at the end of April 1991.
The declaration when it came was false - a blanket denial of the programme, other than in a very tentative form. So the 12-year game began.
Excerpt from the OIF FAQ answer to "Why not free a noncompliant Saddam":
[T]he "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) for the Gulf War ceasefire was purposefully designed with a spectrum of essential international norms to resolve the manifold threat of Iraq established with the Gulf War ... The politics have obfuscated that demonstration of Saddam's WMD was not the essential issue of the Gulf War ceasefire. The essential issue of the Gulf War ceasefire was the reconstruction of the "Government of Iraq" to satisfy "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687). The essential threat posed by the "Government of Iraq" was the unreconstructed nature of the Saddam regime, rather than Iraq's armament. The mandated disarmament of Iraq's WMD program was only a measurable symptom, albeit Iraq's WMD breach was an especially dangerous symptom. The essential purpose of enforcing Iraq's compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire measures, including the WMD disarmament mandates, was to assess whether the nature of the "Government of Iraq" had been reconstructed "to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions" (UNSCR 687).
The Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), mandated by the UN and enforced under US law, set the diagnostic measurements-cum-prescriptive measures that defined Iraq's outstanding threat and its solution. Iraq proving it had satisfied all of its ceasefire obligations was the only prescribed and reliable way to assure that the "Government of Iraq" could be trusted with the peace. The mandated compliance was the threshold for resolving Iraq's probation pursuant to the UNSCR 660-series mandates and normalizing Iraq's international status. If Saddam failed to rehabilitate the "Government of Iraq" with the measures required by UNSCR 687 and related resolutions, then the Gulf War ceasefire would be breached with Iraq's status restored to the Gulf War. By mandate and judgement, the US as chief enforcer could not accept less from Saddam than full compliance with Iraq's ceasefire obligations, especially after 9/11 in light of Saddam's "regional and global terrorism" (IPP).
The Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), mandated by the UN and enforced under US law, set the diagnostic measurements-cum-prescriptive measures that defined Iraq's outstanding threat and its solution. Iraq proving it had satisfied all of its ceasefire obligations was the only prescribed and reliable way to assure that the "Government of Iraq" could be trusted with the peace. The mandated compliance was the threshold for resolving Iraq's probation pursuant to the UNSCR 660-series mandates and normalizing Iraq's international status. If Saddam failed to rehabilitate the "Government of Iraq" with the measures required by UNSCR 687 and related resolutions, then the Gulf War ceasefire would be breached with Iraq's status restored to the Gulf War. By mandate and judgement, the US as chief enforcer could not accept less from Saddam than full compliance with Iraq's ceasefire obligations, especially after 9/11 in light of Saddam's "regional and global terrorism" (IPP).
Again, the Saddam regime was assigned a unique threat status compared to "Iran, Libya and North Korea" because of the first part of "the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security" (UNSCR 1441). Iraq's primary threat was evaluated according to its noncompliance with the Gulf War ceasefire terms, which defined the Iraq WMD issue. The essential "need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687) with any UNSCR 687 compliance test is a reason that the UNSCR 678 enforcers could not accept the compromised procedure that Saddam's accomplices pushed to replace the UNSCR 1441 "enhanced inspection regime" for UNSCR 687.
The UK Iraq Inquiry's misunderstanding of Iraq's unique threat status and its Gulf War ceasefire compliance basis is a fundamental—even disqualifying—flaw of the Chilcot report.
Chilcot report:
333. Mr Cook set out his doubts about Saddam Hussein’s ability to deliver a strategic
attack and the degree to which Iraq posed a “clear and present danger” to the UK.
The points Mr Cook made included:
... • “Iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction in the commonly understood sense of the term – namely a credible device capable of being delivered against a strategic city target. It probably ... has biological toxins and battlefield chemical munitions, but it has had them since the 1980s when US companies sold Saddam anthrax agents and the then British Government approved chemical and munitions factories. Why is it now so urgent that we should take military action to disarm a military capacity that has been there for twenty years, and which we helped to create? Why is it necessary to resort to war this week, while Saddam’s ambition to complete his weapons programme is blocked by the presence of UN inspectors?”
... • “Iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction in the commonly understood sense of the term – namely a credible device capable of being delivered against a strategic city target. It probably ... has biological toxins and battlefield chemical munitions, but it has had them since the 1980s when US companies sold Saddam anthrax agents and the then British Government approved chemical and munitions factories. Why is it now so urgent that we should take military action to disarm a military capacity that has been there for twenty years, and which we helped to create? Why is it necessary to resort to war this week, while Saddam’s ambition to complete his weapons programme is blocked by the presence of UN inspectors?”
Mr. Cook's 1980s or pre-Gulf War reference point for American and British relations with Iraq marks him as surprisingly ignorant for a senior British official about the watershed events of 1990-1991 that consequently altered Iraq's international status and threat status and UK and US law and policy on Iraq pursuant to UNSCR 678. His view that "Saddam’s ambition to complete his weapons programme is blocked by the presence of UN inspectors" overlooks the sticking point that Iraq effectively hid proscribed items and activity from UN inspectors throughout 1991 to 2003, which the UN inspectors reported and Iraq Survey Group confirmed. Mr. Cook overlooks the danger posed by an 'incomplete' Saddam regime "weapons programme". For example, the 'incomplete' covert ready WMD capability in the IIS found by ISG, which was undeclared and unknown to UN inspectors, was markedly compatible with the deep terrorist capabilities, also managed by the IIS, found by IPP. And Mr. Cook overlooks that Saddam's terrorism and human rights abuses in violation of UNSCRs 687 and 688 were not "blocked by the presence of UN inspectors" even in theory, and those threats were also casus belli.
Chilcot report:
313. On 28 November 2001, the JIC assessed that:
• Saddam Hussein had “refused to permit any Al Qaida presence in Iraq”.
• Evidence of contact between Iraq and Usama Bin Laden (UBL) was “fragmentary and uncorroborated”; including that Iraq had been in contact with Al Qaida for exploratory discussions on toxic materials in late 1988.
• “With common enemies ... there was clearly scope for collaboration.”
• There was “no evidence that these contacts led to practical co‑operation; we judge it unlikely ... There is no evidence UBL’s organisation has ever had a presence in Iraq.”
• Practical co‑operation between Iraq and Al Qaida was “unlikely because of mutual mistrust”.
• There was “no credible evidence of covert transfers of WMD‑related technology and expertise to terrorist groups”.
314. On 29 January 2003, the JIC assessed that, despite the presence of terrorists in Iraq “with links to Al Qaida”, there was “no intelligence of current co‑operation between Iraq and Al Qaida”.
315. On 10 February 2003, the JIC judged that Al Qaida would “not carry out attacks under Iraqi direction”.
...
319. The JIC also judged that:
• Saddam’s “capability to conduct effective terrorist attacks” was “very limited”.
• Iraq’s “terrorism capability” was “inadequate to carry out chemical or biological attacks beyond individual assassination attempts using poisons”.
320. The JIC Assessment of 29 January 2003 sustained its earlier judgements on Iraq’s ability and intent to conduct terrorist operations.
321. Sir David Omand, the Security and Intelligence Co‑ordinator in the Cabinet Office from 2002 to 2005, told the Inquiry that, in March 2002, the Security Service judged that the “threat from terrorism from Saddam’s own intelligence apparatus in the event of an intervention in Iraq ... was judged to be limited and containable”.
• Saddam Hussein had “refused to permit any Al Qaida presence in Iraq”.
• Evidence of contact between Iraq and Usama Bin Laden (UBL) was “fragmentary and uncorroborated”; including that Iraq had been in contact with Al Qaida for exploratory discussions on toxic materials in late 1988.
• “With common enemies ... there was clearly scope for collaboration.”
• There was “no evidence that these contacts led to practical co‑operation; we judge it unlikely ... There is no evidence UBL’s organisation has ever had a presence in Iraq.”
• Practical co‑operation between Iraq and Al Qaida was “unlikely because of mutual mistrust”.
• There was “no credible evidence of covert transfers of WMD‑related technology and expertise to terrorist groups”.
314. On 29 January 2003, the JIC assessed that, despite the presence of terrorists in Iraq “with links to Al Qaida”, there was “no intelligence of current co‑operation between Iraq and Al Qaida”.
315. On 10 February 2003, the JIC judged that Al Qaida would “not carry out attacks under Iraqi direction”.
...
319. The JIC also judged that:
• Saddam’s “capability to conduct effective terrorist attacks” was “very limited”.
• Iraq’s “terrorism capability” was “inadequate to carry out chemical or biological attacks beyond individual assassination attempts using poisons”.
320. The JIC Assessment of 29 January 2003 sustained its earlier judgements on Iraq’s ability and intent to conduct terrorist operations.
321. Sir David Omand, the Security and Intelligence Co‑ordinator in the Cabinet Office from 2002 to 2005, told the Inquiry that, in March 2002, the Security Service judged that the “threat from terrorism from Saddam’s own intelligence apparatus in the event of an intervention in Iraq ... was judged to be limited and containable”.
Knowing what we know now from the Iraqi Perspectives Project, the post-war investigation of Saddam's terrorism, it's clear that the Joint Intelligence Committee highly underestimated Saddam's terrorism and its relationship with al Qaeda. Excerpt from Saddam: What We Now Know by IPP co-author Jim Lacey:
... All of this is just the tip of the iceberg of available evidence demonstrating that Saddam posed a dangerous [terrorism and WMD] threat to America. There are other reports providing specific information on dozens of terrorist attacks, as well as details of how Iraq helped plan and execute many of them. Moreover, there is also proof of Saddam’s support of Islamic groups that were part of the al-Qaeda network. A good analogy for the links between Saddam and bin Laden is the Cali and MedellÃn drug cartels. Both drug cartels (actually loose collections of families and criminal gangs) were serious national-security concerns to the United States. The two cartels competed for a share of the illegal drug market. However, neither cartel was reluctant to cooperate with the other when it came to the pursuit of a common objective — expanding and facilitating their illicit trade. The well-publicized and violent rise of the MedellÃn cartel temporarily obscured and overshadowed the rise of, and threat posed by, the Cali cartel, in the same way that 9/11 camouflaged the terror threat posed by Saddam. In reality Saddam and bin Laden were operating parallel terror networks aimed at the United States. Bin Laden just has the distinction of having made the first horrendous attack.
Given the evidence, it appears that we removed Saddam’s regime not a moment too soon.
Given the evidence, it appears that we removed Saddam’s regime not a moment too soon.
Chilcot report:
323. Baroness Manningham‑Buller added that subsequent events showed the judgement that Saddam Hussein did not have the capability to do anything much in the UK, had “turned out to be the right judgement”.
...
351. Baroness Manningham‑Buller told the Inquiry:
“By 2003/2004 we were receiving an increasing number of leads to terrorist activity from within the UK ... our involvement in Iraq radicalised, for want of a better word ... a few among a generation ... [who] saw our involvement in Iraq, on top of our involvement in Afghanistan, as being an attack on Islam.”
...
356. Asked whether the judgement that the effect of the invasion of Iraq had increased the terrorist threat to the UK was based on hard evidence or a broader assessment, Baroness Manningham‑Buller replied:
“I think we can produce evidence because of the numerical evidence of the number of plots, the number of leads, the number of people identified, and the correlation of that to Iraq and statements of people as to why they were involved ... So I think the answer to your ... question: yes.”
...
351. Baroness Manningham‑Buller told the Inquiry:
“By 2003/2004 we were receiving an increasing number of leads to terrorist activity from within the UK ... our involvement in Iraq radicalised, for want of a better word ... a few among a generation ... [who] saw our involvement in Iraq, on top of our involvement in Afghanistan, as being an attack on Islam.”
...
356. Asked whether the judgement that the effect of the invasion of Iraq had increased the terrorist threat to the UK was based on hard evidence or a broader assessment, Baroness Manningham‑Buller replied:
“I think we can produce evidence because of the numerical evidence of the number of plots, the number of leads, the number of people identified, and the correlation of that to Iraq and statements of people as to why they were involved ... So I think the answer to your ... question: yes.”
Baroness Manningham-Buller's "judgement that Saddam Hussein did not have the [terrorist] capability to do anything much in the UK" contradicts the Iraqi Perspectives Project, whose findings are conspicuously absent in the Chilcot report. IPP excerpt:
Under Saddam, the Iraqi regime used its paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam training camps to train terrorists for use inside and outside Iraq. In 1999, the top ten graduates of each Fedayeen Saddam class were specifically chosen for assignment to London, from there to be ready to conduct operations anywhere in Europe.
A Fedayeen Saddam planner outlines the general plan for terrorist operations in the Kurdish areas, Iran, and London, to "His Excellency, Mr. Supervisor" (the title for the head of the Fedayeen Saddam, a position occupied by Uday Hussein, Saddam's oldest son). This memorandum (Extract 1) specifically states that these "trainees" are designated for martyrdom [suicide or suicidal] operations.
... Two other documents present evidence of logistical preparation for terrorist operations in other nations, including those in the West. It is not clear from these documents if these weapons were being staged for a specific purpose or stockpiled for future contingencies. Extract 2 is a response from the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) to a letter from Saddam asking for a list of weapons available in Iraqi embassies overseas.
A Fedayeen Saddam planner outlines the general plan for terrorist operations in the Kurdish areas, Iran, and London, to "His Excellency, Mr. Supervisor" (the title for the head of the Fedayeen Saddam, a position occupied by Uday Hussein, Saddam's oldest son). This memorandum (Extract 1) specifically states that these "trainees" are designated for martyrdom [suicide or suicidal] operations.
... Two other documents present evidence of logistical preparation for terrorist operations in other nations, including those in the West. It is not clear from these documents if these weapons were being staged for a specific purpose or stockpiled for future contingencies. Extract 2 is a response from the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) to a letter from Saddam asking for a list of weapons available in Iraqi embassies overseas.
The Iraqi Perspectives Project was published in 2007. Baroness Manningham‑Buller's testimony was given in 2010. The Chilcot report was published in 2016. Yet incredibly, it's apparent that the Baroness and the Inquiry committee at large are unaware of the IPP finding that the Saddam regime was deploying terrorists to London in violation of UNSCR 687 long before OIF.
For the Saddamist terrorists deployed to London, "the correlation of that to Iraq and statements of people as to why they were involved" would be a cinch. So, were the "increasing number of leads to terrorist activity from within the UK" a product of a "few among a generation" radicalized by the UK's "involvement in Iraq"? Were they a product of the deployed Saddamist terrorists? Or maybe they were a product of "a few among a generation" who were radicalized in the UK by Saddamist terrorists.
Baroness Manningham‑Buller couldn't answer these questions because, unaware of the IPP findings, she doesn't know to ask them. The UK Iraq Inquiry's failure to notice, let alone criticize, the Baroness and JIC's severe underestimation of Saddam's "regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations" (IPP) is reflected in the Chilcot report's fundamental misconceptions about Iraq-related post-war terrorism, especially the Saddamist terrorists' insurgency against Iraq.
Chilcot report:
573. In addition to the conclusions of those reports, the Inquiry notes the forthright
statement in March 2005 of the US Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the
United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. Reporting to President Bush,
the Commission stated that “the [US] Intelligence Community was dead wrong in almost
all of its pre‑war judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. This was a major
intelligence failure.”
The "forthright statement in March 2005 of the US Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction" needs to be taken with a grain of salt because the Silberman-Robb report is degraded by its false premise. Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #intel section:
My criticism of the Silberman-Robb report is that the keystone premise of its analysis is false:
The keystone premise of Silberman-Robb's analysis is the assumed "fact" that the Iraq Survey Group's non-findings are unequivocal "clear" conclusions, yet in actuality they are the opposite of "clear": ISG's non-findings are heavily qualified in the ISG Duelfer report's Transmittal Message, Scope Note, and throughout the report's various sections. ISG could not account for all of Iraq's WMD stocks and can't be sure of the extent that Iraq's WMD program was retained and reconstituted. In effect, what ISG found constitutes a floor only. Yet by mis-valuating the unaccounted for mass of evidence that Iraq "sanitized" (ISG) as though the missing or lost evidence never existed at all, Silberman-Robb's analysis mis-valuates ISG's findings as a complete account of Saddam's WMD. Moreover, despite the substantial limitations of the ex post investigation, the Iraq Survey Group found a great deal of evidence of an active program which the Silberman-Robb WMD Commission either omitted or devalued with an arbitrary "conclusive evidence" standard in place of the UNSCR 687 "governing standard" (UNSCR 1441).
Saddam and his regime repeatedly insisted that all of Iraq’s banned weapons had been destroyed and that there were no active programs to reconstitute the capability. The United Nations inspectors, after 1996, found no conclusive evidence that these claims were wrong. In retrospect, as found by the ISG, it is clear that the stockpiles and programs were not there to be found. The question therefore arises of why the Intelligence Community did not discover that fact before the war, or at least consider the possibility that, however improbably, Saddam was telling the truth.The answer to the Silberman-Robb WMD Commission's essential question of "why the Intelligence Community did not discover that fact before the war" is that "fact" wasn't discovered before — or after — the war because it isn't a fact. The Intelligence Community was tasked to support the UN inspections, which were not mandated to "[find] conclusive evidence that these claims were wrong". The UN inspectors were mandated to verify whether Iraq declared, yielded, and eliminated the entirety of Saddam's WMD under international supervision in accordance with UNSCR 687, which Iraq never did. Nonetheless, the UN inspections and subsequent Iraq Survey Group investigation found that the Saddam regime's "repeatedly insisted ... claims" were comprised of "fraudulent statements, forged documents, misrepresentation of the roles of people and facilities, and other specific acts of deception" (UNSCOM, 25JAN99).
The keystone premise of Silberman-Robb's analysis is the assumed "fact" that the Iraq Survey Group's non-findings are unequivocal "clear" conclusions, yet in actuality they are the opposite of "clear": ISG's non-findings are heavily qualified in the ISG Duelfer report's Transmittal Message, Scope Note, and throughout the report's various sections. ISG could not account for all of Iraq's WMD stocks and can't be sure of the extent that Iraq's WMD program was retained and reconstituted. In effect, what ISG found constitutes a floor only. Yet by mis-valuating the unaccounted for mass of evidence that Iraq "sanitized" (ISG) as though the missing or lost evidence never existed at all, Silberman-Robb's analysis mis-valuates ISG's findings as a complete account of Saddam's WMD. Moreover, despite the substantial limitations of the ex post investigation, the Iraq Survey Group found a great deal of evidence of an active program which the Silberman-Robb WMD Commission either omitted or devalued with an arbitrary "conclusive evidence" standard in place of the UNSCR 687 "governing standard" (UNSCR 1441).
Unfortunately, a number of official reports repeat the demonstrably false premise of the Silberman-Robb report, which has warped the public discourse on Iraq with compounding harm to the politics and policies of both the UK and US at home and abroad.
Chilcot report:
168. ... Mr Blair responded that “even German and French intelligence were
sure that there was WMD in Iraq”. Dr Blix said they seemed “unsure” about “mobile BW
production facilities”: “It would be paradoxical and absurd if 250,000 men were to invade
Iraq and find very little.”
The controversy over the pre-war intelligence estimate of “mobile production facilities used to make biological agents” (Secretary of State Powell, 05FEB03) provides a useful illustration of how an intel estimate could be discredited with Iraq still found guilty of the intel estimate's substantive element. The Iraq Survey Group famously did not find the estimated “mobile BW production facilities”. Instead, ISG found the equivalent UNSCR 687 violations in "the secret biological work in the small IIS [Iraqi intelligence service] laboratories discovered by ISG ... The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories were never declared to the UN" and “The UN deemed Iraq’s accounting of its production and use of BW [biological weapon] agent simulants—specifically Bacillus subtilis, Bacillus lichenformis, Bacillus megaterium and Bacillus thuringiensis to be inadequate … the equipment used for their manufacture can also be quickly converted to make BW agent.”
Regarding “It would be paradoxical and absurd if 250,000 men were to invade Iraq and find very little,” Dr. Blix was wrong about that, and he knew or should have known he was wrong when he said it to Prime Minister Blair.
The "unilateral and secret destruction ... and concealment of proscribed items" (Butler) was a leading feature of Iraq's strategy against the UNSCR 687 disarmament process and the international intelligence efforts to support it. UNSCOM director Richard Butler, January 25, 1999:
5. Actions by Iraq in three main respects have had a significant negative impact upon the Commission's disarmament work:
Iraq's disclosure statements have never been complete;
contrary to the requirement that destruction be conducted under international supervision, Iraq undertook extensive, unilateral and secret destruction of large quantities of proscribed weapons and items;
it also pursued a practice of concealment of proscribed items, including weapons, and a cover up of its activities in contravention of Council resolutions.
Iraq's disclosure statements have never been complete;
contrary to the requirement that destruction be conducted under international supervision, Iraq undertook extensive, unilateral and secret destruction of large quantities of proscribed weapons and items;
it also pursued a practice of concealment of proscribed items, including weapons, and a cover up of its activities in contravention of Council resolutions.
Iraq's strategy was persistent enough to compel the UN Security Council to reinforce UNSCR 687 with UNSCR 707 which mandated Iraq to, inter alia, "cease immediately any attempt to conceal, or any movement or destruction of any material or equipment relating to its nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or ballistic missile programmes, or material or equipment relating to its other nuclear activities without notification to and prior consent of the Special Commission". In other words, the secret unilateral destruction of WMD evidence touted by OIF opponents, including the UK Iraq Inquiry, was in fact a Gulf War ceasefire violation that established casus belli in its own right.
A veteran inspector like Blix who dealt first-hand with Iraq's illicit destruction and concealment of evidence should have expected that Task Force-75, the Iraq Survey Group, and coalition forces would "find very little" after Iraqi counter-intelligence "sanitized" (ISG) the evidence. Excerpt from the OIF FAQ answer to "Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq":
A prevalent assumption in the politics is that what ISG found and more pointedly did not find constituted a complete account of Saddam's WMD. However, ISG qualified the Duelfer report with cautionary notes that the Saddam regime was expert at hiding proscribed items and activities, much evidence was lost prior to, during, and after the war, key regime officials were not cooperative, statements conflicted, suspect areas were found "sanitized", and other practical factors limited the post hoc investigation. For example, on January 28, 2004, David Kay informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that "at the end of the work of the [Iraq Survey Group] there's still going to be an unresolvable ambiguity about what happened ... [due to] the unparalleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program and their other programs as well, a lot of which was what we simply called Ali Baba looting."
...
The Iraq Survey Group can offer a guess, but with its practical limitations, ISG can't be sure about the fate of all Saddam's secret stores and the extent Iraq's WMD program was retained and reconstituted. In many instances where ISG cited a lack of evidence, it meant the evidence required for a definite determination was missing or lost, not that absence of evidence was evidence of absence. With the burden on Iraq to prove the mandated disarmament and no mandate for the ceasefire enforcers to demonstrate Iraq's proscribed armament, the Iraq Survey Group's post hoc investigation was handicapped by that the UN inspections, OIF invasion, and post-war occupation simply were not designed to scour for, guard, and preserve evidence like a crime-scene forensic investigation. Concurrently, the systematic Iraqi "concealment and deception activities" (ISG), much unfettered, rid evidence of proscribed armament, e.g., "many of these [WMD-related] sites were either sanitized by the [Saddam] Regime or looted prior to OIF", "M23 [Directorate of Military Industries] officers also were involved in NMD [National Monitoring Directorate] document concealment and destruction efforts", and "extensive looting and destruction at military facilities during OIF" (ISG). The resulting evidentiary gaps prevented a complete account of Saddam's WMD by ISG.
...
The Iraq Survey Group can offer a guess, but with its practical limitations, ISG can't be sure about the fate of all Saddam's secret stores and the extent Iraq's WMD program was retained and reconstituted. In many instances where ISG cited a lack of evidence, it meant the evidence required for a definite determination was missing or lost, not that absence of evidence was evidence of absence. With the burden on Iraq to prove the mandated disarmament and no mandate for the ceasefire enforcers to demonstrate Iraq's proscribed armament, the Iraq Survey Group's post hoc investigation was handicapped by that the UN inspections, OIF invasion, and post-war occupation simply were not designed to scour for, guard, and preserve evidence like a crime-scene forensic investigation. Concurrently, the systematic Iraqi "concealment and deception activities" (ISG), much unfettered, rid evidence of proscribed armament, e.g., "many of these [WMD-related] sites were either sanitized by the [Saddam] Regime or looted prior to OIF", "M23 [Directorate of Military Industries] officers also were involved in NMD [National Monitoring Directorate] document concealment and destruction efforts", and "extensive looting and destruction at military facilities during OIF" (ISG). The resulting evidentiary gaps prevented a complete account of Saddam's WMD by ISG.
Of note, Dr. Kay reported on January 28, 2004 that "A lot of that [Iraq rid evidence] traces to the failure on April 9 [2003] to establish immediately physical security in Iraq", which infers that much, maybe most, of Saddam's WMD was "sanitized" (ISG) by Iraqi counter-intelligence after the regime change.
The Iraqi "concealment and deception activities" (ISG) that counteracted the Iraq Survey Group and the resulting qualified and incomplete character of ISG's account of Saddam's WMD are conspicuously absent in the Chilcot report.
It's remarkable that the Iraq Survey Group found as much WMD evidence as they did despite the systematic denial of evidence by Iraq. Taken together, the still-large pile of WMD evidence left behind for ISG and "the unparalleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program" (Kay) strongly suggest Saddam possessed a vaster WMD program than we can know.
Chilcot report:
329. At no stage was the proposition that Iraq might no longer have chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or programmes identified and examined by either the JIC or the policy community.
This point is false given that the JIC and policy community and their American counterparts supported and, indeed, made key assessments based on the rigorous UNSCR 687 disarmament process, which was the legally mandated and practical way to identify and examine whether "Iraq might no longer have chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or programmes". It made no sense for the JIC or policy community to accept a "proposition that Iraq might no longer have chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or programmes" that contradicted the dedicated UNSCOM/UNMOVIC findings, which continually showed Iraq did not disarm per UNSCR 687.
Anyway, the UK Iraq Inquiry is assuming a false premise again. In Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), UNMOVIC confirmed Iraq did not disarm per UNSCR 687 for casus belli, and the Iraq Survey Group and Operation Avarice confirmed the Saddam regime did possess "chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or programmes" in violation of UNSCR 687 and related resolutions.
Chilcot report:
809. The following key findings are from Section 4.4:
... The ISG’s principal findings – that Iraq’s WMD capability had mostly been destroyed in 1991 but that it had been Saddam Hussein’s strategic intent to preserve the capability to reconstitute his WMD – were significant, but did not support statements made by the UK and US Governments before the invasion, which had focused on Iraq’s current capabilities and an urgent and growing threat.
... The ISG’s principal findings – that Iraq’s WMD capability had mostly been destroyed in 1991 but that it had been Saddam Hussein’s strategic intent to preserve the capability to reconstitute his WMD – were significant, but did not support statements made by the UK and US Governments before the invasion, which had focused on Iraq’s current capabilities and an urgent and growing threat.
The UK Iraq Inquiry points out "the lack of significant finds ... after the Occupation of Iraq" and that "ISG's principal findings ... were significant". Hm.
Chilcot report: "it had been Saddam Hussein’s strategic intent to preserve the capability to reconstitute his WMD".
Iraq Survey Group: "As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation. ... There is an extensive, yet fragmentary and circumstantial, body of evidence suggesting that Saddam pursued a strategy to maintain a capability to return to WMD after sanctions were lifted by preserving assets and expertise. In addition to preserved capability, we have clear evidence of his intent to resume WMD as soon as sanctions were lifted."
Common sense says "the capability to reconstitute his WMD" (Chilcot report), "activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (ISG), and "preserv[ed] assets and expertise ... preserve[d] capability" (ISG) were "current capabilities" (Chilcot report).
This relates to the Iraq Survey Group's obfuscation of the Iraq WMD issue by torturously labeling UNSCR 687 violations, i.e., proscribed WMD activity, as something not WMD activity. Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #duelferreport section:
The whole ISG Duelfer report, including all 3 volumes, is worth reading. While doing so, it is critical for readers to take it upon themselves to apply the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) to the ISG findings because, although the Iraq Survey Group says it adhered to the UNSCR 687 standard, ISG fundamentally deviated from UNSCR 687 by inventing a distinction between WMD activities and "activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (ISG) that does not exist under the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441).
According to UNSCR 687, Iraqi "activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (ISG), such as the IIS "large covert procurement program ... for conventional weapons, WMD precursors, and dual-use technology" (ISG), were WMD activities. Yet ISG's inapposite arbitrary distinction between WMD activities and "activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (ISG) enabled OIF opponents to claim the Iraq Survey Group found Iraq WMD-free when in fact ISG's findings are rife with UNSCR 687 WMD violations.
As well as inapposite of UNSCR 687, the arbitrary distinction between WMD activities and "activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (ISG) is also impractical since the Iraq-induced "degradation" (ISG) of the "extensive, yet fragmentary and circumstantial, body of evidence suggesting that Saddam pursued a strategy to maintain a capability to return to WMD" (ISG) made it impossible for ISG to parse that distinction.
According to UNSCR 687, Iraqi "activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (ISG), such as the IIS "large covert procurement program ... for conventional weapons, WMD precursors, and dual-use technology" (ISG), were WMD activities. Yet ISG's inapposite arbitrary distinction between WMD activities and "activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (ISG) enabled OIF opponents to claim the Iraq Survey Group found Iraq WMD-free when in fact ISG's findings are rife with UNSCR 687 WMD violations.
As well as inapposite of UNSCR 687, the arbitrary distinction between WMD activities and "activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (ISG) is also impractical since the Iraq-induced "degradation" (ISG) of the "extensive, yet fragmentary and circumstantial, body of evidence suggesting that Saddam pursued a strategy to maintain a capability to return to WMD" (ISG) made it impossible for ISG to parse that distinction.
Along with IPP, ISG's findings confirmed "Iraq's current capabilities and an urgent and growing threat", but it's worth reminding that legally speaking, whether ISG's findings did or "did not support past statements by the UK and US Governments ... on Iraq’s current capabilities and an urgent and growing threat" is irrelevant to OIF's compliance-based justification beyond a corroboration of Iraq's noncompliance: "ISG judges that Iraq failed to comply with UNSCRs" (ISG).
Chilcot report:
582. Mr Blair’s initial response to growing criticism of the failure to find WMD was
to counsel patience.
Instead of "counsel patience", Prime Minister Blair should have clarified to the public that the Iraq Survey Group found substantial evidence of a WMD program—whether or not those findings matched pre-war intelligence estimates.
More importantly, Blair should have clarified that in many cases, an ISG "failure to find WMD" was actually an inability to account for proscribed items or activity due to the Iraqi "active and successful policy of deception and concealment" (Chilcot report) that sabotaged the UN inspections, pre-war intelligence efforts, and the ex post ISG investigation. Case in point, excerpt from the Iraq Survey Group:
ISG has investigated claims by former IIS officials—a former IIS chemist and his former supervisor, the late Dr. Al Azmirli—that the IIS produced ricin until at least 1995 and possibly until 2003, although ISG has not yet obtained direct evidence of ricin work.
• Interviews with Dr. Al Azmirli—a former IIS official and scientific advisor to Saddam—revealed that the IIS researched ricin as a BW agent until 2003. He himself was directly involved with ricin work until 1992, when Husayn Kamil demanded the program be turned over to Dr. Rihab and a doctor from the Ministry of Agriculture.
• Interviews with Dr. Al Azmirli—a former IIS official and scientific advisor to Saddam—revealed that the IIS researched ricin as a BW agent until 2003. He himself was directly involved with ricin work until 1992, when Husayn Kamil demanded the program be turned over to Dr. Rihab and a doctor from the Ministry of Agriculture.
• Dr. Al Azmirli claimed that between 1992 and 1996, ricin was being produced at Al Shameir Hospital in Al Rashad until it was transferred to Al Hakam. A separate former IIS official confirmed that Al Azmirli produced approximately two kilograms of ricin at the Ar Rashidiyah plant in 1991 and 1992. An exploitation of the Ar Rashidiyah plant corroborated the location and presence of a facility, but ISG could not confirm that ricin work had occurred there because of extensive looting.
• Mun’im Mustafa Fatahi, a close friend of Dr. Al Azmirli, reportedly told Al Azmirli that a group of people was actively pursuing ricin for weaponization. As of March 2003, ricin was being developed into stable liquid to deliver as an aerosol in small rockets, cluster bombs, and smoke generators, according to Al Azmirli.
In lawyer-speak, the ISG finding of IIS work on ricin is highly probative yet not quite dispositive as "ISG could not confirm that ricin work had occurred there because of extensive looting". In intelligence analyst-speak, the indicators in the finding are sufficient to predict a proscribed WMD activity. For OIF's justification, the "extensive looting" is a prima facie violation of UNSCR 707 for casus belli.
More, ISG excerpt from the OIF FAQ answer to "Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq":
Six, OIF opponents who accuse Bush of lying his way to war with Iraq cite the ISG finding, "While it appears that Iraq, by the mid-1990s, was essentially free of militarily significant WMD stocks, Saddam’s perceived requirement to bluff about WMD capabilities made it too dangerous to clearly reveal this to the international community, especially Iran."
However, although OIF opponents represent the ISG finding as unequivocal, it is in fact heavily qualified in the Duelfer report:
However, although OIF opponents represent the ISG finding as unequivocal, it is in fact heavily qualified in the Duelfer report:
With the degradation of the Iraqi infrastructure and dispersal of personnel, it is increasingly unlikely that these questions will be resolved. Of those that remain, the following are of particular concern, as they relate to the possibility of a retained BW capability or the ability to initiate a new one.
• ISG cannot determine the fate of Iraq’s stocks of bulk BW agents remaining after Desert Storm and subsequent unilateral destruction. There is a very limited chance that continuing investigation may provide evidence to resolve this issue....
• The fate of the missing bulk agent storage tanks.
• The fate of a portion of Iraq’s BW agent seed-stocks.
• The nature, purpose and who was involved in the secret biological work in the small IIS laboratories discovered by ISG.
ISG’s investigation of Iraq’s ammunition supply points—ammunition depots, field ammunition supply points (FASPs), tactical FASPs, and other dispersed weapons caches—has not uncovered any CW munitions. ISG investigation, however, was hampered by several factors beyond our control. The scale and complexity of Iraqi munitions handling, storage, and weapons markings, and extensive looting and destruction at military facilities during OIF significantly limited the number of munitions that ISG was able to thoroughly inspect.
• ISG technical experts fully evaluated less than one quarter of one percent of the over 10,000 weapons caches throughout Iraq, and visited fewer than ten ammunition depots identified prior to OIF as suspect CW sites.
• The enormous number of munitions dispersed throughout the country may include some older, CW-filled munitions, and ISG cannot discount the possibility that a few large caches of munitions remain to be discovered within Iraq.
As Dr. Kay tried to explain to Congress, the proscribed items and activity that the Iraq Survey Group was unable to account for due to "the unparalleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program and their other programs as well" (Kay) equate to "unresolvable ambiguity" (Kay), not proof that the items or activity didn't exist. It came as no surprise when Operation Avarice found substantial chemical munitions that ISG had missed. The missing WMD evidence that Iraq did not account for and ISG was unable to account for did not exonerate Saddam. It only proved that Iraq was guilty of "denial and deception operations" (ISG) that in and of themselves violated the Gulf War ceasefire for casus belli.
That's how Prime Minister Blair—and President Bush—should have responded to the "growing criticism of the failure to find WMD".
If the UK Iraq Inquiry was sincere in its stated purpose to "establish as accurately and reliably as possible what happened", then it would have clarified to the public that ISG's "failure to find WMD"—beyond the large pile of UNSCR 687 violations that ISG did find—was mainly ISG's inability to account for proscribed items and activity that were covered up by Iraqi violations of UNSCR 707. The Chilcot report did not do that.
Chilcot report:
27. When UK policy towards Iraq was formally reviewed and agreed by the Ministerial
Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) in May 1999, the objectives towards
Iraq were defined as:
...
45. Mr Blair told the Inquiry that, until 11 September 2001, the UK had a policy of containment, but sanctions were eroding. The policy was “partially successful”, but it did not mean that Saddam Hussein was “not still developing his [prohibited] programmes”.
“... in the short term, to reduce the threat Saddam poses to the region including by eliminating his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes; and, in the longer term, to reintegrate a territorially intact Iraq as a law‑abiding member of the international community.”28. The policy of containment was seen as the “only viable way” to pursue those objectives. A “policy of trying to topple Saddam would command no useful international support”. Iraq was unlikely to accept the package immediately but “might be persuaded to acquiesce eventually”.
...
45. Mr Blair told the Inquiry that, until 11 September 2001, the UK had a policy of containment, but sanctions were eroding. The policy was “partially successful”, but it did not mean that Saddam Hussein was “not still developing his [prohibited] programmes”.
See the OIF FAQ answer to "Why did Bush leave the ‘containment’ (status quo)".
Prime Minister Blair's view that the sanctions-based 'containment' was "partially successful" is too generous. The post-war ISG, IPP, and UNCHR findings show that the post-ODF ad hoc 'containment' was not viable. By 2002 when the UNSCR 678 enforcers belatedly confronted the Saddam regime with its "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), the 'containment' was all but defeated, if it ever worked at all. The hope that "Iraq was unlikely to accept the package immediately but “might be persuaded to acquiesce eventually”" was never realistic because when the sanctions-based 'containment' was named the strategy, the UN sanctions were already terminal. According to the Iraq Survey Group, "By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their international support. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of 1999. ... As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation." The failure of the UN sanctions went hand in hand with Saddam "developing his [prohibited] programmes” because that's how Iraq paid for his "concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (ISG) and "Saddam’s use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups [that] remained strong up until the collapse of the regime" (IPP).
I assume "The policy was “partially successful”" refers to the misconception that while the "sanctions were eroding" they were still inhibiting Iraq from reconstituting Saddam's WMD program. The misconception is based on the ISG finding, "In addition to preserved capability, we have clear evidence of his intent to resume WMD as soon as sanctions were lifted," which is commonly interpreted as Saddam was waiting for a UN Security Council decree to end the sanctions before acting on his "intent to resume WMD" (ISG). However, the Iraq Survey Group clarified that Saddam was not waiting for the UN Security Council to lift the sanctions. Instead, Saddam was lifting the UN sanctions himself with corruption: "The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council" (ISG). (This is another "significant find" that is conspicuously absent in the Chilcot report.)
The ISG finding, "As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation," shows that for Saddam the "sanctions were lifted" (ISG) enough by 1999 for Iraq to be done with UNSCR 687 and act on his "intent to resume WMD" (ISG). The "preserved capability" found by ISG, such as "WMD-related procurement programs steadily grew in scale, variety, and efficiency" (ISG), shows that Saddam's WMD program was reconstituting. Excerpt from the Iraq Survey Group:
We have said with certainty that the embargo will not be lifted by a Security Council resolution, but will corrode by itself. -- Saddam speaking in January 2000 to mark the 79the [sic] anniversary of the Iraqi armed forces.
...
The RCC [Revolutionary Command Council] resolution formally ended all Iraqi agreements to abide by UN resolutions. Ahmad Husayn Khudayr recalled that Saddam’s text ordered Iraq to reject every Security Council decision taken since the 1991 Gulf war, including UNSCR 687. Ahmad said the resolution was worded in careful legal terms and “denied all the previously accepted [resolutions] without any remaining trace of them [in the Iraqi Government].”
...
From 1999 until he was deposed in April 2003, Saddam’s conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs steadily grew in scale, variety, and efficiency.
...
The RCC [Revolutionary Command Council] resolution formally ended all Iraqi agreements to abide by UN resolutions. Ahmad Husayn Khudayr recalled that Saddam’s text ordered Iraq to reject every Security Council decision taken since the 1991 Gulf war, including UNSCR 687. Ahmad said the resolution was worded in careful legal terms and “denied all the previously accepted [resolutions] without any remaining trace of them [in the Iraqi Government].”
...
From 1999 until he was deposed in April 2003, Saddam’s conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs steadily grew in scale, variety, and efficiency.
Technically speaking, while containment accurately describes the UK and US "way" or little-s strategy with Iraq between Operation Desert Fox and 9/11, containment was not our "policy" on Iraq, just like regime change was a strategy, not our policy on Iraq. From the adoption of UNSCRs 687 and 688 in 1991 onward, our policy on Iraq was enforcing Iraq's mandated compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire terms pursuant to UNSCR 678—with or without Saddam as head of state. The policy objectives of "... in the short term, to reduce the threat Saddam poses to the region including by eliminating his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes; and, in the longer term, to reintegrate a territorially intact Iraq as a law‑abiding member of the international community" were part of the UNSCR 678, Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement.
Chilcot report:
796. By 2009, it had been demonstrated that some elements of the UK’s 2003
objectives for Iraq were misjudged. No evidence had been identified that Iraq possessed
weapons of mass destruction, with which it might threaten its neighbours and the
international community more widely. But in the years between 2003 and 2009, events
in Iraq had undermined regional stability, including by allowing Al Qaida space in which
to operate and unsecured borders across which its members might move.
Again, the UK Iraq Inquiry has it fundamentally wrong on Saddam's WMD and terrorism.
ISG findings show Saddam with an active WMD program with covert ready capability and ready capacity to scale up, and that's just a floor given the "unparalleled" (Kay) mass of WMD evidence that ISG could not account for due to Iraq's "denial and deception operations" (ISG).
As far as "allowing Al Qaida space in which to operate and unsecured borders across which its members might move", per IPP, the Saddam regime was a world-leading terrorist organization that already hosted the al Qaeda network in Iraq. Post-Saddam Iraq "in the years between 2003 and 2009" fought the terrorists bred by Saddam instead of breeding Saddam's "regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations" (IPP). The Saddamist insurgents who allowed "Al Qaida space in which to operate" were carrying on with the Saddam regime's working relationship with the al Qaeda network.
Note: My commentary on OIF's justification above is international, national security law. My commentary on the OIF occupation and peace operations below is political science, international relations.
Chilcot report:
796. ... But in the years between 2003 and 2009, events in Iraq had undermined regional stability, including by allowing Al Qaida space in which
to operate and unsecured borders across which its members might move.
The Saddam regime was not a source of regional stability. Nor did OIF undermine regional stability. What the regime change did was bring out into the open the harm of France, Germany, and Russia's complicity with Saddam's noncompliance, and Britain and America—the Gulf War ceasefire enforcers—allowing the noncompliant Saddam regime to fester for so long, "including by allowing" the extreme expansion of Saddam's "regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations" (IPP) since 1991.
However, the premature end of OIF by Prime Minister Brown and President Obama did undermine regional stability by enabling Iran and other consequences.
Chilcot report:
1 May President Bush declares “Mission Accomplished”
To clarify, "Mission Accomplished" was printed on the banner that was displayed on the USS Abraham Lincoln to praise the ship's crew for accomplishing their specific mission in support of the OIF invasion. The phrase "mission accomplished" was not in the speech by President Bush, so there was no declaration of "mission accomplished".
The false description of "1 May [2003] President Bush declares “Mission Accomplished”" is usually used to suggest that the American president thought, planned, and prepared no further than toppling the Saddam regime. In reality, President Bush used the May 1, 2003 speech to mark the formal transition from the "major combat operations" or war against Saddam's Iraq to the next stage of occupation and peace operations that would build the peace with post-Saddam Iraq. President Bush, May 1, 2003:
Admiral Kelly, Captain Card, officers and sailors of the USS Abraham Lincoln, my fellow Americans: Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. ... And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country.
...
We have difficult work to do in Iraq. We're bringing order to parts of that country that remain dangerous. ... We're helping to rebuild Iraq, where the dictator built palaces for himself, instead of hospitals and schools. And we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq as they establish a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people.
The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done.
...
We have difficult work to do in Iraq. We're bringing order to parts of that country that remain dangerous. ... We're helping to rebuild Iraq, where the dictator built palaces for himself, instead of hospitals and schools. And we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq as they establish a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people.
The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done.
That being said, if the President had stated "mission accomplished", it would have been a normal commander's recognition of the successful completion of a military operation, while also marking, as Bush did, the commencement of the nation-building aspect of the mission. We had our "VE" and "VJ" days in World War Two followed by a lot of follow-up work over the decades that continues today.
Chilcot report:
630. Yet when Mr Blair set out the UK’s vision for the future of Iraq in the House of
Commons on 18 March 2003, no assessment had been made of whether that vision
was achievable, ... UN authorisation had not yet been secured, and there had been no decision on
the UN’s role in post‑conflict Iraq.
Regarding "no assessment had been made of whether that vision was achievable", by March 18, 2003, that question was too late by twelve years. The UN had adopted and the UK and US had enforced the human rights mandates of UNSCR 688, alongside UNSCR 687, since April 1991. "[T]he UK's vision for the future of Iraq" simply reiterated the standing solution for Iraq's compliance with UNSCR 688. Of course, no assessment was needed to know that the alternative to "the UK's vision for the future of Iraq" was achievable since the Saddam regime was achieving it. UN Commission on Human Rights, April 19, 2002:
Recalling: ... [UNSCR] 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, in which the Council demanded an end to repression of the Iraqi civilian population and insisted that Iraq cooperate with humanitarian organizations and that the human rights of all Iraqi citizens be respected ... Strongly condemns: The systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror.
If the UK Iraq Inquiry is implying that "the UK’s vision for the future of Iraq in the House of Commons on 18 March 2003" per UNSCR 688 was not achievable, then that can only mean the UK Iraq Inquiry implicitly upholds the alternative, the Saddamist status quo which extremely violated UNSCR 688.
Regarding "UN authorisation had not yet been secured, and there had been no decision on the UN’s role in post‑conflict Iraq", my understanding is that detailed agreements and governing documents for the post-war stage are not usually done and ready before the war or determination for the war. For context, the NATO campaign in Kosovo started on March 23, 1999 and UNSCR 1244 was adopted on June 10, 1999. OIF started on March 19, 2003 and UNSCR 1483, the Iraq equivalent to UNSCR 1244, was adopted on May 22, 2003. Of course, the Kosovo intervention did not have an equivalent authorization to UNSCR 678. The Iraq intervention always had the UNSCR 678 authorization to "use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area", which covered OIF's post-war stage while the task-specific resolutions were made.
Chilcot report:
630. ... no agreement had been reached with the US on a workable post‑conflict plan ...
...
634. Mr Blair did not:
... • press President Bush for definitive assurances about US post‑conflict plans or set out clearly to him the strategic risk in underestimating the post‑conflict challenge and failing adequately to prepare for the task; or
• consider, or seek advice on, whether the absence of a satisfactory plan was a sufficient threat to UK strategic objectives to require a reassessment of the terms of the UK engagement in Iraq. Despite concerns about the state of US planning, he did not make agreement on a satisfactory post‑conflict plan a condition of UK participation in military action.
...
634. Mr Blair did not:
... • press President Bush for definitive assurances about US post‑conflict plans or set out clearly to him the strategic risk in underestimating the post‑conflict challenge and failing adequately to prepare for the task; or
• consider, or seek advice on, whether the absence of a satisfactory plan was a sufficient threat to UK strategic objectives to require a reassessment of the terms of the UK engagement in Iraq. Despite concerns about the state of US planning, he did not make agreement on a satisfactory post‑conflict plan a condition of UK participation in military action.
I assume Prime Minister Blair "did not ... press" President Bush on our post-war plans because Bush had talked about them with Blair already.
On topic, see the OIF FAQ retrospective #postwar section and my discussion about our post-war planning, among other OIF issues, with British journalist John Rentoul at Critical response to John Rentoul's "Chilcot Report: Politicians".
Contrary to the myth implied by the UK Iraq Inquiry, the American planning for the post-war with Iraq was conscientious. When he made the call for Operation Iraqi Freedom to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235), President Bush was, in the words of Secretary of State Albright, "committed -- as are our friends [e.g., Prime Minister Blair and the UK] -- to the victory of principle over expediency; and to the evolution in Iraq of a society based on law, exemplified by pluralism and content to live at peace. These goals ... are right; they are necessary; and they will be achieved."
The UK Iraq Inquiry's demand for "definitive assurances about US post‑conflict plans" and "agreement ... on a workable" or "satisfactory post‑conflict plan" seems to be based on the schema of project approval for a mall construction in London rather than the variables of war. Based on what I know of military history, the post-war stage normally starts as much ad hoc as planned and firms up as the long-term bureaucracy and infrastructure take shape organically. The post-war transition in Iraq does not seem unusual in that regard, whereas the UK Iraq Inquiry's bureaucratic schema does seem unusual.
I guess the reason for the myth that the US neglected to plan and prepare for the post-war with Iraq is that the initial post-war plan took a light-footprint, soldier-supported, civilian-centered approach, which was based on the theory popular at the time, and endorsed by Iraqi expats, that a heavy-footprint (scare quotes) "FOREIGN MILITARY OCCUPATION" would be counter-productive for our nation-building goals for Iraq. Whereas the light-footprint, civilian-centered approach, to be enabled by but not based on our soldiers, was supposed to accelerate the learning curve for Iraqis to come together to stand up post-Saddam Iraq. Much of the criticism is based on the assumption that the uniformed US military was always the alpha and omega of the nation-building project, but that contradicts the premise of the initial post-war plan.
The initial post-war plan failed, but the theory of it was valid. Note, it didn't fail because of US leaders "underestimating the post‑conflict challenge and failing adequately to prepare for the task". The "task" wasn't to immediately replace the Saddam regime with the Battle of Algiers. It failed because the occupation and the Iraqi people it served were ambushed by the pre-assembled big Saddamist terrorist insurgency. To the extent our forces being caught off guard was from "underestimating the post‑conflict challenge and failing adequately to prepare", that came down to one pivotal error: our counterterrorism officials, including clearly Baroness Manningham‑Buller as she outs herself in the Chilcot report, severely underestimated Saddam's terrorism. Our leaders could not have been expected to prepare to fight the Saddamist terrorists' insurgency at the same time our CT officials were insisting that Saddamist terrorism was a much lower threat than it actually was.
To their credit, after they lost the initiative to the Saddamist insurgency, our leaders and forces adjusted well and quickly to take back the initiative. With the civilian-centered approach broken, the light footprint turned into a heavy footprint in short order while pursuing the same nation-building objectives. About three years from Saddamist insurgency ambush to counterinsurgency "surge" isn't too bad. It shows our forces didn't waste time. They adjusted rapidly and worked at it until they developed COIN along with the leadership, from President Bush on down, to make it work.
Chilcot report:
601. Despite being aware of the shortcomings of the US plan, strong US resistance
to a leading role for the UN, indications that the UN did not want the administration
of Iraq to become its responsibility and a warning about the tainted image of the UN
in Iraq, at no stage did the UK Government formally consider other policy options,
including the possibility of making participation in military action conditional on a
satisfactory plan for the post‑conflict period, or how to mitigate the known risk that
the UK could find itself drawn into a “huge commitment of UK resources” for which
no contingency preparations had been made.
Because of the severe underestimation of Saddam's terrorism, the Saddamist insurgency wasn't a "known risk" . The "plan for the post-conflict period", albeit innovative, was satisfactory based on the known risks and pre-OIF conceptions of Iraqi society, unless the UK Iraq Inquiry would only have been satisfied by a heavy-footprint occupation right away, even before the Saddamist insurgency introduced themselves.
As far as "making participation in military action conditional", the UK had been a UNSCR 678 enforcer committed to solving the Saddam problem and, to that end, undertaking military action alongside the US at every step of the UNSCR 678 enforcement since before there was a UNSCR 678 in 1990-1991. It would have been some kind of dishonor and irresponsibility for the UK to renege at the resolution point because a perfectly scripted preemptive post-war wasn't guaranteed. What "contingency preparations" does the UK Iraq Inquiry have in mind other than abandoning the UK's longstanding commitment and responsibility as a UNSCR 678 enforcer?
As far as "strong US resistance to a leading role for the UN", while the US has been a lead enforcer of UN mandates since the founding of the United Nations, from Korea to Iraq, and routinely worked closely with the UN, it's longstanding US policy that the US military doesn't deploy under UN command. That standard practice didn't start with Iraq, so it wasn't odd for the UN. It would have been odd for the UK to suddenly expect the US to go under UN command.
As far as the "UN did not want the administration of Iraq to become its responsibility", setting aside the general controversy over how UN enforcement is structured, it has always been standard for the UN to rely on member states for big UN enforcements, particularly the member states who had been enforcing UNSCR 678 all along. Since Korea, the UN and US and UK have had long experience working with each other with that understanding, but the UK Iraq Inquiry makes it seem like the UK got amnesia on the way to Iraq.
Chilcot report:
617. At no stage did Ministers or senior officials commission the systematic evaluation
of different options, incorporating detailed analysis of risk and UK capabilities, military
and civilian, which should have been required before the UK committed to any course
of action in Iraq.
The UK Iraq Inquiry's suggestion for preemptive or prophylactic comprehensive pre-war planning and preparation "before the UK committed to any course of action in Iraq" sounds like a good idea. But it's actually not helpful in the case of Iraq. Because for it to produce the informed benefit for UK decision-makers that the UK Iraq Inquiry suggests, the exercise would have needed accurate, deep, and detailed knowledge about Saddam's Iraq. Which was not like the info on Saddam's Iraq we had outside of Iraq. For example, US planning incorporated conceptions of Iraqi society that were valid in the early 1990s and still thought to be valid in the early 2000s, but as we found out, those conceptions were obsolete by 2003 due to the extreme corruption and corrosion of Iraqi society that had been imposed by the Saddam regime since Operation Desert Storm. The West's top experts on Iraq, including Iraqi expats and UN officials who had been to Saddam's Iraq, were shocked by what they learned about Iraq after the regime change. We learned Saddam's human rights violations, along with his terrorism, had been severely underestimated. We expected to find Iraqi society in bad shape. What we found when we got into Iraq was "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, 18MAR04). Thus, the exercise envisaged by the UK Iraq Inquiry would have gathered the available info on Iraq without knowing it was GIGO: garbage in, garbage out. If UK leaders relied on the product of that exercise as a fool-proof manual for the post-war: not good. In other words, probably not altogether different than how the post-war's opening stage of events actually played out.
Chilcot report:
622. In his statement to the Inquiry, Mr Blair said:
“... with hindsight, we now see that the military campaign to defeat Saddam was relatively easy; it was the aftermath that was hard. At the time, of course, we could not know that and a prime focus throughout was the military campaign itself …”623. The conclusions reached by Mr Blair after the invasion did not require the benefit of hindsight.
Apples and oranges. The UK Iraq Inquiry's criticism is based on general pre-war notions. I assume Blair is referring to things that were engaged on the ground in Iraq that we didn't know enough to anticipate in detail beforehand. In the "aftermath", UK and US peace operators were prepared to deal with post-war terrorism in Iraq to the degree expected from pre-war estimates of Saddam's terrorism like the samples from Baroness Manningham-Buller and JIC in the Chilcot report. In hindsight, the big thing in OIF that "we could not know" to anticipate was the Saddamist terrorists' insurgency because the Baroness and JIC severely underestimated Saddam's terrorism, which led to coalition forces being caught off guard by the rapidity, scale, and intensity of the Saddamist insurgency ambush.
Chilcot report:
675. Some instances of important CPA decisions in which the UK played little
or no formal part were:
• The decision to issue CPA Order No.2, which “dissolved” (or disbanded) a number of military and other security entities that had operated as part of Saddam Hussein’s regime, including the armed forces (see Section 12). ... The concept of creating a new army had also been raised by Mr Walt Slocombe, CPA Senior Adviser on National Security and Defense, in discussion with Mr Hoon. Dissolution was a key decision which was to have a significant effect on the alienation of the Sunni community and the development of an insurgency in Iraq, and the terms and timing of this important Order should have been approved by both Washington and London.
...
792. The Iraq of 2009 certainly did not meet the UK’s objectives as described in January 2003: it fell far short of strategic success. Although the borders of Iraq were the same as they had been in 2003, deep sectarian divisions threatened both stability and unity. Those divisions were not created by the coalition, but they were exacerbated by its decisions on de‑Ba’athification and on demobilisation of the Iraqi Army and were not addressed by an effective programme of reconciliation.
• The decision to issue CPA Order No.2, which “dissolved” (or disbanded) a number of military and other security entities that had operated as part of Saddam Hussein’s regime, including the armed forces (see Section 12). ... The concept of creating a new army had also been raised by Mr Walt Slocombe, CPA Senior Adviser on National Security and Defense, in discussion with Mr Hoon. Dissolution was a key decision which was to have a significant effect on the alienation of the Sunni community and the development of an insurgency in Iraq, and the terms and timing of this important Order should have been approved by both Washington and London.
...
792. The Iraq of 2009 certainly did not meet the UK’s objectives as described in January 2003: it fell far short of strategic success. Although the borders of Iraq were the same as they had been in 2003, deep sectarian divisions threatened both stability and unity. Those divisions were not created by the coalition, but they were exacerbated by its decisions on de‑Ba’athification and on demobilisation of the Iraqi Army and were not addressed by an effective programme of reconciliation.
Regarding "The Iraq of 2009 certainly did not meet the UK’s objectives as described in January 2003: it fell far short of strategic success", that's because UK forces didn't stay in Iraq nearly long enough to achieve a substantial nation-building objective, which to the UK Iraq Inquiry's credit is a point of emphasis in the Chilcot report. Six years wouldn't be enough time to secure an ambitious neighborhood reform in New York City or London, let alone Saddam-wrecked Iraq. Prime Minister Brown needs to be held to account for his inhumane and harmful mistake of ending the essential peace operations with Iraq too early. Same for President Obama.
Regarding "The decision to issue CPA Order No.2", see OIF FAQ post Demobilizing Iraq Army: a good call, after all? and Too Few Good Men by CPA officials Dan Senor and Walter Slocombe, which clarifies the context and the CPA's actions.
According to Senor and Slocombe, the timing of the CPA order was compelled by the Iraqi army having dissolved on its own, so the timing, if not the terms, of the dissolution was too far ahead for prior approval by Washington and London when the CPA issued the order.
As far as the CPA order having a "significant effect on the alienation of the Sunni community and the development of an insurgency in Iraq", that's mostly myth based on the misconception that the insurgency originated from rank-and-file Sunni Iraqis alienated by the occupation. In fact, the insurgency was developed before the occupation with Saddam's army of terrorists. Excerpt from American Enterprise Institute panel discussion, "The Iraq War Series: The Conduct of the War":
Jack Keane:
The fact of the matter is, we were dealing with an enemy force that Saddam Hussein had before the invasion, that planned to do what he was doing. And we were conducting likely the most formidable insurgency the West has ever encountered. Why am I saying that? Human capital is usually an issue for insurgents. Sometimes they get it outside. But human capital, they had somewhere in the neighborhood, if you add up the Fedayeen, the Ba’ath Party militia, special Republican Guard, excuse me, and [inaudible 01:10:58] intelligence service, the numbers 130,000. I’m not suggesting that we’re all involved. But I’m suggesting to you that was a good place to start. Remember, this is Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-based insurgency to start with. He had an unlimited amount of money, billions and billions of dollars. Normally, in the typical Mao based insurgency, they’re starving for what? For capital. They had an unlimited amount of money. They had unlimited amount of arms and ammunition. ... And what else did they have? Well, hell, they ran the country for 35 years, and they wanted to take it back.
The fact of the matter is, we were dealing with an enemy force that Saddam Hussein had before the invasion, that planned to do what he was doing. And we were conducting likely the most formidable insurgency the West has ever encountered. Why am I saying that? Human capital is usually an issue for insurgents. Sometimes they get it outside. But human capital, they had somewhere in the neighborhood, if you add up the Fedayeen, the Ba’ath Party militia, special Republican Guard, excuse me, and [inaudible 01:10:58] intelligence service, the numbers 130,000. I’m not suggesting that we’re all involved. But I’m suggesting to you that was a good place to start. Remember, this is Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-based insurgency to start with. He had an unlimited amount of money, billions and billions of dollars. Normally, in the typical Mao based insurgency, they’re starving for what? For capital. They had an unlimited amount of money. They had unlimited amount of arms and ammunition. ... And what else did they have? Well, hell, they ran the country for 35 years, and they wanted to take it back.
Chilcot report:
De‑Ba’athification
818. The following key findings are from Section 11.2, and relate to evidence in Section 11.1:
• Early decisions on the form of de‑Ba’athification and its implementation had a significant and lasting negative impact on Iraq.
• Limiting de‑Ba’athification to the top three tiers of the party, rather than extending it to the fourth, would have had the potential to be far less damaging to Iraq’s post‑invasion recovery and political stability.
... • The UK chose not to act on its well‑founded misgivings about handing over the implementation of de‑Ba’athification policy to the Governing Council.
...
880. After the fall of a repressive regime, steps inevitably have to be taken to prevent those closely identified with that regime from continuing to hold positions of influence in public life. The development of plans which minimise undesired consequences, which are administered with justice and which are based on a robust understanding of the social context in which they will be implemented, should be an essential part of preparation for any post‑conflict phase. This should include measures designed to address concerns within the wider population, including those of the victims of the old regime, and to promote reconciliation.
881. It is vital to define carefully the scope of such measures. Bringing too many or too few individuals within scope of measures like de‑Ba’athification can have far‑reaching consequences for public sector capacity and for the restoration of public trust in the institutions of government.
818. The following key findings are from Section 11.2, and relate to evidence in Section 11.1:
• Early decisions on the form of de‑Ba’athification and its implementation had a significant and lasting negative impact on Iraq.
• Limiting de‑Ba’athification to the top three tiers of the party, rather than extending it to the fourth, would have had the potential to be far less damaging to Iraq’s post‑invasion recovery and political stability.
... • The UK chose not to act on its well‑founded misgivings about handing over the implementation of de‑Ba’athification policy to the Governing Council.
...
880. After the fall of a repressive regime, steps inevitably have to be taken to prevent those closely identified with that regime from continuing to hold positions of influence in public life. The development of plans which minimise undesired consequences, which are administered with justice and which are based on a robust understanding of the social context in which they will be implemented, should be an essential part of preparation for any post‑conflict phase. This should include measures designed to address concerns within the wider population, including those of the victims of the old regime, and to promote reconciliation.
881. It is vital to define carefully the scope of such measures. Bringing too many or too few individuals within scope of measures like de‑Ba’athification can have far‑reaching consequences for public sector capacity and for the restoration of public trust in the institutions of government.
To its credit, the UK Iraq Inquiry recognizes that the de‑Baathification was normal and necessary. It was also part of the law and policy of the UNSCR 688 part of the UNSCR 678 enforcement long before OIF.
I assume "Early decisions on the form of de‑Ba’athification and its implementation had a significant and lasting negative impact on Iraq" refers to the misconception that the Saddamist insurgency originated from ordinary Iraqis who felt alienated rather than the insurgency's actual origin of pre-assembled Saddamist terrorists. Of course, Saddam's terrorists were alienated by the de-Baathification.
"It is vital to define carefully the scope of such measures" makes sense, but the UK Iraq Inquiry implies that the de‑Baathification needed to be perfectly calibrated from the start. Once again, the UK Iraq Inquiry applies a standard of preemptive or prophylactic perfection that's neither normal nor realistic. Social programs of all kinds by any public or private entity anywhere usually undergo recalibration after first implementation that "define[s] carefully the scope of such measures". According to CPA officials, the de‑Baathification underwent normal recalibration that addressed the "tiers" controversy, but that isn't mentioned in the Chilcot report.
When considering the challenge of calibrating the de-Baathification, keep in mind that the Saddam regime's human rights violations were found to be "far worse" (UNCHR) than we thought, despite that they were already evaluated at the end of the scale, including genocide. Saddam obviously didn't carry out all of his abuse of the Iraqi people with his own hands. Also keep in mind that there were many more Saddamist terrorists than we thought, and Saddam ruled Iraq with "widespread terror" (UNCHR) and "[t]he predominant targets of Iraqi state terror operations were Iraqi citizens, both inside and outside of Iraq" (IPP). Given those circumstances, it's understandable that in "handing over the implementation of de‑Ba’athification policy to the Governing Council" the de-Baathification would start by reaching for "too many" Saddam regime members rather than "too few" before scaling back.
As far as the "far‑reaching consequences for public sector capacity" of "Bringing too many ... individuals within scope of measures like de‑Ba’athification", the Saddam regime was deeply corrupt as well as deeply abusive. So the "potential" of "damaging ... Iraq’s post‑invasion recovery and political stability" by bringing in "too many" to the de-Baathification wasn't inherently greater than the potential damage of bringing in "too few". Anyway, the new Iraqi government didn't stop hiring after the first iteration of the de-Baathification. Former regime bureaucrats who weren't terrorists or human rights abusers for Saddam could apply for government work once they became eligible when the de-Baathification was recalibrated.
As far as "measures designed ... to promote reconciliation", those weren't lacking. De-Baathification was not de-Sunnification. Sunnis were included among Iraq's diversity from the start of the nation-building project. However, the risk-reward calculation for joining the anti-Saddamist post-Saddam Iraq and defying the Saddamist insurgency, which was a conversion of the Saddam regime's "systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror" (UNCHR), would be especially hard for Sunni Iraqis. The risk-reward calculation was made harder by the strident anti-peace movements within coalition societies that discouraged the Iraqi people by undercutting the peace operations that Iraqis, especially Sunnis, needed to counteract the Saddamist insurgency and its Iran-driven complement. When the Coalition caught up to the Saddamist insurgency with the counterinsurgency "surge", Sunnis quickly embraced the "measures designed ... to promote reconciliation" that had been on the table from the start.
Chilcot report:
689. The Inquiry considers that a deterioration in security could and should have been
identified by Lt Gen Reith by the end of August 2003 and that the cumulative evidence
of a deteriorating security situation should have led him to conclude that the underlying
assumptions on which the UK’s Iraq campaign was based was over‑optimistic, and
to instigate a review of the scale of the UK’s military effort in Iraq.
The problem in terms of the "deteriorating security situation" wasn't that "the underlying assumptions on which the UK’s Iraq campaign was based was [sic] over‑optimistic". The problem was that British analysts like Baroness Manningham‑Buller and their American counterparts severely underestimated Saddam's terrorism, including its "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with al Qaeda. Knowing what we know now, the initial difficulty of assessing the security situation was due to focusing on the Iraqi populace and seeing one thing and not realizing the security problem was actually being generated from outside the Iraqi populace by Saddamist terrorists, whose primary insurgency was then joined by the complementary Iran-driven insurgents with whom they built a pseudo-civil war.
The success of the counterinsurgency "surge" shows that the optimistic "underlying assumptions" about the Iraqi people were valid. They were just overwhelmed by the one big thing that the occupying powers had wrong. If not for the Saddamist insurgency breaking it, the initial post-war plan could have adapted as expected.
Chilcot report:
646. The JIC correctly judged on 16 April that the local population had high hopes that
the Coalition would rapidly improve their lives and that “resentment of the Coalition ...
could grow quickly if it is seen to be ineffective, either politically or militarily. Such
resentment could lead to violence.”
...
649. In the absence of a functioning Iraqi police force and criminal justice system, and without a clear Coalition Phase IV plan, looting and score‑settling became a serious problem in Baghdad soon after the regime fell. The looting of ministry buildings and damage to state‑owned infrastructure in particular added to the challenges of the Occupation.
650. Reflecting in June 2004, Mr David Richmond, the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Iraq from March to June 2004, judged that the failure to crack down on looting in Baghdad in April 2003 released “a crime wave which the Coalition has never been able to bring fully under control”.
651. After visiting Iraq in early May 2003, General Sir Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, observed:
...
649. In the absence of a functioning Iraqi police force and criminal justice system, and without a clear Coalition Phase IV plan, looting and score‑settling became a serious problem in Baghdad soon after the regime fell. The looting of ministry buildings and damage to state‑owned infrastructure in particular added to the challenges of the Occupation.
650. Reflecting in June 2004, Mr David Richmond, the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Iraq from March to June 2004, judged that the failure to crack down on looting in Baghdad in April 2003 released “a crime wave which the Coalition has never been able to bring fully under control”.
651. After visiting Iraq in early May 2003, General Sir Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, observed:
“A security vacuum still exists [in Baghdad] ... particularly at night. Looting, revenge killing and subversive activities are rife … Should a bloody and protracted insurgency establish itself in Baghdad, then a ripple effect is likely to occur.”652. Gen Jackson recognised that the UK’s ability to maintain the consent of the population in the South depended on a stable and secure Baghdad, and advised:
“The bottom line is that if we choose not to influence Baghdad we must be confident of the US ability to improve [its tactics] before tolerance is lost and insurgency sets in.”
The UK Iraq Inquiry is correct that there was looting, lawlessness, and a lack of omnipotence from the Coalition in the immediate wake of toppling the Saddam regime, but the question is whether that calmed down or whether it grew into the insurgency. We know now it did not grow into the insurgency because the insurgency was actually pre-assembled by Saddam and his terrorists.
Mr. Richmond's "failure to crack down on looting in Baghdad in April 2003 released “a crime wave which the Coalition has never been able to bring fully under control”" and General Jackson's "if we choose not to influence Baghdad we must be confident of the US ability to improve [its tactics] before tolerance is lost and insurgency sets in" in May 2003 are a case of correlation does not imply causation. Richmond and Jackson exemplify our ignorance of the Saddamist insurgency early on in the post-war that led UK and US officials to reverse the cause and effect. We know now that the Saddamist insurgency established itself and set in before the occupation. The Saddamist insurgency was the cause and the "crime wave which the Coalition has never been able to bring fully under control” and "revenge killing and subversive activities" were the effect, not the other way around. That's why Lieutenant General Reith and his American counterparts had so much difficulty getting a handle on the security situation. They were doing the right things with the Iraqi populace and should have been seeing better trend lines, yet the security situation continued to worsen. We know now that was the doing of the Saddamist insurgency rather than the Iraqi populace.
Chilcot report:
710. ... Having recognised that a stable and secure environment was the key factor on which
progress in Iraq depended, by May 2004 the UK solution was “a better and quicker
plan for building Iraqi capacity in the Police, Civil Defence Corps, the Army and the
Intelligence Service”. This made sense in the long term but was unlikely to meet
the requirement to regain control of Iraq rapidly in the face of a mounting insurgency.
This is a good point. It's worth keeping in mind about criticism of the Iraqi security forces and our efforts to train and build them that their performance was relative to the Saddamist insurgency. Coming from the Saddam regime meant Saddamist insurgents were the world's top experts at terrorizing and mass-murdering Iraqis on top of their world-leading terrorist capabilities. I don't imagine post-World War Two German or Japanese security forces would have fared better than the Iraqi security forces if they had to compete against an equal of the Saddamist insurgency.
Chilcot report:
686. By the autumn of 2003, violence was escalating in Baghdad and attacks were
becoming more sophisticated. Attacks on the UN in August and September, which
injured and killed a number of UN officials including the UN Special Representative for
Iraq, prompted some organisations to withdraw their international staff. Although Basra
was less turbulent than the capital, the risk of a ripple effect from Baghdad – as identified
by Gen Jackson in May – remained.
The well-meaning mistakes made by UN Special Representative for Iraq Sergio Vieira de Mello that enabled his murder by the Saddamist insurgency helped me realize that the difficulties we were facing in Iraq weren't due to US leaders "underestimating the post‑conflict challenge and failing adequately to prepare for the task" (Chilcot report), given that a top UN expert like Vieira was following the same essential premises as US leaders about the situation and how to approach the nation-building project. Like with US officials, the things that UN officials got right were overwhelmed at first by the big mistake of underestimating Saddamist terrorism. Vieira paid for it with his life.
Chilcot report:
862. As Iraq showed, the pattern set in the initial stage of an intervention is crucial.
The maximum impact needs to be made in the early weeks and months, or opportunities
missed may be lost for ever. It is very difficult to recover from a slow or damaging start.
...
867. Better planning and preparation for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq would not necessarily have prevented the events that unfolded in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. It would not have been possible for the UK to prepare for every eventuality.
...
867. Better planning and preparation for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq would not necessarily have prevented the events that unfolded in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. It would not have been possible for the UK to prepare for every eventuality.
It may be difficult to recover from a slow or damaging start, but setbacks are normal in any kind of real competition, no less in a maximal contest of war and peace against zealous unbounded world-leading genocidal terrorists like Saddamists. Again, the UK Iraq Inquiry's call for comprehensive pre-war planning and preparation that's prophylactic or preemptive is not as helpful as it sounds. "Better planning and preparation for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq would not necessarily have prevented the events that unfolded in Iraq between 2003 and 2009" fits what happened better. The severe underestimation of Saddamist terrorism all but guaranteed a "slow or damaging start" no matter how well the UK and US planned and prepared for the post-war. But even in a hypothetical where we had clairvoyant foresight about the Saddamist insurgency and tailored our planning and preparation to that, while some things would have made a difference, e.g., UN officials prioritizing rather than subordinating their security, and the insurgency would have struck with less confusion and surprise, it seems likely that the contest would have come down to the counterinsurgency "surge" at about the same point of the mission anyway.
"It would not have been possible for the UK to prepare for every eventuality" in this case because the UK and US did not enter the occupation with the institutional knowledge, capability, and mindset needed to effectively counteract the particular Saddamist insurgency from the start. COIN was not on a shelf ready to go. Saddam's terrorists started the competition much more experienced and expert at wrecking Iraq and terrorizing and mass-murdering Iraqis than the Coalition's ability to defend Iraq and protect the Iraqi people from Saddamists. But learning how to win by adjusting to setbacks is also normal in real competition, including martial contests. I can't speak to the UK forces that, as the Chilcot report recounts, faced different challenges in Iraq. The US forces in the thick of the contest adjusted well. Realistically, the only way to beat the Saddamist insurgency was to evolve through the competition on the ground, which is how the winning counterinsurgency capability developed in Iraq.
In that aspect, the contest for post-Saddam Iraq versus the Saddamist insurgency was—or should have been—vital corrective training for the UK and US to emerge as annealed and capable champions of the essential principles embodied by the UNSCR 678, Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, and stronger confident leaders in the evolving world order of the 9/11 era. Unfortunately, Prime Minister Brown and President Obama chose to discard the vital competitive gains that the UK and US earned in Iraq.
The UK Iraq Inquiry plays up the UK and US's shortcomings and challenges in the contest for post-Saddam Iraq, but in reality, much of what the Chilcot report describes is par for the course. Our shortcomings and challenges with Iraq are vastly dwarfed by the shortcomings and challenges we overcame in our much more "damaging start" in Korea over seventy years ago. The essential difference is that we stayed in Korea long enough to work through our shortcomings and the challenges. It took us decades with Korea. We needed to stay for decades to work with Iraq the same way. That's normal for a nation-building project: Whether it's in Europe, Asia, or the Middle East, building a nation to secure the peace does not happen faster, or with less error, than raising a child.
The only fatal error that we made with Iraq was the extremely premature removal of the essential peace operations by Prime Minister Brown in 2009 and President Obama in 2011. They need to be held to account. See my critical comment on Prime Minister Brown's choice to end the British peace operations with Iraq and OIF FAQ post An irresponsible exit from Iraq.
And, public credit needs to be given to Prime Minister Blair where credit is overdue: On law, fact, and principle, Blair was right on Iraq in the first place. Publicly criticizing the specious UK Iraq Inquiry Chilcot report is part of that.
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