Glimpse inside President Bush's decision on the "Surge" or the real "3 am call"

To set the stage, first see 06OCT05 President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy and the 12JUL07 Press Conference by the President on the counterinsurgency "Surge".

Then, via the always excellent Small Wars Journal, see Troop ‘Surge’ Took Place Amid Doubt and Debate by NY Times reporter Michael Gordon. The article is a fascinating look inside the sharp debates, disagreements, and decision-making process that led to the present COIN strategy in Iraq.

In the same vein, also see Bush's Lonely Decision, the Wall Street Journal review of Bob Woodward's The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008. Excerpts from Woodward's book are serialized at the Washington Post: part 1, part 2, part 3. (h/t)

My biggest criticism of President Bush has been his reliance on delegating, which is not necessarily a poor leadership style, but in a war demanding evolutionary institutional changes, we've needed a President more like FDR who was more of a micro-manager. Excerpt from the Gordon article:

But Mr. Bush’s penchant to defer to commanders in the field and to a powerful defense secretary delayed the development of a new approach until conditions in Iraq, in the words of a November 2006 analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency, resembled anarchy and “civil war.”

I don't believe my criticism, albeit matching Michael Gordon's criticism, is right in this case, though. Primary benchmarks of the initial post-war plan were being met. Situation reports from commanders in Iraq were not providing a clear picture to the leadership in Washington of what was happening on the ground. Incremental adjustments that developed into the counterinsurgency "Surge" were being made under Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Until the need became obvious as Gordon points out, it was not obvious that a drastic change beyond the incremental adjustments was warranted. A timeframe of three years is reasonable in terms of allowing enough time to prove the success or failure of the initial post-war plan and drastically changing course with the COIN "Surge" when the initial post-war plan failed.

When the crisis point was reached, President Bush did take the necessary action. For the most part, Bush is made out in the Gordon article to be a competent, committed leader who made a tough choice from among a set of strongly held diverging 'expert' views.

President Bush is often maligned as a bumpkin whose strings are pulled by a neo-con cabal, a view reinforced by his less-than-stately public demeanor. And an argument can be made that Bush could, if not should, have made the call for the COIN "Surge" sooner had he been more of a micro-manager rather than a delegator.

However, the Gordon article and Woodward's book show President Bush chose a risky course of action under great pressure to do otherwise, with great deliberation, and so far at least, the course of action has been the correct one. In fact, the group that included GEN David Petraeus and advocated for the course of action that President Bush eventually chose — over the proposals of commanders in Iraq and top military and administration officials — does not seem like it was the most influential faction in the debate.

The Hillary Clinton presidential campaign featured an ad touting her as better qualified than Barack Obama to answer the "3 am call" and make a tough decision with far-reaching international implications. President Bush made his "3 am call" decision with the COIN "Surge".

How will Senator Obama or even Senator McCain fare when they face such an enormous decision without a clearly correct answer, when a decision must be made, when different factions are calling for radically different courses of action? Can either of them be as (eventually) decisive, committed to mission success, and deliberate as President Bush? As much as President Bush is degraded today by popular political culture, I would not be surprised if historians with access to now-classified records treat him much more kindly. Bush's decision for the counterinsurgency "Surge" is an exemplar of resolute principled American presidential leadership.

Add: George W. Bush is smarter than you and Bush ended financial crisis before Obama took office -- three important truths about 2008 by Bush senior economic advisor Keith Hennessey and Dubya and Me (backup) by Walt Harrington.

David Petraeus . . . my man

The always excellent Small Wars Journal posted a Times Online article, General David H Petraeus: The general's knowledge (archived), by Charles M Sennott, profiling General Petraeus, military commander of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

I already admired GEN Petraeus for the obvious reasons, but this quote from the article struck a chord:

“If we are going to fight future wars, they’re going to be very similar to Iraq,” he says, adding that this was why “we have to get it right in Iraq”.

I believe this deeply. With this quote alone, I feel as though GEN Petraeus represents me on the issue of Iraq better than any elected official. He gets it.

It seems obvious to me that our success or failure in Iraq will have far reaching implications. It will define and set the baseline. Operation Iraqi Freedom, as much as anything else, is a critical evolutionary learning curve for us in 4th Generation Warfare. Before OIF, even before 9/11, when I was a MI soldier, I realized we would have to confront our deeply entrenched phobias about guerilla war, moreso as it has evolved with globalization. I didn't invent the notion: over 40 years ago, President Kennedy announced that learning counterinsurgency was the American priority for the 20th Century. Unfortunately, we were hurt badly by the Vietnam War, which proved his point. Our defeat simultaneously provided a blueprint to the world for defeating us and made us phobic about engaging guerilla warfare. We are now struggling to catch up, evolutionarily speaking, in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I'm reading John Robb's Brave New War at the moment and Robb has only further reinforced my view that our Iraq mission has long-term consequences. Add: Along the same theme of the need to be ready to compete with other forms of martial competition, see Science of Resistance by Paul Tompkins and Robert R. Leonhard.

President John. F. Kennedy – Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military Academy, 6 June 1962

Listen to President Kennedy explain the Iraq intervention to West Point graduates in 1962. It's captivating, a must-listen. The transcript of Kennedy's speech is here. Kennedy's copy of his prepared speech is here. (h/t)

Kennedy was only President from January 1961 until his assassination in November 1963. His main accomplishment in that short time was to set a firm direction for the young liberal superpower with eloquently and powerfully stated ideals and ideas.

Where his 1961 inaugural speech laid a foundation of American ideals, President Kennedy's Special Message to Congress on Urgent National Needs on May 25, 1961 built upon that foundation a set of clear goals and ideas. Most striking is Kennedy's grasp of the evolving nature of geo-politics and warfare, the kind of military we need, the challenges they face, and the kind of missions they need to perform. His speech to West Point's Class of 1962 was formed in the context of his 1961 inaugural speech and special message to Congress on urgent national needs.

Since we are in the midst of the type of war for which President Kennedy sought to prepare our nation, pay special attention to that part of his speech. I won't excerpt from it because the entire speech is worth listening to and reading, especially for any American politician who fancies himself or herself a successor of JFK and a champion of his legacy. Anytime you forget what it means to be a liberal, go back to President Kennedy's inaugural speech, special message to Congress on urgent national needs, and his remarks to the West Point class of 1962, and refresh yourself.

Snapshot of early challenges with and our hope for Iraq

In the excellent Belmont Club, an anti-war commenter referred to a wonderfully instructive snapshot from the Washington Post of the early challenges and our hope for Iraq: Occupation Forces Halt Elections Throughout Iraq by William Booth and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, June 28, 2003. (Article at commondreams.org) The article has been widely cited by anti-war people as proof that the liberal American promise for Iraq was a lie. I understood the article differently.

My reaction:

Thank you. That Washington Post article, in its entirety, is a highly worthwhile read as a snapshot of both the challenges we faced and the justification for our hopes at a critical early stage in the post-war. The WP piece agrees with stories told to me by a friend of mine who served in OIF I (as a soldier, not a CPA civilian). He was an EOD team leader whose jobs were the WMD hunt and destroying ammo stockpiles. He told me how local Iraqi leaders sought out any Americans in leadership positions — even him, an EOD SSG on a non-diplomatic mission — to start the process of building the post-Saddam Iraq. The problem was, while our soldiers were the only practical interface with Iraqis, it was not their job (as it is now) to manage the transition. It was the CPA's job, but they were absent on the ground.

It's terrific reporting by the WP. The Bush admin has been widely accused of being unaware of the conflictual complexities of Iraqi society. If anything, the record shows that the Bush admin was, perhaps, overly sensitive and cautious about those complexities (eg, Bremer's fear of Baathists and Sadrists filling the vacuum).

Given the internal conflicts, missing the right political structure, the Bush admin clearly didn't trust the Iraqi factions to avoid a civil war. In hindsight, perhaps we should have taken a step back from the outset, focused on security, and simply helped the Iraqis while they took the initiative in building their post-Saddam civil society. We would have needed to trust them that they could make that leap from their own history.

In any case, the WP piece captures the caution by Bremer over the complexities of Iraqi society, the desire to avoid the risks of local factions undermining national reconciliation, and the desire by Bremer for a deliberate controlled transition to a stable post-Saddam Iraq. He didn't want a nation-building project doomed to fracture due to a rushed transition cracked with instrinsic structural flaws.

Remember, we had recently watched Afghanistan and Yugoslavia fracture with bloody civil war. We didn't want that to happen in Iraq on our watch, and it was Bremer's job with the CPA to make sure it didn't happen.

The choice of Iraqi military leaders wasn't about creating a puppet government and keeping popularly elected leaders out of the political process, as was expressed by the disillusioned Iraqis in the article. Those generals were supposed to be interim managers who were trained to take orders, top-down, while the CPA organized a national political structure, according to a blueprint, that could incorporate democratically chosen leaders without the nation fracturing.

Sensitive tasks. On their face, Bremer's decisions made sense. In a more 'laboratory' setting, if Bremer had fewer variables, fewer destructive agents, more time, and better constructive agents, he maybe could have done his job.

Unfortunately, we know what happened. Bremer failed. He could not implement his blueprint for post-Saddam transition in Iraq in the deliberate controlled fashion he — and most of us — wanted.

The WP piece backs up my ex-EOD friend's experience that Iraqis did, in fact, trust Americans and were willing to work with us in the early post-war. Clearly, however, that trust was (understandably) conditional and it had its limits. The enemy successfully moved to exploit those limits at the same time Bremer and the CPA, while well-intentioned, were insufficiently competent to accomplish their mission.

Some say that the Iraqis had to go through the bloody turmoil of the last 5 years, a cruel learning curve, to arrive at where they are today. I can't be certain that view is wrong, but I disagree. I believe if GEN Petraeus and his COIN warriors had been in charge in Iraq immediately in the post-war, we would have a far different story in Iraq today.

As is, the Iraqis gave us a real chance to fulfill the American promise in 2003, and we failed them then. If they've given us another chance, I hope we don't fail the Iraqi people again.

Again with realists and Iraq

I chimed in on a neoneocon post about Barack Obama. Regarding the Iraq mission, Obama strikes me as a more-palateable redux of John Kerry in 2004 in that he holds promise for both Iraq mission supporters and opponents.

From the comments thread:

“The various anti-war factions, from the incredibly harmful right-wing realist camp to the isolationists to the leftists, are illiberal. “

Thats interesting. Which faction are the “harmful right-wing realist camp”? Are you talking about those conservatives too anti-McCain to either vote for him or vote against him? Im not sure what you meant there. Other than that, the only truly anti-war Republican Im aware of is Ron Paul camp, and he strikes me more libertarian than right wing.

My response [with some copy editing]:

President Bush, 2004: “Some who call themselves “realists” question whether the spread of democracy in the Middle East should be any concern of ours. But the realists in this case have lost contact with a fundamental reality. America has always been less secure when freedom is in retreat. America is always more secure when freedom is on the march.”

Google ‘realist Iraq’ or a similar variation, and you will find many articles by the top proponents of realism explaining their opposition to our Iraq mission. They have been prolific in their opposition of the mission since the first day the Bush admin made it a prospect. Indeed, it would almost seem that the vindication of their fundamental beliefs as relevant in the 21st century, ie, after the Cold War in which they made their mark, relies upon a defining failure of liberalism in Iraq. It’s been a symbiotic relationship between right-wing realists and radical anti-war protestors. You find few realists stridently protesting the Long War with guerilla theatrics, but their opposition has provided much of the substantive material and legitimacy for the anti-war movement, which in turn, has obliged the realists by applying theory to practical use. Why? Due to their Cold War legacy, realists are highly respected and entrenched authorities in the academic, military, and political (foreign policy) establishments. For its part, the anti-war movement is highly adaptable, because while most of it is ostensibly leftist, it is able to freely adopt and sample the right-wing realist opposition to the Iraq mission. Doing so is not a contradiction for them. The “anti-” of the anti-war movement means their standard of judgement is less about upholding an affirmative belief than whether something can be practically used to attack our nation’s strategy or more specifically target the Republican party or this Bush administration. As such, the realists have been eminently useful in fueling the anti-war movement.

In sum, the realists oppose the Iraq mission because it has been shaped as a Wilsonian progressive liberal mission. Much of the prevailing anti-war argument against the Iraq mission as a (liberal) “fool’s errand" is realist-based. However, Barack Obama presents himself as an enthusiastic, even aggressive, Wilsonian progressive liberal who wants the US to be a proactive, leading liberal change-agent in the world. So, how can Obama’s classically liberal principles square with his professed allegiance to the illiberal anti-war movement? Well, the hope — my hope — is that those principles cause him to be the enthusiastically liberal CinC upholding the Iraq mission that we’ve needed all along. Or, he could be anti-war. Much like John Kerry in 2004, Obama holds forth both promises.

BTW, I had close access to realist thinking as a recent Poli Sci/IR grad from Columbia University, where the realist school is dominant. As a campus activist, I also had close observations of the anti-war movement.

GEN David Petraeus' year-end letter to the troops

GEN Petraeus' letter is copied from the excellent Small Wars Journal.

HEADQUARTERS
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE – IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09342-1400

28 December 2007

Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Civilians of Multi-National Force-Iraq:

As 2007 draws to a close, you should look back with pride on what you, your fellow troopers, our Iraqi partners, and Iraqi Coalition civilians have achieved in 2007. A year ago, Iraq was racked by horrific violence and on the brink of civil war. Now, levels of violence and civilians and military casualties are significantly reduced and hope has been rekindled in many Iraqi communities. To be sure, the progress is reversible and there is much more to be done. Nonetheless, the hard-fought accomplishments of 2007 have been substantial, and I want to thank each of you for the contributions you made to them.

In response to the challenges that faced Iraq a year ago, we and our Iraqi partners adopted a new approach. We increased our focus on securing the Iraqi people and, in some cases, delayed transition of tasks to Iraqi forces. Additional U.S. and Georgian forces were deployed to theater, the tours of U.S. unites were extended, and Iraqi forces conducted a surge of their own, generating well over 100,000 more Iraqi police and soldiers during the year so that they, too, had additional forces to execute the new approach. In places like Ramadi, Baqubah, Arab Jabour, and Baghdad, you and our Iraqi brothers fought—often house by house, block by block, and neighborhood by neighborhood—to wrest sanctuaries away from Al Qaeda-Iraq, to disrupt extremist militia elements, and to rid the streets of mafia-like criminals. Having cleared areas, you worked with Iraqis to retain them—establishing outposts in the areas we were securing, developing Iraqi Security Forces, and empowering locals to help our efforts. This approach has not been easy. It has required steadfastness in the conduct of tough offensive operations, creative solutions to the myriad problems on the ground, and persistence over the course of many months and during countless trying situations. Through it all, you have proven equal to every task, continually demonstrating an impressive ability to conduct combat and stability operations in an exceedingly complex environment.

Your accomplishments have given the Iraqi people new confidence and prompted many citizens to reject terror and confront those who practice it. As the months passed in 2007, in fact, the tribal awakening that began in Al Anbar Province spread to other parts of the country. Emboldened by improving security and tired of indiscriminate violence, extremist ideology, oppressive practices, and criminal activity, Iraqis increasingly rejected Al Qaeda-Iraq and rogue militia elements. Over time, the desire of Iraqis to contribute to their own security has manifested itself in citizens volunteering for the police, the Army, and concerned local citizen programs. It has been reflected in citizens providing information that has helped us find far more than double the number of arms and weapons caches we found last year. And it has been apparent in Iraqi communities now supporting their local security forces.

As a result of your hard work and that of our Iraqi comrades-in-arms—and with the support of the local populace in many areas—we have seen significant improvements in the security situation. The number of attacks per week is down some 60 percent from a peak in June of this year to a level last seen consistently in the early summer of 2005. With fewer attacks, we are also seeing significantly reduced loss of life. The number of civilian deaths is down by some 75 percent since its height a year ago, dropping to a level not seen since the beginning of 2006. And the number of Coalition losses is down substantially as well. We remain mindful that the past year’s progress has been purchased through the sacrifice and selfless service of all those involved and that the new Iraq must still contend with innumerable enemies and obstacles. Al Qaeda-Iraq has been significantly degraded, but it remains capable of horrific bombings. Militia extremists have been disrupted, but they retain influence in many areas. Criminals have been apprehended, but far too many still roam Iraqi streets and intimidate local citizens and Iraqi officials. We and our Iraqi partners will have to deal with each of these challenges in the New Year to keep the situation headed in the right direction.

While the progress in a number of areas is fragile, the security improvements have significantly changed the situation in many parts of Iraq. It is now imperative that we take advantage of these improvements by looking beyond the security arena and helping Iraqi military and political leaders as they develop solutions in other areas as well, solutions they can sustain over time. At the tactical level, this means an increasing focus on helping not just Iraqi Security Forces—with whom we must partner in all that we do—but also helping Iraqi governmental organizations as they endeavor to restore basic services, to create employment opportunities, to revitalize local markets, to refurbish schools, to spur local economic activity, and to keep locals involved in contributing to local security. We will have to do all of this, of course, while continuing to draw down our forces, thinning our presence, and gradually handing over responsibilities to our Iraqi partners. Meanwhile, at the national level, we will focus on helping the Iraqi Government integrate local volunteers into the Iraqi Security Forces and other employment, develop greater ministerial capacity and capability, aid displaced persons as they return, and, most importantly, take the all-important political and economic actions needed to exploit the opportunity provided by the gains in the security arena.

The pace of progress on important political actions to this point has been slower than Iraqi leaders had hoped. Still, there have been some important steps taken in recent months. Iraq’s leaders reached agreement on the Declaration of Principles for Friendship and Cooperation with the United States, which lays the groundwork for an enduring relationship between our nations. The United Nations Security Council approved Iraq’s request for a final renewal of the resolution that authorizes the Coalition to operate in Iraq. Iraq’s leaders passed an important Pension Law that not only extends retirement benefits to Iraqis previously left out but also represents the first of what we hope will be additional measures fostering national reconciliation. And Iraq’s leaders have debated at length a second reconciliation-related measure, the Accountability and Justice Bill (the de-Ba’athification Reform Law), as well as the 2008 National Budget, both which likely will be brought up for a vote in early 2008. Even so, all Iraqi participants recognize that much more must be done politically to put their country on an irreversible trajectory to national reconciliation and sustainable economic development. We will, needless to say, work closely with our Embassy teammates to support the Iraq Government as it strives to take advantage of the improved security environment by pursing political and economic progress.

The New Year will bring many changes. Substantial force rotations and adjustments already underway will continue. One Army brigade combat team and a Marine Expeditionary Unit have already redeployed without replacement. In the coming months, four additional brigades and two Marine battalions will follow suit. Throughout that time, we will continue to adapt to the security situation as it evolves. And in the midst of all the changes, we and our Iraqi partners will strive to maintain the momentum, to press the fight, and to pursue Iraq’s enemies relentlessly. Solutions to many of the tough problems will continue to be found at your level, together with local Iraqi leaders and with your Iraqi Security Force partners, in company and battalion areas of operation and in individual neighborhoods an towns. As you and your Iraqi partners turn concepts into reality, additional progress will emerge slowly and fitfully. Over time, we will gradually see fewer bad days and accumulate more good days, good weeks, and good months.

The way ahead will not be easy. Inevitably, there will be more tough days and tough weeks. Unforeseen challenges will emerge. And success will require continued hard work, commitment, and initiative from all involved. As we look to the future, however, we should remember how far we have come in the past year. Thanks to the tireless efforts and courageous actions of the Iraqi people, Iraq’s political and military leaders, the Iraqi Security Forces, and each of you, a great deal has been achieved in 2007. Thus, as we enter a new year, we and our Iraqi partners will have important accomplishments and a newfound sense of hope on which we can build.

As always, all or your leaders, our fellow citizens back home, and I deeply appreciate the dedication, professionalism, commitment, and courage you display on a daily basis. It remains the greatest of honors to serve with each of you in this critical endeavor.

Sincerely,

David H. Petraeus

Violence works

"Violence works" was Professor Thad Russell's repeated mantra in his Barnard history class, "American Civilization after the Civil War". His point was about American activist history and that diplomatic means of political advocacy could not match the change wrought by insurgent tactics.

My gut reaction is that the removal of humanitarian people and organizations from places like Afghanistan and Iraq is devastating to the greater political process because they — perhaps more than our military civil affairs and government-based aid/development orgs — embody the positive (progressive) promise of the Western relationship in its most interactive form.

Further, I believe their introduction, relationship-building, and then removal under threat has been more damaging to our mission and empowering to the insurgents than if they had been absent from the beginning. The tactic of targeting "non-combatants" has been repeatedly validated as effective, and more significantly, the gap left by the aid groups' removal has severely undermined the full-spectrum interactions necessary to bring about the so-called "political" solution in the peace-building process.*

Read this and despair: YONHAP NEWS: Afghanistan kidnappings keep Korean missionaries from going overseas

Excerpt:

Rev. Park Eun-jo of Sammul Church in Seongnam, south of Seoul, to which all the hostages belong, said Monday that the church will stop volunteer services unwanted by the Afghan government and is taking steps to pull the remaining volunteers out of the war-torn country. "Some already began preparations to return home," a church official said.

In Afghanistan, volunteer workers affiliated with about 10 nongovernmental organizations were to soon close their medical and educational aid activities and return home. "The South Korean Embassy in Afghanistan sent a public document recommending we immediately leave the country, but we have yet to decide when to leave," a medical aid worker operating in Kandahar told Yonhap News Agency by phone, requesting anonymity.

According to the Middle East Team, a Seoul-based Christian group working to help evangelical missionaries and volunteer workers abroad, seven teams had plans to leave for Afghanistan and other Islamic countries in late July, but three cancelled the planned trips and four postponed trips indefinitely in the wake of the kidnapping.

"They already finished reserving air tickets between April and May, but cancelled or indefinitely postponed their trips after learning about the Taliban's kidnapping of Koreans," said Kim Do-heon, a manager of the group. "We persuaded them to make the decision to cope with a possible recurrence of the kidnapping crisis even if they intended to stay in relatively safer regions."

Four Christian evangelical churches in Seoul and its suburbs also changed their plans to dispatch missionary and volunteer teams composed of 10 to 20 members each to such Middle East countries as Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan, according religious sources.

* Update: For what it's worth, the SMEs at Small Wars Journal assure me that the actual impact by private aid groups like the Korean missionary group has been minor to the point of insignificance.

When Anti-war is Anti-peace (2007)

I'm back in the Columbia Spectator today (15FEB07) with my column, When Anti-war is Anti-peace. I have mixed feelings about it because the version that's printed is not the preferred version I revised with the Spec editor assigned to me, but rather a rougher edited-not-with-me version of my original draft that I didn't approve. The substance of the message didn't change that much from the original submission to the unpublished revision, and I did submit the original draft, so I can't cry foul (too loudly). The upside is that the article is more timely in today's Spec given the anti-war protests on campus, and that was my original hope and intent.

Here's my preferred yet unpublished revised version of the article — enjoy:

UNPUBLISHED REVISION:

When Anti-War is Anti-Peace
By [Eric LC]

The calls for the United States to leave Iraq are reaching a frantic crescendo, and the precedent they most often cite is how Congress ended support for South Vietnam. However, while the Vietnam precedent for withdrawing from war is widely known, less understood has been the damage to peace caused by that retreat. The traumatic Vietnam episode convinced American leaders that peace operations in "non-permissive" environments were a misguided national security strategy. As a result, the peace-building options we needed at the outset of our current conflict were unavailable.

Since 9/11, peace building has returned to our strategic thinking, and the Iraq mission has become our greatest test for peace operations in "non-permissive" environments. What are peace operations? Essentially, they are the full-spectrum processes that transform failed regions into viable states that are secure, can sustain development and integrate into the international community, and are stable and effectively governed. Peace operations also encompass the organizations—private sector, government, international, and military civil affairs—that engage in humanitarian intervention, development, and aid.

If we make the deliberate decision to abandon Iraq, then we can forget about peace building in other "non-permissive" environments. Our peace-building capability will be swept away in the political fall-out, just as it was after the Vietnam War. Leading "anti-war" Congressman John Murtha, for example, is actually very hawkish . . . about China. He just vehemently opposes peace operations, whether they are in 2003 Iraq or 1993 Somalia.

I'm not as hard on President Bush's administration for our post-war planning failures in Iraq because I understand much of it was due to the lack of pre-mission capability. After all, how do you fix a country with an absence of tools and know-how for doing it? The easy answer is that you call someone else to fix it, and that's basically how we planned for the post-war in Iraq. We've learned the hard way that there is no one else to call and we are responsible for completing the job we started.

The solution to the mess depends on whether the peace operations community, thrown into the deep end of the pool since 9/11, can struggle out from the legacy of the Vietnam War. Doing so requires a bloody, expensive learning curve. Unfortunately, too many people we mean to help and protect, as well as our own peace operators, have died as the price for learning fundamental lessons while opposed by enemies who expertly attack our weaknesses.

But, are we learning? I contend that we are. Recently, I had the privilege of attending two peace operations conferences, the first in Washington DC and the second in SIPA. I was impressed by the dedication of both military and civilians to win the war by building peace and struck by the degree to which the Vietnam War had undermined the ability of peace agencies to handle the "operations other than war" that are center-stage in the War on Terror. Nonetheless, I was buoyed by the candid admissions of failure and the progress that has been made toward reforming everything from personnel to doctrine to institutional cultures. Participants spoke about the General Petraeus-led troop surge, with its accompanying strategic shifts, as a necessary re-orientation for the peace process in Iraq. It was hammered home – mostly by civilian peace operators humbled in Iraq — that in "non-permissive" environments, the military must be the main agent of peace. As a senior USAID representative stated, "if you [the military] expect a follow-on civilian force to replace you, don't. It's not coming."

My final impression was more emotional. My heart broke as I listened to the lessons learned by peace operators and their hopes for the future while knowing that outside, the "anti-war" movement was tearing down their mission. I especially was moved by the desire of the military officers to secure a better future for the Iraqi people — all the military participants had served in Iraq and expected to return. During the Washington conference, I studied the reactions of two Iraqi embassy liaisons while they listened intently to Americans taking personal responsibility for the fate of Iraq. I wondered how they reconciled the peace operators with the "anti-war" activists who accuse coalition forces of "[refusing] to even validate the lives of Iraqis." At the end of the Columbia conference, a United Nations representative asked whether the American commitment to peace operations would outlast a "regime change" in the next presidential election. Her fear was a massive, and most likely untenable, shift of responsibility to the UN in Iraq should the United States abandon our peace operations there.

Retreat from Iraq won't end the American commitment to peace around the world. However, our success or failure in Iraq sets the benchmark for intervention anywhere, such as Darfur, defined by violent opposition. Today, I am afraid the rising tide of the "anti-war" movement will destroy our capability to build peace, gained through so great a sacrifice, in the places of the world that need our help the most.

Related: 15DEC06 US Army counterinsurgency FM (field manual) 3-24.

ADD: Also see my 2002 Spec article, Weighing in on Iraq, the sources and commentary at An irresponsible exit from Iraq, my expository commentary on the post-war planning, setbacks, and adaptations, and the explanation why upholding the Iraq intervention is vital to reviving American leadership of the free world (US-led liberal world order).

Happy Veterans Day: Call to Duty: Boots on the Ground

Originally posted on November 1st, but I'm moving it up to celebrate Veterans Day. Watch the video.

Description: Call to Duty: Boots on the Ground
Boots on the Ground represents the commitment of the United States of American [sic] and the multiple capabilities of the American Soldier. It reflects the physical and mental aspect of being the ultimate instrument of national resolve that is both ready to meet and relevant to the challenges of the dangerous and complex 21st century security environment.
Airdate: October 9, 2006
Run Time: 00:12:00

*** Open the video here or here. ***



I consider "Call to Duty: Boots on the Ground" a must-see video.

Its illustration of "the commitment of the United States of American [sic]" and "the ultimate instrument of national resolve that is both ready to meet and relevant to the challenges of the dangerous and complex 21st century security environment", combined with President Bush's 06OCT05 defense of the Iraq mission and War on Terror, provides a benchmark for real competitive resolute American leadership of the free world.

The video rings true with the perception of the Army I learned from my experience as a soldier. Its message is from the heart and true to the Army heritage. While "Call to Duty: Boots on the Ground" seems to be designed for young soldiers to explain the 'Why We Fight', I believe this is the message that should be presented to the public as the Army face. It's stupid to pretend soldiers don't go to war or that they don't die at war. The better way is to put the hard facts into context. I prefer it over the new Army recruiter slogan of "Army Strong", although the Army Strong video is pretty good.

Happy Veterans Day. I wish all Americans who have served, are serving and will serve in our Armed Forces a Happy Veterans Day. May we live long, fruitful and meaningful lives, for ourselves and for our brothers and sisters who don't make it to come back home.

---

Also see Army Lieutenant Benjamin Colgan, Castillo, and New York Times writer posits "Thank you for your service" is offensive to veterans. I disagree..

Senator Kerry insults the American soldier.

John Kerry: "You know, education, if you make the most of it, if you study hard and you do your homework, and you make an effort to be smart, uh, you, you can do well. If you don't, you get stuck in Iraq."

Kerry's response to the criticism of his remark:

"If anyone thinks a veteran would criticize the more than 140,000 heroes serving in Iraq and not the president who got us stuck there, they're crazy. This is the classic G.O.P. playbook. I'm sick and tired of these despicable Republican attacks that always seem to come from those who never can be found to serve in war, but love to attack those who did.

I'm not going to be lectured by a stuffed suit White House mouthpiece standing behind a podium, or doughy Rush Limbaugh, who no doubt today will take a break from belittling Michael J. Fox's Parkinson's disease to start lying about me just as they have lied about Iraq. It disgusts me that these Republican hacks, who have never worn the uniform of our country lie and distort so blatantly and carelessly about those who have.

The people who owe our troops an apology are George W. Bush and Dick Cheney who misled America into war and have given us a Katrina foreign policy that has betrayed our ideals, killed and maimed our soldiers, and widened the terrorist threat instead of defeating it. These Republicans are afraid to debate veterans who live and breathe the concerns of our troops, not the empty slogans of an Administration that sent our brave troops to war without body armor.

Bottom line, these Republicans want to debate straw men because they're afraid to debate real men. And this time it won't work because we're going to stay in their face with the truth and deny them even a sliver of light for their distortions. No Democrat will be bullied by an administration that has a cut and run policy in Afghanistan and a stand still and lose strategy in Iraq."

Senator, you have a history. Just stop the excuses and apologize, okay?

P.S. Contra Kerry's misrepresentation, President Bush's decision for Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrably was correct on the law and facts. The US case versus Saddam is substantiated, Iraq was evidentially in categorical breach of the Gulf War ceasefire.