PREFACE: Scroll down or click on
#fallows for my critical review of
James Fallows's November 2002
The Atlantic article, "The Fifty-First State?", and October 2004
The Atlantic article, "Bush's Lost Year";
#lichtman for my clarification to
Allan Lichtman regarding Trump on Bush and WMD in
The Case for Impeachment (2017);
#bobbitt for my correction of
Philip Bobbitt's "principal motive" for Operation Iraqi Freedom in
The Garments of Court and Palace: Machiavelli and the World that He Made (2013); and
#cook for my critical response to
Steven A. Cook's 17FEB19
Foreign Policy article, "All This Should Remind You of the Run-Up to the Iraq War". Their e-mails in our respective exchanges are omitted.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [James Fallows]
date: Mar 1, 2019, 12:22 PM
subject: Re: New Cheney biopic Vice is a gift opportunity to clarify the Iraq issue for the public
Mr. Fallows,
My appreciation for your lifetime of reporting on US military power and policy and civil-military relations is
why I am appealing to you to set the record straight contra
Vice et al. But
again, expert stature does not take precedence over bedrock law and fact.
I review your articles below [per the dictate in my
Critical responses to leaders and pundits preface]. To round out the diagnosis, I shared this excerpt (without your e-mail address) with national security analyst Brian Dunn, who blogs at
The Dignified Rant with a strategy orientation, for his critical input:
Brian posted his review at "Victory, Indeed":
http://thedignifiedrant.blogspot.com/2019/02/victory-indeed.html. His e-mail address is on the left-side menu bar under the ad. Excerpt:
I did look at the two articles Fallows cites to justify his current view.
The first was published in the November issue of The Atlantic. Despite being cited as an example of why the war was a big error, it was actually just a collection of people discussing all the ways things could go horribly wrong. If you throw up enough potential problems it sounds bad. But that pre-war laundry list is not an argument for error.
...
The second article, in October 2004, focuses on comparing the reality of Iraq to the fantasy world of all the other problems America would have solved without being involved in Iraq:
...
Again, it is way too early to base your 2019 judgment of an enormous strategic error on 2002 and 2004 speculation and results! Look at Europe in November 1946 if you want to see why you need time to judge a victory or defeat. In my lifetime I've gone from seeing the Korean War as a draw to seeing it as a victory because as time passed South Korea moved from an autocracy to a democratic and prosperous state.
...
It was certainly morally just for America to get rid of an evil and murderous dictator. But America also won the Iraq War on the results.
--Iraq no longer is run by a minority Sunni Arab faction for the narrow benefit of that faction while impoverishing, terrorizing, and killing its own people (including most Sunni Arabs). Iraq is now dominated by the Shia majority in an imperfect democracy that needs our help to develop rule of law. But at least imperfect ballots rather than lethal bullets are settling the question of who runs Iraq.
--Iraq no longer uses, produces, or seeks weapons of mass destruction.
--Iraq no longer a major threat to its own Kurds, where once Saddam gassed them on a large scale.
--Iraq is no longer a threat to neighbors as it was under Saddam to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and even Iran. While Iran under the mullahs was and is no friend of America, the war with Iran in the 1980s raised tensions in a vital part of the world that could have interrupted the world's oil supplies. And Saddam's power bent Jordan to be a client of Iraq in many ways. All that is negated.
--Iraq no longer supports terrorism in the region, and is in fact an ally who has killed far more jihadis than many of our most capable NATO allies. Somehow that obvious sign of victory is overlooked all too easily.
Iraq is not perfect. Far from it. But it is far better than it was under Saddam. America--and the region--is far better off because of our much-maligned victory over Saddam and the jihadis and Iranian who waged war against America in Iraq after Saddam was chased from his palaces.
My review:
Your articles confirmed the implication of the inherently incompatible view that President Bush's decision on Iraq was simultaneously correct on the controlling law and policy and an "enormous error" on subordinate strategy: that is, the articles show your conception of the Iraq issue is basically flawed.
Your opportunity cost argument stitches together a basket of speculative swatches, including significantly for its keystone representation of the Iraq issue. On the merits, a patchwork of speculation — however esteemed its sources — is neither equivalent to nor interchangeable with the interlocked primary sources that define the Iraq issue. Given its core role in your argument, your telling of the President's decision is remarkably devoid of the operative context, i.e., the controlling law, policy, and precedent that defined the operative enforcement procedure for the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) and the fact findings of Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) that determined enforcement with OIF.
Moreover, where you do foray from conjecture onto legal-factual ground, you misinform your readers. For example, your assertion, "Iraq has been bottled up, by international sanctions, for more than ten years", is incorrect. For clarification about the sanctions, see the OIF FAQ
answer to "Why did Bush leave the ‘containment’ (status quo)"; excerpt:
A prevalent assumption in the politics is the ISG finding, "In addition to preserved capability, we have clear evidence of his intent to resume WMD as soon as sanctions were lifted," means Saddam had not undertaken to resume WMD because the UNSC had not yet officially lifted the UNSCR 660-series sanctions. However, ISG reported Saddam's position on the sanctions was "We have said with certainty that the embargo will not be lifted by a Security Council resolution, but will corrode by itself." ISG findings confirm Saddam’s "end-run strategy" was to lift the sanctions by undermining them for "the de facto elimination of sanctions" rather than to lift the sanctions by UNSC decree through compliance with "the formal and open Security Council process". From Saddam's perspective, he was lifting the sanctions long before the 2002-2003 "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441):
By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their international support. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of 1999.
... As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation. [ISG]
In fact, by the time of President Bush's September 2002 speech to the UN General Assembly, Iraq had undertaken conventional and WMD-related armament activity in violation of UNSCR 687 for years. Reconstitution of Saddam's WMD program was underway. The Regime Finance and Procurement section of the Iraq Survey Group Duelfer report details the Saddam regime's nearly completed defeat of the sanctions and 'containment' that was averted with OIF.
With your misrepresentation of the Iraq issue, your argument confronts a pliably murky straw man in place of the otherwise well-defined Iraq issue. As such, on the merits, your argument is mooted by your miss of the actual justification of the Iraq intervention. But in the politics, the forceful obfuscation by a public expert authority of your estimable stature has helped normalize the otherwise blatantly false anti-OIF narrative, such as
Vice's reiterated propaganda, with compounding harmful consequences. Note, for example,
Hassan Hassan's
criticism of Western "leftists or anti-imperialists" for "fighting the Iraq war through Syria" and thus enabling the humanitarian toll in Syria caused by the Assad regime and its allies, especially Iran and Russia.
You said, "I have come to mine [my conclusions] with great care, and it's not because I have missed or overlooked the kinds of points you're making." That implies you've deliberately misinformed your readers. I hope that's not the case. Instead, I'll grant you the benefit of the doubt that you've merely been a victim of, as Secretary Rumsfeld famously explained, "But there are also unknown unknowns — the ones we don't know we don't know."
You can remedy the damage you've helped cause. For that purpose, you more than most — multiplied by the American public in your reach — would benefit from the
OIF FAQ clarification; excerpt:
...
As always, if you have questions about my work (or Brian's work), please ask.
---------------
from: [Eric LC]
to: [James Fallows]
date: Mar 9, 2019, 1:42 PM
subject: Re: New Cheney biopic Vice is a gift opportunity to clarify the Iraq issue for the public
Mr. Fallows,
...
Tip: Given that you cite President Clinton to contextually frame your argument, it should help you — as it critically helped me — to learn that Clinton, whose entire presidency was preoccupied by the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement, is the best source for understanding President Bush's decision on Iraq. In that regard, you said, "I will ask you to recognize the possibility that people can come to conclusions different from your own, based on reasoning as strong as you believe your own to be." Indeed, some areas of the broader discourse on Iraq are necessarily more subjective; but OIF's law and policy, fact basis is not one of those areas. The primary source authorities of the Iraq intervention are exceptionally straightforward, thorough, and plain — incontrovertible — and make for a simple clear assessment of whether a representation of the Iraq issue credibly accords with or else misinforms
contra the operative law and facts. Much credit for that constant clarity goes to President Clinton. As Saddam exhausted the lesser ceasefire enforcement measures during his tenure, the Yale JD president worked with Congress with evident foresight to meticulously refine the case against Saddam and reinforce the enforcement procedure, which Clinton's Harvard MBA successor carried forward to capacitate Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441).
... The OIF FAQ includes numerous Clinton Iraq citations in the same vein since the Clinton-to-Bush continuity in the US-led Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement is a main theme.
...
[Note: The
#clinton section of
Perspective on Operation Iraqi Freedom provides a comprehensive listing of Clinton Iraq citations.]
---------------
from: [Eric LC]
to: [James Fallows]
date: Mar 11, 2019, 4:36 PM
subject: Re: New Cheney biopic Vice is a gift opportunity to clarify the Iraq issue for the public
Mr. Fallows,
You're welcome, but to be accurate, they're critical reviews of
your view per your articles, per your request. The purpose of critically reviewing your articles is to help you clarify the Iraq issue for the public — which starts with correcting the seminal faults of your own work.
Note, again, laying a proper foundation with the operative law and facts doesn't necessarily mean discarding all your speculative analysis. Rather, it means re-sorting and valuating your content in the operative context.
Your articles surprised me. The deferential assumption due to your stature and experience is that you have working if not proficient knowledge of the controlling law, policy, precedent and determinative facts for President Bush's decision on Iraq. After all, the US-mandated enforcement of the UN-mandated Gulf War ceasefire threat-resolution measures versus Saddam's intransigence had progressed to coda over a decade of headline news by the time Bush became president. Plus, you repeatedly (if vaguely) insisted to me that you know them. Thus, I was curious to learn the presumably extraordinarily sophisticated reasoning for a view that's contradictory on its face.
I learned from your articles instead that your reasoning is simple: it follows a fundamental flaw, omission of OIF's law and policy, fact basis. To my surprise, your articles evidence you do not know the actual justification of the Iraq intervention despite your stature and experience and insistence you know it. Your view per your articles is akin to missing, overlooking, or worse, obfuscating the basic malady and prescription in order to creatively reproach a critical medical procedure.
My review singled out the linchpin assertion, "Iraq has been bottled up, by international sanctions, for more than ten years", for correction with that fault in mind. These additional Iraq Survey Group and Iraqi Perspectives Project findings, also borrowed from the OIF FAQ
answer to "Why did Bush leave the ‘containment’ (status quo)", further elaborate the correction:
...
Your misrepresentation of the Iraq issue has helped cause much damage, but you can fix it.
---------------
from: [Eric LC]
to: [James Fallows]
date: Mar 12, 2019, 3:32 PM
subject: Re: New Cheney biopic Vice is a gift opportunity to clarify the Iraq issue for the public
Mr. Fallows,
On the merits, a synthesis of the
primary source authorities manifestly outweighs an omission of the primary source authorities and the conjectural straw man planted in their stead.
The OIF FAQ is purpose-designed to lay a proper foundation with the operative law and facts, and correct the conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue, which means it's a purpose-designed tool for you to reexamine your premises.
Again, you're welcome to critically review the OIF FAQ:
https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/ to substantiate your disagreement as we've critiqued your articles. I look forward to your feedback.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Allan Lichtman]
date: Mar 9, 2019, 12:09 PM
subject: Regarding Trump on Bush and WMD in The Case for Impeachment
Professor Lichtman,
I use the primary source authorities — i.e., the controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts — to clarify the Iraq issue at
Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ.
From that perspective, I am writing you in response to this excerpt from pages 87-88 of
The Case for Impeachment in Chapter 5, "Lies, Lies, and More Lies":
Some believe that George W. Bush should have suffered impeachment for pushing America into war through falsehoods about the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. One Bush critic said, "For the war! He lied! He got us into the war with lies!" He was surprised that Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi didn't look to impeach Bush and get him out office. "Which personally I think would have been a wonderful thing." That critic was none other other than Donald J. Trump.
1
Despite condemning Bush's lies, Donald Trump has his own history of lying as an ingrained way of life.
Indeed, President Trump's charge against President Bush is false: according to the operative law and facts that define the Iraq issue, by which a hypothetical impeachment would have been litigated, President Bush's decision on Iraq was in fact correct. Though written prior to the 2016 presidential race, the OIF FAQ
answer to "Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq" directly addresses Trump's assertion, "He [President Bush] got us into the war [OIF] with lies!". In addition, during the 2016 presidential race, I
correct[ive]ly criticized then-Candidate Trump's misrepresentation of the Iraq issue.
To clarify, the "threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq" was established per UNSCR 687 at the outset of the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement and carried forward from the HW Bush and Clinton administrations' enforcement with Iraq. An American president upholding his duty could not arbitrarily decide Iraq's WMD threat per UNSCR 687 was resolved short of the mandated proof from Iraq. Iraq's WMD threat was established and presumed until Iraq met its burden of proof that it complied and disarmed in accordance with the UNSCR 687 "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441).
By procedure, the enforcement with OIF was triggered when Hans Blix and UNMOVIC
reported Iraq again did not disarm per UNSCR 687, which meant Iraq remained in "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the ceasefire in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). This excerpt is from the
#casusbelli section of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts":
At the decision point for OIF, the Saddam regime was evidentially in material breach across the board of the Gulf War ceasefire terms. The principal cause for OIF was Iraq's failure to comply and disarm as mandated with the UNSCR 1441 inspections. In Saddam's "final opportunity to comply" with "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations" (UNSCR 1441), Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire WMD mandates was established by UNSCOM, decided by the UN Security Council, confirmed by UNMOVIC to trigger the decision for OIF, and corroborated post hoc by the Iraq Survey Group.
...
For a succinct explanation of the legal basis for the military enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire, see President Clinton's letter to Congress outlining the legal authority for Operation Desert Fox. See President Bush's letter to Congress summarizing his determination and the legal authority for Operation Iraqi Freedom for a longer explanation.
Clarification in the public discourse of the Iraq intervention's actual justification would supplement your argument.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Philip Bobbitt]
date: Feb 22, 2019, 4:08 PM
subject: The "principal motive" for OIF in your 2013 Machiavelli book
Professor Bobbitt,
Your 2013 book,
The Garments of Court and Palace[:] Machiavelli and the World that He Made, states in note 30 for chapter 8 on page 235:
It's open to doubt whether the principal motive of the Bush administration in 2003, when it organized the invasion of Iraq, was to create a democratic regime to replace the autocracy of Saddam Hussein. But once American forces occupied Iraq, it was inconceivable that the old regime would be replaced with anything other than a democracy. And so, as the war began to proceed in earnest — despite American claims of victory — the war aim of a peaceful and benign democratic state took shape.
There's no doubt about the Bush administration's motive for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The US law and policy and UN resolutions that define OIF plainly show that the mission's purpose was to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (Public Law 107-243) and "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235) per the Gulf War ceasefire terms purpose-designed to resolve Iraq's Gulf War-established threat.
To that end, by the time President Clinton handed off the UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement to President Bush, credible threat of regime change was
established as necessary to compel Saddam's mandated cooperation. If Saddam failed to comply volitionally, regime change was established in the law and policy as the necessary measure to bring Iraq into its mandated compliance.
The premise that Iraqi regime change would "create a democratic regime to replace the autocracy of Saddam Hussein" was established in the operative set of law, policy, and precedent inherited by President Bush.
I clarify this question and other aspects of the Iraq issue at my
Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ. In particular, I suggest the OIF FAQ answers to "Why did resolution of the Saddam problem require a threat of regime change", "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom about WMD or democracy", and "Was the invasion of Iraq perceived to be a nation-building effort".
The OIF FAQ clarifies the Iraq issue by synthesizing the primary source authorities that define President Bush's decision on Iraq. As such, I encourage you also to share the OIF FAQ with the New Hampshire state representatives who in 2008 sought to "force" Congress to impeach President Bush over the OIF decision.
---------------
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Philip Bobbitt]
date: Feb 23, 2019, 12:31 PM
subject: Re: The "principal motive" for OIF in your 2013 Machiavelli book
Professor Bobbitt,
Indeed, reminiscent of the Japanese regime change with or without Hirohito, the US-led ceasefire enforcers would have accepted (and long held out for) compliant Saddam as 1st preference. A compliant insurrectionist Iraqi leadership was 2nd preference. Unfortunately, Saddam refused the 1st and disallowed the 2nd in his distinctive manner. The Iraq Survey Group confirmed Saddam "never intended" to comply as mandated.
.
The three OIF FAQ answers I suggested below address the issue with apt citations. Particular to your objection, see the OIF FAQ answer to "Was the invasion of Iraq perceived to be a nation-building effort":
https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/#nation-building. In fact, PL 107-243 contained a democracy component by extension — recall that the 2002 AUMF was not novel but rather carried forward, summarized, and updated the operative set of law, policy, and precedent that was finished with Operation Desert Fox under President Clinton.
[Section 4 of
Public Law 107-243 "expected those actions described in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–338)". Section 7 of
Public Law 105-338 ("SEC. 7. ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQ UPON REPLACEMENT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME") instructed, "the United States should support Iraq’s transition to democracy by providing immediate and substantial humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, by providing democracy transition assistance to Iraqi parties and movements with democratic goals", no matter the agency by which the Saddam regime was replaced, whether by insurrectionist Iraqi leadership or invasive regime change.]
The UNSCRs (1483, 1511, etc) for the OIF peace operations were detailed. However, you're correct that
preceding OIF, the UN mandates were not (and could not be) detailed about regime change like the attendant US law and policy. That being said, preceding OIF, there was a general (nominally anyway) normative UN standard for occupations that the US strove to uphold. See the "Foundational legal documents for the 2003-2011 peace operations in post-Saddam Iraq" section at
https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#law for a linked listing of topical UN and US references.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Steven A. Cook]
date: Feb 28, 2019, 6:28 PM
subject: Critical response to "All This Should Remind You of the Run-Up to the Iraq War"
Dr. Cook,
I am writing you in response to your 17FEB19 article in
Foreign Policy, "All This Should Remind You of the Run-Up to the Iraq War":
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/17/all-this-should-remind-you-of-the-run-up-to-the-iraq-war/, in particular your references to the Iraq intervention.
Steven A. Cook:
No one has made a reference to smoking guns and mushroom clouds ...
To clarify the reference, see the
#nuclear section of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts" post; excerpt:
In the operative UNSCR 687 disarmament context with the established fact of "Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme" (IAEA), that there were indicators of proscribed nuclear activity by Iraq is true.
...
Nonetheless, while reasonably concerned about the indicators of proscribed nuclear activity by Iraq, President Bush did not claim Saddam possessed nuclear weapons. His caution on October 7, 2002, "Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud," is often mischaracterized as a claim by Bush that Saddam possessed nuclear weapons. Yet in the same remarks, Bush stated, "Many people have asked how close Saddam Hussein is to developing a nuclear weapon. Well, we don't know exactly, and that's the problem." Understood in context, "we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud" helped explain that the intelligence and Iraq's continued violation of the UNSCR 687 WMD and terrorism mandates — the "clear evidence of peril" — compelled resolution of Iraq's mandated compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire terms, notwithstanding the President's acknowledgement that the intelligence was not "smoking gun" "final proof" that Saddam possessed nuclear weapons. In fact, the caution of a potential "mushroom cloud" was stated not as knowledge of Iraqi nuclear weapons but rather to stress that Saddam's outstanding WMD and terrorist threat per UNSCR 687 plus the intelligence gave weight to the call for UN and IAEA inspectors to return to Iraq forthwith in order to verify Iraq was compliant with the range of UNSCR 687 disarmament mandates, not limited to the nuclear disarmament mandates. To wit, the "mushroom cloud" image was prefaced with "Our enemies would be no less willing, in fact, they would be eager, to use biological or chemical, or a nuclear weapon." By "confront it now" in the same remarks, President Bush meant expeditiously bring Iraq into compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire terms, including the nuclear disarmament mandates.
Steven A. Cook:
... but how far off are we when the most senior U.S. officials have essentially declared their Iranian counterparts to be little more than a murderous gang hellbent on dominating the region? This was the same message that the George W. Bush administration stressed over and over again about Saddam Hussein and Iraq.
Highlighting Saddam's record of aggression simply reiterated the long established grounds of the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement purposed to fulfill "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687).
To wit, this excerpt is from the Iraq Survey Group report:
Saddam’s rationale for the possession of WMD derived from a need for survival and domination. This included a mixture of individual, ethnic, and nationalistic pride as well as national security concerns particularly regarding Iran. Saddam wanted personal greatness, a powerful Iraq that could project influence on the world stage, and a succession that guaranteed both. ... WMD was one of the means to these interrelated ends.
To wit, this excerpt is from UNSCR 949 (1994):
Recalling that Iraq's acceptance of resolution 687 (1991) adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations forms the basis of the cease- fire,
Noting past Iraqi threats and instances of actual use of force against its neighbours,
Recognizing that any hostile or provocative action directed against its neighbours by the Government of Iraq constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,
... Determined to prevent Iraq from resorting to threats and intimidation of its neighbours and the United Nations,
Underlining that it will consider Iraq fully responsible for the serious consequences of any failure to fulfil the demands in the present resolution,
...
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
... 3.Demands that Iraq not again utilize its military or any other forces in a hostile or provocative manner to threaten either its neighbours or United Nations operations in Iraq;
... 5.Demands that Iraq cooperate fully with the United Nations Special Commission;
To wit, this excerpt is from the OIF FAQ
answer to "Why not free a noncompliant Saddam":
On August 2, 1999, in his last comprehensive update on Iraq's compliance to Congress per Public Law (P.L.) 102-1 (1991), President Clinton was plainly opposed to freeing a noncompliant Saddam:
We are convinced that as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, he will continue to threaten the well-being of his people, the peace of the region, and vital U.S. interests. We will continue to contain these threats, but over the long term, the best way to address them is by encouraging the establishment of a new government in Baghdad.
...
The human rights situation in Iraq continues to fall far short of international norms, in violation of Resolution 688. That resolution explicitly notes that the consequences of the regime's repression of its own people constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region.
...
Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security. I remain determined to see Iraq fully comply with all of its obligations under Security Council resolutions. The United States looks forward to the day when Iraq rejoins the family of nations as a responsible and law-abiding member.
...
As such, the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) for the Gulf War ceasefire was purposefully designed with a spectrum of essential international norms to resolve the manifold threat of Iraq established with the Gulf War:
Reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait,
... Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of its prior use of chemical weapons and affirming that grave consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons,
... Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq,
Concerned by the reports in the hands of Member States that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons programme contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968,
... Deploring threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to make use of terrorism against targets outside Iraq and the taking of hostages by Iraq,
Taking note with grave concern of the reports of the Secretary-General of 20 March 1991 and 28 March 1991, and conscious of the necessity to meet urgently the humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq,
Bearing in mind its objective of restoring international peace and security in the area as set out in recent resolutions of the Security Council,
Conscious of the need to take the following measures acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
...
34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area. [UNSCR 687]
The politics have obfuscated that demonstration of Saddam's WMD was not the essential issue of the Gulf War ceasefire. The essential issue of the Gulf War ceasefire was the reconstruction of the "Government of Iraq" to satisfy "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687). The essential threat posed by the "Government of Iraq" was the unreconstructed nature of the Saddam regime, rather than Iraq's armament. The mandated disarmament of Iraq's WMD program was only a measurable symptom, albeit Iraq's WMD breach was an especially dangerous symptom. The essential purpose of enforcing Iraq's compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire measures, including the WMD disarmament mandates, was to assess whether the nature of the "Government of Iraq" had been reconstructed "to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions" (UNSCR 687).
Steven A. Cook:
Pence could have spared himself the trip to Poland and sent Donald Rumsfeld in his stead to reprieve his infamous criticism of the Germans and French as “old Europe,”...
The "infamous criticism" of Germany and France constitutes delicate diplomacy given that the two European leaders were
implicated in the Oil For Food scandal and
complicit with Saddam breaking the UNSCR 687 arms embargo, and thus they shared Saddam's culpability for the casus belli, i.e., Iraq's ceasefire breach.
Steven A. Cook:
... though, having learned their lesson in Iraq, the former defense secretary would now have to include the British.
The British can't be included with the Germans and French because unlike Germany and France, the UK was not complicit with Iraq's ceasefire breach. Rather, the UK together with the US responsibly enforced Iraq's mandated compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire terms.
Regarding the US-UK partnership with Iraq, see my
Critical response to John Rentoul's "Chilcot Report: Politicians" and my
Rebuttal of Prime Minister Brown's memoir argument against Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Steven A. Cook:
Most ominously, there is a lot of whispering in Washington that the Trump administration is ignoring the professionals within U.S. intelligence community, Defense Department, and other foreign-policy bureaucracies who have judged Iran to be in compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
To be sure, the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) was more stringent than the JCPOA. Iraq's noncompliance with the UNSCR 687 WMD mandates was assessed, confirmed, and corroborated by the U.S. intelligence community, Defense Department, other foreign-policy bureaucracies, the UN Security Council, UNSCOM, UNMOVIC, and the Iraq Survey Group.
To wit, this excerpt is from the
#casusbelli section of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts" post:
At the decision point for OIF, the Saddam regime was evidentially in material breach across the board of the Gulf War ceasefire terms. The principal cause for OIF was Iraq's failure to comply and disarm as mandated with the UNSCR 1441 inspections. In Saddam's "final opportunity to comply" with "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations" (UNSCR 1441), Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire WMD mandates was established by UNSCOM, decided by the UN Security Council, confirmed by UNMOVIC to trigger the decision for OIF, and corroborated post hoc by the Iraq Survey Group.
Steven A. Cook:
they [the Iranians] have taken advantage of the strategic blunders of others—the United States in Iraq
Yes, President Obama's radical course deviation with Iraq was a strategic blunder. See the OIF FAQ
answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory", and the sources and commentary at
An irresponsible exit from Iraq; excerpt:
In January 2009, President Bush handed President Obama a hard-won turnaround success in strategically critical Iraq to build upon. The US was fulfilling the principal objective of bringing Iraq into compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions stemming from UNSCR 660 (1990). Looking ahead from the COIN "Surge", post-Saddam Iraq was clearly headed the way of Germany, Japan, and South Korea as a key regional strategic partnership. In May 2011, at the dawn of the Arab Spring, Obama described the historic opportunity for peace in the Middle East where "Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress".
Concurrently, OIF had set up a better stable and ethical path to deal with Iran that relied on 3 prongs: stabilize Iraq as an American ally, increase sanctions pressure, and support civil reform in Iran. President Obama, instead, did the opposite of all three.
Steven A. Cook:
The one big difference between 2019 and 2002 is the determination among Democrats not to make the same mistakes they made 17 years ago when they allowed the Bush administration to frame the terms of the debate that paved the way for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Actually, the "terms of the debate ... 17 years ago" were established by President Clinton, who is a Democrat, and faithfully carried forward by President Bush. As Clinton 2nd-term Secretary of State Albright put it in her 2003 memoir, "As I listened to his words [Bush regarding Iraq], I had to nod in agreement. It was, after all, similar to speeches I had made time and again during my years as UN ambassador and Secretary of State."
See the clarification of the Iraq issue at
Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ. A main theme of the OIF FAQ is the Clinton-to-Bush continuity of the US policy on Iraq.
Steven A. Cook:
Democrats in particular are not going to support another preventive war in the Middle East.
To be clear, the actual character of the Iraq intervention was the compliance enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates which represented the range of essential international norms. The casus belli was Iraq's "material breach" [(UNSCR 1441)] of the Gulf War ceasefire. Because the Gulf War ceasefire terms were threat-resolution measures, defense was an inherent characteristic of the enforcement. Iraq's unresolved threat was measured by Iraq's noncompliance with the ceasefire terms, and Iraq's noncompliance was categorical. Note, Saddam's categorical breach of the ceasefire included the UNSCR 687 terrorism mandates, and counter-terrorism is intrinsically preventive.
I hope this is helpful. If you have questions, please ask.
Related:
Regarding pundits and David Brooks's "Saving the System".
