The thing about Secretary of State Powell’s presentation to the UN Security Council on February 5, 2003 is that while some of its pre-war intelligence-based details that were predictively imprecise have been severely panned in the politics, on the fact record – knowing what we know now – Powell’s presentation actually holds up very well. On the main points of his case presentation against Saddam, Powell was correct nearly across the board.
Of foundational importance, Powell correctly reiterated the burden of proof and standard of compliance with the UNSCR 1441 inspections, and that enforcement would be triggered by Saddam’s failure to comply and disarm
UNMOVIC confirmed and ISG [Iraq Survey Group] corroborated Powell’s view that Iraq did not comply and disarm as mandated by UNSCRs 687 and 1441.
ISG confirmed Powell’s view that Saddam was in fact covertly reconstituting Iraq’s WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687.
ISG confirmed Powell’s view regarding “denial and deception operations” and “concealment and destruction efforts” (ISG) and “many of these [WMD-related] sites were…sanitized by the Regime” (ISG).
ISG confirmed Powell’s view that Saddam had no intention to comply with the UN mandates.
UNMOVIC confirmed Powell’s view that Iraq did not turn over the information required to establish the total verified declaration that accounted for Iraq’s entire WMD-related program, including for anthrax and other BW.
Albeit not the “mobile production facilities used to make biological agents” (Powell) that Powell depicted, ISG confirmed a covert IIS chemical and biological lab network along with CW- and BW-convertible capability.
For example, ISG: “The UN deemed Iraq’s accounting of its production and use of BW agent simulants … to be inadequate. … the equipment used for their manufacture can also be quickly converted to make BW agent.”
UNMOVIC, ISG historical accounts confirm Powell’s context setting of Iraq’s proscribed activity “when UNSCOM was in country and inspecting”. Again, Iraq’s ceasefire-proscribed WMD was established fact on which the burden of proof was on Saddam to disarm as mandated.
Powell’s statement, “There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more” is panned because ISG didn’t find them. [Note: "them" refers to BW stocks; UNMOVIC and ISG confirmed Iraq's dual-use biological production capability.] But in fact, Iraq failed to account for its BW program as mandated. Then ISG could not answer for the fate of Iraq’s missing BW agents, stocks, and equipment due to Iraq’s “denial and deception operations” and “concealment and destruction efforts” (ISG).
UNMOVIC confirmed Powell’s view that Iraq failed to account for its CW stores: “These quantities of chemical weapons are now unaccounted for.” The historical account also confirm Powell’s context setting of Saddam’s track record of “denial and deception operations” (ISG) on CW.
ISG confirmed Powell’s view that “Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry”. ISG found a plethora of convertible dual-use items and activity.
ISG confirmed Powell’s view that “Iraq procures needed items from around the world using an extensive clandestine network”. ISG: “The IIS ran a large covert procurement program”.
ISG confirmed, “Early on, Saddam sought to foster the impression with his generals that Iraq could resist a Coalition ground attack using WMD.”
ISG confirmed that the covert undeclared IIS labs experimented on humans.
IAEA and ISG confirmed Powell’s context setting on Iraq’s track record of nuclear ambitions. ISG confirmed Saddam was revitalizing Iraq’s nuclear program and the indicators of proscribed nuclear-related activity, especially related to possible centrifuge activity, and that the aluminum tubes were properly flagged for possible nuclear application. The only part of Powell’s nuclear presentation that falls down in hindsight is the extent to which Iraq sought fissile material.
ISG confirmed Powell’s view on Iraq’s ceasefire-proscribed missile development.
On terrorism, Powell does speak at length with inordinate focus on Zarqawi.
[Update: Analysis of the Zarqawi issue is included in this exceptionally detailed write-up of the Saddam-al Qaeda relationship. Basically, the Bush administration was again substantively correct on the issue, if not predictively precise in the details.]
However, the Iraqi Perspectives Project [IPP] confirmed Powell’s main point that “Iraq and terrorism go back decades” and validated Powell’s warning about “the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the Al Qaida terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder”.
IPP also confirmed the “regional and global” (IPP) scope of Saddam’s terrorism.
While Powell emphasized the Saddam-AQ link with inordinate focus on Zarqawi, he did not define Saddam’s terrorism exclusively with the Saddam-AQ link:
And the record of Saddam Hussein’s cooperation with other Islamist terrorist organizations is clear … Terrorism has been a tool used by Saddam for decades. Saddam was a supporter of terrorism long before these terrorist networks had a name. And this support continues. The nexus of poisons and terror is new. The nexus of Iraq and terror is old. The combination is lethal.Various human rights organizations (I refer mainly to the UN Commission on Human Rights due to their regular reference to UNSCR 688) confirmed Powell’s view of Saddam’s humanitarian violations.
ISG confirmed Powell’s view of Saddam’s WMD intent. ISG: “we have clear evidence of his intent to resume WMD as soon as sanctions were lifted … the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions. Outward acts of compliance belied a covert desire to resume WMD activities.”
Finally, Powell was correct that “We wrote 1441 to give Iraq one last chance” and “Iraq is not so far taking that one last chance.”
PREFACE: Michael Morell was Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and served as President George W. Bush’s intelligence briefer. Morell apologized to Colin Powell during the promotional tour for Morell's book, The Great War of Our Time: The CIA’s Fight Against Terrorism from AL QA’IDA to ISIS.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Michael Morell]
date: Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 9:00 AM
subject: Your apology to Secretary Powell re his 05FEB03 UNSC speech was unnecessary and misleading
Mr. Morell,
I recently came across your May 2015 apology to Secretary Powell regarding his 05FEB03 speech at the UN Security Council: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/michael-morell-apologizes-colin-powell-about-cia-pre-iraq-war-wmd-evidence/.
Your apology to Secretary Powell was unnecessary and misleading.
I unpack Powell's UNSC speech here — https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2016/05/powell-unsc.html — with reference to the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), the decade+ established fact of the Saddam regime's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441), the UNMOVIC findings per UNSCR 1441 pursuant to UNSCR 687 that confirmed Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) to trigger President Bush's determination to use force per Public Law 107-243, the ex post Iraq Survey Group findings that corroborated Saddam's "material breach", and the Iraqi Perspectives Project findings on Saddam's "regional and global terrorism" that included "considerable operational overlap" with al Qaeda and also breached UNSCR 687.
Your apology is unnecessary because knowing what we know now, Powell’s UNSC speech holds up very well. The main points of his case presentation against Saddam are substantiated nearly across the board. The only major part of Powell’s presentation that falls down in hindsight is the extent to which the Saddam regime sought fissile material.
Your apology is misleading because it obfuscates that the principal theme of Powell's UNSC speech was the reiteration that the casus belli was Saddam's evidential noncompliance with the terms of ceasefire in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) — not the pre-war intelligence estimates. At the same time, Powell's characterization of Saddam's UNSCR 687 WMD violations was based mainly on the established fact record of the UNSCOM, IAEA, and UNMOVIC inspections, rather than independent intelligence analysis as such. (Recall that intelligence efforts to assess Saddam's WMD thwarted by Iraq's ceasefire-breaching "denial and deception operations" (ISG) compelled you to rely on the UN inspections.)
Per ISG's findings, the pre-war intelligence estimates were predictively imprecise. However, the inapposite and distorted emphasis on the pre-war intelligence estimates in the politics has obfuscated that Powell's substantive points regarding Saddam's noncompliance with UNSCRs 687 and 688 are nearly all validated. Per UNMOVIC and ISG's findings, although the pre-war estimates were predictively imprecise, the intelligence correctly indicated the Saddam regime was noncompliant with the UNSCR 687 mandates and engaged in proscribed armament and terrorist activity. For example, although the intelligence-estimated mobile bio weapons labs famously were not found by ISG, on the substantive point per UNSCR 687, ISG did find a covert IIS chemical and biological laboratory network together with a readily convertible BW simulant production capability.
During your book's promotional tour, you should have clarified that the President's decision for enforcement with Iraq pivoted on whether Saddam met Iraq's burden to prove the mandated "full and immediate compliance" (UNSCR 1441) with the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), there was no burden on the US to prove the predictive precision of your pre-war intelligence estimates, and Saddam's categorical "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire is confirmed.
Moreover, ISG's non-findings of WMD, usually portrayed as unequivocal in the politics, are in fact heavily qualified in the Duelfer report. In many instances where ISG cited lack of evidence, it meant the evidence needed for a definite determination is missing or lost, not that absence of evidence is evidence of absence. The ISG report, which corroborated Saddam's UNSCR 687 WMD breach and is rife with UNSCR 687 disarmament violations, in effect comprises a floor only, not a complete account.
On the law and facts, President Bush's decision for Operation Iraqi Freedom was correct. The case against Saddam is substantiated. I hew to the controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts to clarify the Iraq issue here: https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/.
I recommend that you review my post unpacking Powell's UNSC speech, revisit his speech and check my assessment for yourself, and then when you realize your error, publicly clarify the Iraq issue and retract your apology. There was no need for your apology because on 05FEB03 at the UNSC, Secretary Powell was right on Iraq.
PREFACE: Richard Haass is president of the Council on Foreign Relations. Colin Powell passed away on 18OCT21.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Richard Haass]
date: Nov 8, 2021, 3:13 AM
subject: Actually, Colin Powell's 05FEB03 UNSC speech is nearly all validated
Dr. Haass,
I clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ by organizing the primary source authorities, i.e., the set of controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts that define OIF's justification, to lay a proper foundation and correct for the prevalent conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.
I am writing you to clarify the Iraq issue in your 21OCT21 post, Colin Powell's American Life.
Haass:
What most of the critics miss is that Powell went to great lengths to establish the truth, and that what he said was what he thought to be true. One can be wrong without malign intent.
To genuinely honor Colin Powell's legacy, you should clarify that he was fundamentally right on Iraq in the first place and "most of the critics" have been wrong all along.
For example, see the relatable OIF FAQ Critique of Matt Latimer's "The Don Rumsfeld the Obituaries Won’t Write About".
Haass:
The biggest blemish on his record was his appearance as secretary of state before the United Nations Security Council in February 2003 to make the case for military intervention in Iraq.
Secretary of State Powell's 05FEB03 presentation to the UN Security Council should not be a blemish on his record. Knowing what we know now, the speech holds up well. The main points are substantiated nearly across the board. See OIF FAQ post Regarding Secretary of State Powell's speech at the UN Security Council on February 5, 2003 where I unpack Secretary Powell's speech.
Note, when I say "substantiated", I don't necessarily mean the intelligence-estimated details were proven to be predictively precise, but rather that the substantive element in the point was validated.
For example, the Iraq Survey Group did not find “mobile production facilities used to make biological agents” (Powell). Instead, ISG reported "secret biological work in the small IIS [Iraqi intelligence service] laboratories discovered by ISG" and “The UN deemed Iraq’s accounting of its production and use of BW [biological weapon] agent simulants—specifically Bacillus subtilis, Bacillus lichenformis, Bacillus megaterium and Bacillus thuringiensis to be inadequate … the equipment used for their manufacture can also be quickly converted to make BW agent.”
Moreover, many of Secretary Powell's points were not based on intelligence estimate but only reiterated the operative enforcement procedure and the fact record established by UNSCOM/UNMOVIC and IAEA in the decade-plus course of the UNSCR 687 disarmament process.
Haass:
As we now know, what Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, was hiding from international inspectors was not weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but the fact that he had none.
Incorrect. While Saddam was bluffing, which by itself violated UNSCRs 687 and 1441 for casus belli, Saddam wasn't only bluffing. As David Kay reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 28, 2004:
Iraq was in clear violation of the terms of [U.N.] Resolution 1441. Resolution 1441 required that Iraq report all of its activities -- one last chance to come clean about what it had. We have discovered hundreds of cases, based on both documents, physical evidence and the testimony of Iraqis, of activities that were prohibited under the initial U.N. Resolution 687 and that should have been reported under 1441, with Iraqi testimony that not only did they not tell the U.N. about this, they were instructed not to do it and they hid material.We know "From 1999 until he was deposed in April 2003, Saddam’s conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs steadily grew in scale, variety, and efficiency" (ISG) with illicit funds from the Oil For Food scandal. We know Iraq was reconstituting a broad array of conventional arms, military infrastructure, and nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile research, development, and production capabilities with the "large covert procurement program" (ISG) under cover of "denial and deception operations" (ISG).
But we can't know the extent that Saddam's proscribed weapons programs were retained and reconstituted because Iraq effectively rid evidence with extensive "concealment and destruction efforts" (ISG).
Again, David Kay, 28JAN04:
I regret to say that I think at the end of the work of the [Iraq Survey Group] there's still going to be an unresolvable ambiguity about what happened ... [due to] the unparalleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program and their other programs as well, a lot of which was what we simply called Ali Baba looting.While we speculate on the true extent of Iraq's UNSCR 687 violations, we can assume that the many UNSCR 687 violations ISG did find were only what was left over after Iraqi counterintelligence rid presumably higher-value evidence.
Haass:
We know now the statement was in part inaccurate, owing to what is known as “confirmation bias.” Assuming that Saddam Hussein possessed WMD, intelligence analysts and policymakers tended to devote the most attention to information that appeared to confirm their premise and discount information that did not.
To clarify, the "confirmation bias" was actually Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) probationary status with the established fact of Saddam's WMD, Iraq's established dual-use WMD method, and Iraq's evidential failure to disarm as mandated -- e.g., "With respect to stockpiles of bulk agent stated to have been destroyed, there is evidence to suggest that these was [sic] not destroyed as declared by Iraq" (UNMOVIC) -- through its "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) with the ceasefire terms.
The logic of the "confirmation bias" charge is akin to if the 9/11 hijackers had escaped death on 9/11 and then reiterated the established 'dual use' pattern that preceded 9/11 -- e.g., entering the US, flying lessons, packing utility blades in carry-on bags, etc. -- yet alternative nonthreatening explanations were prioritized and red-line threat analysis was deemed "overstated" until the unreconstructed recidivists again drew their 'dual use' knives in flight.
Suffice to say, the operative context of the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) and the law, policy, and precedent that enforced Iraq's mandated compliance did not work that way.
Haass:
Moreover, it would be misreading history to hold Powell responsible for the costly, ill-advised war that followed. Alone among George W. Bush’s senior advisers, he did not push for it ...
President Bush, Secretary Powell, and the rest of "George W. Bush’s senior advisers" weren't responsible for the war: Saddam was. It was always Saddam's choice -- whether in 1990-1991, 1997-1998, or 2002-2003 -- to comply with the UNSCR 660 series in order to forestall war or to violate the US-enforced UN mandates in order to instigate war. Saddam ultimately chose to violate the UNSCR 660 series through Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441).
However "ill-advised" you opine it was, the regime change demonstrably was necessary to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235) and "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (P.L. 107-243).
Before Bush was President, Saddam had exhausted the UNSCR 678 non-military and lesser military enforcement measures. By Operation Desert Fox at the eight-year point, President Clinton and Congress had already concluded regime change was the only realistic way to bring Iraq into its mandated compliance. In fact, the UNSCR 1441 "final opportunity to comply" was the second final chance given to Saddam after Clinton pronounced "Iraq has abused its final chance" with ODF.
Iraq Survey Group:
Trade fostered under the OFF [Oil For Food] program starting in 1997 allowed Saddam to pursue numerous illicit revenue earning schemes, which began generating significant amounts of cash outside of the auspices of the UN ... After 1996, the state of the Iraqi economy no longer threatened Saddam’s hold on power in Iraq, and economic recovery underpinned a more confident Regime posture ... By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their international support ... As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation.Saddam's victory over the sanctions meant the diplomatic coercive alternative to military enforcement was neutralized. It also meant the pre-9/11 status quo with Iraq, the chiefly sanctions-based post-ODF ad hoc 'containment', was no longer a viable alternative, if it ever worked at all.
After Saddam failed his "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) with UNMOVIC, the Iraq Survey Group confirmed "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" and "In addition to preserved capability, we have clear evidence of his [Saddam's] intent to resume WMD". Along with the UNSCR 687 disarmament violations found by ISG, Saddam's UNSCR 687 terrorism violations and UNSCR 688 human rights violations were found to be "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq) than we knew before OIF.
Jim Lacey, who headed the postwar Iraqi Perspectives Project investigation of Saddam's terrorism, concluded, "Given the evidence, it appears that we removed Saddam’s regime not a moment too soon."
With the post-ODF ad hoc 'containment' broken, President Bush's determination for OIF was the only real choice once Saddam chose to breach Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). The real alternative to OIF was compromising the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) to wind down the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement and accommodate the practically uncontained, categorically noncompliant, unreconstructed Saddam regime, which was not a choice allowed by the controlling law and policy on Iraq.
Haass:
... as subsequent events showed, Bush was prepared to go to war without much international support.
Actually, the preceding event of Operation Desert Fox prepared President Bush "to go to war without much international support" because President Clinton faced the same opposition to the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement. By 1998, "The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council" (ISG). Unfortunately, despite the intensive diplomacy by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair to convince their fellow UNSC members to uphold international law pursuant the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), Saddam's accomplices instead chose to continue their complicity with
Haass:
At the end of the day, Powell’s efforts at the UN are not central to understanding why and how the United States went to war.
Actually, Secretary Powell's 05FEB03 speech to the UN Security Council is a serviceable explanation of the compliance-based case against Saddam.
Clarifying the Iraq issue for the public by laying a proper foundation with the controlling law, policy, precedent, and determinative facts that define OIF's justification is "central to understanding why and how the United States went to war". The OIF FAQ synthesis of the mission's primary sources is designed for that purpose.
I hope you and the Council on Foreign Relations will set the record straight and genuinely honor Colin Powell's legacy.
If you have questions about my work, please ask.
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