#bushlied4bulletpoints
Original source (h/t).
Tweets on 28FEB22:
... To clarify [the 4 bullet points]:Tweets on 22MAY22:
1. WMD stocks estimates were based on UNSCOM analysis rather than US intel-sourced "specific info" as such. US intel supported UNSCOM's mission & incorporated UNSCOM data. [The "massive stockpiles" reference is from Bush's 07OCT02 speech.]
...
2. The Dec 2002 [31DEC02] press Q&A Bush answer is apparently an off-the-cuff outlier since the Bush admin position was consistently in line with "we don't know...how close Saddam Hussein is to developing a nuclear weapon" (Bush 07OCT02).
...
3. Rice's [08SEP02 CNN] statement re aluminum tubes was consistent with CIA & majority intel analysis.
4. Cheney's [14NOV01, 09DEC01, 10SEP06] statements re Atta were consistent with [the Czech] intel. And, "He said this after the CIA and FBI concluded this meeting never took place" is incorrect b/c CIA & FBI didn't conclude that. [Notice that Cheney's statements re Atta were in response to media inquiries about the 27OCT01 New York Times report on the Czech intel on Atta in the 1st place.]
Clarifications:
1st bullet point: The "massive stockpile" of BW in Bush's O7OCT02 speech https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html was not "literally just made up". Bush clearly cites UNSCOM, not US intel-sourced "specific information", consistent w/ US intel analysts' reliance on UNSCOM analysis.
...
2nd bullet point: The quote from a 31DEC02 press Q&A https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021231-1.html is a non-representative off-the-cuff answer that's understandably close to the intel & regular Bush admin position of "we don't know...how close Saddam...is to developing a nuclear weapon"(Bush 07OCT02).
...
3rd bullet point: Rice's 08SEP02 statement http://cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/08/le.00.html on the proscribed high-grade aluminum tubes was consistent with the majority analysis of the 2002 NIE https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/iraq-wmd.html DOE's partial dissent was an outlier & 'possible use' isn't the same as 'suitable use'.
...
4th bullet point: US relied on foreign intel re terrorism, eg, Czech intel re Atta-IIS meeting. The timeline of Cheney's evolving view on it matches US intel's investigation. US intel did not conclude the "meeting never took place", only that it was unconfirmed & seemed unlikely.
...
More on the 2nd bullet point: Setting aside that 'don't know if any' is an understandable off-the-cuff contraction of 'don't know how close to any', 'don't know if any' is right too if we factor the AQ Khan WMD network, which we know at least tried to sell ready WMD tech to Iraq.
...
More on the 4th bullet point: For better context re the Czech intel Atta-IIS Prague meeting https://nytimes.com/2001/10/27/world/nation-challenged-investigation-czechs-confirm-iraqi-agent-met-with-terror.html controversy, I recommend reviewing @KyleWOrton's exceptional write-up https://kyleorton.co.uk/2015/06/21/saddam-al-qaeda-stephen-hayes-the-connection/, which Orton has newly updated. Read the whole post. Excerpt:
#ellemanunmovic
A striking 19MAR18 tweet from UNMOVIC inspector and Director of Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy at IISS, Michael Elleman:
We acted on the best intelligence provided by "member states" including the US. But nothing found. We were prepared to state there were no WMD in Iraq, but needed another 3-6 weeks to resolve residual issues from the 1990s. The rush to war prevented a conclusive finding. 2/xMy response to Elleman's admission:
March 19, 2018
Tweet, 21DEC20:
Why do you believe you only "needed another 3-6 weeks to resolve residual issues from the 1990s" given those issues included the verified total declaration of Iraq's WMD program--the baseline step of the UNSCR 687 disarmament process--that Iraq failed to provide through 12 years?Tweet, 21DEC20:
The kernel of truth in @EllemanIISS's "3-6 weeks" is Iraq could&should have disarmed w/in weeks of the ceasefire. Yet in 12 yrs & 4 mo under Res1441 Iraq refused even the basic disarm step--a verified total declaration--that was required w/in 15 days of Res687's 03APR91 adoption.Tweet, 21DEC20:
Given UNMOVIC & ISG's reports are rife with UNSCR 687 violations, including IIS's large covert procurement program & chem&bio labs Iraq hid from UNSCOM&UNMOVIC, your admission "We were prepared to state there were no WMD in Iraq" in "3-6 weeks" is terrifying malfeasance averted.Tweet, 25DEC20:
I assume the 15 days mandated by Res687 for the verified total declaration of Iraq's WMD program is the basis for @EllemanIISS's claim he needed only "another 3-6 weeks". That might be plausible if Iraq immediately took the 1st&2nd disarm steps. But Iraq "never intended"(ISG) to.Note: To clarify Elleman's disinformation, "nothing found", see the 25JAN99 UNSCOM report that set the baseline WMD status for Iraq's "final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" (UNSCR 1441) and the 06MAR03 UNMOVIC report that confirmed Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) on WMD.
#schwarztheintercept
I criticized the faulty premises of Jon Schwarz's 10APR15 The Intercept article, Twelve Years Later, US Media Still Can’t Get Iraqi WMD Story Right, in response to this tweet:
Are you referring to the weapons described here regarding saddam? Would be interested to hear a different side.Tweet, 25JAN23:
https://t.co/c8aGReqHhC
January 25, 2023
FYI, contra The Intercept, in fact, UNSCOM/UNMOVIC lost oversight of the al Muthanna site upon the 1998 expulsion & Duelfer's claim that Iraq innocently lost track of WMD is 1, not an excuse under UNSCR 687 & 2, speculation not evidenced by ISG findings.Tweet, 25JAN23:
@ https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#duelferreport
[Screenshot from the [Chemical] subsection]
...Also, The Intercept misrepresents the poor control & unreliability of UNSCOM's oversight of the al Muthanna site even before UNSCOM was expelled in 1998, eg, ISG marks 1994 for possible Iraqi abuse of the site.Tweet, 26JAN23:
Excerpt from the ISG report's CW section re the al Muthanna site:
...A 4th misleading premise by The Intercept is its cherry-picked reliance on ISG finding Saddam ordered cooperation w/ inspectors. In fact, UNMOVIC & ISG found the order was false: Iraq "concealment & deception" continued "up to OIF & beyond" (ISG).
@ ISG https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#duelferreport
[Screenshot from the [Biological] subsection]
#congressviewbeforebush
Tweet, 28SEP21:
Your Reddit Leitenberg paper [link], whose citations imply is end 2000, early 2001, juxtaposed w/ the 22MAR00 Senate hearing on Iraq https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67659/html/CHRG-106shrg67659.htm, illustrates the crisis w/ Iraq matured long before 9/11, even before Bush became POTUS. Eg, Senator Biden at the 22MAR00 hearing:Tweet, 28SEP21:
Relevant insight on Senator Biden's position on the Iraq crisis from the 22MAR00 Senate hearing on Iraq https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67659/html/CHRG-106shrg67659.htm: Biden believes President HW Bush made a "fundamental mistake" at the outset by suspending Desert Storm short of Iraqi regime change.Tweet, 28SEP21:
Excerpt:
Relevant insight from 22MAR00 Senate hearing on Iraq https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67659/html/CHRG-106shrg67659.htm: Contra the narrative re 2002 AUMF that Congress was negligent, tricked or bullied into accepting Bush's view on Saddam's WMD, in fact POTUS only echoed Congress's standing view on Saddam's WMD. Excerpt:Tweet, 30SEP21:
Interesting insight from the 22MAR00 Senate hearing on Iraq https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67659/html/CHRG-106shrg67659.htm: Congress's view that Saddam was likely hiding nuclear weapon capability was largely based on testimony from Scott Ritter, the same Scott Ritter made famous for disputing the US re Iraq.Tweet, 30SEP21:
Excerpt:
Relevant insight from the 22MAR00 Senate hearing on Iraq https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67659/html/CHRG-106shrg67659.htm: Congress knew the fundamental difference b/w mandated Iraqi compliance vs "report that no evidence of violations had been detected". Bush's Iraq enforcement applied the compliance criteria.
Excerpt:
#pnacconspiracy
PNAC is Project for a New American Century.
Tweet, 17JUN23:
The underlined phrase in https://web.archive.org/web/20130817122719/http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf is cited out of context to accuse PNAC of exploiting (maybe orchestrating) 9/11 to invade the Middle East, particularly Iraq. Yet the actual context of the phrase is a discussion of DoD reforms, not a conspiracy to invade anyone.Tweet, 17JUN23:
+
Moreover, the PNAC source for the "like a new Pearl Harbor" phrase is focused on peer/near-peer nation-v-nation conventional armament, not counter-terrorism/insurgency. The DoD adjustments compelled by 9/11 were CT/COIN-focused & dissimilar to the DoD reforms advocated by PNAC.Tweet, 17JUN23:
+
To be sure, PNAC did call for Iraq regime change, but that advocacy was distinct from its advocacy of DoD reforms whence stated the "like a new Pearl Harbor" phrase. PNAC called for Iraq regime change based on Iraq's festering noncompliance w/ UNSCR 687, not a 9/11-level event.
=
