from: [Eric LC]
to: [Richard Haass], [Michael Froman]
cc: communications@cfr.org
date: Aug 31, 2023, 10:05 AM
subject: Correction of Richard Haass's "Revisiting America’s War of Choice in Iraq" (Project Syndicate, 17MAR23)
Dr. Haass, Ambassador Froman, and Council on Foreign Relations,
I clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ by organizing the primary source authorities, i.e., the set of controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts that define OIF's justification, to lay a proper foundation and correct for the prevalent conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.
In that vein, I am writing to you with corrective criticism of CFR President Emeritus Richard Haass's 17MAR23 Project Syndicate article, Revisiting America’s War of Choice in Iraq. I address Dr. Haass's misrepresentation of the justification of the Iraq intervention, "war of choice", Saddam and the WMD, terrorism, and democracy issues, Colin Powell's UN Security Council presentation, and the Bush administration.
Haass:
But governments can and do get things wrong without lying.
See the OIF FAQ answer to "Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq".
In this case, the US government did not get things wrong or lie. President Bush's decision on Iraq demonstrably was correct. The case against Saddam is substantiated.
Haass:
Wars are fought not only on the battlefield but also in domestic political debates and in histories written after the fact. In the case of the US invasion of Iraq 20 years ago, we are still in this final phase, seeking an elusive consensus about the war's legacy.
...One advantage that historians have over journalists concerns time, not so much in the sense that they are free from urgent deadlines, but that they have the deeper perspective conferred by the years – or decades – between events and the act of writing about them. Twenty years is not a lot of time in historical terms, of course. But when it comes to understanding the war that the United States launched against Iraq in March 2003, it is all we have.
...One advantage that historians have over journalists concerns time, not so much in the sense that they are free from urgent deadlines, but that they have the deeper perspective conferred by the years – or decades – between events and the act of writing about them. Twenty years is not a lot of time in historical terms, of course. But when it comes to understanding the war that the United States launched against Iraq in March 2003, it is all we have.
Dr. Haass is incorrect that "the years – or decades – between events and the act of writing about them" are "all we have...when it comes to understanding the war that the United States launched against Iraq in March 2003".
We have the primary sources of the mission, i.e., the controlling law, policy, precedent and determinative facts of the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement which define OIF's justification, to correctly understand Operation Iraqi Freedom. OIF's primary sources, which include UNMOVIC's finding of Iraq's noncompliance that established casus belli and President Bush's consequent determination for OIF, are well developed and plainly stated, public domain and readily accessed on-line.
OIF's justification is straightforward according to OIF's primary sources. So why "we are still...seeking an elusive consensus about the war's legacy"? Because in "domestic political debates and in histories written after the fact", Dr. Haass and other experts have distorted the Iraq issue. Framing the Iraq issue in the "years – or decades – between events and the act of writing about them" is a revisionist formula for omitting OIF's primary sources and replacing them with historical distortion "written after the fact".
Dr. Haass distorted the Iraq issue to the public as President of CFR. Therefore, the Council on Foreign Relations is ethically obligated to correct Dr. Haass's false narrative of OIF for the public. That's done by realigning the Iraq issue with OIF's primary sources in the public discourse. This is an example of how.
Haass:
The events and other factors that led to the US decision to go to war in Iraq remain opaque and a matter of considerable controversy.
The assertion that "The events and other factors that led to the US decision to go to war in Iraq remain opaque" is the inceptive premise that obfuscates OIF's primary sources to enable the historical distortion that produces the "matter of considerable controversy".
When the Iraq issue is properly aligned with OIF's primary sources, "the US decision to go to war in Iraq'' is straightforward and plainly stated, not "opaque". Issue-rule analysis shows that President Bush's decision on Iraq was correct on the law and on the facts.
Haass:
Wars tend to fall into two categories: those of necessity and those of choice. Wars of necessity take place when vital interests are at stake and there are no other viable options available to defend them. Wars of choice, by contrast, are interventions initiated when the interests are less than vital, when there are options other than military force that could be employed to protect or promote those interests, or both.
...The Iraq War was a classic war of choice: the US did not have to fight it. Not everyone agrees with this assessment, however. Some contend that vital interests were indeed at stake, ...
...The Iraq War was a classic war of choice: the US did not have to fight it. Not everyone agrees with this assessment, however. Some contend that vital interests were indeed at stake, ...
According to OIF's primary sources and Dr. Haass's two elements of "wars of necessity", i.e., "when vital interests are at stake and there are no other viable options available to defend them", OIF was a war of necessity, not a "war of choice".
Regarding Dr. Haass's first element, "when vital interests are at stake", the reason that "some contend that vital interests were indeed at stake" is that the vital national security interests with Iraq were mandated by the controlling law and policy on Iraq since 1990-1991.
President HW Bush decided and Congress agreed that the need to resolve the Iraqi threat that manifested in 1990-1991 was a vital national security interest. The President and Congress agreed that the Iraqi threat would be resolved by enforcing Iraq's compliance with the UNSCR 660 series. Operation Desert Shield/Storm failed to resolve the Iraqi threat with Iraq's mandated compliance, so the Gulf War was only suspended with a conditional ceasefire whose "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) was purpose-designed with diagnostic measurements-cum-prescriptive measures that defined the Iraqi threat and its solution pursuant to "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait [and]...to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687). The President and Congress agreed that "Iraq's noncompliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 [and 688] constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region [and]...the Congress supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of Security Council Resolution 687 [and 688]" (Public Law 102-190).
"Iraq's noncompliance with [the Gulf War ceasefire terms] constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region" (P.L. 102-190) meant the threat of Iraq's noncompliance was by definition a vital national security interest per the Reagan corollary to the Carter doctrine that impelled President HW Bush to remedy the Saddam problem in the first place.
On the law and policy, Congress and Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush reiterated that the mandate to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L.105-235) was a vital national security interest — "We are convinced that as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, he will continue to threaten the well-being of his people, the peace of the region, and vital U.S. interests...Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security. I remain determined to see Iraq fully comply with all of its obligations under Security Council resolutions" (Clinton, 02AUG99), "it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced" (P.L. 107-243).
On the facts, the Saddam regime's manifold violation of the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) on WMD (UNSCR 687), terrorism (UNSCR 687), aggression (UNSCR 949), and human rights (UNSCR 688), which constituted Iraq's continuing threat, at Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) is confirmed.
Regarding Dr. Haass's second element, "there are no other viable options available to defend them", that was the situation of the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement by 1998, let alone 2002-2003. Saddam exhausted the diplomatic non-military and lesser military enforcement measures over a decade-plus of intransigent noncompliance with the UNSCR 660 series. President Clinton and Congress assessed by 1998 that regime change was the only realistic way to bring Iraq into its mandated compliance. In fact, the UNSCR 1441 "final opportunity to comply" marked Saddam's second final chance to comply after the President pronounced "Iraq has abused its final chance" when UNSCOM's finding of Iraq's noncompliance triggered Operation Desert Fox. ODF used up the penultimate military enforcement measure in 1998. The non-military diplomatic leverage of sanctions, already in shreds by 1998, was de facto neutralized by 2000-2001. The post-ODF ad hoc 'containment' relied chiefly on the constraint of sanctions and thus was collapsed by 2000-2001, if it ever worked at all. And, "As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (Iraq Survey Group) with "military reconstitution efforts starting in 1997" (ISG) even before UNSCOM failed in 1998.
UNMOVIC found in real-time and the Iraq Survey Group subsequently confirmed that credible threat of regime change was necessary to capacitate Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). UNMOVIC also found and ISG confirmed that even the credible threat of regime change, while necessary, was insufficient to convince Saddam to comply as mandated. ISG found that "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions", which confirmed President Clinton and Congress's assessment that regime change was necessary to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L.105-235).
In conclusion, Dr. Haass is incorrect that "The Iraq War was a classic war of choice". According to OIF's primary sources and Dr. Haass's two elements of "wars of necessity", Operation Iraqi Freedom was a war of necessity.
Haass:
...because Iraq was believed to possess weapons of mass destruction that it might use or share with terrorists. Proponents of the war had little to no confidence that the US had other reliable options to eliminate the purported Iraqi WMDs.
Indeed, the Clinton and Bush administrations shared the concern that "Iraq was believed to possess weapons of mass destruction that it might use or share with terrorists". However, that does not represent the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) on WMD and terrorism in "the US decision to go to war in Iraq''. Iraq's obligations to disarm and renounce terrorism per UNSCR 687 were not contingent on using WMD or sharing WMD with terrorists. In the ceasefire disarmament process, "Iraqi WMDs" were not "purported" or "believed": rather, Iraq's proscribed WMD intent and possession were IAEA, UNSCOM/UNMOVIC-established fact and presumed per UNSCR 687 until Iraq proved that it disarmed in accordance with UNSCR 687. In fact, the Saddam regime never disarmed or intended to: "In addition to preserved capability, we have clear evidence of his [Saddam's] intent to resume WMD" (ISG).
Haass:
I did not favor going to war. I believed there were other acceptable options, above all measures that could slow or stop the flow of Iraqi oil to Jordan and Turkey, as well as the possibility of cutting Iraq’s oil pipeline to Syria. Doing so would have put significant pressure on Saddam to allow inspectors into suspected weapons sites. If those inspections were blocked, the US could have conducted limited attacks against those facilities.
First of all, as Hans Blix reminded the UN Security Council, "Paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002) states that this cooperation shall be "active". It is not enough to open doors." Dr. Haass's standard of "allow inspectors into suspected weapons sites" is short of the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), which speaks to Dr. Haass's basic misunderstanding of the Iraq WMD issue.
Second, regarding "I [Haass] did not favor going to war", the credible threat of "going to war" was requisite to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (P.L. 107-243) whether or not Dr. Haass favored it. See the OIF FAQ answer to "Why did resolution of the Saddam problem require a threat of regime change".
President Bush, determination for OIF, 18MAR03:
Diplomatic efforts have not affected Iraq's conduct positively. Any temporary changes in Iraq's approach that have occurred over the years have been in response to the threat of use of force.
Prime Minister Blair, response to the Chilcot report, 06JUL16:
Finally and only under threat of military action, Saddam permitted Inspectors to return.
Dr. Haass's "other acceptable options" in lieu of "going to war" are on par with or less than the coercive measures, most notably Operation Desert Fox, that had failed to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (P.L. 107-243) before Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Iraq Survey Group found that Saddam chose to breach his "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) because in part Saddam was unfazed by ODF, "Saddam speculated that the United States would instead seek to avoid casualties and, if Iraq was attacked at all, the campaign would resemble Desert Fox" (ISG).
"The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council" (ISG): Saddam also chose to breach his "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) because he convinced himself that his accomplices on the UN Security Council, led by France and Russia along with China, would diminish any US and UK-led military response to something tolerable like Dr. Haass's "other acceptable options".
Again, credible threat of regime change proved necessary to compel even the very deficient "token effort" (ISG) by the Saddam regime in its "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). And, the ISG finding that "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" confirmed that OIF was necessary to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (P.L. 107-243).
Haass:
Yes, the US government maintained that Iraq possessed WMDs, and my boss at the time, Secretary of State Colin Powell, made that case before the United Nations. It turned out not to be true.
I previously criticized Dr. Haass's smear of Colin Powell regarding Iraq in 21OCT21 Council on Foreign Relations post, "Colin Powell's American Life".
Dr. Haass is incorrect that "Secretary of State Colin Powell, made that case before the United Nations. It turned out not to be true."
I unpack Colin Powell's "case before the United Nations" at Regarding Secretary of State Powell's speech at the UN Security Council on February 5, 2003. Based on the fact record – knowing what we know now – Secretary Powell's UNSC speech holds up well. The speech's main points are validated nearly across the board.
Powell's "case before the United Nations" could not "[turn] out not to be true" since it mainly reiterated the basic IAEA, UNSCOM/UNMOVIC fact record of Iraqi UNSCR 687 WMD violations and the ceasefire disarmament procedure mandated for Iraq to prove it disarmed.
Beyond Secretary Powell's reiteration of the basic facts and procedure for UNSCR 1441, where the intelligence-estimated details in Powell's presentation were not predictively precise, by and large the substantive element of his point is validated. For example, the Iraq Survey Group did not find “mobile production facilities used to make biological agents” (Powell). Instead, ISG found the equivalent "secret biological work in the small IIS [Iraqi intelligence service] laboratories discovered by ISG" and “The UN deemed Iraq’s accounting of its production and use of BW [biological weapon] agent simulants—specifically Bacillus subtilis, Bacillus lichenformis, Bacillus megaterium and Bacillus thuringiensis to be inadequate … the equipment used for their manufacture can also be quickly converted to make BW agent”.
Haass:
More than anything else, the run-up to the Iraq War demonstrated the danger of leaving assumptions unexamined. Saddam’s refusal to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors was seen as proof that he had something to hide. He did, but what he was hiding was not WMDs but the fact he did not have them.
Dr. Haass is incorrect that "the Iraq War demonstrated the danger of leaving assumptions unexamined" in terms of the Iraq WMD issue.
In fact, Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) on WMD were rigorously examined with the mandated ceasefire disarmament process. As a result, in Saddam's "final opportunity to comply" with "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations" (UNSCR 1441), Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire WMD mandates was established by UNSCOM, decided by the UN Security Council, confirmed by UNMOVIC for casus belli, and corroborated by the Iraq Survey Group ("ISG judges that Iraq failed to comply with UNSCRs").
Dr. Haass is incorrect that "what he [Saddam] was hiding was not WMDs but the fact he did not have them".
In fact, the Iraq Survey Group confirmed Saddam was hiding an active — and growing — WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687: "We [Iraq Survey Group] have discovered hundreds of cases, based on both documents, physical evidence and the testimony of Iraqis, of activities that were prohibited under the initial U.N. Resolution 687 and that should have been reported under 1441, with Iraqi testimony that not only did they not tell the U.N. about this, they were instructed not to do it and they hid material" (David Kay, 28JAN04).
The Iraq Survey Group found, among the "hundreds of cases" (Kay) of UNSCR 687 WMD violations, "In addition to preserved capability, we have clear evidence of his [Saddam's] intent to resume WMD" (ISG), "As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (ISG), "until he was deposed in April 2003, Saddam’s conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs steadily grew in scale, variety, and efficiency" (ISG), "the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert [chemical and biological] laboratories" (ISG), “The UN deemed Iraq’s accounting of its production and use of BW [biological weapon] agent simulants...to be inadequate…the equipment used for their manufacture can also be quickly converted to make BW agent" (ISG), "Iraq also possessed declarable equipment for chemical production, which it had not declared to the UN...it would have been possible for Iraq to assemble a CW production plant" (ISG), "In January 2002...Saddam Husayn also directed the IAEC [Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission] to begin a multi-year procurement project called the IAEC Modernization Program...which was still functioning up to the Coalition invasion in 2003" (ISG), "The pace of ongoing missile programs accelerated, and the Regime authorized its scientists to design missiles with ranges in excess of 150 km that, if developed, would have been clear violations of UNSCR 687" (ISG), "Given Iraq’s investments in technology and infrastructure improvements, an effective procurement network, skilled scientists, and designs already on the books for longer range missiles, ISG assesses that Saddam clearly intended to reconstitute long-range delivery systems and that the systems potentially were for WMD" (ISG).
The WMD evidence that the Iraq Survey Group found represents only a sliver of Saddam's WMD. Besides the WMD stocks separately confiscated by Operation Avarice, ISG's failure to find WMD stockpiles does not prove "the fact he did not have them" because ISG makes clear throughout its report that the failure to find them was mainly due to practically unfettered Iraqi "denial and deception operations" (ISG). Consequently, the Iraq Survey Group reported that much of Saddam's WMD remains unaccounted for, e.g., "ISG cannot determine the fate of Iraq’s stocks of bulk BW agents" (ISG) and "ISG cannot discount the possibility that a few large caches of [CW] munitions remain to be discovered within Iraq" (ISG), not that "what he [Saddam] was hiding was not WMDs but the fact he did not have them".
David Kay, report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 28JAN04:
I regret to say that I think at the end of the work of the [Iraq Survey Group] there's still going to be an unresolvable ambiguity about what happened.
A lot of that traces to the failure on April 9 to establish immediately physical security in Iraq -- the unparalleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program and their other programs as well, a lot of which was what we simply called Ali Baba looting.
...The result is -- document destruction -- we're really not going to be able to prove beyond a truth the negatives and some of the positive conclusions that we're going to come to. There will be always unresolved ambiguity here.
A lot of that traces to the failure on April 9 to establish immediately physical security in Iraq -- the unparalleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program and their other programs as well, a lot of which was what we simply called Ali Baba looting.
...The result is -- document destruction -- we're really not going to be able to prove beyond a truth the negatives and some of the positive conclusions that we're going to come to. There will be always unresolved ambiguity here.
Note "A lot of that [unresolvable ambiguity] traces to the failure on April 9 [2003] to establish immediately physical security in Iraq". Dr. Kay infers Saddam's forces rid much, perhaps most, of the "unparalleled" (Kay) mass of WMD evidence that's unaccounted for by ISG after the regime change, on top of the WMD evidence that Saddam's forces "sanitized" (ISG) in violation of UNSCR 707 during the UNMOVIC inspections and OIF invasion, plus the still-large pile of WMD evidence that was left behind for ISG.
Haass:
I was not particularly worried about Saddam getting into the terrorism business. He ruled secular Iraq with an iron fist and considered religious-fueled terrorism (with or without Iranian backing) the greatest threat to his regime. He also was not the sort of person to hand WMDs over to terrorists, as he wanted to maintain tight control of anything that could be linked to Iraq.
Dr. Haass's conceptions of Saddam's terrorism and "He [Saddam] ruled secular Iraq" are incorrect.
To clarify "He [Saddam] ruled secular Iraq", see From Militant Secularism to Islamism: The Iraqi Ba’th Regime 1968-2003 by Amatzia Baram and The Islamic State Was Coming Without the Invasion of Iraq by Kyle Orton.
Orton: "To put it simply, the Saddam regime’s reputation for keeping a lid on religious militancy and sectarianism is exactly wrong; by commission and omission it brought both things to levels Iraq has scarcely ever known in its history."
Dr. Haass's admission, "I was not particularly worried about Saddam getting into the terrorism business", is self-incriminating per the pre-war CIA assessment, which underestimated Saddam's terrorism, and the post-war Iraqi Perspectives Project investigation, which found "the Saddam regime regarded inspiring, sponsoring, directing, and executing acts of terrorism as an element of state power", "the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda", "many terrorist movements and Saddam found a common enemy in the United States", and "Saddam’s use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime" (IPP).
IPP further found that Saddam and bin Laden's respective "terror cartel[s]" "increased the aggregate terror threat" by "seeking and developing supporters from the same demographic pool". In effect, bin Laden's terrorists were simultaneously Saddam's terrorists. The dramatic growth of bin Laden's terrorist threat largely owed to its "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with Saddam's state-level development of the "same demographic pool" (IPP) that supplied al Qaeda.
At the same time that Dr. Haass was "not particularly worried about Saddam getting into the terrorism business", Saddam was in fact a world leader of "regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations" (IPP).
IPP found that Saddam was an international terrorist chief who bred, armed, and trained "a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations" (IPP) in violation of UNSCR 687. ISG found that Saddam possessed an active WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687 that contained, at minimum, ready covert terrorism-level chemical and biological capability in the Iraqi intelligence service — the same regime arm that managed Saddam's terrorism.
With Saddam's prolific "regional and global terrorism" (IPP), ready terrorism-level WMD capability, and virulent hostility to the United States and our allies, Dr. Haass's blithe assumption that "he [Saddam] also was not the sort of person to hand WMDs over to terrorists" was incredibly risky. In contrast, President Bush, mindful of his duty to "deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States" (P.L. 107-40) and "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (P.L. 107-243), heeded his predecessor and was unwilling to accept that risk: "Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option."
See A Myth Revisited: “Saddam Hussein Had No Connection To Al-Qaeda” by Kyle Orton, which includes analysis of the Saddam-al Qaeda-WMD nexus. Keep in mind that Saddam had plenty of in-house terrorist capability aside from his "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with al Qaeda.
Haass:
The idea that al-Qaeda or another terrorist group could strike the US with a nuclear, chemical, or biological device was simply unacceptable. Then-Vice President Dick Cheney was the primary exponent of this view.
Dr. Haass is incorrect that "then-Vice President Dick Cheney was the primary exponent of this view". Actually, the Clinton administration was the "primary exponent of this view". While Vice President Cheney agreed with his predecessors, the Bush administration merely upheld the policy that "the idea that al-Qaeda or another terrorist group could strike the US with a nuclear, chemical, or biological device was simply unacceptable" which was inherited from the Clinton administration's response to the escalating Saddam and al Qaeda problems.
President Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39, 21JUN95:
[T]he United States shall seek to identify groups or states that sponsor or support such terrorists, isolate them and extract a heavy price for their actions.
...The United States shall seek to deter terrorism through a clear public position that our policies will not be affected by terrorist acts and that we will act vigorously to deal with terrorists and their sponsors.
...The United States shall give the highest priority to developing effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons use by terrorists.
The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by a terrorist group, through theft or manufacture, is unacceptable. There is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of this capability or removing this capability from terrorist groups potentially opposed to the U.S.
...The United States shall seek to deter terrorism through a clear public position that our policies will not be affected by terrorist acts and that we will act vigorously to deal with terrorists and their sponsors.
...The United States shall give the highest priority to developing effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons use by terrorists.
The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by a terrorist group, through theft or manufacture, is unacceptable. There is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of this capability or removing this capability from terrorist groups potentially opposed to the U.S.
President Clinton, remarks at the Pentagon, 17FEB98:
[T]his is not a time free from peril -- especially as a result of reckless acts of outlaw nations and an unholy axis of terrorists, drug traffickers and organized international criminals. We have to defend our future from these predators of the 21st century. They feed on the free flow of information and technology. They actually take advantage of the freer movement of people, information, and ideas. And they will be all the more lethal if we allow them to build arsenals of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and the missiles to deliver them. We simply cannot allow that to happen.
There is no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein's Iraq. His regime threatens the safety of his people, the stability of his region, and the security of all the rest of us.
...In this century we learned through harsh experience that the only answer to aggression and illegal behavior is firmness, determination, and, when necessary, action.
In the next century, the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now: a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals, who travel the world among us unnoticed.
There is no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein's Iraq. His regime threatens the safety of his people, the stability of his region, and the security of all the rest of us.
...In this century we learned through harsh experience that the only answer to aggression and illegal behavior is firmness, determination, and, when necessary, action.
In the next century, the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now: a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals, who travel the world among us unnoticed.
Public Law 104-132, 24APR96:
The Congress finds that--
(1) international terrorism is among the most serious
transnational threats faced by the United States and its allies,
far eclipsing the dangers posed by population growth or
pollution;
(2) the President should continue to make efforts to counter
international terrorism a national security priority;
(3) because the United Nations has been an inadequate forum
for the discussion of cooperative, multilateral responses to the
threat of international terrorism, the President should
undertake immediate efforts to develop effective multilateral
responses to international terrorism as a complement to national
counter terrorist efforts;
(4) the President should use all necessary means, including
covert action and military force, to disrupt, dismantle, and
destroy international infrastructure used by international
terrorists, including overseas terrorist training facilities and
safe havens;
(1) international terrorism is among the most serious
transnational threats faced by the United States and its allies,
far eclipsing the dangers posed by population growth or
pollution;
(2) the President should continue to make efforts to counter
international terrorism a national security priority;
(3) because the United Nations has been an inadequate forum
for the discussion of cooperative, multilateral responses to the
threat of international terrorism, the President should
undertake immediate efforts to develop effective multilateral
responses to international terrorism as a complement to national
counter terrorist efforts;
(4) the President should use all necessary means, including
covert action and military force, to disrupt, dismantle, and
destroy international infrastructure used by international
terrorists, including overseas terrorist training facilities and
safe havens;
See The Myth of George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy Revolution by Chin-Kuei Tsui, which provides a helpful illustration of the continuity of national security policy from (Reagan to HW Bush to) Clinton to Bush.
Haass:
Others, including President George W. Bush and many of his top advisers, appeared also to be motivated by additional calculations, such as the pursuit of what they saw as a new and great foreign-policy opportunity.
Dr. Haass's characterization of a "new...foreign-policy opportunity" is incorrect. The Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement was more than a decade old when President Bush entered Office. The "crisis between the United States and Iraq that led to the declaration on August 2, 1990, of a national emergency has not been resolved" (Clinton, 28JUL00) effectively culminated when "Iraq has abused its final chance" (Clinton, 16DEC98) with Operation Desert Fox. The controlling law, policy, and precedent that defined Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) and OIF matured with ODF.
Dr. Haass's characterization of a "great foreign-policy opportunity" better fits the "great" intrinsic significance of the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement, which from its inception in 1990-1991 set the practical baseline, conceptual paradigm, and primary test case for American leadership of the post-Cold War liberal international order.
Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #americanprimacy section:
The Gulf War ceasefire terms were purpose-designed to resolve Saddam's manifold threat established with the Gulf War. The scope of the ceasefire terms meant that enforcing Iraq's mandated compliance resonated beyond the 4 corners of the Saddam problem or even the Iraq intervention itself. In 1991, at the dawn of the post-Cold War, the Gulf War ceasefire was invested with all the essential international norms, including strict aggression, disarmament, human rights, and terrorism-related mandates, and vital enforcement principles that were required to reify the aspirational "rules" of the post-Cold War world order.
Due to the historical context, threats and interests at stake, comprehensive spectrum of the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), model enforcement procedure, and US-led UN-based structure, the UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement was tantamount to the flagship and litmus test of the US-led post-Cold War liberal international order.
In other words, the resolution of Saddam's probation with Iraq's mandated compliance per the Gulf War ceasefire represented the primary test case for US-led international enforcement with a readily measured pass/fail gauge. The paradigmatic set of international norms that defined Iraq's ceasefire obligations was enforced with a clear UN-mandated compliance standard and a strict US-led compliance process. Iraq's mandated compliance set the gold standard for enforcing post-Cold War liberal international order, whereas Saddam's noncompliance risked a model failure for US-led enforcement of the liberal international order, a theme that permeated the US law and policy on Iraq through the HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations.
Under the avid scrutiny of our competitors, who were also Saddam's accomplices, the success or failure of American leadership to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L. 105-235) would reveal the real-world viability of the post-Cold War "Pax Americana" rule set and American leadership of the free world.
The contest was hard, but the US passed the primary leadership test with Iraq.
Due to the historical context, threats and interests at stake, comprehensive spectrum of the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), model enforcement procedure, and US-led UN-based structure, the UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement was tantamount to the flagship and litmus test of the US-led post-Cold War liberal international order.
In other words, the resolution of Saddam's probation with Iraq's mandated compliance per the Gulf War ceasefire represented the primary test case for US-led international enforcement with a readily measured pass/fail gauge. The paradigmatic set of international norms that defined Iraq's ceasefire obligations was enforced with a clear UN-mandated compliance standard and a strict US-led compliance process. Iraq's mandated compliance set the gold standard for enforcing post-Cold War liberal international order, whereas Saddam's noncompliance risked a model failure for US-led enforcement of the liberal international order, a theme that permeated the US law and policy on Iraq through the HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations.
Under the avid scrutiny of our competitors, who were also Saddam's accomplices, the success or failure of American leadership to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L. 105-235) would reveal the real-world viability of the post-Cold War "Pax Americana" rule set and American leadership of the free world.
The contest was hard, but the US passed the primary leadership test with Iraq.
Haass:
Many in the Bush administration were motivated by a desire to bring democracy to the entire Middle East, and Iraq was viewed as the ideal country to set the transition in motion. Democratization there would set an example that others across the region would be unable to resist following. And Bush himself wanted to do something big and bold.
Again, the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement was intrinsically "something big and bold" since its inception.
Dr. Haass is incorrect to characterize the policy on Iraqi democratic reform as a "new and great foreign-policy opportunity" where "many in the Bush administration were motivated by a desire to bring democracy to the entire Middle East, and Iraq was viewed as the ideal country to set the transition in motion."
Actually, the policy on Iraqi democratic reform was a ceasefire, UNSCR 688 enforcement measure that President Bush carried forward from Presidents HW Bush and Clinton with the rest of the law and policy of the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement.
President HW Bush, report to Congress, 19JAN93:
Since my last report on November 16, 1992, Iraq has repeatedly ignored and violated its international obligations under U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Iraq's actions include the harassment of humanitarian relief operations in northern Iraq contrary to U.N. Security Council Resolution 688, violations of the Iraq-Kuwait demilitarized zone, interference with U.N. operations in violation of Security Council Resolution 687, repeated violations by Iraqi aircraft of the southern and northern no-fly zones, and threats by Iraq's air defense forces against Coalition aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones.
...We continue to support the efforts of the Iraq [sic] National Congress to develop a broad-based alternative to the Saddam regime. We encourage other governments to do the same. The Congress espouses a future Iraq based on the principles of political pluralism, territorial unity, and full compliance with all the U.N. Security Council resolutions.
...We continue to support the efforts of the Iraq [sic] National Congress to develop a broad-based alternative to the Saddam regime. We encourage other governments to do the same. The Congress espouses a future Iraq based on the principles of political pluralism, territorial unity, and full compliance with all the U.N. Security Council resolutions.
President Clinton, signing statement of Public Law 105-338, 31OCT98:
Today I am signing into law H.R. 4655, the "Iraq Liberation Act of 1998." This Act makes clear that it is the sense of the Congress that the United States should support those elements of the Iraqi opposition that advocate a very different future for Iraq than the bitter reality of internal repression and external aggression that the current regime in Baghdad now offers.
Let me be clear on what the U.S. objectives are:
The United States wants Iraq to rejoin the family of nations as a freedom-loving and law-abiding member. This is in our interest and that of our allies within the region.
The United States favors an Iraq that offers its people freedom at home. I categorically reject arguments that this is unattainable due to Iraq's history or its ethnic or sectarian make-up. Iraqis deserve and desire freedom like everyone else.
The United States looks forward to a democratically supported regime that would permit us to enter into a dialogue leading to the reintegration of Iraq into normal international life.
My Administration has pursued, and will continue to pursue, these objectives through active application of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. The evidence is overwhelming that such changes will not happen under the current Iraq leadership.
Let me be clear on what the U.S. objectives are:
The United States wants Iraq to rejoin the family of nations as a freedom-loving and law-abiding member. This is in our interest and that of our allies within the region.
The United States favors an Iraq that offers its people freedom at home. I categorically reject arguments that this is unattainable due to Iraq's history or its ethnic or sectarian make-up. Iraqis deserve and desire freedom like everyone else.
The United States looks forward to a democratically supported regime that would permit us to enter into a dialogue leading to the reintegration of Iraq into normal international life.
My Administration has pursued, and will continue to pursue, these objectives through active application of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. The evidence is overwhelming that such changes will not happen under the current Iraq leadership.
Vice President Gore, joint statement with the Iraqi National Congress, 26JUN00:
The INC and the Vice President reaffirmed their joint desire to see a united Iraq served by a representative and democratic government responsive to the needs of its people and willing to live in peace with its neighbors.
The Vice President reaffirmed the Administration's strong commitment to the objective of removing Saddam Hussein from power, and to bringing him and his inner circle to justice for their war crimes and crimes against humanity. Saddam's removal is the key to the positive transformation of Iraq's relationship with the international community and with the United States, in particular.
...The Vice President reaffirmed American concern for the welfare of the Iraqi people....He further emphasized the US concern for the safety and security of all the Iraqi people in accordance with UNSCR 688, which condemns Saddam Hussein's repression of the Iraqi people as a threat to regional stability.
The Vice President reaffirmed the Administration's strong commitment to the objective of removing Saddam Hussein from power, and to bringing him and his inner circle to justice for their war crimes and crimes against humanity. Saddam's removal is the key to the positive transformation of Iraq's relationship with the international community and with the United States, in particular.
...The Vice President reaffirmed American concern for the welfare of the Iraqi people....He further emphasized the US concern for the safety and security of all the Iraqi people in accordance with UNSCR 688, which condemns Saddam Hussein's repression of the Iraqi people as a threat to regional stability.
Public Law 105-338, 31OCT98:
SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ.
It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.
...
SEC. 7. ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQ UPON REPLACEMENT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME.
It is the sense of the Congress that once the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power in Iraq, the United States should support Iraq’s transition to democracy by providing immediate and substantial humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, by providing democracy transition assistance to Iraqi parties and movements with democratic goals, and by convening Iraq’s foreign creditors to develop a multilateral response to Iraq’s foreign debt incurred by Saddam Hussein’s regime.
It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.
...
SEC. 7. ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQ UPON REPLACEMENT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME.
It is the sense of the Congress that once the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power in Iraq, the United States should support Iraq’s transition to democracy by providing immediate and substantial humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, by providing democracy transition assistance to Iraqi parties and movements with democratic goals, and by convening Iraq’s foreign creditors to develop a multilateral response to Iraq’s foreign debt incurred by Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Public Law 107-243, 16OCT02:
SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
(a) REPORTS.—The President shall, at least once every 60 days, submit to the Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution, including actions taken pursuant to the exercise of authority granted in section 3 and the status of planning for efforts that are expected to be required after such actions are completed, including those actions described in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–338).
(a) REPORTS.—The President shall, at least once every 60 days, submit to the Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution, including actions taken pursuant to the exercise of authority granted in section 3 and the status of planning for efforts that are expected to be required after such actions are completed, including those actions described in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–338).
In that operative context, President Bush did share the hope with his predecessors and successor that a democratically reformed Iraq would provide a constructive example for the Middle East, and the presidents were right.
President Obama, remarks on the Middle East and North Africa, 19MAY11:
Indeed, one of the broader lessons to be drawn from this period is that sectarian divides need not lead to conflict. In Iraq, we see the promise of a multiethnic, multisectarian democracy. The Iraqi people have rejected the perils of political violence in favor of a democratic process, even as they’ve taken full responsibility for their own security. Of course, like all new democracies, they will face setbacks. But Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress. And as they do, we will be proud to stand with them as a steadfast partner.
Nevertheless, President Bush's policy statements do not show an expectation that "democratization there [Iraq] would set an example that others across the region would be unable to resist following". Dr. Haass may be confusing President Bush's Freedom Agenda — a post-9/11 innovation that was not Iraq-specific — with the older policy on Iraqi democratic reform which originated with President HW Bush's Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement. However, the Freedom Agenda was also more measured than Dr. Haass's caricature.
Haass:
The war also isolated the US, owing to its decision to fight...without explicit backing from the United Nations.
Dr. Haass's characterization of "its [US] decision to fight...without explicit backing from the United Nations" is incorrect legally. His characterization is partially correct politically for the OIF invasion, and incorrect politically for the OIF occupation and peace operations.
See the OIF FAQ answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom legal", which clarifies the domestic and international legal questions.
Legally, Operation Iraqi Freedom was conducted with the "explicit backing from the United Nations" in the basic UNSC mandate and authorization that enforced the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) pursuant to UNSCR 678 "acting under Chapter VII of the Charter". That was the same "explicit backing from the United Nations" for Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Operation Desert Fox, the UNSCR 688 humanitarian no-fly zones, and the other military actions in the UNSCR 660 series, Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement.
Extra UNSC "explicit backing" wasn't legally necessary because the international law enforcement with Iraq was mandated and authorized and continuous since 1990-1991. The value of adding more "explicit backing" to a UNSCR 678 military action was political rather than legal.
Dr. Haass is partially correct insofar the OIF invasion did not receive extra UNSC "explicit backing" after UNSCR 1441. However, UNSCR 1441 itself provided "explicit backing" for OIF by reiterating the ceasefire mandate and UNSCR 678 authorization.
Dr. Haass overlooks that the OIF occupation and peace operations received extra UNSC "explicit backing" with UNSCRs 1483, 1511, 1546, 1637, 1723, 1790.
The key to understanding why the OIF invasion did not receive extra UNSC "explicit backing" after UNSCR 1441 is knowing that ODF and the UNSCR 688 humanitarian no-fly zones also did not receive extra UNSC "explicit backing" for the same reason: The UNSC members who opposed OIF, ODF, and the no-fly zones were corrupt.
Despite that Saddam remained intransigently noncompliant with Iraq's ceasefire obligations and the US and UK remained faithful to the ceasefire compliance enforcement, they were undermined by the UNSC members, led by France and Russia along with China, who were complicit with the Saddam regime's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) [even while "Recognizing the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security" (UNSCR 1441)].
Prime Minister Blair, 06JUL16:
[A]s at 18 March 2003, there was gridlock at the UN. In resolution 1441, it had been agreed to give Saddam one final opportunity to comply. It was accepted that he had not done so.
In that case, according to 1441, action should have been agreed.
It was not because by then, politically, there was an impasse.
The undermining of the UN was in fact the refusal to follow through on 1441. And with the subsequent statement from President Putin and the President of France that they would veto any new resolution authorising action in the event of non-compliance, it was clearly not possible to get a majority of the UN to agree a new resolution. As the then President of Chile explained, there was no point since any decision by a majority would be vetoed.
In that case, according to 1441, action should have been agreed.
It was not because by then, politically, there was an impasse.
The undermining of the UN was in fact the refusal to follow through on 1441. And with the subsequent statement from President Putin and the President of France that they would veto any new resolution authorising action in the event of non-compliance, it was clearly not possible to get a majority of the UN to agree a new resolution. As the then President of Chile explained, there was no point since any decision by a majority would be vetoed.
Iraq Watch, New York Times article, 13APR
The data reveals that firms in Germany and France outstripped all others in selling the most important thing — specialized chemical-industry equipment that is particularly useful for producing poison gas. Without this equipment, none of the other imports would have been of much use.
Iraq Survey Group:
From Baghdad the long struggle to outlast the containment policy of the United States imposed through the UN sanctions seemed tantalizingly close. There was considerable commitment and involvement on the part of states like Russia and Syria, who had developed economic and political stakes in the success of the Regime.
...The MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] formulated and implemented a strategy aimed at ending the UN sanctions and breaching its subsequent UN OFF program by diplomatic and economic means. Iraq pursued its related goals of ending UN sanctions and the UN OFF program by enlisting the help of three permanent UNSC members: Russia, France and China....Saddam expressed confidence that France and Russia would support Iraq’s efforts to further erode the UN sanctions Regime.
...The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council.
...The number of countries and companies supporting Saddam’s schemes to undermine UN sanctions increased dramatically over time from 1995 to 2003 (see figure 54).
...In 2001, Tariq Aziz characterized the French approach to UN sanctions as adhering to the letter of sanctions but not the spirit. This was demonstrated by the presence of French CAs [diplomatic commercial attaches] in Baghdad, working to promote the interests of French companies while assisting them in avoiding UN sanctions.
...In May 2002, IIS correspondence addressed to Saddam stated that a MFA (quite possibly an IIS officer under diplomatic cover) met with French parliamentarian to discuss Iraq-Franco relations. The French politician assured the Iraqi that France would use its veto in the UNSC against any American decision to attack Iraq, according to the IIS memo.
...The MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] formulated and implemented a strategy aimed at ending the UN sanctions and breaching its subsequent UN OFF program by diplomatic and economic means. Iraq pursued its related goals of ending UN sanctions and the UN OFF program by enlisting the help of three permanent UNSC members: Russia, France and China....Saddam expressed confidence that France and Russia would support Iraq’s efforts to further erode the UN sanctions Regime.
...The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council.
...The number of countries and companies supporting Saddam’s schemes to undermine UN sanctions increased dramatically over time from 1995 to 2003 (see figure 54).
...In 2001, Tariq Aziz characterized the French approach to UN sanctions as adhering to the letter of sanctions but not the spirit. This was demonstrated by the presence of French CAs [diplomatic commercial attaches] in Baghdad, working to promote the interests of French companies while assisting them in avoiding UN sanctions.
...In May 2002, IIS correspondence addressed to Saddam stated that a MFA (quite possibly an IIS officer under diplomatic cover) met with French parliamentarian to discuss Iraq-Franco relations. The French politician assured the Iraqi that France would use its veto in the UNSC against any American decision to attack Iraq, according to the IIS memo.
See The Regime Finance and Procurement section of the Iraq Survey Group Duelfer report, Iraq's Suppliers at Iraq Watch, and IIC's Report on the Manipulation of the Oil-for-Food Programme to learn more about Saddam's accomplices.
Haass:
The war also isolated the US, owing to its decision to fight alongside only a few partners...
That "the war also isolated the US, owing to its decision to fight alongside only a few partners" speaks to the profoundly ethical leadership by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair on Iraq. Ethical leadership is usually unpopular with unethical fellows when it disrupts their illicit activities. Standing apart to do the right thing is hard when one's fellows are committed to doing the wrong thing. It's an isolating experience and a fraught ethical test for leaders. President Bush and Prime Minister Blair had the US and UK pass the ethical leadership test with OIF, yet Dr. Haass apparently believes America should have failed the test by acquiescing to noncompliant Saddam and Saddam's accomplices.
Given their historical track records, perhaps we can't expect better than Russia and China's malfeasance with Iraq. But UN Security Council and NATO founding member France's flagrant complicity with the Saddam regime's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) — casus belli — is particularly appalling. France's malfeasance influenced Saddam to choose "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) and thereby resume the Gulf War instead of comply as mandated to make the Gulf War ceasefire permanent.
Haass:
Millions of Americans became disillusioned with their government and US foreign policy, helping to set the stage for the anti-government populism and foreign-policy isolationism that has dominated US politics in recent years. The war ultimately proved to be a costly distraction. Without it, the US could have been in a much better position to reorient its foreign policy to contend with a more aggressive Russia and a more assertive China.
Operation Iraqi Freedom was costly (though not as costly as "$2 trillion"), but it was not a "distraction". What OIF was is substantively correct on the facts, procedurally correct on law and precedent, and justified on the policy. As the Saddam regime's threat was its violation of the spectrum of essential international norms that defined the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), OIF was also essentially correct for the sake of liberal international order.
The actual reason why "Millions of Americans became disillusioned with their government and US foreign policy, helping to set the stage for the anti-government populism and foreign-policy isolationism that has dominated US politics in recent years" is Dr. Haass's false narrative of OIF.
If the influential then-President of the Council on Foreign Relations had used his leading voice to clarify OIF's actual justification and hold Russia, China, and the rest of Saddam's accomplices to account, instead of Dr. Haass validating their anti-OIF, anti-American propaganda with his preeminent expert authority, then the "US could have been in a much better position to reorient its foreign policy to contend with a more aggressive Russia and a more assertive China".
Today, the CFR President Emeritus and CFR President can begin to revitalize American leadership of the free world and discredit illiberal competitors who were also Saddam's accomplices by clarifying OIF's actual justification for the public at the premise level of our politics and policy.
Haass:
The lack of local knowledge was pervasive. It may seem obvious to suggest that it is dangerous or even reckless to invade a country that you do not understand, but that is exactly what the US did.
...What is needed is a balanced consideration of the most likely scenarios, not just the worst ones.
Ironically, the analysis of what would follow a battlefield victory in Iraq erred in the opposite direction: US officials placed all their chips on a best-case scenario. After rolling out the welcome mat to those who had liberated them from Saddam, the Iraqis would quickly put aside their sectarian differences and embrace democracy.
...What is needed is a balanced consideration of the most likely scenarios, not just the worst ones.
Ironically, the analysis of what would follow a battlefield victory in Iraq erred in the opposite direction: US officials placed all their chips on a best-case scenario. After rolling out the welcome mat to those who had liberated them from Saddam, the Iraqis would quickly put aside their sectarian differences and embrace democracy.
See the OIF FAQ retrospective #postwar section.
Dr. Haass's characterization of the US pre-war acumen as "The lack of local knowledge was pervasive. It may seem obvious to suggest that it is dangerous or even reckless to invade a country that you do not understand, but that is exactly what the US did" is incorrect.
Obviously, not every American soldier or civil servant who deployed to Iraq was a country expert anymore than American soldiers and civil servants who deploy to Germany, Japan, or Korea are country experts. Nonetheless, institutionally, the US did not lack country experts on Iraq. By 2003, the US had engaged deeply with Iraqi dissidents inside and outside of Iraq per the UNSCR 688 humanitarian piece for more than a decade on top of the continuous US focus on Iraq since the Iran-Iraq War. The US consulted with Iraqi expats. And, the US worked with allies and international organizations, particularly the UN, who contributed their own experiences with Iraq, much of it from the same UNSCR 688 humanitarian piece. Of course, following the regime change, the US worked with more local Iraqis than the dissidents.
Dr. Haass's characterization of the initial post-war plan as "US officials placed all their chips on a best-case scenario" is misleading and incorrect.
It's misleading for Dr. Haass to characterize the initial post-war plan as simply a "...best-case scenario". While the initial post-war plan did adopt a 'light footprint' civilian-centered approach, it was customized to the pre-war concept about the tasks and conditions of the theoretical OIF occupation, which informed the initial belief that a 'heavy footprint' military-centered occupation would be counterproductive. In other words, the initial post-war plan was based on "a balanced consideration of the most likely scenarios, not just the worst ones". It was not based on, as Dr. Haass insinuates, blind faith in a "best-case scenario".
It's incorrect for Dr. Haass to say "US officials placed all their chips...", which implies US officials would not adjust if plan A failed. In fact, the history of OIF shows US officials from President Bush on down were willing and able to reassess and adjust to the competition and conditions in Iraq. For a highly competitive endeavor like OIF, it's normal for an initial plan, once engaged, to face setbacks that compel adjustment. That's what happened in Iraq. The mission faced setbacks and US leaders and US forces adjusted.
Haass:
But the cost side of the ledger is far longer. The Iraq War took the lives of some 200,000 Iraqi civilians and 4,600 US soldiers.
...Ironically, the analysis of what would follow a battlefield victory in Iraq erred in the opposite direction: US officials placed all their chips on a best-case scenario. After rolling out the welcome mat to those who had liberated them from Saddam, the Iraqis would quickly put aside their sectarian differences and embrace democracy. We know what happened instead. [emphasis added] The fall of Saddam became a moment for violently settling scores and jockeying for position. Promoting democracy is a daunting task. It is one thing to oust a leader and a regime, but it is quite another thing to put a better, enduring alternative in its place.
...As might be expected, the situation on the ground deteriorated rapidly. Looting and violence became commonplace. Insurgent movements and a civil war between Sunni and Shia militias destroyed what temporary order had been established. After that, conditions did not begin to improve until 2007, when the US deployed an additional 30,000 troops to Iraq in the famous “surge.”
...Ironically, the analysis of what would follow a battlefield victory in Iraq erred in the opposite direction: US officials placed all their chips on a best-case scenario. After rolling out the welcome mat to those who had liberated them from Saddam, the Iraqis would quickly put aside their sectarian differences and embrace democracy. We know what happened instead. [emphasis added] The fall of Saddam became a moment for violently settling scores and jockeying for position. Promoting democracy is a daunting task. It is one thing to oust a leader and a regime, but it is quite another thing to put a better, enduring alternative in its place.
...As might be expected, the situation on the ground deteriorated rapidly. Looting and violence became commonplace. Insurgent movements and a civil war between Sunni and Shia militias destroyed what temporary order had been established. After that, conditions did not begin to improve until 2007, when the US deployed an additional 30,000 troops to Iraq in the famous “surge.”
Dr. Haass does not "know what happened instead" because he does not know what we've learned about the Saddam regime.
Elsewhere in his article, Dr. Haass reveals his ignorance of what we now know about Saddam's terrorism, sectarianism, and tyranny, which causes Dr. Haass to blame OIF and the Iraqi people for the loss of "some 200,000 Iraqi civilians and 4,600 US soldiers", the "violently settling scores", and "insurgent movements and a civil war between Sunni and Shia militias". In fact, based on what we've learned about the Saddam regime, the root cause of those things is Saddamists.
We now know the Saddam regime converted from secular Baath to radical sectarian Islamist.
We now know Saddam's terrorism was significantly worse than it was estimated before OIF, including its "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with al Qaeda. To identify the root cause of the "violently settling scores" and "insurgent movements and a civil war between Sunni and Shia militias", note that IPP found "The predominant targets of Iraqi state terror operations were Iraqi citizens, both inside and outside of Iraq".
We now know that Saddam's rule by “systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror” (UN Commission on Human Rights, 19APR02) — already assessed as genocidal by outside observers — was actually "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, 18MAR04) than had been believed outside of Iraq.
Even expert Iraqi expats like Kanan Makiya, who advised the US planning for post-war Iraq, talk about their shock at the extreme corruption of Iraqi society that had been inflicted by Saddam, degrading the nation far from Iraq of the 1970s and 1980s.
In short, the loss of "some 200,000 Iraqi civilians and 4,600 US soldiers", the "violently settling scores", and "insurgent movements and a civil war between Sunni and Shia militias" were not caused by the OIF regime change. Rather, based on what [we] now know about Saddam's governance, they were caused by the Saddam regime's extreme corruption of Iraqi society, which was exploited by the genocidal Saddamists who smoothly converted their radical sectarian terrorist rule of Iraq and "regional and global terrorism" (IPP) to their radical sectarian terrorist insurgency against Iraq.
Inasmuch the initial post-war plan failed, that was not due to "the decision-making at the highest levels was often informal and lacking in rigor" or "the Bush administration wanted to reap the benefits of nation building without putting in the hard work it required". Rather, the initial post-war plan was overwhelmed by the surprising terrorist insurgency in part because pre-war analysts severely underestimated Saddam's radical sectarian turn, extreme corruption of Iraqi society, and deep domestic, regional, and global terrorism.
Based on what we now know, the Gulf War ceasefire enforcers should not have allowed the metastatic cancer of the noncompliant Saddam regime to fester as long as we did. In hindsight, the solution for the loss of "some 200,000 Iraqi civilians and 4,600 US soldiers", the "violently settling scores", and "insurgent movements and a civil war between Sunni and Shia militias" is that the Iraqi regime change should have happened long before 2003, if not in Operation Desert Storm, then as soon as it became apparent that Saddam would not comply with Iraq's Gulf War ceasefire obligations. That failure falls on the HW Bush administration.
Haass:
The 1990-91 Gulf War – in which the US successfully led a UN-backed international coalition that liberated Kuwait at minimal cost
[President HW Bush, news conference on suspension of Gulf War, 01MAR91:
In my own view I've always said that it would be -- that the Iraqi people should put him [Saddam] aside, and that would facilitate the resolution of all these problems that exist and certainly would facilitate the acceptance of Iraq back into the family of peace-loving nations.
...You mentioned World War II; there was a definitive end to that conflict. And now we have Saddam Hussein still there, the man that wreaked this havoc upon his neighbors.
...I still have a little bit of an unfinished agenda.]
...You mentioned World War II; there was a definitive end to that conflict. And now we have Saddam Hussein still there, the man that wreaked this havoc upon his neighbors.
...I still have a little bit of an unfinished agenda.]
Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #hwbush section:
I focus mainly on the Clinton-to-Bush continuity when I explain the grounds for Operation Iraqi Freedom because the law, policy, and precedent and the state of "crisis between the United States and Iraq" (Clinton, 28JUL00) underlying the decision for OIF matured during the Clinton administration.
However, I consider neither Clinton nor Bush as the US president most responsible for OIF. The US president I hold most responsible for OIF is President HW Bush.
Rather than [recount] the beginning of the US-led enforcement of the UNSCR 660 series under President HW Bush, I recommend reviewing the #hwbush section of "Perspective on Operation Iraqi Freedom". With hindsight, the decisions to suspend the Gulf War and attempt an alternative way to achieve Iraqi regime change show the road to OIF was locked in from the beginning of the Gulf War ceasefire.
However, I consider neither Clinton nor Bush as the US president most responsible for OIF. The US president I hold most responsible for OIF is President HW Bush.
Rather than [recount] the beginning of the US-led enforcement of the UNSCR 660 series under President HW Bush, I recommend reviewing the #hwbush section of "Perspective on Operation Iraqi Freedom". With hindsight, the decisions to suspend the Gulf War and attempt an alternative way to achieve Iraqi regime change show the road to OIF was locked in from the beginning of the Gulf War ceasefire.
Haass:
I also foresaw that establishing democracy would require a large, prolonged military occupation that would likely prove costly on the ground and controversial at home.
...After that, conditions did not begin to improve until 2007, when the US deployed an additional 30,000 troops to Iraq in the famous “surge.”
...Promoting democracy is a daunting task. It is one thing to oust a leader and a regime, but it is quite another thing to put a better, enduring alternative in its place.
...After that, conditions did not begin to improve until 2007, when the US deployed an additional 30,000 troops to Iraq in the famous “surge.”
...Promoting democracy is a daunting task. It is one thing to oust a leader and a regime, but it is quite another thing to put a better, enduring alternative in its place.
Excerpt from An irresponsible exit from Iraq:
Michael Gordon's report of President Obama's poor leadership with the Iraq mission contrasts sharply with Gordon's report of historic leadership by President Bush with his decision for the counterinsurgency "Surge".
Building a nation to secure the peace does not happen faster than raising a child. Based on America's experience as leader of the free world, just the opening stage of building a nation even in relatively straightforward conducive conditions should normally and reasonably be expected to require a decade. See the World War 2 nation-building examples, where US military forces continue to serve in evolving roles, and more contemporary to Iraq, the peace operations with Kosovoand Afghanistan, which both pre-date OIF and are also ongoing. Indeed, long before OIF and the discovery that Saddam's rule was in fact "far worse" (UNCHR) than outsiders realized, the international community understood Iraq required comprehensive rebuilding on a generational scale. Yet despite normal nation-building expectations heightened by the particular challenges of Iraq, President Obama cut short the peace operations with Iraq at a severely premature 8 years. Imagine the consequences if the US had withdrawn peace operations from Europe and Asia in the late 1940s or early 1950s like the US pulled out of Iraq at the 8-year mark. President Obama should have stayed the course from President Bush like President Eisenhower stayed the course from President Truman. Instead, Obama fumbled away the possibility of a reliable, long-term American partner in Iraq with an astonishingly passive-aggressive approach to the SOFA negotiation.
Building a nation to secure the peace does not happen faster than raising a child. Based on America's experience as leader of the free world, just the opening stage of building a nation even in relatively straightforward conducive conditions should normally and reasonably be expected to require a decade. See the World War 2 nation-building examples, where US military forces continue to serve in evolving roles, and more contemporary to Iraq, the peace operations with Kosovo
Haass:
But four years later, Bush’s successor, Barack Obama, decided to withdraw US troops in the face of worsening political relations with the Iraqi government.
Dr. Haass omits that President Obama's deviant approach to Iraq, from disengaged to passive-aggressive, caused the "worsening political relations with the Iraqi government". There's no excuse for Obama's contravention of the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement and the compounding harms from his gross strategic blunder.
Excerpt from An irresponsible exit from Iraq:
In January 2009, President Bush handed President Obama a hard-won turnaround success in strategically critical Iraq to build upon. The US was fulfilling the principal objective of bringing Iraq into compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions stemming from UNSCR 660 (1990). Looking ahead from the COIN "Surge", post-Saddam Iraq was clearly headed the way of Germany, Japan, and South Korea as a key regional strategic partnership. In May 2011, at the dawn of the Arab Spring, Obama described the historic opportunity for peace in the Middle East where "Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress".
...When the 2008-2011 status of forces agreement (SOFA) was signed at the close of the Bush administration, Iraq was improving sharply. Alongside the SOFA, the US and Iraq signed the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), whose conditions-based guidelines constituted the overarching law-and-policy frame for the long-term US-Iraq relationship.
...Instead, President Obama contravened the Strategic Framework Agreement. As Emma Sky explains, Obama's disengaged approach to Iraq from the outset sharply deviated from Bush's developmental approach to Iraq. PM Maliki altered his approach in reaction to President Obama. Based on conditions in Iraq in 2011, with the added risk factor introduced by the Arab Spring, US-led peace operations were needed past 2011. But as Rick Brennan explains, Obama's disengaged approach to Iraq from the outset of his presidency continued through his disengaged approach to the SOFA negotiation. Add: Speculatively, Obama may have insisted passive-aggressively on an Iraqi parliamentary SOFA because the SFA was sufficient legal basis to house partnership arrangements via executive agreement. The partnership arrangement since mid-2014, such as it is, for US troops serving in Iraq is housed in executive agreement.
...When the 2008-2011 status of forces agreement (SOFA) was signed at the close of the Bush administration, Iraq was improving sharply. Alongside the SOFA, the US and Iraq signed the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), whose conditions-based guidelines constituted the overarching law-and-policy frame for the long-term US-Iraq relationship.
...Instead, President Obama contravened the Strategic Framework Agreement. As Emma Sky explains, Obama's disengaged approach to Iraq from the outset sharply deviated from Bush's developmental approach to Iraq. PM Maliki altered his approach in reaction to President Obama. Based on conditions in Iraq in 2011, with the added risk factor introduced by the Arab Spring, US-led peace operations were needed past 2011. But as Rick Brennan explains, Obama's disengaged approach to Iraq from the outset of his presidency continued through his disengaged approach to the SOFA negotiation. Add: Speculatively, Obama may have insisted passive-aggressively on an Iraqi parliamentary SOFA because the SFA was sufficient legal basis to house partnership arrangements via executive agreement. The partnership arrangement since mid-2014, such as it is, for US troops serving in Iraq is housed in executive agreement.
Haass:
the war upset the balance of power in the region to the benefit of neighboring Iran, which has increased its sway over Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, in addition to Iraq.
Dr. Haass is incorrect to say "the war upset the balance of power in the region to the benefit of neighboring Iran, which has increased its sway over Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, in addition to Iraq". OIF did not "upset the balance of power in the region to the benefit of neighboring Iran". The premature end of OIF did that.
In fact, before President Obama's radical deviation, OIF had set up a better stable and ethical path to deal with Iran that relied on 3 prongs: stabilize Iraq as an American ally, increase sanctions pressure, and support civil reform in Iran. President Obama, instead, did the opposite of all three, together with a host of deviant choices that "upset the balance of power in the region to the benefit of neighboring Iran, which has increased its sway over Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, in addition to Iraq".
Haass:
I remember meetings with Israeli officials who suggested that the US was going to war with the wrong country. They saw Iran as the much greater threat. But these officials held back from saying so publicly, because they sensed that Bush was determined to go to war with Iraq and did not want to anger him with futile attempts at dissuasion.
The "Israeli officials who suggested that the US was going to war with the wrong country" were apparently unaware that President Bush was staying true to the Clinton Iran-Iraq dual-containment framework which worked by simultaneously enforcing Iraq's compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire terms while applying a conventional containment to Iran. President Obama dropped both sides of the dual containment.
Saddam's evidential "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire set a full law and fact basis for the US "to go to war with Iraq" per Public Laws 102-1 (102-190) and 107-243 pursuant to UNSCR 678.
What law and fact basis did those "Israeli officials" suggest for the US [to] go to war with Iran?
Haass:
The war’s lessons are manifold.
Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #postwar section:
[D]ue to the military's aversion to dedicated peace operations before OIF, the only practical way the Army could develop the sufficient peace-operations doctrine, capability, and more fundamentally, the proper civil-affairs mindset that were needed for occupying post-war Iraq was to actually occupy post-war Iraq and learn through necessity. Ergo, the needs of the mission enabled the conception and birth of the Petraeus-led counterinsurgency “Surge” that combined with the Sahwa Awakening and had us winning the peace with Iraq before President Obama changed course and disengaged the peace operations.
That being said, the terrorist insurgency we battled in post-war Iraq was not the first time the Army was caught flat-footed. That sort of demanding learning curve is normal in our military history where victory over capable adversaries has typically followed a harsh road of grim perseverance and in-competition adaptation, not preemptive perfection.
The standard of perfect preemptive anticipation, preparation, cost accounting, and execution that critics apply to OIF is ahistorical in military history. I agree we should do what we can beforehand to prepare. However, that the learning curve for victory in post-war Iraq was driven by necessity on the ground is consistent with military history. Our military has always undergone steep learning curves in war that have often included devastating setbacks, such as the battles of New York, First Manassas, Kasserine Pass, and Chosin Reservoir. The enemy teaches if we will learn, and President Bush's resolute leadership provided the necessary will to succeed with Iraq. OIF just demanded a steeper learning curve for the peace operations than the major combat operations that deposed Saddam's regime due to the kind of enemies that adapted to the inviting weakness ingrained in the military by the Powell Doctrine.
That being said, the terrorist insurgency we battled in post-war Iraq was not the first time the Army was caught flat-footed. That sort of demanding learning curve is normal in our military history where victory over capable adversaries has typically followed a harsh road of grim perseverance and in-competition adaptation, not preemptive perfection.
The standard of perfect preemptive anticipation, preparation, cost accounting, and execution that critics apply to OIF is ahistorical in military history. I agree we should do what we can beforehand to prepare. However, that the learning curve for victory in post-war Iraq was driven by necessity on the ground is consistent with military history. Our military has always undergone steep learning curves in war that have often included devastating setbacks, such as the battles of New York, First Manassas, Kasserine Pass, and Chosin Reservoir. The enemy teaches if we will learn, and President Bush's resolute leadership provided the necessary will to succeed with Iraq. OIF just demanded a steeper learning curve for the peace operations than the major combat operations that deposed Saddam's regime due to the kind of enemies that adapted to the inviting weakness ingrained in the military by the Powell Doctrine.
Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #americanprimacy section:
At the dawn of the Cold War, the US takeaway from the Korea intervention — which was much more brutal and afflicted with American shortcomings than the Iraq intervention — was to urgently elevate US-led practical readiness and political willingness to sufficiently compete versus the Soviets and their fellow travelers all the time, everywhere in the world. The lesson from Korea was not to forswear future Koreas but to win the next Korean War from the outset and champion US international preferences with superior power and political will that were credibly ready and strong enough to discourage the competition. The deterrence model — peace through strength.
Holding Iraq to the terms of the UNSCR 660-series resolutions mattered beyond pacifying Saddam. The world was judging whether American leadership possessed the resolute integrity required to effectively enforce norms and mandates with rogue actors like Iraq, Iran, and north Korea.
Like the American leadership forged in Korea at the dawn of the Cold War, in the contest for Iraq, America learned to lead the free world again as the strong horse for the 9/11 era. Once more, Ambassador Crocker:
The keystone premise needed to revitalize US-led enforcement of liberal world order is a competitive embrace of the Iraq intervention by policy makers, like US leaders built on the Korea intervention to suit America for the global contest. Repudiation of the Iraq intervention undermines effectual American leadership of the free world and devalues the essential international norms the US enforced with Iraq, which encourages and enables the advance of avid illiberal competitors.
Holding Iraq to the terms of the UNSCR 660-series resolutions mattered beyond pacifying Saddam. The world was judging whether American leadership possessed the resolute integrity required to effectively enforce norms and mandates with rogue actors like Iraq, Iran, and north Korea.
Like the American leadership forged in Korea at the dawn of the Cold War, in the contest for Iraq, America learned to lead the free world again as the strong horse for the 9/11 era. Once more, Ambassador Crocker:
Bush's decision rocked America's adversaries, says Crocker: "The lesson they had learned from Lebanon was, 'Stick it to the Americans, make them feel the pain, and they won't have the stomach to stick it out.' That assumption was challenged by the surge."Yet, despite that the Iraq intervention was better grounded and succeeding better than the Korea intervention at the analogous stage when Obama contravened the US-Iraq SFA, the US takeaway from the Iraq intervention has been the diametric opposite of the takeaway from the Korea intervention. Rather than embrace the hard-earned lessons from the Iraq intervention to win the next Iraq War from the outset and champion US international preferences with superior power and political will that are credibly ready and strong enough to discourage the competition, the prevalent political response — even by ostensible proponents of American leadership of the free world — has been to disclaim OIF and forswear future Iraqs. Some pundits would even preclude US boots on the ground as a matter of policy. Rather than build on the hard-earned lessons of Iraq to reset the baseline for effectual American leadership of the free world, OIF stigma has driven American politics towards a weak-willed American leadership that invites the competition to exploit a gaping self-imposed strategic vulnerability.
The keystone premise needed to revitalize US-led enforcement of liberal world order is a competitive embrace of the Iraq intervention by policy makers, like US leaders built on the Korea intervention to suit America for the global contest. Repudiation of the Iraq intervention undermines effectual American leadership of the free world and devalues the essential international norms the US enforced with Iraq, which encourages and enables the advance of avid illiberal competitors.
Haass:
The results of the war have been overwhelmingly negative.
The results from OIF were positive. The results from prematurely ending OIF have been negative.
See the OIF FAQ epilogue answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory".
"Revisiting America’s War of Choice in Iraq" provided a lot of meat on the bone to chew on. I appreciate that.
Feel free to share my corrective criticism of Dr. Haass and the OIF FAQ with CFR colleagues and anyone else. Critical feedback is welcome. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
Tweet on 05SEP23:
Problem:
Experts needed to clarify the Iraq issue balk at disputing top experts like @RichardHaass who obfuscate the Iraq issue https://twitter.com/RichardHaass/status/1637038623177539584
Solution:
Correct experts in the discourse the same way you would in court—Impeach by contradiction with OIF's defining sources.The US Govt & my boss at the time Colin Powell did not lie about WMD. The word “lie” involves intent. There was no intent; we got it wrong. We misinterpreted intelligence & assumed Saddam was hiding WMD when he was hiding his lack of WMD. No more, no less. https://t.co/ZlwQMuZDMo
— Richard N. Haass (@RichardHaass) March 18, 2023
Add: In Cleaning Haass With a Fisking, national security analyst Brian Dunn goes point by point with his thoughts to complement my correction of Richard Haass.
