In March 2023, I quickly critiqued about half of the symposium for Quin Hillyer to equip him for a planned follow-up. I halted my review when the follow-up was cancelled. A year later, I completed it for the 21st anniversary of OIF.
Scroll down or click on #lake-we for my comments on Eli Lake's answer; #antle-we for my comments on James Antle's answer; #exner-we for my comments on Garrett Exner's answer; #greenwald-we for my comments on Abe Greenwald's answer; #hamid-we for my comments on Shadi Hamid's answer; and #carney-we for my comments on Timothy Carney's answer to "What is the most important lesson of the Iraq War?".
Scroll down or click on #stewart-we for my comments on Brian Stewart's "Saddam Hussein was there too"; #hillyer-we for my comments on Quin Hillyer's "What We Got Right In Iraq"; and #agresto-we for my comments on John Agresto's "What We Got Wrong In Iraq".
Mr. Hillyer and Dr. Agresto's e-mails are omitted. The symposium's other contributors did not respond to my e-mails, so I don't know whether they've read them.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Quin Hillyer]
date: Mar 24, 2023, 7:49 PM
subject: 20th anniversary of OIF: Comments on Eli Lake's WE symposium piece
Mr. Hillyer,
Preface: For my review of the Washington Examiner symposium on OIF, I'll refrain from my standard criticism. Instead, I'll pick out things to comment on, which means skipping some of the faulty statements that I would normally grab, for example (Lake):
Saddam’s defiance, the final report of U.S. weapons inspectors would conclude, was driven by his fear that Iran and his own population would topple his regime if the secret got out that he no longer possessed the weapons of mass destruction he pretended he had. It would have been nice had the CIA deciphered this strategy before the war. But its failure to read the Iraqi tyrant’s mind is not evidence of state deception, as so many critics of the war believe to this day.
My presumption is that you know, or should know, the subject material well enough by now to evaluate the WE symposium pieces in accordance with OIF's source material. If you need help, you know how to use the OIF FAQ. If you want more detailed criticism from me, ask.
Before I begin, note that the cancer of the false narrative of OIF isn't limited to America: https://www.theamericanconservative.com/one-continuous-war/. It's the keystone premise for Peter Hitchens's advocacy, by a Briton in an American publication, to fundamentally discredit both your political faction and Anglo-American championship of liberal international order. If you accomplish the mission over here, you'll help cure the problem over there.
First up, from the top, [Eli Lake].
Lake:
After all, by conservative estimates, the war cost more than $2 trillion.
What "conservative estimates" is Lake alluding to? Excerpt from the OIF FAQ answer to "Did Operation Iraqi Freedom really cost X trillions of dollars":
According to the Congressional Research Service report, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 (March 29, 2011), which measured the "cumulative total appropriated [for Iraq and Afghanistan] ... war operations, diplomatic operations, and medical care for Iraq and Afghan war veterans", covering DOD, State/USAID, and VA Medical costs, the combined cost for Iraq totaled 805.5 billion dollars through FY2011 and 823.2 billion dollars estimated through FY2012. Within the combined cost, the DOD portion totaled 757.8 billion through FY2011 and 768.8 billion dollars estimated through FY2012. DOD funding for OIF peaked at 138.5 billion dollars in FY2008 for the counterinsurgency "Surge" and dropped sharply every year thereafter to a low of 11 billion dollars in FY2012, the last year of OIF (also known as Operation New Dawn).
That's not cheap by any stretch of the imagination, but it's also not X trillions of dollars.
That's not cheap by any stretch of the imagination, but it's also not X trillions of dollars.
Perhaps Lake is 'conservatively' adding costs incurred after OIF. Maybe, with "America had already intervened in Iraq by 2003", he's also adding pre-OIF costs. Costs following the 2011 withdrawal shouldn't go to OIF's ledger given the radical deviation by President Obama that contravened the US-Iraq SFA in order to end OIF, which set the stage for and enabled, if not caused, subsequent events.
If we're expanding accounts, then OIF costs should be charged to Desert Storm/Shield's ledger given the continuum that followed President HW [B]ush's choice to suspend the Gulf War with the ceasefire terms that defined OIF's casus belli.
Stretch out the logic, and we could charge all of our military costs since WW2 to WW2's ledger and then transfer the whole bundle to WW1's ledger.
Lake:
...even U.S. allies wanted to soften and ultimately lift the sanctions kept in place despite his defiance.
Presumably, Lake is referring chiefly to our NATO 'ally' France, which makes his characterization a gross understatement.
France more than "wanted". France was actively complicit in the Oil For Food scandal, the windfall from which Saddam was applying to fund his UNSCR 687-proscribed procurement and terrorism. More than money, France was selling UNSCR 687-proscribed items to Saddam.
Excerpt from Iraq WMD watchdog, Iraq Watch:
The data reveals that firms in Germany and France outstripped all others in selling the most important thing — specialized chemical-industry equipment that is particularly useful for producing poison gas. Without this equipment, none of the other imports would have been of much use.
What cemented France's malfeasance for me was the ISG finding that late 2002, in the midst of UNSCR 1441, our 'friend' France was closing on a sale of proscribed anti-aircraft technology to Iraq that Saddam presumably would have turned on the British and American craft enforcing the UNSCR 688 humanitarian no-fly zones, which presumably would have continued forward had OIF not happened. The same no-fly zones that France left in 1996 in order to profit illicitly from helping the genocidal Saddam regime breach the ceasefire.
Lake:
While there is no evidence that Saddam’s regime played a role in 9/11, he was nonetheless a leading sponsor of international terrorism.
Lake applies the same 9/11 qualifier to Saddam's terrorism as you did. "While there is no evidence that Saddam’s regime played a role in 9/11" misleadingly implies that "a role in 9/11" was an element of the President's case against Saddam, which it pointedly was not. The qualified characterization also obscures that Saddam's terrorism as-is was a definitional element of OIF's casus belli.
Like I said in my review of your article, Lake should clarify that culpability for 9/11 was not part of the case against Saddam. And that in fact the 9/11 mandate includes a broader counterterrorism objective that covered Saddam's "regional and global terrorism" (IPP) and its "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with al Qaeda. It joined paragraph 32 of UNSCR 687 (1991), the standing Gulf War ceasefire counterterrorism mandate.
Lake:
It’s fair to say that the gains were not worth the price. It’s also fair to argue that America was not capable of managing the reconstruction of a country as complex as Iraq.
Evaluation of "the gains were not worth the price" and "America was not capable of managing the reconstruction of a country as complex as Iraq" need to be considered separately before and after the radical deviation of President Obama's irresponsible exit from Iraq.
President Obama contravened both the US-Iraq SFA and the cardinal precedent, then SOP, for American leadership of the free world à la Korea, Japan, and Germany. Judging OIF under President Bush by conflating it with the end of OIF under President Obama is as misleading as judging a medical procedure by the consequences of prematurely yanking the patient out of the treatment program.
Lake:
That said, one must account for the alternative of leaving Saddam in power.
Lake understates "the alternative of leaving Saddam in power", knowing what we know now. We know the sanctions-based 'containment' had failed by 2000-2001 and "As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (ISG). Due to the Iraqi "denial and deception operations" (ISG) that continued through the ISG investigation itself, we can't know the actual extent that Iraq retained and reconstituted Saddam's WMD. What ISG found is just the floor. But we do know the Saddam regime's radical sectarian turn, extreme corruption of Iraqi society, and deep domestic, regional, and global terrorism were "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, 18MAR04) than we believed before OIF.
Lake:
One way or the other, America would be sucked into the abyss created by Saddam’s misrule.
Lake should clarify the why of the "One way or the other", i.e., the controlling law, policy, and precedent on Iraq. The "alternative of leaving Saddam in power" was not available to President Bush at the decision point after Saddam called our bluff with http://www.un.org/depts/unmovic/new/documents/cluster_document.pdf in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). With that choice by Saddam and the complicity of Saddam's accomplices on the Security Council, the diplomatic and lesser military compliance enforcement options were exhausted. President Bush was obligated to "ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (Public Law 107-243). Accommodation with the "threat [of] Iraq's non-compliance" (UNSCR 1441) was not permitted by the law and policy to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L. 105-235). Which left only OIF at the decision point, unless Bush reneged on the highest duties of his Office. The President did not renege his duties.
You're welcome to share this e-mail's comments with Mr. Lake. Just make sure for the sake of his advocacy moving forward to add your corrective criticism of his faulty statements that I skipped.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [James Antle]
date: Mar 25, 2023, 7:15 PM
subject: Reaction to W. James Antle III piece in "What is the most important lesson of the Iraq War?"
Mr. Antle,
I clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ by organizing the primary source authorities, i.e., the set of controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts that define OIF's justification, to lay a proper foundation and correct for the prevalent conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue. (Quin Hillyer recommended the OIF FAQ in his feature article, What we got right in Iraq.)
With that, I am writing to you with my critical reaction to your piece in the 17MAR23 Washington Examiner symposium, What is the most important lesson of the Iraq War?. If you like, I can review the rest of the WE symposium on OIF, too.
Antle:
The lesson presidents appear to have learned from the Iraq War is, perhaps unsurprisingly, a political one: If you are going to attempt any Iraq-like projects abroad, keep the use of American ground troops to an absolute minimum.
That's a harmful political lesson. A political norm of "keep the use of American ground troops to an absolute minimum" is obviously anti-competitive with a restriction on US options and concomitant expansion of our competitors' options.
Here's the beneficial political lesson from OIF, excerpt from OIF FAQ post Critical response to John Rentoul's "Chilcot Report: Politicians":
The first lesson of Iraq is political. Don't concede conjecture, distorted context (like the Chilcot report), and readily debunked dis[mis]information as the prevailing narrative, especially not for the defining international law enforcement of the post-Cold War whose success was essential to credit the threat/use of force for the deterrence base of American leadership of the free world. The resulting stigmatization of OIF has crippled American leadership of the free world with much harm resulting.
The second lesson is don't elect leaders who use conjecture, distorted context, anddis[mis]information to stigmatize a paradigmatic liberal intervention in order to deviate from American leadership of the free world and throw away a hard-earned peace to empower the illiberal enemy.
The second lesson is don't elect leaders who use conjecture, distorted context, and
Antle:
That’s why Barack Obama was able to repeat a central error of Iraq in Libya less than a decade later, regime change with no thought to what would happen once the dictator was gone, while paying a fraction of the political price.
Your characterization of President Obama is true. The Obama administration's systematic errors are due to the fact that its operative premise was the specious narrative stigmatizing OIF: stigmatizing right normalizes wrong.
However, your characterization of President Bush is false regarding "regime change with no thought to what would happen once the dictator was gone". In fact, along with the rest of the decade-plus of controlling law and policy on Iraq that he inherited, President Bush faithfully carried forward the law and policy that had officially 'thought' about Iraqi regime change since his father was President. I'm surprised you don't know this as a "politics editor".
To clarify your false premise, see the #unscr688 and #postwar sections of the OIF FAQ 10th anniversary retrospective post. Also note these citations from the Bush section of the OIF FAQ main table of sources:
+ President Bush letter to Congress on the determination and legal authority for Operation Iraqi Freedom, 18MAR03 – html copy; Addendum, 21MAR03. [see the addendum]
+ Bush White House: Statement of the Atlantic Summit: A Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People, 16MAR03 – State Department copy.
President Bush discusses the future of Iraq, 26FEB03.
* "provision for humanitarian support in Iraq in the event of any military action".
Bush White House: Briefing on humanitarian reconstruction issues, 24FEB03.
Feith (War and Decision): Selected documents on Post-War Planning for Iraq, 2008.
+ Bush White House: Statement of the Atlantic Summit: A Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People, 16MAR03 – State Department copy.
President Bush discusses the future of Iraq, 26FEB03.
* "provision for humanitarian support in Iraq in the event of any military action".
Bush White House: Briefing on humanitarian reconstruction issues, 24FEB03.
Feith (War and Decision): Selected documents on Post-War Planning for Iraq, 2008.
Now that you know, I expect that you and the Washington Examiner will clarify your basic misconception of the Iraq issue.
Antle:
The bottom line is that it is much easier to break things than to fix them, whether we are talking about military targets, complex systems, or entire cultures.
Operation Iraqi Freedom didn't break Iraq. By the operative enforcement procedure, OIF was caused by the fact* that Iraq was broken by the Saddam regime as definitively diagnosed by the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) that was purpose-designed to cure Iraq.
* Fact: We know that at Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), the Saddam regime had broken the sanctions-based 'containment' and "As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (Iraq Survey Group) in violation of UNSCR 687. We know the Saddam regime's radical sectarian turn, extreme corruption of Iraqi society, and aggressive domestic, regional, and global terrorism in violation of UNSCRs 687, 688, and 949 were "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, 18MAR04) than we believed before OIF.
The initial setback faced by the OIF occupation was not due to Presidential thoughtlessness. Rather, the initial 'light footprint' post-war plan was calibrated to an obsolete concept of Iraqi society as the pre-war analysis had severely underestimated the extent that Saddamists had broken Iraq since Operation Desert Storm. The military and civilian peace operators who were caught off guard by the Saddamist insurgents, who exploited the inimical conditions they had created, were like a surgical team that had prepared to treat a Stage II, Stage III cancer only to be surprised by an advanced Stage IV cancer.
Knowing what we know now, the essential lesson is that the Gulf War ceasefire enforcers were wrong to allow the Saddamist cancer to progress as much as it did, for as long as it did in clear violation of the diagnostic-cum-prescriptive ceasefire terms. The Saddam regime's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) in "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire should have triggered the Iraqi regime change far sooner, if not in Operation Desert Storm prior to UNSCR 687.
That being said, unexpected setbacks are normal in any kind of real competition, let alone maximal contests of war and peace. As US forces have adapted throughout our military history, the OIF coalition adjusted to the initial setback in Iraq, which is also normal for competition. However, President Obama's subsequent irresponsible exit from Iraq was abnormal for competition.
The "bottom line" is that we know that the OIF peace operations, which were necessary to rehabilitate Iraq from the Saddamist cancer in line with our precedential peace operations with Korea, Japan, and Germany, were succeeding before President Obama's radical deviation cut them off.
Antle:
But presidents have been slower to embrace another vital Iraq lesson related to why George W. Bush once campaigned against “nation-building” in the first place. Or why Colin Powell warned him about the “Pottery Barn rule”: You break it, you buy it.
. . .
Things built up with great care over time can be destroyed quickly and not so easily reconstituted. The most important lesson from Iraq may also be the most conservative one.
. . .
Things built up with great care over time can be destroyed quickly and not so easily reconstituted. The most important lesson from Iraq may also be the most conservative one.
Contrary to your "most conservative" lesson, see the #americanprimacy section of the OIF FAQ 10th anniversary retrospective for the competitive "most important...vital Iraq lesson". Excerpt:
Like the American leadership forged in Korea at the dawn of the Cold War, in the contest for Iraq, America learned to lead the free world again as the strong horse for the 9/11 era. Once more, Ambassador Crocker:
The keystone premise needed to revitalize US-led enforcement of liberal world order is a competitive embrace of the Iraq intervention by policy makers, like US leaders built on the Korea intervention to suit America for the global contest. Repudiation of the Iraq intervention undermines effectual American leadership of the free world and devalues the essential international norms the US enforced with Iraq, which encourages and enables the advance of avid illiberal competitors.
Bush's decision rocked America's adversaries, says Crocker: "The lesson they had learned from Lebanon was, 'Stick it to the Americans, make them feel the pain, and they won't have the stomach to stick it out.' That assumption was challenged by the surge."Yet, despite that the Iraq intervention was better grounded and succeeding better than the Korea intervention at the analogous stage when Obama contravened the US-Iraq SFA, the US takeaway from the Iraq intervention has been the diametric opposite of the takeaway from the Korea intervention. Rather than embrace the hard-earned lessons from the Iraq intervention to win the next Iraq War from the outset and champion US international preferences with superior power and political will that are credibly ready and strong enough to discourage the competition, the prevalent political response — even by ostensible proponents of American leadership of the free world — has been to disclaim OIF and forswear future Iraqs. Some pundits would even preclude US boots on the ground as a matter of policy. Rather than build on the hard-earned lessons of Iraq to reset the baseline for effectual American leadership of the free world, OIF stigma has driven American politics towards a weak-willed American leadership that invites the competition to exploit a gaping self-imposed strategic vulnerability.
The keystone premise needed to revitalize US-led enforcement of liberal world order is a competitive embrace of the Iraq intervention by policy makers, like US leaders built on the Korea intervention to suit America for the global contest. Repudiation of the Iraq intervention undermines effectual American leadership of the free world and devalues the essential international norms the US enforced with Iraq, which encourages and enables the advance of avid illiberal competitors.
Antle:
W. James Antle III is the Washington Examiner’s politics editor.
Intellectual undertakings like the Washington Examiner symposium on OIF are normally expected to seek better substantive rigor. It's not normally expected to replace substantive precision with the equivocation that enabled the fundamentally flawed commentary in your piece and other pieces in the WE symposium.
As politics editor, it's incumbent on you to lay a proper foundation for the Iraq issue with the operative law and facts that define OIF's justification, which is necessary to clarify the discourse on Iraq with a precise definitional, objective standard. It's incumbent on you to hew to that objective standard to correct the basic misconceptions of the Iraq issue degrading the WE symposium on OIF, including in your piece.
Again, if you like, I can review the rest of the WE symposium on OIF, too. Critical feedback and questions are welcome.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Quin Hillyer]
date: Mar 28, 2023, 11:28 AM
subject: 20th anniversary of OIF: Comments on Garrett Exner's WE symposium piece
Mr. Hillyer,
As with the others, I'll pick out things from [Garrett Exner]'s piece in the Washington Examiner 20th anniversary symposium on OIF to comment on instead of my standard criticism. My presumption is that you're able to spot and criticize his faulty statements that I skip in accordance with OIF's defining sources. You can use the OIF FAQ and ask me for more detailed criticism.
Exner's piece is a useful reminder that the debate over OIF is about more than Iraq. The stakes are a paradigm shift for US national security and foreign policy. Exner's piece is also yet another illustration that this essential debate is corrupted by false premises from experts.
As an opinion, Exner's piece is questionable, such as his decoupling counterterrorism from the counterinsurgency in OIF. The anti-OIF insurgency was a strategic product of Saddamist terrorists and their al Qaeda allies whom, as IPP discovered, Saddamists had built up in the first place. Exner appears ignorant of the longstanding law and policy framework that defined OIF. Per my analogy of judging a medical procedure by what happens if the patient is prematurely yanked from his treatment program, I wonder if Exner's judgement that OIF's nation-building was ineffective is based on the crippling consequences of President Obama prematurely ending OIF.
In terms of national security doctrine and policy, these two statements from Exner taken together are false and misleading: "the fact that our military is a fighting force that shouldn’t be tasked with nation-building" and "This is neither what the U.S. Marine Corps is meant to do nor what our nation expects it to do".
Peace operations are in fact doctrinal for the US military because they've been critical to US foreign policy since before OIF. Excerpt from the #postwarmil section of the OIF FAQ 10th anniversary retrospective post:
US Army FM (field manual) 1:
I agree we should have had more troops available at the outset of the post-war, but we didn’t need over 500,000 troops to be effective. An extra 50-100,000 troops would have been ideal. In fact, our post-war troop level in Iraq peaked at 157,800 in FY2008.
The Army's main problem entering post-war Iraq wasn't the troop numbers or presidential decisions. Drawing from my contemporary military service, our main problem was insufficient method (strategy, plans, tactics, techniques, procedures, etc.) by the military for a sufficient post-war occupation for the particular non-permissive conditions we encountered in Iraq. Despite the Army's doctrinal peace operational role and our overall successful modern (20th century) record of post-war nation-building occupations, the regular Army of 2003 simply was not ready to carry out the kind of peace operations we learned were needed.
The Army’s contribution to joint operations is landpower. ... Landpower includes the ability to ... Establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for a lasting peace [and] .... Address the consequences of catastrophic events—both natural and manmade—to restore infrastructure and reestablish basic civil services.On the military side, GEN Eric Shinseki famously warned that 500,000 or more soldiers would be needed to garrison Iraq.
I agree we should have had more troops available at the outset of the post-war, but we didn’t need over 500,000 troops to be effective. An extra 50-100,000 troops would have been ideal. In fact, our post-war troop level in Iraq peaked at 157,800 in FY2008.
The Army's main problem entering post-war Iraq wasn't the troop numbers or presidential decisions. Drawing from my contemporary military service, our main problem was insufficient method (strategy, plans, tactics, techniques, procedures, etc.) by the military for a sufficient post-war occupation for the particular non-permissive conditions we encountered in Iraq. Despite the Army's doctrinal peace operational role and our overall successful modern (20th century) record of post-war nation-building occupations, the regular Army of 2003 simply was not ready to carry out the kind of peace operations we learned were needed.
To be fair to Exner, US Marine Corps doctrine as I understand it based on my military experience (i.e., the reason that US soldiers and airmen are stationed in Korea but US marines will only deploy from Okinawa if DPRK invades the ROK) is comparatively expeditionary. However, "acting as a police force in a foreign country" is a historical role in US Army doctrine. Therefore, implying that overall US military doctrine is the same as the comparatively narrow USMC doctrine with "This is neither what the U.S. Marine Corps is meant to do nor what our nation expects it to do" is misleading. As I understand it, the Marines 'lent a hand' to the Army in that aspect of OIF based on the needs of the mission per the joint operations doctrine rather than USMC doctrine per se.
Writ large, what does Exner think our Regular Army soldiers did in Europe and Asia following WW2? Writ small, what does Exner think our National Guard soldiers do when they're deployed in domestic emergencies such as riots and natural disasters that overwhelm local police forces akin to the Saddamist insurgency?
If you want, we can delve further into the opinion aspect of Exner's piece which conflicts with the essential lessons of Iraq that I discuss in the #americanprimacy section of my 10th anniversary retrospective post. Excerpt:
If the US is to be the leader of the free world that effectually enforces liberal world order in front of world events, then US strategy needs to match US policy by maintaining balance with US practical and political mastery of all relevant forms of competition, not pinball with an either/or imbalance of conventional versus unconventional methods. And US strategy certainly cannot phobicly self-restrict on the spectrum of relevant competition as the Powell Doctrine dictates. If we feed one competitive method and starve the other, then capable willing competitors who contradict US policy preferences will simply, logically exploit our self-imposed vulnerability by choosing the other method.
. . .
US strategic vulnerabilities derived from the Vietnam War stigma, e.g., the Powell Doctrine, undermined Presidents HW Bush and Clinton's UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement from the start, which subverted the mandated remedy for Iraq and allowed the Saddam problem to fester. A particularly harmful cascade effect of the Vietnam War stigma has been the crippling of US peace operations policy and capability. That fundamental flaw in US strategy was solved under President Bush with resolute leadership and a harsh learning curve in the crucible of Iraq. Yet in the current politics, rather than correct for the Vietnam War stigma-induced faults that led to Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), like the US corrected for the faults that led to the Korean War, President Obama has made sure to uphold and update the Vietnam War stigma instead by burning President Bush's hard-earned, vital corrective actions with Iraq. The essential lessons of Iraq have thus been stigmatized in the politics for future reference for US leaders. Meanwhile, with the Vietnam War stigma upheld as operative premise, President HW Bush's path-setting errors in the wake of Desert Storm that locked in the road to OIF and President Clinton's enforcement failures that moved the US to coda with Saddam are either ignored or even held up as examples for US leaders to emulate. By the same token, Obama's course deviation cannot be corrected as long as his keystone premise, OIF stigma, is an operative premise in US politics and policy.
. . .
US strategic vulnerabilities derived from the Vietnam War stigma, e.g., the Powell Doctrine, undermined Presidents HW Bush and Clinton's UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement from the start, which subverted the mandated remedy for Iraq and allowed the Saddam problem to fester. A particularly harmful cascade effect of the Vietnam War stigma has been the crippling of US peace operations policy and capability. That fundamental flaw in US strategy was solved under President Bush with resolute leadership and a harsh learning curve in the crucible of Iraq. Yet in the current politics, rather than correct for the Vietnam War stigma-induced faults that led to Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), like the US corrected for the faults that led to the Korean War, President Obama has made sure to uphold and update the Vietnam War stigma instead by burning President Bush's hard-earned, vital corrective actions with Iraq. The essential lessons of Iraq have thus been stigmatized in the politics for future reference for US leaders. Meanwhile, with the Vietnam War stigma upheld as operative premise, President HW Bush's path-setting errors in the wake of Desert Storm that locked in the road to OIF and President Clinton's enforcement failures that moved the US to coda with Saddam are either ignored or even held up as examples for US leaders to emulate. By the same token, Obama's course deviation cannot be corrected as long as his keystone premise, OIF stigma, is an operative premise in US politics and policy.
[Add: A particular oddity in Exner's piece is his seeming endorsement of the Iraq regime change itself but then the contradictory position that US forces in Iraq should have been limited to counterterrorism thereafter. He cites Africa missions that were limited to counterterrorism in counterpoint, but those missions didn't involve regime changes like Iraq. The policy applications are different in kind.
Practically speaking, I can't imagine how Exner's formulation would work. At a guess, he's implying the US should have pursued a more extreme version of the initial 'light footprint' plan that the Saddamist insurgents exploited. Or else, he's ignoring that Saddam's security forces self-dissolved and implying that they should have been kept on to police Iraq.]
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Abe Greenwald]
date: Apr 18, 2024, 3:26 AM
subject: Comment on Abe Greenwald's answer to "What is the most important lesson of the Iraq War?" (Washington Examiner, 17MAR23)
Mr. Greenwald,
I clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ in accordance with OIF's primary source authorities.
To commemorate the 21st anniversary of OIF, I recently completed my Review of the American Enterprise Institute's "The Iraq War Series 20 Years Later", which I invite you to review.
I'm now completing my Review of Washington Examiner symposium "What is the most important lesson of the Iraq War?". I reviewed about half of the symposium in March 2023. I halted on Garrett Exner's answer. I'm picking up where I left off. Your answer is next.
Abe Greenwald:
The most important lesson of the Iraq War is that American foreign policy is inevitably determined by domestic politics. Because George W. Bush was a controversial president from the moment he was elected, his ability to sustain popular support for the war would suffer grievously.
... Barack Obama campaigned on ending the war, was elected president, and followed through.
... the need to pay attention to domestic politics is the biggest lesson because domestic politics dictate whether we overcome wartime challenges with sober judgment or lose our will and succumb to them.
... Barack Obama campaigned on ending the war, was elected president, and followed through.
... the need to pay attention to domestic politics is the biggest lesson because domestic politics dictate whether we overcome wartime challenges with sober judgment or lose our will and succumb to them.
I agree that "The most important lesson of the Iraq War is that American foreign policy is inevitably determined by domestic politics" and "the need to pay attention to domestic politics is the biggest lesson because domestic politics dictate whether we overcome wartime challenges with sober judgment or lose our will and succumb to them".
The first "domestic politics" lesson of Iraq is don't allow readily correctable conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation to become the dominant political narrative, especially not when the foreign policy at stake is the defining international law enforcement of the post-Cold War whose success was essential to credit the threat and use of force at the deterrence base of American leadership of the free world. Hence, the stigmatization of the Iraq intervention has significantly degraded American leadership and enabled our competitors.
The second "domestic politics" lesson of Iraq follows from the first: Don't elect leaders who use conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation to stigmatize a paradigmatic US foreign affair in order to throw away a hard-earned peace, empower the illiberal enemy, and undermine the essential principles of American leadership of the free world.
Third, curing the degenerative Iraq Syndrome requires re-laying a proper foundation with OIF's primary sources to discredit the prevailing false narrative and clarify OIF's justification for the public.
Abe Greenwald:
While most of the country was in favor of the Iraq War at its start, Bush was only ever extended a sliver of goodwill. And when the insurgency arose in the spring of 2003 and the war went bad, that sliver vanished.
I assume you meant "when the insurgency arose in the spring of" 2004, not "spring of 2003". The OIF invasion happened in the spring of 2003. While the Saddamists set up their terrorist insurgency before the invasion, it didn't burst right away.
The cynical nature of the Democrats' opposition to OIF is particularly stark given that "most of the country was in favor of the Iraq War at its start" because the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement had been dutifully carried out by both Republican and Democratic leaders. President Bush's case against Saddam was really President Clinton's case against Saddam, which faithfully followed President HW Bush's case against Saddam. The governing procedure for Bush's decision for Operation Iraqi Freedom was established by Congress and Clinton's decision for Operation Desert Fox per Public Law 102-1 (102-190) pursuant to UNSCR 678.
The Democrats' partisanship was brazen. To oppose President Bush's UNSCR 678 enforcement, Democrats adopted the specious propaganda that Saddam's accomplices had leveled a short while ago against President Clinton's UNSCR 678 enforcement. If Democrats had not validated and propagated the prevailing false narrative of OIF, it would not have metastasized like it has in our politics and policy.
Democrats bear the most blame, but Republicans bear blame, too. Bush officials, other Republican leaders, and Republican pundits should have been indefatigable about actively seeking out and discrediting anti-US, anti-OIF propaganda across the political arena. President Bush's decision on Iraq demonstrably was correct. OIF's defining law and facts are incontrovertible and clearly on Bush's side. Applying OIF's primary sources to set the record straight should have been a constant top priority for Republicans.
Instead, the Bush administration pushed back some, but not nearly enough. Worse, many Republicans became effectively useful idiots by adapting enemy propaganda into their own conception of the Iraq issue.
Abe Greenwald:
The United States made many mistakes in Iraq...
Sure, but "mistakes" are expected in the normal course of competition. Setback to an initial plan and response with adjustment is normal for any kind of real contest, including maximal contests of war and peace versus vicious initially underestimated opponents like Saddamists. In US military history, victory has often developed from failure, oftentimes disasters. The insurgency setback and COIN adjustment in OIF matched a normal competitive pattern.
In contrast, the standard of preemptive perfection that critics apply to OIF is abnormal for competition. Normalizing the standard of preemptive perfection that critics apply to OIF fundamentally restricts the US capacity to compete for real in the international arena.
That being said, President Obama's course-changing mistake of prematurely ending OIF was abnormal for competition.
Abe Greenwald:
...from our bad intelligence on Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction...
It wasn't that bad. While the intelligence estimates were predictively imprecise, the ex post Iraq Survey Group findings show that the "bad" intelligence nonetheless correctly indicated that the Saddam regime did have an active WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687. The ISG findings are rife with UNSCR 687 WMD violations.
To clarify, see the exposition and sample of ISG excerpts in the OIF FAQ retrospective #duelferreport section.
Abe Greenwald:
...to our misguided de-Baathification policy, which birthed the insurgency.
The de-Ba'athification policy did not birth the insurgency. Saddamists birthed the insurgency by converting their genocidal terrorist governance of Saddam's Iraq and world-leading "regional and global terrorism" (Iraqi Perspectives Project) to their terrorist insurgency against post-Saddam Iraq.
The de-Ba'athification policy was not "misguided". It manifested the UNSCR 688 mandate and the US law and policy that enforced UNSCR 688 since 1991. It was promised and needed to move Iraqi society past Saddam's extreme UNSCR 688 human rights violations, which he didn't carry out by himself.
The de-Ba'athification did have to be recalibrated due to the competing demands of reconciliation for the sake of functioning society versus the mandated justice for Saddam's UNSCR 688 human rights violations that turned out to be "far worse" (UNCHR) than we anticipated. But the adjustments were made.
I hope my comments help clarify the Iraq issue. I look forward to your feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Shadi Hamid]
date: Apr 18, 2024, 3:46 AM
subject: Comment on Shadi Hamid's answer to "What is the most important lesson of the Iraq War?" (Washington Examiner, 17MAR23)
Dr. Hamid,
I clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ by reinstating the primary sources that define OIF's justification to correct the conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.
For the 21st anniversary of OIF, I recently completed my Review of the American Enterprise Institute's "The Iraq War Series 20 Years Later", which I invite you to review. In the same vein, I'm completing my Review of Washington Examiner symposium "What is the most important lesson of the Iraq War?" that I started during the 20th anniversary of OIF. Your answer is next.
Shadi Hamid:
To most Americans today, the stupidity, immorality, and destructiveness of the Iraq War seem almost too obvious. It goes without saying, so we’ve stopped saying it.
... As a sophomore in college, I was energized by the anti-war movement. In some ways, it was the first movement that I ever truly felt part of. ... I thought the war was stupid and deeply destructive.
... As a sophomore in college, I was energized by the anti-war movement. In some ways, it was the first movement that I ever truly felt part of. ... I thought the war was stupid and deeply destructive.
"It goes without saying" that "most Americans" have been tricked by a false narrative of OIF. When the Iraq issue is realigned with the law and facts that define it, the false narrative fabricating the "stupidity, immorality...of the Iraq War" is "too obvious". The Iraq intervention pursuant to UNSCR 678 was neither stupid nor immoral. Properly understood, OIF was correctly decided, necessary, principled, and essential to uphold liberal international order.
The contest for post-Saddam Iraq was "deeply destructive", but that wasn't the fault of the UNSCR 678 enforcers for whom the humanitarian reconstruction of Iraq was mandated by law pursuant to UNSCR 688. The cause of the trauma suffered by post-Saddam Iraq was the same as the cause of the trauma suffered by Saddam's Iraq: the Saddamists who caused the "systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror" (UNCHR, 19APR02) and "The predominant targets of Iraqi state terror operations were Iraqi citizens, both inside and outside of Iraq" (Iraqi Perspectives Project). The Saddamist terrorist insurgency was converted from Saddam's genocidal terrorist governance.
It was stupid and immoral of you "as a sophomore in college" to be "energized by the anti-war movement" that encouraged Saddam to keep Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) on disarmament, terrorism, aggression, and human rights in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) for casus belli and then undermined the UNSCR 1483 peace operations fighting to protect the Iraqi people from the Saddamist insurgency inflicting terror and mass murder on the Iraqi people like the Saddamists had ruled Iraq. A college sophomore swept up in "the first movement that [you] ever truly felt part of" has the excuse of youthful ardor and ignorance. That excuse doesn't hold water for a political science PhD.
The "deeply destructive" toll suffered by post-Saddam Iraq and the UNSCR 678 coalition upholds President Bush and Prime Minister Blair's decision on Iraq because the toll reflects the revealed severity of the Saddam problem. The post-war struggle was like a surgeon planning to treat a stage II, possibly III, cancer only to get inside the patient and find a vicious stage IV cancer. The regime change exposed that Saddam's corruption of Iraqi society was "far worse" (UNCHR) than outsiders, including Iraqi expats, had anticipated. It exposed that Saddam's Iraq had festered over the period that the Gulf War was suspended. It exposed how severely we had underestimated Saddam's UNSCR 687 terrorism and UNSCR 688 human rights violations, which would have only worsened the longer that the Saddam regime was allowed to breach the Gulf War ceasefire.
Shadi Hamid:
A clear congressional majority voted to authorize military force, including 29 of 50 Senate Democrats. Much of the public, also cutting across party lines, supported the invasion to one degree or another, reaching a high of over 70% in March 2003. Today, many voters long for “bipartisan consensus,” but the Iraq War, 20 years on, should remind them that consensus is overrated.
The bipartisan consensus on Iraq was due to that President Bush's case and procedure for Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" with UNSCR 1441 reiterated President Clinton's case and procedure for "Iraq has abused its final chance" (Clinton, 16DEC98) with UNSCRs 1154, 1194, and 1205. The Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement that began in 1991 had reached its culmination point by 2000-2001. The 2002 AUMF shows that the law and policy basis for Operation Iraqi Freedom was not novel. It reiterated the operative set of law and policy that President Clinton and "Senate Democrats" had finished with Operation Desert Fox.
President Bush's UNSCR 678 enforcement entailed bipartisan consensus because Bush faithfully followed President Clinton's procedure pursuant to UNSCR 678. The 06MAR03 UNMOVIC Clusters document established casus belli for OIF just as the 15DEC98 UNSCOM Butler report had established casus belli for ODF. In order to turn on President Bush who was faithfully upholding the law and policy that they had developed under Clinton, the Democrats adopted the specious propaganda that Saddam's accomplices had leveled against President Clinton's UNSCR 678 enforcement.
Shadi Hamid:
But I also thought that George W. Bush was a good man, and I appreciated his belief that the United States, after propping up Arab authoritarian regimes for decades, could atone for its sins by putting (nonmilitary) pressure on those regimes to open up their political systems.This was the so-called Freedom Agenda. I sometimes joke that my ideal foreign policy would have been the Freedom Agenda minus the Iraq War.
President Bush was remarkably dutiful, principled, and resolute on Iraq and in his response to 9/11. To clarify, the US policy on Iraqi democratic reform was a UNSCR 688 enforcement measure that President Bush inherited with the UNSCR 678 enforcement. Therefore, it was an older policy than the Freedom Agenda, which was a post-9/11 innovation. The two policies neatly overlapped and are often conflated by experts, but they were distinct.
As a political science PhD, you ought to learn OIF's actual justification according to the law and facts that define it. Then, as a "columnist and member of the Editorial Board at The Washington Post", you ought to clarify the Iraq issue for the public. The OIF FAQ is purpose-designed to help you do that. I look forward to your feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Timothy Carney]
cc: [Max Markon]
date: Apr 19, 2024, 8:50 AM
subject: Comment on Timothy Carney's answer to "What is the most important lesson of the Iraq War?" (Washington Examiner, 17MAR23)
I clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ by correctively applying OIF's primary sources to the misinformation and misconceptions obfuscating the Iraq issue.
For the 21st anniversary of OIF, I recently completed my Review of the American Enterprise Institute's "The Iraq War Series 20 Years Later", which I invite you to review. Much of it is relevant to your Washington Examiner symposium answer. In the same vein, I'm completing my Review of Washington Examiner symposium "What is the most important lesson of the Iraq War?" that I started during the 20th anniversary of OIF. Your answer is next.
Timothy Carney:
An unwise federal program with overly ambitious goals proved a political disaster, failed expectations, and overran all cost estimates in terms of lives, time, and money.
... Here’s what should baffle us: The leading figures in the pro-war movement called themselves “conservatives.”
... Here’s what should baffle us: The leading figures in the pro-war movement called themselves “conservatives.”
It's not baffling that "the leading figures in the pro-war movement called themselves “conservatives”” since the priority of national security is a tenet for conservatives. Your criticism is libertarian, not conservative. In contrast to conservatives, libertarians generally dismiss modern national security interests and attendant US military applications as "an unwise federal program with overly ambitious goals [that] proved a political disaster, failed expectations, and overran all cost estimates in terms of lives, time, and money".
Timothy Carney:
Nor was it shocking that advocates of this massive central planning undertaking would vilify their opposition.
... The corollary lesson is this: Intolerance of dissent and debate on crucial decisions increases the odds of bad decision-making.
... Calling your debate counterparts “unpatriotic” and telling dissenters they will have blood on their hands is not the behavior of the intellectually humble.
... The corollary lesson is this: Intolerance of dissent and debate on crucial decisions increases the odds of bad decision-making.
... Calling your debate counterparts “unpatriotic” and telling dissenters they will have blood on their hands is not the behavior of the intellectually humble.
"Intolerance of dissent and debate" is a strawman. There was a flood of "dissent and debate" over the UNSCR 678 enforcement of Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) with the Gulf War ceasefire terms.
I can't speak to your experience with "calling your debate counterparts “unpatriotic” and telling dissenters they will have blood on their hands". In my experience, the "dissenters" were not "intellectually humble". Rather, their "opposition" was based on misinformation and misconceptions that could only "[increase] the odds of bad decision-making" if heeded, which came to pass with President Obama's strategic blunders.
Timothy Carney:
The main lesson of the Iraq War is one that every conservative should have already known: Dramatic changes to complex systems will yield unexpected results, most of which are bad.
Conservatives know that war is inherently about "dramatic changes to complex systems". The question is whether the "complex system" at bar, in this case the Saddam regime in "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire at Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), is "bad" enough to warrant "dramatic changes" at the risk of "unexpected results".
In the case of Saddam, the war question was answered in 1991. The Gulf War was only suspended, not ended, with a strictly conditioned ceasefire that was purpose-designed for "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687). Thereafter, the question of resuming the Gulf War with Iraq was answered with the diagnostic measurement of Iraq's unresolved Gulf War-established threat according to Iraq's compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441).
By 2002-2003, twelve years of Iraqi intransigence had exhausted the non-military and lesser military enforcement alternatives as Saddam kept pushing—"The Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council" (Iraq Survey Group). The UNSCR 678 enforcers were left with one way to “bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations” (Public Law 105-235). Iraq's failure to comply in its "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) answered the question of resuming the Gulf War: the Saddam regime confirmed it was "bad" enough.
Timothy Carney:
The war’s champions also rejected conservative lessons in how they conducted their case for the war and instead leaned on fearmongering. “Facing clear evidence of peril,” President George W. Bush said in 2002, “we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun, that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”
To clarify, see the OIF FAQ retrospective #nuclear section. “Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud" (Bush, 07OCT02) was not about invading Iraq. It was about the need for Iraq to be made compliant with the UNSCR 687 disarmament mandates, which Iraq should have done in 1991, let alone 2002. That being said, it was understood that the 2002-2003 iteration was Iraq's final chance to comply with the UNSCR 687 inspections, and the looming consequence was resumption of the Gulf War if Iraq again failed to prove it disarmed per UNSCR 687.
The statement wasn't "fearmongering". It reflected Saddam's track record with terrorism, nuclear arms, and other WMDs that informed the UNSCR 687 "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) in the first place. Subsequent fact findings confirmed Saddam's WMD and terrorism threats.
Timothy Carney:
Champions of the Iraq War believed they could depose a tyrant and be greeted as liberators.
The UNSCR 678 coalition was greeted as liberators by the Iraqi people. Though not by all Iraqis of course: The genocidal Saddamists who converted their terrorist rule of Iraq to their terrorist insurgency against Iraq were Iraqis too.
Timothy Carney:
They believed that by deploying the best and the brightest into the war-torn vacuum, they could build a liberal democracy where a Muslim dictatorship once stood.
As the 14APR23 AEI panel discussion, "The Iraq War Series: The Conduct of the War", highlights, "deploying the best and the brightest into the war-torn vacuum" was necessary because while most Iraqis wanted a liberal democratic replacement for Saddam's Iraq, they needed help to realize that aspiration by building it from the ground up.
In fact, Iraq's need for the help of our "best and the brightest" turned out to be greater than initially anticipated due to the Saddam tyranny's degradation of Iraq's own "best and the brightest".
Timothy Carney:
The Iraq War dragged on for years and years, like almost every other major government undertaking — just orders of magnitude costlier and deadlier.
The Iraq intervention was "orders of magnitude costlier and deadlier" than "almost every other major government undertaking" because it addressed the Saddam problem, which was "orders of magnitude costlier and deadlier" than other kinds of problems addressed by "almost every other major government undertaking".
It may have seemed to you like "the Iraq War dragged on for years and years", but in fact the OIF invasion at roughly two months and the anti-OIF insurgency at roughly four years were both wrapped up exceptionally quickly by historical standards.
As far as the nation-building timeframe, for context, Senator Daniel Moynihan famously said, “If you don't have 30 years to devote to social policy, don't get involved." Senator Moynihan was referring to specific reforms within the American political system; nonetheless, Moynihan's "30 years" is a useful rule of thumb for a minimum timeframe for nation-building.
Timothy Carney:
Nation-building in Iraq failed, like every prior utopian undertaking to reshape society in the image of those who think they know best.
The nation-building in Iraq was evidently succeeding relative to its nascent stage before President Obama undermined it by curtailing and then altogether removing the vital element of the OIF peace operations.
Excerpt from OIF FAQ post An irresponsible exit from Iraq:
In January 2009, President Bush handed President Obama a hard-won turnaround success in strategically critical Iraq to build upon. The US was fulfilling the principal objective of bringing Iraq into compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions stemming from UNSCR 660 (1990). Looking ahead from the COIN "Surge", post-Saddam Iraq was clearly headed the way of Germany, Japan, and South Korea as a key regional strategic partnership. In May 2011, at the dawn of the Arab Spring, Obama described the historic opportunity for peace in the Middle East where "Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress".
. . .
Building a nation to secure the peace does not happen faster than raising a child. Based on America's experience as leader of the free world, just the opening stage of building a nation even in relatively straightforward conducive conditions should normally and reasonably be expected to require a decade. See the World War 2 nation-building examples, where US military forces continue to serve in evolving roles, and more contemporary to Iraq, the peace operations with Kosovo and Afghanistan, which both pre-date OIF and are also ongoing. Indeed, long before OIF and the discovery that Saddam's rule was in fact "far worse" (UNCHR) than outsiders realized, the international community understood Iraq required comprehensive rebuilding on a generational scale. Yet despite normal nation-building expectations heightened by the particular challenges of Iraq, President Obama cut short the peace operations with Iraq at a severely premature 8 years. Imagine the consequences if the US had withdrawn peace operations from Europe and Asia in the late 1940s or early 1950s like the US pulled out of Iraq at the 8-year mark. President Obama should have stayed the course from President Bush like President Eisenhower stayed the course from President Truman. Instead, Obama fumbled away the possibility of a reliable, long-term American partner in Iraq with an astonishingly passive-aggressive approach to the SOFA negotiation.
. . .
Building a nation to secure the peace does not happen faster than raising a child. Based on America's experience as leader of the free world, just the opening stage of building a nation even in relatively straightforward conducive conditions should normally and reasonably be expected to require a decade. See the World War 2 nation-building examples, where US military forces continue to serve in evolving roles, and more contemporary to Iraq, the peace operations with Kosovo
Timothy Carney:
Conservatives also know that culture matters and that governments and other institutions need to grow organically in certain cultural settings. Yet a Republican administration tried to staple a Madisonian democracy onto a culture that lacked grounding in Judeo-Christian values, anglophone liberalism, Roman republicanism, and Greek democracy. That’s something you would do only if you saw humans as interchangeable bundles of rights and needs — which is not how conservatives view people.
In fact, the policy design of the OIF peace operations made sure that post-Saddam Iraq's development was organic with enough constructive assistance to counteract invasive destructive factors like the Saddamists and Iranians. See the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement.
Conservatives don't view the Saddam regime's "systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror" (UNCHR, 19APR02) as appropriate for the "rights and needs" of any people.
Conservatives further know that a key component of competitive American leadership since World War II has been staying to reform vanquished foes with nation-building diplomacy backstopped by US forces, including former enemies that hitherto "lacked grounding in Judeo-Christian values, anglophone liberalism, Roman republicanism, and Greek democracy". If anything, compared to our other modern experiences with nation-building and democratic reform, post-Saddam Iraq's nascent progress was ahead of expectation until President Obama contravened the SFA and radically changed Iraq's course.
Timothy Carney:
Conservatives are supposed to be averse to central planning, not because we like disorder or find something charming in the hodgepodge but because we believe central planning yields bad results. We believe that central planning yields bad results because knowledge is distributed and because power corrupts.
For post-Saddam Iraq, the "bad results" did not come from US "central planning". Rather, Iraq's nation-building and democratic progress has been retarded by the complementary Saddamist and Iranian interventions. When the COIN "surge" made Iraq a secure space against the Saddamist and Iranian interventions, Iraq's progress blossomed. Unfortunately, the constructive window was cut short when President Obama chose to strip away Iraq's secure space which depended on American protection.
Timothy Carney:
The lessons of the war — the need for humility, the centrality of culture, and the perils of dramatic changes to complex systems — were lessons no conservative should have had to learn.
The political lesson of Iraq is that readily correctable misinformation and misconceptions cannot be allowed to become the dominant political narrative, especially not when the foreign policy at stake is the defining international law enforcement of the post-Cold War whose success was essential to credit the threat and use of force at the deterrence base of American leadership of the free world.
The strategic lesson of Iraq is the need for the US military and other relevant US government agencies to be poised and able to do counterinsurgency at the highest level. From now on, COIN should always be ready right away, not just an emergency contingency. Our competitors need to know that the threat of insurgency is not an exploitable vulnerability of US deterrence.
The policy lesson of Iraq is that when the "complex system" in question is as "bad" as the noncompliant Saddam regime, regime change needs to happen soon, if not immediately, rather than later. Saddam should not have been allowed to breach the Gulf War ceasefire for so long while the Iraqi people suffered and Iraqi society festered.
The belated Iraqi regime change is why OIF "overran all cost estimates in terms of lives...and money". Pre-war analysts severely underestimated the progression of Saddam's extreme UNSCR 687 terrorism and UNSCR 688 human rights violations since 1991. That's why the initial post-war plan, calibrated to an outdated concept of Iraqi society, proved inadequate for the far worse-than-expected condition of Iraqi society and why the terrorist insurgency, preplanned by Saddamists, caught the UNSCR 678 coalition by surprise.
For more on the constructive "lessons of the war", see the OIF FAQ retrospective #americanprimacy section.
I look forward to your feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Brian Stewart]
date: Apr 19, 2024, 4:05 PM
subject: Comment on Brian Stewart's "Saddam Hussein was there too" (Washington Examiner, 17MAR23)
Mr. Stewart,
I clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ with OIF's primary sources to correct the false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome.
For the 21st anniversary of OIF, I recently completed my Review of the American Enterprise Institute's "The Iraq War Series 20 Years Later". I invite you to review it and your feedback. Since his book, Confronting Saddam Hussein, is the main basis of your article, I recommend my critical comments on Professor Leffler's remarks from the 27MAR23 AEI panel discussion, "The Iraq War Series: Operation Iraqi Freedom".
In the same vein, I'm completing my Review of Washington Examiner symposium "What is the most important lesson of the Iraq War?" that I started during the 20th anniversary of OIF. Your article, Saddam Hussein was there too, is next.
Before I state my critical comments on your article, you should know that I appreciate that most of it is consistent with the operative law and facts of the Iraq issue. That's exceptional. Kudos. Your article is ostensibly based on Professor Leffler's book, yet oddly, your work is more on point than his remarks in the 27MAR23 AEI panel discussion.
I have a critical recommendation for you at the end. Make sure to read it.
Brian Stewart:
In 1980, Saddam unleashed a bloody war with the Islamic Republic of Iran in which the U.S. supported both sides in the hope that both would lose.
My understanding is that the US helped Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War for the direct purpose of Iraq not losing to Iran. Fairly straightforward. Whereas the Iran-Contra scandal was a half-baked convoluted mess that was not directly purposed to help Iran against Iraq, though that's where the illicit arms would have gone. Did the US have other dealings with Iran that had the direct purpose of helping Iran to not lose to Iraq?
Brian Stewart:
Just across the border from coalition forces, Iraq crushed a Shiite rebellion in the south and another Kurdish rebellion in the north. In response, the U.S. and the United Kingdom, and initially France, instituted no-fly zones — without a U.N. mandate.
To clarify, the no-fly zones enforced the UNSCR 688 mandate. See the OIF FAQ retrospective #unscr688 section. The no-fly zones were implemented pursuant to UNSCR 688 with the standing UNSCR 678 authorization as a "necessary means to uphold and implement...all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 678) and "to take such further steps as may be required...to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687).
President HW Bush, 16APR91:
I can well appreciate that many Kurds have good reason to fear for their safety if they return to Iraq. And let me reassure them that adequate security will be provided at these temporary sites by U.S., British, and French air and ground forces, again consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 688. We are hopeful that others in the coalition will join this effort.
I want to underscore that all that we are doing is motivated by humanitarian concerns. We continue to expect the Government of Iraq not to interfere in any way with this latest relief effort. The prohibition against Iraqi fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft flying north of the 36th parallel thus remains in effect.
I want to underscore that all that we are doing is motivated by humanitarian concerns. We continue to expect the Government of Iraq not to interfere in any way with this latest relief effort. The prohibition against Iraqi fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft flying north of the 36th parallel thus remains in effect.
President HW Bush, 19JAN93:
Since my last report on November 16, 1992, Iraq has repeatedly ignored and violated its international obligations under U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Iraq's actions include the harassment of humanitarian relief operations in northern Iraq contrary to U.N. Security Council Resolution 688, violations of the Iraq-Kuwait demilitarized zone, interference with U.N. operations in violation of Security Council Resolution 687, repeated violations by Iraqi aircraft of the southern and northern no-fly zones, and threats by Iraq's air defense forces against Coalition aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones.
The southern no-fly zone and Operation Southern Watch were established in August 1992 to assist the monitoring of Iraq's compliance with Security Council Resolution 688. Since that time, Iraq has stopped aerial bombardments of its citizens in and around the southern marsh areas and ceased large-scale military operations south of the 32nd parallel. Operation Southern Watch cannot detect lower-level acts of oppression, however.
The southern no-fly zone and Operation Southern Watch were established in August 1992 to assist the monitoring of Iraq's compliance with Security Council Resolution 688. Since that time, Iraq has stopped aerial bombardments of its citizens in and around the southern marsh areas and ceased large-scale military operations south of the 32nd parallel. Operation Southern Watch cannot detect lower-level acts of oppression, however.
Brian Stewart:
Having survived another skirmish with American power and without intrusive inspectors to contend with, Baghdad sought, with French and Russian collusion, to break free of sanctions and reconstitute its WMD programs.
Further evidence that Saddam firmly rejected compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire mandates, including Iraq's UNSCR 687 disarmament obligations, is his summary nullification of the UNSCR 660-series resolutions in Iraqi law.
Excerpt from the Iraq Survey Group via the OIF FAQ retrospective #duelferreport section:
• According to ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud, on the second day of Desert Fox, Saddam said, “[T]he cease-fire principle is over; the US broke the international law and attacked a country, which is a member in the UN.” He drafted a resolution which called for the RCC “to cancel all the international obligations and resolutions, which Iraq has agreed upon.” ‘Abd said that Saddam blamed the United States for attacking “Iraq without the UN permission, and [pulling] the inspectors out of Iraq.” As a result, “Iraq [had] the right to cancel all these resolutions to get rid of the sanction which was imposed for more than seven years.”
• The RCC resolution formally ended all Iraqi agreements to abide by UN resolutions. Ahmad Husayn Khudayr recalled that Saddam’s text ordered Iraq to reject every Security Council decision taken since the 1991 Gulf war, including UNSCR 687. Ahmad said the resolution was worded in careful legal terms and “denied all the previously accepted [resolutions] without any remaining trace of them [in the Iraqi Government].”
• The RCC resolution formally ended all Iraqi agreements to abide by UN resolutions. Ahmad Husayn Khudayr recalled that Saddam’s text ordered Iraq to reject every Security Council decision taken since the 1991 Gulf war, including UNSCR 687. Ahmad said the resolution was worded in careful legal terms and “denied all the previously accepted [resolutions] without any remaining trace of them [in the Iraqi Government].”
Brian Stewart:
Regime change, though implemented by President George W. Bush, had become U.S. policy during the Clinton administration.
To clarify, Iraqi regime change became US policy during the HW Bush administration by May 1991 at the latest. It was carried forward by the Clinton administration. Congress merely codified the long active executive policy during the Clinton administration with Public Law 105-338, the "Iraq Liberation Act".
Take note of section 7 of Public Law 105-338, which was reiterated in section 4 of Public Law 107-243.
Brian Stewart:
In 1998, a series of deliberate Iraqi provocations — challenging Anglo-American no-fly zones, evicting U.N. weapons inspectors, and abetting international terrorism — prompted Congress to pass the Iraq Liberation Act, which proclaimed that U.S. policy was “to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government.”
Not just Public Law 105-338. The Iraq Liberation Act joined Public Law 105-235, "Iraqi Breach of International Obligations". Of the two 1998 Congressional directives, the two-month-older Public Law 105-235 and its instruction to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" was the more-significant milestone in the nearing culmination of the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement.
Brian Stewart:
Less than three years later came 9/11. Al Qaeda’s brazen attack did nothing to allay fears about the special nexus of dangers presented by Saddam, not least because the Iraqi despot was the only world leader to praise the jihadi operation. The atrocity would loom large in Washington’s revised security assessments, making America’s most convenient enemy look more and more like an intolerable one. This was not because Saddam had a hand in that deed of terror (he did not) but rather that he personified the culture of autocracy and radicalism from which it had sprung. Beyond al Qaeda, which would be decimated in the Hindu Kush, Iraq appeared to be the most likely conduit of a future attack, especially one conducted with unconventional weapons.
We know now that Saddam's causal relationship with the al Qaeda threat was more substantial than "he personified the culture of autocracy and radicalism from which it had sprung". Excerpt from my Critique of the Iraq-related portions of Miller Center's revised "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs":
The 9-11 Commission describes the sundry reasons that counterterrorism policy was inadequate prior to the 9/11 attacks despite the threat assessment. Relevant to Iraq, one reason that "neutralize bin Laden" was not a singular priority for counterterrorism officials is they understood that neutralizing bin Laden could not by itself solve the terrorist threat.
The pre-9/11 understanding was corroborated by the post-war Iraqi Perspectives Project investigation that revealed the pre-war analysis significantly underestimated Saddam's terrorism. IPP found that Saddam and bin Laden's respective terrorist "cartels" "increased the aggregate terror threat" by "seeking and developing supporters from the same demographic pool". More, "the Saddam regime regarded inspiring, sponsoring, directing, and executing acts of terrorism as an element of state power", "the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda", and "Saddam’s use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime" (IPP).
In effect, bin Laden's terrorists were simultaneously Saddam's terrorists. The dramatic growth of bin Laden's terrorist threat largely owed to its "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with Saddam's state-level development of the "same demographic pool" (IPP) that supplied al Qaeda.
We know now that Saddam's illicit investments in "regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations" (IPP) and "conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs" (Iraq Survey Group) were escalating with his victory over the UN sanctions.
Albeit bin Laden was "considered a threat to homeland security", "neutraliz[ing] bin Laden prior 9/11 [sic]" would not have solved the "aggregate terror threat" (IPP) as long as the Saddam regime remained in power and noncompliant with paragraph 32 of UNSCR 687.
The pre-9/11 understanding was corroborated by the post-war Iraqi Perspectives Project investigation that revealed the pre-war analysis significantly underestimated Saddam's terrorism. IPP found that Saddam and bin Laden's respective terrorist "cartels" "increased the aggregate terror threat" by "seeking and developing supporters from the same demographic pool". More, "the Saddam regime regarded inspiring, sponsoring, directing, and executing acts of terrorism as an element of state power", "the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda", and "Saddam’s use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime" (IPP).
In effect, bin Laden's terrorists were simultaneously Saddam's terrorists. The dramatic growth of bin Laden's terrorist threat largely owed to its "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with Saddam's state-level development of the "same demographic pool" (IPP) that supplied al Qaeda.
We know now that Saddam's illicit investments in "regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations" (IPP) and "conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs" (Iraq Survey Group) were escalating with his victory over the UN sanctions.
Albeit bin Laden was "considered a threat to homeland security", "neutraliz[ing] bin Laden prior 9/11 [sic]" would not have solved the "aggregate terror threat" (IPP) as long as the Saddam regime remained in power and noncompliant with paragraph 32 of UNSCR 687.
Brian Stewart:
Despite the ambivalent evidence about the condition of Iraq’s arsenal...
... The fact that no stockpiles of WMD were ever found would be cited ad nauseam by the anti-war faction as proof that a false pretext had been used to justify the invasion. But the covert weapons programs were latent, and anyway, the absence of stockpiles was not the same as an absence of intent.
... The fact that no stockpiles of WMD were ever found would be cited ad nauseam by the anti-war faction as proof that a false pretext had been used to justify the invasion. But the covert weapons programs were latent, and anyway, the absence of stockpiles was not the same as an absence of intent.
To clarify, the common international belief in Saddam's stockpiles was not based on the "ambivalent evidence" independently gathered by national intelligence agencies, but rather on the common international determinative UNSCOM/UNMOVIC record, which was openly cited in the intelligence assessments. For example, "UNSCOM considered that the evidence was insufficient to support Iraq’s statements on the quantity of anthrax destroyed and where or when it was destroyed", "UNMOVIC has credible information that the total quantity of BW agent in bombs, warheads and in bulk at the time of the Gulf War was 7,000 litres more than declared by Iraq", and "With respect to stockpiles of bulk agent stated to have been destroyed, there is evidence to suggest that these was [sic] not destroyed as declared by Iraq" (UNMOVIC Clusters document).
"The fact that no stockpiles of WMD were ever found" is incorrect. Don't overlook the chemical stocks confiscated by the CIA's Operation Avarice, which corroborate the caveat, "ISG cannot discount the possibility that a few large caches of munitions remain to be discovered within Iraq" (ISG).
The fact is that we don't know what happened to Saddam's stockpiles beyond Operation Avarice since the Saddam regime never accounted for them with UNSCOM/UNMOVIC per UNSCR 687, and the Iraq Survey Group was unable to account for them per UNSCR 687 due to the denial of evidence by Iraq's non-pareil "denial and deception operations" (ISG). Of note, Iraqi counter-intelligence rid much of the evidence after the regime change. As such, ISG reported, "With the degradation of the Iraqi infrastructure and dispersal of personnel...ISG cannot determine the fate of Iraq’s [biological] stocks...There is a very limited chance that continuing investigation may provide evidence to resolve this issue." Regarding the missing chemical stocks, "ISG investigation, however, was hampered by several factors beyond our control. The scale and complexity of Iraqi munitions handling, storage, and weapons markings, and extensive looting and destruction at military facilities during OIF significantly limited the number of munitions that ISG was able to thoroughly inspect."
Regarding "the covert weapons programs were latent", ISG confirmed Saddam's WMD intent, and the evidence clearly shows an active Iraqi WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687. However, the same "denial and deception operations" (UNSCR 1441) that prevented a reliable account of Saddam's stockpiles also prevented a reliable assessment of how active or "latent" Iraq's WMD program was beyond the floor set by ISG's findings. ISG reported evidence of WMD activity beyond the floor that ISG was unable to definitively confirm.
Brian Stewart:
..it strained credulity to conclude that the Baathist regime was entitled to the benefit of the doubt.
More significant than that, the governing procedure for the Gulf War ceasefire disarmament process placed the burden on Iraq to prove it disarmed per UNSCR 687. Giving Saddam the benefit of the doubt would have contradicted the UNSCR 687 "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441).
Hans Blix, 27JAN03:
The substantive cooperation required relates above all to the obligation of Iraq to declare all programmes of weapons of mass destruction and either to present items and activities for elimination or else to provide evidence supporting the conclusion that nothing proscribed remains.
Paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002) states that this cooperation shall be "active". It is not enough to open doors. Inspection is not a game of "catch as catch can".
Paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002) states that this cooperation shall be "active". It is not enough to open doors. Inspection is not a game of "catch as catch can".
UNMOVIC Cluster[s] document, 06MAR03:
UNMOVIC must verify the absence of any new activities or proscribed items, new or retained. The onus is clearly on Iraq to provide the requisite information or devise other ways in which UNMOVIC can gain confidence that Iraq’s declarations are correct and comprehensive.
I clarify the UNSCR 687 disarmament procedure at the OIF FAQ answer to "Did Bush allow enough time for the inspections".
Brian Stewart:
Although this lethal arsenal, actual and potential, served as the centerpiece in the public case for war, a host of reasons were cited in the authorization of the use of military force. In October 2002, both houses of Congress passed 23 writs justifying war in Iraq, an update of Clinton’s 1998 Iraq Liberation Act.
Again, between Public Law 105-338, the Iraq Liberation Act, and Public Law 105-235, Iraqi Breach of International Obligations, the latter was the more significant 1998 Congressional directive. That being said, they weren't either, or. The two laws worked as a set.
It's important to clarify that Public Law 107-243 was not novel. The bundle of "23 writs justifying war" for Operation Iraqi Freedom reiterated and updated the operative set of law and policy in the UNSCR 678, Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement that had defined Operation Desert Fox, the direct precedent for OIF.
It's also important to clarify that the UNSCR 687 WMD disarmament was only the first step to “bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations” (Public Law 105-235). Iraq was always obligated to comply with all of its Gulf War ceasefire obligations in order to switch off the UNSCR 678 enforcement, not just paragraphs 8 to 13 of UNSCR 687: "it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced, including through the use of force if necessary" (Public Law 107-243).
In the end, Saddam never came close to taking even the first step of fulfilling Iraq's manifold Gulf War ceasefire obligations.
Brian Stewart:
On the sensitive matter of Saddam’s arsenal, Leffler pointed out that not even the Bush administration’s most pugnacious policymakers conceived of it as an immediate threat to the U.S. or its interests. Rather than being the imminent danger that overzealous advocates of regime change alleged, Iraq’s pursuit of weapons with deterrent power presented a looming peril that was inextricably connected to the character of its regime and would therefore remain in place until it was removed.
Indeed, the Bush administration's case against Saddam pointedly did not characterize an "immediate" or "imminent" threat. Rather, Iraq's evidential UNSCR 687 WMD violations were characterized as a "grave and gathering" threat.
It's important to clarify that the "imminent" threat standard in the Caroline test was designed for conventional military threats, like the Cuban Missile Crisis. Whereas Saddam's WMD threat was combined with his terrorism threat, which the "imminent" threat standard of the Caroline test was not designed for.
A consequence of 9/11 was that the counter-terrorism standard was applied to the combined threat of Iraq's UNSCR 687 WMD and terrorism violations. Counter-terrorism, unlike conventional military response, is intrinsically preventive and therefore does not apply the "imminent" threat standard.
It's also worth noting that the policy basis for the post-9/11 threat assessment of Iraq was not novel. It actually followed Clinton policy. In fact, neither of President Bush's Iraq and counter-terrorism policies were original. See the OIF FAQ answer to "Why did Bush leave the ‘containment’ (status quo)".
Brian Stewart:
In this light, perhaps the best answer to the question “Why invade Iraq?” seemed to be: What if we don’t? A sober analysis of this lingering confrontation reminds us that indecisiveness in international affairs can be the most enfeebling of sins. The principal architects of the war in Iraq, acutely aware of past calamities and convulsed by anxious foresight, recognized that diplomacy has a limit, as much as does force.
See the OIF FAQ answer to "Why did resolution of the Saddam problem require a threat of regime change" and the OIF FAQ answer to "Did Iraq failing its compliance test justify the regime change".
The short answer to "Why invade Iraq" is that the UNSCR 678 enforcers were not permitted by their law and policy on Iraq to let Saddam break free of the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) that was purpose-designed for "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687).
By 2002, the UNSCR 678 enforcement alternatives were used up. The sanctions failed after the Oil for Food Program started in 1996 and was quickly corrupted. The diplomatic ceasefire compliance process failed with UNSCOM's death in 1998. Saddam brushed off the penultimate military enforcement measure, the ODF bombing campaign, in 1998. The sanctions-based ad hoc post-ODF 'containment' failed by 2000-2001, if it ever worked at all. That left the incoming President with resumption of the Gulf War as the last remaining enforcement measure.
In 2002, President Bush leveraged America's international power to resurrect the diplomatic ceasefire compliance process that had died four years earlier. But Saddam killed it again by calling our bluff and failing Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441)—"the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" (ISG).
So at the decision point in March 2003, the choice was binary: either effectively let Saddam break free of the Gulf War ceasefire or resume the Gulf War.
"What if we don't": For President Bush, that choice wasn't allowed—the US law and policy on Iraq did not permit letting Saddam break free of Iraq's Gulf War ceasefire obligations. That left the UNSCR 678 enforcers with one choice at the decision point in March 2003: Operation Iraqi Freedom in order to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235) by the "use of all necessary means" (Public Law 102-190).
Brian Stewart:
Two decades later, the Iraq War is still here, still at the center of our conceptions of interventionism and internationalism, still demanding, insatiably, to be dealt with. The buyer’s remorse that settled upon this war so soon after America struck into Iraq was a dishonorable compulsion to abandon an earnest and solemn commitment. But it also fostered a parochial vision of American power and purpose in the world that continues to work its distortions on the public understanding of statecraft in an age of gathering challenges to world order.
Yes, it's imperative to eradicate the degenerative Iraq Syndrome. The necessary first, basic step of eradicating the Iraq Syndrome is discrediting the patently false narrative that it's based on and clarifying OIF's justification at the premise level of our politics and policy.
For that purpose, here's my critical recommendation to you: Your article is thematically solid, but it's politically insufficient because it's woefully short of specific citations of the controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts that define OIF's justification.
Why does that matter?
Because the prevailing false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome is propagated by an overwhelming "expert consensus". It's impossible for you to overcome it with only your personal expert authority. In a subjective contest of expert consensus versus expert outlier, you lose—No contest. The only way for you to beat the mob is to make the political contest objective by projecting the superior and fundamental primary source authority of OIF's defining law and facts over the mob's inferior secondary expert authority.
That requires you to re-lay a proper foundation for the public by the numbers in order to establish a foundational, definitional, objective standard whereon every expert, no matter their rank, either credibly accords with the operative law and facts or else has misinformed the public contra the operative law and facts: correct or incorrect. Fundamentally reframe the discourse on Iraq with OIF's primary sources, and you'll be able to beat the "expert consensus" to eradicate the Iraq Syndrome.
The OIF FAQ is purpose-designed to teach you how to do the substantive part so you can do the political part. See the OIF FAQ guide. I look forward to your feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Quin Hillyer]
date: Mar 19, 2023, 11:42 PM
subject: 20th anniversary of OIF: Quin Hillyer review Re: Well, here it is already, Eric: Fwd: Your Digital magazine is here
Mr. Hillyer,
Mindful of your follow-up article and hoping more opportunities arise to clarify the Iraq issue, I'll give https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/politics/what-we-got-right-in-iraq the standard critical treatment here. I'll look at the rest of the WE symposium piecemeal over the next few days.
Before I review your work, two more reactions to your Friday, March 17th e-mail:
One: I haven't looked at Brian Stewart's piece yet, but your description "without the specific citations of resolutions by number, etc., but thematically it is really solid" raises a red flag. It reminds me of my criticism of Christopher Hitchens's argument versus Jon Stewart. Like your praise of Brian Stewart, Hitchens's Daily Show appearance is widely praised because he upheld essential principles which also underlie the Gulf War ceasefire mandates. However, Hitchens presented them as a personal opinion in general terms. He thereby failed to correct [Jon] Stewart's specious argument or clarify OIF's justification for the public. To definitively discredit [Jon] Stewart and clarify OIF's justification, Hitchens should have hewed to the long record and legally mandated, specifically defined governing structure of the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement that codified those same principles.
Did Brian Stewart's citation shortfall make him repeat Hitchens's fundamental error? You tell me, and I'll see for myself.
Two: Why is "but for some reason Lake seems to not acknowledge enough of the successes"? Based on his characterization of ISG's findings, the reason is Lake hasn't done his homework, like a HS student who fakes it with CliffsNotes (or a law student who relies on https://www.oyez.org/) in lieu of reading the assigned material. Someone who knows the subject matter can recognize the telltales of a shortcut, like you did.
Now, my review of your What we got right in Iraq:
I understand I may be criticizing editor-imposed changes, including choices forced by the word count. That doesn't affect the substantive value of the criticism for the sake of the mission moving forward.
Which leads to my top criticism: the lack of source quotes and citations throughout the article. I'll blame that on the word count. Nonetheless, keep in mind that the OIF FAQ is purposely source quote and citation-heavy to serve as a cheat sheet.
Reminder: Your substantive advantage as an outlier versus the expert mob is that the law and facts are on your side, and they're incontrovertible. So pound them in the discourse. Force the fabulists to fight directly against the higher authority of the law and facts that they contradict rather than your expert assertion, despite knowing your assertion accurately characterizes the law and facts. Definitively discredit them and set the record straight.
Hillyer:
The next reason involved weapons of mass destruction: Saddam did maintain some stores of WMDs; he had not accounted for ones that had been degraded, secretly moved, hidden, or destroyed;
The UNMOVIC Clusters document cite-link makes sense. But I'm curious why you chose to cite-link the Jim Lacey article at "weapons of mass destruction". It's a useful article that does discuss Saddam's WMD, so that's okay, but Lacey's calling card as an Iraq expert is Saddam's terrorism. Which leads me to wonder why you didn't cite-link the Lacey article in your terrorism section. For that matter, I'm curious why you didn't cite-link the IPP report itself in the terrorism section.
Since you cited the OIF FAQ base post, you could have also cited the OIF FAQ retrospective survey post sections focused on the Iraq WMD, terrorism, and humanitarian issues. They're source quote and citation-heavy, too.
Hillyer:
and he had an ongoing (if impaired) program to reconstitute WMDs that he could soon ramp up if the already-tottering sanctions regime against him collapsed.
You should clarify that the "if the already-tottering sanctions regime against him collapsed" condition came to pass years before OIF. See the ISG findings and my exposition in the OIF FAQ answer to "Why did Bush leave the ‘containment’ (status quo)".
According to ISG, the sanctions regime de facto collapsed by 2000-2001. Before that, Saddam's WMD reconstitution program accelerated with spikes in 1997, consequent to the Oil For Food adjustment, and in 1999, consequent to the failures of UNSCOM and Operation Desert Fox.
As you said, we know Saddam had an ongoing program — ISG found a lot of evidence indicating an active WMD program. But those findings just set the floor.
How much did Saddam's WMD program reconstitute beyond that floor? ISG can guess but can't know. The UNSCOM, UNMOVIC, and ISG reports and the 2019 Army study on OIF emphasize that Iraqi counter-intelligence rid evidence practically unfettered through the UN inspections, OIF invasion, and OIF peace operations, even in the midst of the ISG investigation itself. Moreover, ISG warned of serious limitations to its investigation apart from the Iraqi "concealment and deception activities" (ISG). That ISG found as much WMD evidence as it did, as handicapped as it was, suggests that Saddam's WMD reconstitution program was greater than anyone has speculated.
At minimum, ISG's findings show Saddam had ready terrorism-level bio and chem capabilities hidden in the IIS, along with ready capability to ramp up BW and CW production. IIS also managed Saddam's "regional and global terrorism" (IPP), which included "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with al Qaeda. Of course, the distinctive WMD-terrorism combination threat that manifested in the IIS was prominent in the basic formulation of UNSCR 687 and President Clinton's warnings and policy on Iraq and a primary concern that spurred the urgency to resolve Iraq's mandated compliance following 9/11.
Hillyer:
Then there was terrorism, obviously a preeminent concern after the attacks of 9/11. While Saddam didn’t instigate 9/11, his regime deliberately harbored and sometimes actively abetted dangerous terrorists such as Abu Musab al Zarqawi, Ramzi Yousef, and Abu Nidal, provided payments to the families of terrorists, and sponsored a terrorism training center at Salman Pak, near Baghdad.
When you say "While Saddam didn’t instigate 9/11", you should clarify that the case against Saddam pointedly did not hold Saddam culpable for the 9/11 attacks. I clarify the link between 9/11 and OIF here.
I'm curious about your choices to describe Saddam's terrorism. For comparison, this excerpt is from my Critique of the Iraq-related portions of Miller Center's revised "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs":
IPP found that Saddam and bin Laden's respective terrorist "cartels" "increased the aggregate terror threat" by "seeking and developing supporters from the same demographic pool". More, "the Saddam regime regarded inspiring, sponsoring, directing, and executing acts of terrorism as an element of state power", "the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda", and "Saddam’s use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime" (IPP).
In effect, bin Laden's terrorists were simultaneously Saddam's terrorists. The dramatic growth of bin Laden's terrorist threat largely owed to its "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with Saddam's state-level development of the "same demographic pool" (IPP) that supplied al Qaeda.
In effect, bin Laden's terrorists were simultaneously Saddam's terrorists. The dramatic growth of bin Laden's terrorist threat largely owed to its "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with Saddam's state-level development of the "same demographic pool" (IPP) that supplied al Qaeda.
I'm not saying your descriptive choices are wrong. I'm just curious about them since the IPP findings provide a lot to choose from.
Hillyer:
Because of Saddam’s nexus to and material support for terrorism, not including 9/11, it is false revisionism to deny that the war in Iraq, in addition to its other rationales, was anything other than part and parcel of the free world’s mobilization against international terrorism.
You should clarify, as I do in my Miller Center critique, that the 9/11 mandate was not limited to reprisal against the 9/11 perpetrators. The 9/11 mandate had a broader counterterrorism mandate that encompassed Saddam's terrorism. Excerpt:
...the US mandate induced by 9/11 set immediate and broader objectives "to determine the scope of the military response to 9/11".
"Bush initially ruled out expanding the war to Iraq" is consistent with the immediate objective to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he [the President] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001" (P.L. 107-40).
At the same time, "Some of his advisors argued for broad military action in both Afghanistan and Iraq" is consistent with the broader objective to "deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States" (P.L. 107-40), which encompassed Saddam's terrorist threat:
At the same time, UNSCR 687, which of course pre-dated 9/11 by a decade, already included a terrorism mandate. So, while Saddam's terrorism did have "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with al Qaeda, the terrorism element of the case against Saddam under both the 9/11 mandate and the Gulf War ceasefire was never related to culpability in the 9/11 attacks."Bush initially ruled out expanding the war to Iraq" is consistent with the immediate objective to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he [the President] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001" (P.L. 107-40).
At the same time, "Some of his advisors argued for broad military action in both Afghanistan and Iraq" is consistent with the broader objective to "deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States" (P.L. 107-40), which encompassed Saddam's terrorist threat:
In the period after the 1991 Gulf War, the regime of Saddam Hussein supported a complex and increasingly disparate mix of pan-Arab revolutionary causes and emerging pan-Islamic radical movements ... many terrorist movements and Saddam found a common enemy in the United States. At times these organizations worked together, trading access for capability. [IPP]
Hillyer:
Iraq was entering a humanitarian crisis, largely due to Saddam’s own repression and partly due to the necessary international sanctions.
"entering"? Long before OIF, Iraq was known to be deep in a humanitarian crisis that was found to be "far worse" than believed outside Iraq. See this and this, excerpt:
UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, Andreas Mavrommatis, report on situation of human rights in Iraq, 2004:
The new evidence, particularly that of eyewitnesses, added another dimension to the systematic crimes of the former regime, revealing unparalleled cruelty, even in respect of the people being taken away for execution, and at the same time stories unfolded that were far worse than originally reported to the Special Rapporteur in the past.
Hillyer:
Meanwhile, historical experiences in Latin America, in South Africa, and in post-World War II Japan provided reasonable hope that ordered liberty could indeed take root in lands formerly unfamiliar with it.
Finally, Bush administration officials hoped that by making an example of Saddam, other rogue regimes would see his eviction as a deterrent and thus constrain their own worst instincts.
Finally, Bush administration officials hoped that by making an example of Saddam, other rogue regimes would see his eviction as a deterrent and thus constrain their own worst instincts.
You could, if not should, clarify that these 'hopes' were long-standing law and policy on Iraq that the Bush administration inherited from the HW Bush and Clinton administrations. Excerpt:
In 1991, at the dawn of the post-Cold War, the Gulf War ceasefire was invested with all the essential international norms, including strict aggression, disarmament, human rights, and terrorism-related mandates, and vital enforcement principles that were required to reify the aspirational "rules" of the post-Cold War world order.
Due to the historical context, threats and interests at stake, comprehensive spectrum of the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), model enforcement procedure, and US-led UN-based structure, the UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement was tantamount to the flagship and litmus test of the US-led post-Cold War liberal international order.
In other words, the resolution of Saddam's probation with Iraq's mandated compliance per the Gulf War ceasefire represented the primary test case for US-led international enforcement with a readily measured pass/fail gauge. The paradigmatic set of international norms that defined Iraq's ceasefire obligations was enforced with a clear UN-mandated compliance standard and a strict US-led compliance process. Iraq's mandated compliance set the gold standard for enforcing post-Cold War liberal international order, whereas Saddam's noncompliance risked a model failure for US-led enforcement of the liberal international order, a theme that permeated the US law and policy on Iraq through the HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations.
Under the avid scrutiny of our competitors, who were also Saddam's accomplices, the success or failure of American leadership to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L. 105-235) would reveal the real-world viability of the post-Cold War "Pax Americana" rule set and American leadership of the free world.
Due to the historical context, threats and interests at stake, comprehensive spectrum of the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), model enforcement procedure, and US-led UN-based structure, the UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement was tantamount to the flagship and litmus test of the US-led post-Cold War liberal international order.
In other words, the resolution of Saddam's probation with Iraq's mandated compliance per the Gulf War ceasefire represented the primary test case for US-led international enforcement with a readily measured pass/fail gauge. The paradigmatic set of international norms that defined Iraq's ceasefire obligations was enforced with a clear UN-mandated compliance standard and a strict US-led compliance process. Iraq's mandated compliance set the gold standard for enforcing post-Cold War liberal international order, whereas Saddam's noncompliance risked a model failure for US-led enforcement of the liberal international order, a theme that permeated the US law and policy on Iraq through the HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations.
Under the avid scrutiny of our competitors, who were also Saddam's accomplices, the success or failure of American leadership to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L. 105-235) would reveal the real-world viability of the post-Cold War "Pax Americana" rule set and American leadership of the free world.
Hillyer:
None of this is to deny that U.S. leaders made tragic mistakes in and about Iraq, some of which indubitably made both Iraq and the world objectively grimmer.
Again, word count, so maybe not in this article, but the "tragic mistakes" are worth reexamining. I don't know which ones you have in mind, but there's a good amount of misconception in that topic to clear up, too.
On Sat, Mar 18, 2023 at 1:17 AM [Eric LC] wrote:
Mr. Hillyer,
I'll figure it out and judge the symposium with the same standard as my corrective criticisms at https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/p/expanded-responses-leaders-pundits-media.html.
No matter pro- or anti-, the litmus test is objective: a commentator either credibly accords with the operative law and facts that define the Iraq issue or has misinformed the public contra the operative law and facts. A quick skim of https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/politics/what-is-the-most-important-lesson-of-the-iraq-war shows several members of the symposium are clueless about the operative law and facts. I had hoped you'd fix that.
Other members have a clue but evidently didn't do their homework. For example, it's apparent Eli Lake hasn't read the full ISG report:
Saddam’s defiance, the final report of U.S. weapons inspectors would conclude, was driven by his fear that Iran and his own population would topple his regime if the secret got out that he no longer possessed the weapons of mass destruction he pretended he had. It would have been nice had the CIA deciphered this strategy before the war. But its failure to read the Iraqi tyrant’s mind is not evidence of state deception, as so many critics of the war believe to this day.
I want to say to Lake what I said in my corrective criticism of President Bush's memoir:
Bush:
Bush answers his question by referring to Saddam's policy of bluffing Iran and Saddam wrongly evaluating the US-led threat of regime change. Which is correct, but incomplete.
A more complete answer is Saddam wouldn't prove he didn't have WMD to the UNSCR 1441 inspections because he couldn't — Iraq was in fact heavily violating the UNSCR 687 WMD mandates.
. . .
Bush's phrasing, "Saddam still had the infrastructure and know-how to make WMD," connotes a holdover quality. But ISG found more than retained Gulf War-vintage infrastructure and know-how, although that would have been sufficient by itself to violate UNSCR 687 and corroborate Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441). The chiefly sanctions-based 'containment' was de facto neutralized by 2000-2001, and "[a]s UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (ISG) even before UNSCOM failed in 1998 with "military reconstitution efforts starting in 1997" (ISG). ISG confirmed Saddam was applying the funds from the Oil For Food scandal to illicitly reconstitute a broad array of conventional arms, military infrastructure, and nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile research, development, and production capabilities with a "large covert procurement program" under cover of "denial and deception operations".
Saddam was bluffing, which by itself violated UNSCRs 687 and 1441 for casus belli. But Saddam wasn't only bluffing, and it's not clear how much he was bluffing. Iraq was hiding many UNSCR 687-proscribed items and activities, including IIS and production capabilities. When viewed with the operative lens of the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), the facts show Saddam was rearming. Due to the ISG investigation's practical limitations and evidentiary gaps that Bush doesn't acknowledge in Decision Points, the Iraq Survey Group can offer a guess, but ISG can't be sure about the fate of all Saddam's secret stores and the extent Iraq's WMD program was reconstituted. For example, the CW munitions missed by ISG and confiscated under Operation Avarice bore out ISG's caveat "ISG cannot discount the possibility that a few large caches of munitions remain to be discovered within Iraq."
If Saddam didn't have WMD, why wouldn't he just prove it to the inspectors?
...
Saddam still had the infrastructure and know-how to make WMD.
...
Saddam still had the infrastructure and know-how to make WMD.
Bush answers his question by referring to Saddam's policy of bluffing Iran and Saddam wrongly evaluating the US-led threat of regime change. Which is correct, but incomplete.
A more complete answer is Saddam wouldn't prove he didn't have WMD to the UNSCR 1441 inspections because he couldn't — Iraq was in fact heavily violating the UNSCR 687 WMD mandates.
. . .
Bush's phrasing, "Saddam still had the infrastructure and know-how to make WMD," connotes a holdover quality. But ISG found more than retained Gulf War-vintage infrastructure and know-how, although that would have been sufficient by itself to violate UNSCR 687 and corroborate Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441). The chiefly sanctions-based 'containment' was de facto neutralized by 2000-2001, and "[a]s UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (ISG) even before UNSCOM failed in 1998 with "military reconstitution efforts starting in 1997" (ISG). ISG confirmed Saddam was applying the funds from the Oil For Food scandal to illicitly reconstitute a broad array of conventional arms, military infrastructure, and nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile research, development, and production capabilities with a "large covert procurement program" under cover of "denial and deception operations".
Saddam was bluffing, which by itself violated UNSCRs 687 and 1441 for casus belli. But Saddam wasn't only bluffing, and it's not clear how much he was bluffing. Iraq was hiding many UNSCR 687-proscribed items and activities, including IIS and production capabilities. When viewed with the operative lens of the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), the facts show Saddam was rearming. Due to the ISG investigation's practical limitations and evidentiary gaps that Bush doesn't acknowledge in Decision Points, the Iraq Survey Group can offer a guess, but ISG can't be sure about the fate of all Saddam's secret stores and the extent Iraq's WMD program was reconstituted. For example, the CW munitions missed by ISG and confiscated under Operation Avarice bore out ISG's caveat "ISG cannot discount the possibility that a few large caches of munitions remain to be discovered within Iraq."
If Lake had done his homework, he wouldn't cite ISG to suggest the CIA should have "deciphered ... he [Saddam] no longer possessed the weapons of mass destruction he pretended he had" given that ISG findings indicate an active WMD program while ISG's non-findings are heavily qualified "unresolvable ambiguity" (David Kay).
from: [Eric LC]
to: [John Agresto]
cc: [Jack Miller Center]
date: Apr 20, 2024, 7:34 PM
subject: Comment on John Agresto's "What we got wrong in Iraq" (Washington Examiner, 17MAR23)
Dr. Agresto,
I clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ in order to establish the discourse that's needed for Americans to assimilate the essential corrective lessons of the Iraq intervention.
For the 21st anniversary of OIF, I recently completed my Review of the American Enterprise Institute's "The Iraq War Series 20 Years Later". I invite you to review it and your feedback. In particular, I recommend the AEI panel discussions on the Conduct of the War and The Aftermath which relate to your Washington Examiner article. In the same vein, I'm completing my Review of Washington Examiner symposium "What is the most important lesson of the Iraq War?" that I started during the 20th anniversary of OIF. Your article, What we got wrong in Iraq, is next.
First of all, I agree with you. Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #postwar section:
[The initial concept of the peace operations was to reduce forthwith the American military "footprint" on the ground following major combat operations. The post-war emphasis shifted to supporting civilian government agencies, international organizations, and non-government organizations for the "humanitarian reconstruction" work on the ground. The focus of the peace operations was enabling the diversity of Iraqi leaders, including the Iraqi National Congress, in the formation of a representative, human rights-upholding post-Saddam government in accordance with UNSCR 688.] In short, the peace operations were intended to have an international and Iraqi character and face enabled by American leadership and support.
However, despite the extensive pre-war planning, the initial US "humanitarian reconstruction" plan turned out to be inadequate because its keystone premise proved to be flawed.
The keystone premise was that security would follow upon political progress, and in fact, post-Saddam Iraq met its political benchmarks with the CPA. However, based upon that premise, the pre-war plans prioritized avoiding a traditional military-centered occupation. The initial military role in the nation-building aspect was largely limited to "secure access" and logistical support for the civilian-centered peace operations. In order to minimize the characteristics of a foreign military occupation of Iraq, the security strategy initially focused on standing up Iraqi security forces as fast as possible while the US-led coalition forces stood down and stepped back as soon as possible. But the assigned military support role for the peace operations and associated military attitude proved to be wrong for the immediate post-war needs of Iraq. As events quickly unfolded, a full-spectrum military-centered occupation proved to be necessary.
. . .
It's probable the nation-building infrastructure for the military-supported civilian-centered initial post-war plan would have adjusted to the needs of the mission given more time to evolve in a sufficiently secure setting, but analogous to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, our higher social, political, and economic aspirations for Iraq after Saddam wholly depended on first establishing the base of security and stability, followed by orderly governance, services, and economy. When the insurgents beat us to 1st base on security and stability, we lost the 'golden hour' and our first, best chance to take control of post-war Iraq. Security was the prerequisite for political progress, not as initially premised, the other way around. America's higher order aspirations and ambitious plans for Iraq couldn't work absent the base of security and stability.
However, despite the extensive pre-war planning, the initial US "humanitarian reconstruction" plan turned out to be inadequate because its keystone premise proved to be flawed.
The keystone premise was that security would follow upon political progress, and in fact, post-Saddam Iraq met its political benchmarks with the CPA. However, based upon that premise, the pre-war plans prioritized avoiding a traditional military-centered occupation. The initial military role in the nation-building aspect was largely limited to "secure access" and logistical support for the civilian-centered peace operations. In order to minimize the characteristics of a foreign military occupation of Iraq, the security strategy initially focused on standing up Iraqi security forces as fast as possible while the US-led coalition forces stood down and stepped back as soon as possible. But the assigned military support role for the peace operations and associated military attitude proved to be wrong for the immediate post-war needs of Iraq. As events quickly unfolded, a full-spectrum military-centered occupation proved to be necessary.
. . .
It's probable the nation-building infrastructure for the military-supported civilian-centered initial post-war plan would have adjusted to the needs of the mission given more time to evolve in a sufficiently secure setting, but analogous to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, our higher social, political, and economic aspirations for Iraq after Saddam wholly depended on first establishing the base of security and stability, followed by orderly governance, services, and economy. When the insurgents beat us to 1st base on security and stability, we lost the 'golden hour' and our first, best chance to take control of post-war Iraq. Security was the prerequisite for political progress, not as initially premised, the other way around. America's higher order aspirations and ambitious plans for Iraq couldn't work absent the base of security and stability.
Your article speaks to the core purpose of my OIF FAQ project. Everything you recount should translate into invaluable real-world lessons that upgrade fundamental elements of American leadership of the free world. But we cannot assimilate your vital lessons like we need to as long as the Iraq Syndrome is allowed to stigmatize them as the outgrowth of an outlier, mistake, or conspiracy, i.e., the aberrant fruit of a poisoned tree that's best forsworn, rather than critical areas for improvement.
To establish the discourse we need for the lessons of your article to become constructive, the OIF FAQ is designed to re-lay a proper foundation for the Iraq issue that corrects the false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome and clarifies the actual justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom with its defining law and facts.
In brief, the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement pursuant to UNSCR 678, established at the dawn of the post-Cold War, was by presidential design paradigmatic and baseline for post-Cold War US-led liberal international order. Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush understood that the law and policy pursuant to UNSCR 678 did not permit the US to allow Saddam to escape from Iraq's Gulf War ceasefire obligations, which were purpose-designed for "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687). By law, Iraq's standing threat was defined as Iraq's noncompliance with the Gulf War ceasefire mandates.
Yet by 2002, twelve years of Iraqi intransigence had eliminated the diplomatic and lesser military enforcement alternatives and broken the ad hoc 'containment' that followed Operation Desert Fox. Saddam, emboldened and aggressively noncompliant, had all but broken free of the Gulf War ceasefire—"The Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council" (Iraq Survey Group).
In 2003, the Iraqi regime change became necessary once Saddam chose to call our bluff and fail Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441)—"the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" (ISG). Saddam's ultimate choice to hold onto Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) caused the Gulf War to resume with Operation Iraqi Freedom in order to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235) by the "use of all necessary means" (Public Law 102-190).
The Gulf War was only suspended in 1991, so Iraqi regime change was always on the UNSCR 678 enforcement table if Saddam ultimately chose "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) instead of the ceasefire-mandated compliance. In that context, the US policy "to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime" and "support Iraq’s transition to democracy by providing immediate and substantial humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people...once the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power in Iraq" (Public Law 105-338) was implicit early on in President HW Bush's UNSCR 688 enforcement. The US policy on nation-building Iraq became explicit and codified law under President Clinton.
Here's where you come in.
The fundamental flaw of our Iraq compliance and nation-building policies is that they were undermined at the US government agency level culturally and schematically by the debilitating Vietnam Syndrome. Even worse, the Vietnam Syndrome was open knowledge around the world. Saddam's choice to breach the Gulf War ceasefire was based on the logical assumption that short of Iraq invading its neighbors with conventional military forces again, the Vietnam Syndrome would prevent Iraqi regime change by the US no matter what he did, which practically meant Saddam had all the room for error that he needed to defeat the US-led Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement.
The Vietnam Syndrome is the root cause of almost all the "mistakes" described in your article. At the Congressional and presidential level, the US law and policy on nation-building Iraq set a needed and principled Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People. But at the US government agency level, the culture of the Vietnam Syndrome had deeply corrupted the schema and processes that the US needed to effectuate the law and policy on nation-building Iraq in the non-permissive conditions that we didn't know that Saddam had created. Instead of self-curing the Vietnam Syndrome before OIF, the agency approach to nation-building Iraq was to work around the Vietnam Syndrome. The initial Defense and State pre-war humanitarian reconstruction plan boiled down to 'The US will oversee and facilitate, but international agencies (i.e., the UN) and the Iraqis themselves will take over as the center of gravity in the groundwork of nation-building Iraq'.
When the international agencies and Iraqis proved insufficient as the Saddamist insurgency blew up the initial post-war plan, the US agencies that had tried so hard to avoid traditional occupation duties in Iraq were suddenly thrust into the center of gravity against the vicious Saddamist insurgency while still addled by the Vietnam Syndrome. Your article describes manifested symptoms of the Vietnam Syndrome.
I anticipated, anxiously, what happened in Iraq based on my contemporary military service where I learned first-hand how deeply ingrained the Vietnam Syndrome was in the culture of the US Army. We boasted of our nation-building successes in Germany, Japan, and Korea, where the challenges dwarfed what we faced in Iraq. Peace operations were a core element of Army doctrine. Yet it was obvious to me that the institutional capabilities that laid the foundation for our Cold War success had been killed off by the Vietnam Syndrome. It worried me. So when the initial post-war plan failed in Iraq, I was disappointed but not surprised. It was a case of a years-old fear coming to pass.
Because I feared the Vietnam Syndrome and anticipated what you experienced in Iraq, I disagree with your article's sentiment that our "mistakes" in Iraq constitute a final judgement on American leadership. Rather, I view your experience in Iraq as a diagnostic baseline for a harsh, costly, and utterly vital learning curve that American leadership needed to go through in order to cure the Vietnam Syndrome and make American leadership of the free world—Pax Americana—genuine in its promise and really competitive for the 9/11 era. Excerpt from my 2007 op-ed, When Anti-war is Anti-peace:
I'm not as hard on President Bush's administration for our post-war planning failures in Iraq because I understand much of it was due to the lack of pre-mission capability. After all, how do you fix a country with an absence of tools and know-how for doing it? The easy answer is that you call someone else to fix it, and that's basically how we planned for the post-war in Iraq. We've learned the hard way that there is no one else to call and we are responsible for completing the job we started.
The solution to the mess depends on whether the peace operations community, thrown into the deep end of the pool since 9/11, can struggle out from the legacy of the Vietnam War. Doing so requires a bloody, expensive learning curve. Unfortunately, too many people we mean to help and protect, as well as our own peace operators, have died as the price for learning fundamental lessons while opposed by enemies who expertly attack our weaknesses.
The solution to the mess depends on whether the peace operations community, thrown into the deep end of the pool since 9/11, can struggle out from the legacy of the Vietnam War. Doing so requires a bloody, expensive learning curve. Unfortunately, too many people we mean to help and protect, as well as our own peace operators, have died as the price for learning fundamental lessons while opposed by enemies who expertly attack our weaknesses.
I believe the counterinsurgency "surge", combined with the positive feedback of the Sahwa "awakening", was the critical first step of the learning curve we needed to cure the Vietnam Syndrome and make real the American leadership of the free world demanded by the 9/11 era. The Obama administration should have stayed the course from the Bush administration, like Eisenhower stayed the course from Truman at an analogous inflection point, and built on the essential lessons learned and development achieved with the COIN "surge". Instead, President Obama's irresponsible exit from Iraq wasted our hard-earned progress and not only restored the Vietnam Syndrome but boosted the disease by entrenching the false, degenerative Iraq Syndrome.
I don't know if we can still restore the vital lessons of Iraq that President Obama so callously, cynically, and inhumanely threw away. I hope we can. The tone of your article suggests that you've lost hope. Be that as it may, I know the prerequisite step for restoring the vital lessons of Iraq is to establish the discourse that's needed by re-laying a proper foundation that corrects the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative and clarifies the actual justification of the Iraq intervention with OIF's primary sources.
I hope you take up the cause to turn your experiences in Iraq from a final judgement on American leadership into vital lessons that reform American leadership.
---------------
from: [Eric LC]
to: [John Agresto]
date: Apr 22, 2024, 6:35 AM
subject: Re: Comment on John Agresto's "What we got wrong in Iraq" (Washington Examiner, 17MAR23)
Dr. Agresto,
I can break up that sentence. I reined it in while writing the OIF FAQ base post, but I was more florid while writing the 10th anniversary retrospective post.
The reason I'm more optimistic is Korea, where I spent the bulk of my military service. Our mistakes, difficulties, and setbacks with Korea dwarfed those with Iraq. Listening to Korean War medal of honor recipients talk about their war experiences and comparing the Korea they left in 1953 to the Korea they came back to in 2000 set my standard for American leadership of the free world: imperfect but steadfast and competitive. Maybe we had better "knowledge of the relationship of security to freedom...knowledge of the preconditions of democratic rule...knowledge of the role of civil society [in] standing up popular government" after World War II. If so, that didn't prevent us from making mistakes as bad as or worse than the mistakes we made with Iraq. The difference is that Eisenhower, who campaigned against the Korean War, like Obama with Iraq, nevertheless upheld America's sacrosanct commitment to Korea, unlike Obama with Iraq. The difference is the essential premise that the World War II regime changes were justified in the first place. The false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome stripped away that premise from post-Saddam Iraq.
Senator Daniel Moynihan famously said, “If you don't have 30 years to devote to social policy, don't get involved." The Moynihan benchmark is for specific reforms within the American political system, let alone nation-building. So it's to be expected that eighty years thence, American soldiers still serve in Germany, Japan, and Korea. In contrast, we abandoned our nation-building project with Iraq (repurposing it as the centerpiece of Obama's gift basket for Iran) after only eight years, or three years if you count from the COIN "surge".
Your "mugged by reality" time in Iraq should only have been a rough start for our nation-building project with Iraq, not the end of it. Knowing what we know now about the Saddam regime's extreme UNSCR 687 terrorism and UNSCR 688 human rights violations and how severely we had underestimated them while formulating the initial post-war plan, a rough start was practically inevitable. Recalibration of the de-Ba'athification, which was mandated in the UNSCR 688 enforcement, was practically inevitable. We had a rougher start with Korea anyway.
The nation-building project with Iraq should have been the corrective learning ground for "our lack of knowledge" and "frighteningly deep...failures of understanding". Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #postwar section:
[D]ue to the military's aversion to dedicated peace operations before OIF, the only practical way the Army could develop the sufficient peace-operations doctrine, capability, and more fundamentally, the proper civil-affairs mindset that were needed for occupying post-war Iraq was to actually occupy post-war Iraq and learn through necessity. Ergo, the needs of the mission enabled the conception and birth of the Petraeus-led counterinsurgency “Surge” that combined with the Sahwa Awakening and had us winning the peace with Iraq before President Obama changed course and disengaged the peace operations.
It should have been the corrective learning ground for the civilian side too. Secretary of State Clinton, from her 25APR09 remarks in Iraq, shortly before President Obama mysteriously replaced her with Vice President Biden as his point man on Iraq:
We’re going to be putting real meat on the bones of the strategic framework agreement, which as you know, was adopted at the same time as SOFA – didn’t get as much attention, but now it’s the primary focus of our efforts. Because we have to translate into reality what we mean when we talk about economic assistance and good governance and rule of law, and many of the other services and changes that we would like to be part of.
The COIN faction says a lot of what you say, but their Iraq-based advocacy is marginalized by the Iraq Syndrome as the fruit of a poisoned tree. The same goes for your Iraq-based call to action. Like I said, I don't know if we can still recover the constructive lessons of Iraq that President Obama trashed. I do know the prerequisite step for that recovery is reframing the discourse with a proper foundation that corrects the false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome and clarifies OIF's actual justification for the public. Understanding that the Iraq intervention was justified in the first place and the damaging ripple effects of Obama's radical deviation with Iraq are essential premises of that public discussion.
Again, I hope you take up the cause to turn your experiences in Iraq from a final judgement on American leadership into vital lessons for a true American leadership of the free world.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Quin Hillyer]
date: Mar 29, 2023, 10:36 AM
subject: Re: 20th anniversary of OIF: Comments on Garrett Exner's WE symposium piece
Mr. Hillyer,
I've been writing you a piecemeal review of the WE symposium with your planned follow-up in mind, which presumably will address the other pieces in the symposium. I'm not halfway through them yet, and what I've reviewed is already target-rich with clarification points. Has your follow-up been cancelled?
Since the 20th anniversary commentary has been as bad—thus target rich—as we anticipated, there should be added opportunities for you to clarify the Iraq issue on top of the planned follow-up.
Thanks for the tip on David Freddoso. Since Antle's e-mail address is listed, I figured I'd send him my comments on his piece with an offer to review the other pieces in the same critical light. I don't plan to submit for publication: That's your role as a public expert authority.
Still, when I finish reviewing the whole symposium with you, I might follow your tip and share the bundle with Freddoso to see what happens.
---------------
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Quin Hillyer]
date: Mar 29, 2023, 11:11 AM
subject: Re: 20th anniversary of OIF: Comments on Garrett Exner's WE symposium piece
Mr. Hillyer,
Once the singular 20th anniversary window of opportunity closes, it's hard to imagine what that spot might be.
Regarding "The public hasn't shown much interest", that's because the 20th anniversary commentary, including the WE symposium, has rehashed the same talking points of the last 20 years, i.e., the prevailing false narrative. Without immediate effective corrective action, the reiterated false premises will reconfirm and entrench deeper.
To refocus the public on Iraq, give the people something that's novel and stands out with clear delineation: an objective correction. Not another qualified subjective outlier opinion that's drowned out by the expert consensus. Relitigate the Iraq issue: clarify OIF's justification by the numbers with a foundational, definitional, objective standard, and apply this new (and original) correct-or-incorrect standard to definitively discredit the 20th anniversary-refreshed false takes.
Using bedrock law and facts to hold to account experts who've conveniently reiterated their false takes for the 20th anniversary, reverse a 20-year epochal consequential narrative, and show the public that America was demonstrably right on Iraq all along: that's red meat, new meat, to grab the public interest.
[Add: ...In other words, you should create that trial on Iraq in the People's court that James Fallows [wants so badly]. The public loves a public trial that holds the high and mighty, such as the who's who of leaders and pundits who've distorted the Iraq issue, to account.]
---------------
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Quin Hillyer]
date: Mar 29, 2023, 11:39 AM
subject: Re: 20th anniversary of OIF: Comments on Garrett Exner's WE symposium piece
Mr. Hillyer,
Of course. You presented the key points of the problem as "The constant pressure is to write on what the public is currently most interested in. Web "clicks" rule journalism these days. The Iraq with anniversary coverage by so many outlets saturated the market. The public hasn't shown much interest. My editors will indulge me only so far. That's why..."
I just proposed a solution to the problem on its key points, which you can work with your editors.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Quin Hillyer]
date: Mar 23, 2023, 1:32 AM
subject: 20th anniversary of OIF: James Fallows's hit list can be your cadre list
Mr. Hillyer,
In an article written for the 20th anniversary which Fallows tweeted and, if I recall correctly, he "re-upped" tweeted again, he talks about holding pundits who advocated for OIF to account because they've escaped just reprobation for their malfeasance these many years. For that purpose, his tweeted article links to a list or lists of pundits who advocated for OIF.
Since James Fallows blocked me, I lost track of the link to the article, which I believe he wrote on Substack. You should be able to find it if you're not blocked, too. I believe he tweeted and tweeted the article again on Tuesday March 21st and Wednesday March 22nd.
The same list or lists should be a useful recruiting tool for you. The pundits who Fallows wants punished should be receptive to OIF FAQ's corrective content given their advocacy for OIF in the first place and for its preemptive defense value against Fallows's vindictive call to action. Maybe they'll even want to set the record straight on OIF's justification just because it's the right and needed thing to do.
---------------
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Quin Hillyer]
date: Mar 24, 2023, 10:07 AM
subject: Re: 20th anniversary of OIF: James Fallows's hit list can be your cadre list
Mr. Hillyer,
FYI, the James Fallows 20th anniversary article referenced below: https://fallows.substack.com/p/the-iraq-war-and-modern-memory. Excerpt:
The most influential parts of the press 20 years ago were egging on this war. That’s not comfortable or convenient for most of them to remember. But it’s the reality, as anyone in the business back then must know: The New York Times with its discredited “WMD” coverage; the Washington Post on its bellicose editorial page; most leading magazines.
For details I refer you to John Judis, who was one of the few New Republic staff members who opposed the war, with a clear retrospective here. Nicholas Guyatt has a list of major-media war advocates here, and Parker Molloy has another. A few in this group have written reconsiderations, which I respect. Most would prefer not to dwell on the past.
For details I refer you to John Judis, who was one of the few New Republic staff members who opposed the war, with a clear retrospective here. Nicholas Guyatt has a list of major-media war advocates here, and Parker Molloy has another. A few in this group have written reconsiderations, which I respect. Most would prefer not to dwell on the past.
On Thu, Mar 23, 2023 at 1:32 AM [Eric LC] wrote:
...
