Tuesday, November 22, 2005

Iraqi Sanctions: Were They Worth It?

One reason I support Operation Iraqi Freedom is my opposition to the toxic alternative in the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, namely the pre-OIF status quo with Saddam of the dangerous, costly, vilified, and eroding ad hoc 'containment'. Among its drawbacks, which included that Saddam had broken the UNSCR 687 arms embargo as the Iraqi people continued to suffer, was the 'containment' was exploited by al Qaeda as a cornerstone of terrorist propaganda.
Iraqi Sanctions: Were They Worth It?
by Sheldon Richman, January 2004 [POSTED FEBRUARY 9, 2004]

In May 1996 Madeleine Albright, who was then the U.S. ambassador to the UN, was asked by 60 Minutes correspondent Lesley Stahl, in reference to years of U.S.-led economic sanctions against Iraq,

We have heard that half a million children have died. I mean, that is more children than died in Hiroshima. And, you know, is the price worth it?

To which Ambassador Albright responded,

I think that is a very hard choice, but the price, we think, the price is worth it.

[Read the rest.]*
See An Appeal to Indict the Iraqi Regime for Crimes of Genocide (1997), the 1997-2003 Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq, the UN Security Council (S/1999/100) panel assessment of the humanitarian situation in Iraq (1999), and the Independent Inquiry Committee report on the manipulation of the Oil-for-Food programme (2005).

OIF was a controversial, difficult decision by President Bush. But the alternatives to the regime change — letting Saddam escape from Iraq's ceasefire obligations and the toxic, broken 'containment' — aren't better. At least we're trying our best to help the Iraqi people now with nation-building peace operations instead of the pre-OIF status quo of our effective complicity with intransigently noncompliant, unreconstructed Saddam in purposely, indefinitely, and uselessly causing Iraqi suffering.

* London School of Economics researchers have found the Saddam regime fabricated the reported rise in Iraqi child mortality blamed on sanctions.

Get it through your heads: REP John Murtha is a realist!!

When will people realize that REP Murtha's position on Iraq doesn't have anything to do with his party affiliation?

Murtha opposes OIF because he is a textbook dogmatic Cold War realist (poli sci sense). Realists are traditionally pro-military and pro- National Security. They are genuinely hawkish. Realists are also traditionally against liberal endeavors like nation building and internationalist intervention. The Bush admin's chosen strategy in the WOT, including Iraq, is a liberal strategy.

I bet Murtha is not a fan of the UN. I also bet that if you get him talking about China, he'd be very hawkish and enthusiastic about competing with a 'near-peer' state-actor competitor. The liberal strategy we're employing in the War on Terror, including Iraq, is simply contrary to Murtha's dogma.

More evidence from Newsbusters: REP Murtha opposed the Somalia operation.

Update from my comment on Neptunus Lex:
badbob,

Thanks. Regarding Murtha compared to other reformed realists, he does seem particularly inflexible, hence the qualifier as “dogmatic”.

As a liberal, I don’t ideologically agree with the realist school, but I agree with you: as individual thinkers, not all realists are as rigid as Murtha. I like the idea of a neo-realist school; I’ll just call it the liberal security model.

My point in bringing this up is that I think the focus on Dems vs GOP, doves vs hawks, and Left vs Right has been harmfully misleading when analysing Murtha and those like him. Our concepts are still stuck on the Vietnam War debate. Popular discourse in the WOT needs to be reshuffled to fit a different kind of war.

In the WOT, to include Iraq, we are following a liberal (or neo-realist) strategy. That strategy since Day One has been harshly attacked and undermined by dogmatic realists on the homefront. These people are not ‘hippies’ or ‘moonbats’; they’re established experts — Cold War hawks — in the national security field who were raised in the Cold War balance of power. Their dogmatic worldview is misapplied in the WOT, but just the same, they are still treated as The American Authority in the field of war and national security . . . even if they are dangerously obsolete.

Like I said, I know the type. They dominate the poli sci department at Columbia.

Dogmatic realists have been getting away with attacking OIF because our national debate about war is still stuck on Vietnam. We know enough to disparage ‘hippies’ and moonbats’, but we fail to recognize and respond to the ‘hawkish’ experts who ceaselessly attack the Bush admin’s WOT strategy. Until WOT supporters recognize that threat in our domestic debate and face it head-on, dogmatic realists will continue to erode domestic support for the WOT.

In my opinion, the unchecked opposition to the WOT by these ‘expert’ right-wing dogmatic realists poses a FAR greater domestic threat to our ability to prosecute the WOT than radical leftist ‘moonbats’. Keep in mind, the American people who dismiss anti-war ‘hippies’ out-of-hand have been raised to deeply respect the views of the victorious realist Cold Warriors.

I do respect our dogmatic realists for winning the Cold War and their opinions are not without merit, but this War on Terror must be won by our liberal warriors.

I would like to issue a democratic ‘call to arms’ in the domestic debate so that we can focus on the dogmatic realist threat. To do so, we have to get over the red herrings of Vietnam War ‘anti-war’ stereotypes and recognize the enemy at home for what he is.
Update 12Dec05: Was REP Murtha driven to act now to protect his realist worldview because the future of military funding is at stake? Read Tom Barnett's latest post and decide for yourself.

Saturday, November 19, 2005

Demobilizing Iraq Army: a good call, after all?

I've been undecided on the early CPA decision to demobilize the old Iraqi Army. I believe security, stability and control is the necessary foundation for everything else, and it makes sense to co-opt the existing security apparatus. But I also believe that a short-sighted fix is usually a poor replacement for a long-term solution, and if use of the old Iraqi Army would have undermined everything else, that's a problem, too.

For the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) perspective, see the archived CPA website, including order 1, De-Ba`athification of Iraqi Society, 16MAY03, and the 2004 insight, 2005 insight, 2006 insight, and 2011 insight from CPA senior adviser Dan Senor.

Note: Saddam's regime was not a secular bulwark, as it is often erroneously represented by OIF opponents. Saddam's terrorism included jihadists, including affiliates of al Qaeda, and he had undertaken the sectarian radicalization of Iraqi society since the Iran-Iraq War. The Saddam regime's terroristic rule was why the de-Ba'athication was considered necessary, per UNSCR 1483 and Public Law 105-338, by the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Dale Franks of QandO (a milblog with a strong libertarian bent) provides an interesting point of view (archived) on this issue:
Excerpt from New York Times:
Too Few Good Men by Dan Senor and Walter Slocombe
Published: November 17, 2005

"This would have been a political disaster, alienating the Kurds and Shiites who make up more than 80 percent of Iraq's population and who understandably saw the old army as a key enforcer of Saddam Hussein's tyranny."
That very last sentence also captures the reason I've always thought that, on balance, demobilizing the Iraqi Army—for all the perceived difficulties it brought us after the major combat phase ended—was probably the best course of action.

While it's tempting to believe that a competent Iraqi army, available right from the beginning, would've made the occupation mush easier for us, to seriously make that argument you have to believe two fairly unlikely things.

First, you'd have to believe the Iraqi Army actually was competent, which is not really supported by its actual performance. Unless, by "competent" you mean "able to cow the Iraqi civilian population". For that purpose, of course, it seems to have been pretty capable, admittedly.

Second, you'd have to believe that the Iraqi Army was trustworthy enough to trust with guns at the US Army's back. The fact that we could beat the Iraqi army—or really, any other army in the world—on the battlefield still doesn't mean that some Sunni general with his eye on a palace and gold-plated toilet of his own wouldn't've tried it. Even worse, it's almost guaranteed that an army led mainly by holdovers from the previous regime would've been even more keen to get arms into the hands of insurgents—or become insurgents themselves—than an army recruited from scratch. Although, in the event, recruiting from scratch was troublesome enough as far as inside assistance to the insurgency goes.

And, of course, the effect on the Shiite and Kurdish population, seeing what would've appeared to be a US policy of keep[ing Sunnis running the show, would've probably resulted in a lot more intransigence in those portions of the population.

On balance, it's difficult to see how we had any choice other than eliminating the old Iraqi army, and starting over from scratch.

Sunday, November 13, 2005

Honor Casey Sheehan and sympathize with Cindy Sheehan

On this Veterans Day weekend, Army Specialist Casey Sheehan deserves to be remembered much better than for his mother's sad quest.

SPC Sheehan died a hero's death, honorably, as an American soldier. He volunteered to return to Iraq for a 2nd tour. He was on a rescue mission when he was killed. We must make a special effort to defend his memory and his sacrifice from the ugly smear perpetrated by his mother's furious anger and those who exploit his death (however willingly on his mother's part).



Add: Blackfive's 29MAR15 memorial post for Casey Sheehan:
This is an annual repost honoring Casey Sheehan who gave his life in a fight to save his brothers...

Casey Sheehan grew up in a devout Catholic home. He served as an altar boy and then as a key member of his church's youth group for years.

When he was old enough, Casey joined the Boy Scouts, becoming the very second Eagle Scout out of his troop.

He enlisted in the Army when he was twenty years old. He decided to be a mechanic. He would undergo Combat Lifesaver training - a class on how to give IVs and treat trauma only second in intense learning to combat medic training. He was also certified to assist with giving communion to soldiers while in the field.

Specialist Sheehan re-enlisted in the Army in 2004 knowing full well that he could be sent into a combat zone.

Casey Sheehan was a Humvee mechanic with the 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery Regiment.

On April 3rd, 2004, forces loyal to Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al'Sadr stormed police stations and government offices in Sadr City (a city of over 2 million). They knew the Americans would come, and they wanted a fight. Muqtada Sadr was working them up into a religious frenzy. And he had his thugs murder anyone who he thought might stand in his way - even other Shi'ite clerics. His forces were known as the Mahdi Army.

American forces quickly surrounded Muqtada al'Sadr's quarters.

On April 4th, 2004, al'Sadr's Mahdi forces blocked roadways and bridges with burning tires, vehicles and trash. Visibility was less than 300 meters anywhere in the city. They began to attack American vehicles on patrol throughout Sadr City - some were protecting Shia worshipers (Holy Arbayeen) while others were escorting city government vehicles.

A battle raged across Sadr City. Insurgents assaulted American troops while looters and mobs formed and stormed through the streets. Word spread quickly across the American FOBs that there was trouble.

Soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment were ambushed with RPGs and pinned down and dying. While fighting off an attack himself, the Commander of the 2/5th, LTC Volesky, called for help. A Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was formed of volunteers - their mission was to go out and rescue the American troops.

Casey Sheehan's Sergeant asked for volunteers. Sheehan had just returned from Mass. After Sheehan volunteered once, the Sergeant asked Sheehan again if he wanted to go on the mission. According to many reports (and according to his own mother), Casey responded, "Where my Chief goes, I go."

The QRF was launched. Not long after entering the Mahdi area, the QRF was channeled onto a dead-end street where the roofs were lined with snipers, RPGs, and even some militia throwing burning tires onto the vehicles. The Mahdi blocked the exit and let loose with everything they had.

Sheehan's vehicle was hit with multiple RPGs and automatic-weapons fire.

Specialist Casey Sheehan and Corporal Forest J. Jostes were killed.

A second QRF was formed - all volunteers - to go rescue the first. Specialist Ahmed Cason was hit in the second QRF - but kept fighting until he bled to death.

Seven men died with Casey Sheehan on Sunday, April 4th, 2004.

They were Spc. Robert R. Arsiaga, Spc. Ahmed Cason, Sgt. Yihjyh L. "Eddie" Chen, Spc. Stephen D. Hiller, Spc. Israel Garza, Cpl. Forest J. Jostes, and Sgt. Michael W. Mitchell.

It was Palm Sunday.

Palm Sunday commemorates the day that Jesus entered Jerusalem. Back then, the palm frond was a symbol of victory - laid beneath the feet of those of the highest honor and triumph. Some believe it was this honor fit for a king that forced Jesus's enemies to act and crucify him.

In recognition of Casey, the Catholic Chapel at Fort Hood, Texas (where Sheehan was stationed) named the Knights of Columbus chapter the "Casey Austin Sheehan Council".

Casey also received the Bronze Star for his Valor that day.

Palm fronds for the most honored.


I have strong feelings about Cindy Sheehan's protest. But balancing my great sympathy for her loss as an Army mom (I've had one of my own), my disgust over the petty exploitation of her grief and her son's death — twisting them into a perversion that aids the same intolerable enemy who killed her son and so many like him —, my hatred of the groups who shamelessly use her as a shield for their own evil agendas, and my distress over the embarrassment caused to the honor of her son's service and sacrifice . . . it's not a commentary to be taken lightly nor expressed glibly.

In Mrs. Sheehan's defense, her son died as an American soldier. Mrs. Sheehan didn't volunteer, her son Casey did. He died in a tradition and as part of a heritage, and in a cause, she clearly does not and probably cannot understand. She can only interpret the life and death of her beloved son the best she is capable, and in that, I can't fault her. After all, I've had an Army mom, too, who was not a soldier and resisted giving her son to the Army. When Casey became a soldier, for whatever reason that motivated him, he entered a world and joined with a reality that is other than what she is.

Vaya con Dios, Specialist Sheehan — Casey. We, your brothers and sisters in arms, understand you and honor you. Your mother knows not what she does, but we love her just the same, as we love our moms who have borne the helpless weight of their love and their children's sacrifice.