Sunday, February 22, 2015

New York Times writer posits "Thank you for your service" is offensive to veterans. I disagree.

Byron Wong at bigWOWO asks:
Hey [Eric LC],

I just saw this:

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/sunday-review/please-dont-thank-me-for-my-service.html?emc=edit_th_20150222&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=29649347

I'd be interested in your opinion. Could you blog about it? (I usually don't request this, but I think lots of people might also be interested.) All considered, I think the vets are right about those who don't serve--it's what you're supposedly supposed to say, without any kind of thought.
Byron,

Sure.

I was a soldier and, thus, I will always be a veteran. I have advocated for veterans in the civilian-military context. I have been thanked for my military service, so I have some insight on the topic. That being said, I qualify my reactions to Matt Richtel's article with I am not a 9/11-generation war veteran and even if I were, veterans are opinionated individuals with diverse takes on being thanked for their military service.

Reactions:

_Mr. Richtel's article would have been better rounded had he teamed with a thoughtful veteran, preferably a contemporary 9/11-generation war veteran, as a co-author.

Nonetheless, the perfect is the enemy of the good. I encourage people like Mr. Richtel to explore, however imperfectly, veterans issues from the civilian side of the civilian-military divide. His article implies that veterans prefer a social firewall to shut off acknowledgement and conversation from civilians who are not members of the American military fraternity and lack the basic framework to understand it. Perhaps some veterans feel like that. Not all do. I don't believe most veterans feel like that. I take a different tack. In college, creating a vital civilian-military cultural interface was a foundational reason for starting MilVets. Bridging the civilian-military divide has carried forward as a core element of MilVets' mission on campus and, for years, the group has been almost entirely 9/11-generation war veterans.

_The response from Tim O'Brien, author of The Things They Carried, highlights a key point that I feel strongly about, too: the politics of war matter to veterans.

We know when we volunteer that selfless service and sacrifice, potentially of our lives, are part of the deal. They're core elements of American military heritage. By oath, we trust up front that our nation's leaders will invest our lives in worthy causes. That doesn't mean, however, soldiers don't care about the politics of war. Of course they care; they live the wars and stake their lives in them. It mattered to me why my fellow American soldiers and I should potentially die defending Koreans from Koreans. The same question has been asked about the wisdom of Americans dying to defend Vietnamese from Vietnamese, Somalis from Somalis, Slavs from Slavs, Iraqis from Iraqis, Afghanis from Afghanis, and possibly someday, (Taiwanese) Chinese from (mainland) Chinese. The question really is one of fundamental premise: should America be a 'leader of the free world' at all that stakes the lives of America's sons and daughters for the sake of other peoples across distant shores.

Other than outliers like Ehren Watada, the politics of war take a backseat for soldiers while they're engrossed with the tasks, conditions, and standards of the mission at hand, and keeping their men, their buddies, and themselves sound. But the why and the outcome of the war matter very much to veterans when they reflect on their experiences, contextualize them in narrative form, and weigh the consequences for their own lives, their families, their comrades, their country, the people over there, and the world.

What categorically separates 'good' wars from 'bad' wars is the prevailing narrative of the why and outcome. While the wars viewed as honorable in the zeitgeist are just as harsh in their ground and personal effects as the wars viewed as dishonorable, the prevailing narrative sets the contextual frame that colors the social value of a veteran's military service. For that reason, it's critical for the sake of Iraq veterans to correct the political distortions of the law and policy, fact basis or justification — the why — of Operation Iraqi Freedom, more so since the long-term outcome of their mission has been thrown off track. Setting the record straight in the zeitgeist is most important for the young children of our KIA in Iraq who will only ever know their father or mother through the prism of the cultural legacy of the Iraq War.

_How have I personally felt when I've been thanked for my military service? A bit awkward.

The conventional responses to "Thank you", such as "No problem" or "You're welcome", don't squarely fit because overseas military service, generally speaking, is a national security action in the global context for the sake of the collective us. National security (i.e., national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests of the United States) is not the same thing as homeland security. Overseas military service is not a direct conveyance from American soldier to American (civilian) citizen, unlike say, a Coast Guard sailor or National Guard soldier who directly engages fellow Americans while serving on a search-and-rescue, peacekeeping, or disaster relief mission in the homeland. The good of my service in a national security mission in Korea to my fellow Americans was collective, indirect, and largely abstract.

As such, I would advise veterans who feel cynical like Hunter Garth to not interpret the statement, "Thank you for your service", from the viewpoint of their personal relationship with the thanker. Instead, they ought to adopt a more social view that a citizen on behalf of the nation is expressing civic appreciation to a soldier or veteran as a representative of the military's greater contribution to the collective us as the American nation.

The same civic concept underlies the "any soldier" letters from American schoolchildren that are distributed randomly to soldiers serving overseas. As a 20-something soldier in Korea, I felt awkward and vaguely objectified receiving a handwritten letter from a 4th grader in Ohio thanking me, too. The letter wasn't to me, though. It was to an American soldier serving over there and I was an American soldier serving over there.

I've summarized the abstract social value of military service and the civic appreciation thereof thus:
It truly is selfless service – a lot of love and pride goes into soldiering. It doesn’t matter why someone joins or where he came from, or how much he enjoys (or suffers) his duties. It doesn’t matter who’s making the tough decisions in the White House. Soldiers are part of a heritage that is older, deeper and more essential than the republic for which they sacrifice. Soldiers are of the people. They are the primal embodiment of the social contract we make with each other to be a civilization.

Now, and in all times, our soldiers, marines, sailors and airmen deserve the American people’s gratitude and understanding.
The summary follows from the way I counseled the new soldiers assigned to my care: You're a professional soldier of the United States Army now. Never forget that on your chest, you are telling the world at all times what you represent — your country, your Army, your family.

In my opinion, when a veteran is being thanked for his service by someone who has not served, likely will never serve, and doesn't know what it's like, the proffer of gratitude is not attuned to the veteran's individual service experience. But the expression is not meaningless. The veteran is being thanked by a fellow countryman less for his own sake than as an affirmation of something essential the veteran is part of that is bigger, deeper, and older than himself, that in fact is deeper and older than the American nation. He should accept it as a civic cultural ritual and not reject it as an unintended affront. The thank-you is not personal. It's for "any soldier" and the veteran represents "any soldier" who has served bearing his country, his Army, his family name over his heart.

Perhaps formulating a ritualistic response for veteran thankees would help alleviate the awkwardness of being thanked for our service. I suggest responding with "It was an honor", which deflects the individual aspect and focuses the exchange, instead, on the timeless collective aspect of military service.

Post-script:

To expand a bit on my post, "Thank you for your service" is viewed properly as a civic cultural ritual rather than a unique transaction between individuals. As with any ritual, though, "Thank you for your service" functions only when the meaning and context of the ritual are mutually understood and the underlying ethic is shared by its participants. As ritual, the key pieces currently missing are, one, a common cultural understanding of "Thank you for your service" as an affirmation of a fundamental social value rather than a comment on an individual experience and, two, a formulaic ritual response by the veteran thankee. I suggest the response, "It was an honor", to focus on the timeless collective aspect instead of the particular individual aspect of the veteran's military service.

As analogy, the ritual of the Eucharist is not a quick, thoughtless, throwaway substitute for the spectrum of Catholicism. Rather, the brief ritual is an entry point for the larger clockwork of believing and practicing the faith. "Thank you for your service", properly understood and practiced, should function similarly within a larger clockwork of (secular) civilian-military relations. When the context of the ritual of the Eucharist is subtracted, then the Communion bread becomes just a piece of wheat bread. Ritual context should be added to "Thank you for your service".

Thursday, February 12, 2015

Quick reaction to the proposed AUMF against ISIS

See Letter from the President -- Authorization for the Use of United States Armed Forces in connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, 11FEB15.

As previously discussed, the President already possesses the legal authority needed to conduct the anti-ISIS counter-terrorism campaign, which is not the same as a nation-v-nation war, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom. The President's counter-terrorism authority is rooted in Article II of the Constitution, not statutory authority, which has been affirmed by Congress since the Clinton administration. The proposed AUMF is for policy and political reasons, not for legal authority, although it may be legally useful for an anti-ISIS action on territory where the local nation opposes the action.

Of note, the proposed AUMF would repeal the 2002 AUMF, Public Law 107-243.

Repealing the 2002 AUMF would have limited impact from the standpoint of the mandate to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq" (P.L. 107-243) since it was oriented on the threat posed by Iraq when Iraq meant the noncompliant Saddam regime. There was closure on the 2002 AUMF in that respect since the threat posed by Saddam's regime has been resolved: The UN Security Council determined in 2010 that Iraq was largely in compliance with UNSCR 660-series mandates.

At the same time, repealing the 2002 AUMF would have limited impact from the standpoint of the mandate to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (P.L. 107-243) since its authority to enforce Iraq's compliance with UNSC resolutions is redundant.

If the 2002 AUMF is repealed, the 1991 AUMF (Public Law 102-1) and sections 1095 and 1096 of Public Law 102-190 (1991) are still in effect. As far as I know, the UN authorization that P.L. 102-1 is predicated on, UNSCR 678 (1990), remains active, which means the US continues to be authorized "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 678).

After the regime change of 2003, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338), which mandated the post-war peace operations, moved to the forefront, and since the end of 2008, the US-Iraq relationship has been guided by the 2008-2011 Status of Forces Agreement and the overarching guidelines of the long-term Strategic Framework Agreement. Notice that President Obama did not propose an end-date for the SFA nor whatever SOFA he adopted with Iraq in 2014. Iraq-specific Public Law 102-1, sections 1095 and 1096 of Public Law 102-190, Public Law 105-235 (1998), and Public Law 105-338, counter-terrorism statutes Public Law 104-132 (1996) and Public Law 107-40 (2001), and of course, Article II of the Constitution have not been repealed, either.

Keep in mind the UNSCR 660-series mandates are not lifted. With or without Saddam, Iraq remains obligated to keep compliant with "resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 678), which continue to be enforced under US law. The UNSCRs for Iraq contain the overarching mandate to "restore international peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 678) and an argument can be proffered that UNSCR 2170 (2014) activated the authority of the 1991 and 2002 AUMFs. Also note the counter-terrorism character in P.L. 107-243 and the standing counter-terrorism international mandate in UNSCR 1373 (2001).

There will be no repeat of Operation Iraqi Freedom because this time, the US is working with Iraq as an ally, not resolving a threat by Iraq as an enemy with noncompliant Saddam. President Obama's depiction of the mission for US forces in the anti-ISIS campaign seems similar to the mission envisioned had a residual US force stayed in 2011 to assist Iraqi forces. It's like Obama is taking a mulligan on the error of prematurely removing US peace-operation forces from Iraq. Of course, Iraq's condition now is very different than it was before Obama disengaged from Iraq. What would have been sufficient from a residual US force to protect Iraq then is likely no longer sufficient now.

Add: Legal analysis of the proposed AUMF at National Review and Lawfare blog. A balanced look at the conflicted nature of the proposed AUMF.

Add: S.J.Res.21 – Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against the Government of Syria to Respond to Use of Chemical Weapons, 06SEP13. Lawfare coverage.

Add: S.J.Res.10 – To repeal the authorizations for use of military force against Iraq, and for other purposes, 03MAR21. The obvious effect of the resolution would be removal of the standing Congressional authorization for the President to enforce UN resolutions on Iraq. Notably, the preamble of the resolution includes the implicit recognization that the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement is sufficient bilateral basis for the US forces deployed to Iraq contrary to President Obama's excuse for ending the OIF peace operations that Iraqi parliamentary approval was necessary.

Wednesday, February 11, 2015

An appeal to indict the Saddam regime for genocide (1997)

Note: The below text is copied from here. I post it with the qualifications that there seems to be no web presence for the "Kurdish Organisation for Human Rights – UK" nor have I found an official citation of this appeal in searchable United Nations on-line records. Nonetheless, whether or not it was a formally entered appeal with the UN, the content is a useful reference.

Also see Saddam Hussein Trial, Law Library of Congress, 03JUL07, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds, Human Rights Watch, July 1993, Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and Its Aftermath, Human Rights Watch, June 1992, and The Great Terror by Jeffrey Goldberg, The New Yorker, 25MAR02.



An Appeal to Indict the Iraqi Regime for Crimes of Genocide

AN APPEAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS TO INDICT THE HIGHER ECHELONS OF THE IRAQI REGIME FOR CRIMES OF GENOCIDE COMMITTED AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF IRAQI-KURDISTAN

His Excellency Mr. Kofi Annan, secretary-general of the United Nations, New York.

Members of the Security Council:
Ambassador Juan Somavia (Chile)
Ambassador Qin Huasun (China)
Ambassador Fernando Berrocal Soto (Costa Rica)
Ambassador Dr Nabil A. Elaraby (Egypt)
Ambassador Alain Dejammet (France)
Ambassador Alfredo Lopes Cabral (Guinea-Bissau)
Ambassador Hishashi Owada (Japan)
Ambassador Njuguna M. Maahugu (Kenya)
Ambassador Dr. Z. Bigniew M. Wlosowicz (Poland)
Ambassador Pedro Catarino (Portugal)
Ambassador Park Soo Gil (Republic of Korea)
Ambassador Sergey V. lavrov (Russia)
Ambassador Peter Osvaald (Sweden)
Ambassador Sir John Weston (United Kingdom)
Ambassador Bill Richardson (USA)


The Iraqi regime has perpetrated many crimes against the people of Iraqi Kurdistan, most of them are considered as crimes of genocide as defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9th December, 1948 which was approved by Iraq on 20th January, 1959. Some examples of the criminal acts committed by the Iraqi regime against the Kurdish people during the last three decades are the destruction of the Kurdish villages and the policy of ethnic cleansing, by the mass deportation of the Kurds and the settlement of Arab tribes in their place, public execution, mass murder, internment, the confiscation of property, torture, rape, large-scale disappearances, the systematic humiliation and demoralisation of individuals and groups of people and the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population.

This programme of destruction has been condemned by the international organisations concerned with human rights and especially those which have conducted research into the documents found in the Security Service and Intelligence departments in Kurdistan, after the uprising of March 1991. Several tons of these documents are in the library of the U.S. Congress in Washington.

The Security Council has already condemned the inhuman politics of the Iraqi regime in its Resolution No. 688 of 5th April 1991. The General Assembly of the U.N. has also passed many resolutions concerning the situation of human rights in Iraq, in particular Resolution No. 46/134, of 17th December 1991, Resolution No. 47/145 of 18th December 1992, Resolution No. 48/144 of 20th December 1993 and Resolution No. 49/203 of 23rd December 1994.

The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has also passed resolutions concerning the situation of human rights in Iraq:

1. E/CN. 1991/74, 6th March 1991.
2. E/CN. 1992/71, 5th March 1992.
3. E/CN. 1993/74. 10th March 1993.
4. E/CN. 4/1994/74, 9th March 1994.
5. E/CN. 4/1997/60, 9th March 1997.

The Sub-Commission for the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities also passed the following resolutions on the situation of human rights in Iraq:

1. E/CN. 4/1994/2, E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1993/520, 20th August 1994.
2. E/CN. 4/1995/2, E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1994/56, 25th August 1994.

Max van der Stoel, the special reporter for the Commission on Human Rights of the U.N. has submitted many reports which also condemn the Iraqi regime:

1. E/CN. 4/1992/31, 18th February 1992.
2. E/CN. 4/1993/45. 15th February 1993.
3. E/CN. 4/1994/58, 25th February 1994.
4. E/CN. 4/1995/56, 15th February 1995.
5. E/CN. 4/1997/57, 18th February 1997.

We can give here some examples of the criminal acts committed by the Iraqi regime which constitute genocide according to the international conventions:

A. The destruction of thousands of villages and small cities and the murder of their inhabitants.

The Iraqi regime began the destruction of the villages close to the Iranian border at the beginning of 1975, and followed this with the destruction of the villages near the Turkish border, and then those on the plains of Kurdistan which are far from the international border. The inhabitants of these villages and small towns were forced into concentration camps situated near the large cities or main roads. They were built especially for them and lacked even the barest necessities and facilities for basic living. These concentration camps were similar to those built by the Nazis during the Second World War which were administered by the Secret Services.

Those rural areas of Iraqi Kurdistan which were destroyed, represented more than 80% of the Kurdish agricultural land which supplied most of Iraq with food. The area was converted into a military zone "prohibited for security reasons". This operation was at its height during the years of the Anfal campaign. "Anfal" was the code-name given to the regime's policy of eliminating the Kurds and it was carried out in three stages during 1987 and 1988. The legal framework for the Anfal campaign was established in a decree, signed by Saddam Hussein, dated March 29th, 1987, in the name of the Revolutionary Command Council, which is the highest legislative and executive authority in Iraq and is composed of all the most powerful figures of the regime. This decree gave, to Ali Hassan Al-Majid, the cousin of the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, absolute power over all civilian, military and security institutions and the authority to use chemical weapons. The aim of the Anfal campaign was to force the inhabitants of most Kurdish villages in the Governorates of Kirkuk, Sulaimania, Arbil, Duhok and the Kurdish districts in the Governorate of Mosul and Dyala to leave their villages and surrender themselves to the military or Secret Service. Orders were given to clear the area completely. To this end, any person encountered by the forces was to be immediately executed and any who surrendered were to be handed over to the Security Services. Some of the villagers managed to escape to the borders, but most were obliged to surrender. They were later taken to the desert in the south of Iraq where they were killed by machine-gun and buried alive. The number killed in the three Anfal operations is put at 182,000 Kurds. In May 1991, when asked by a Kurdish delegate to the peace negations in Baghdad, Ali Hassan Al-Majid nervously said, " it couldn't have been more than 100,000"!

These Anfal operations and other previous operations from the mid- 1970s resulted in the destruction of 3,839 Kurdish villages, including many Assyrian christian villages. There were, in these destroyed villages, 1757 primary schools and 2457 mosques, many old monasteries and churches and 271 clinics. 219,828 Kurdish and Assyrian families were deported and, in rural Kurdish society, a "family" would include at least five people. The magnitude of this destruction clearly demonstrates the intention of the Iraqi regime to destroy totally the Kurdish entity.

(B) The policy of ethnic cleansing by the Arabization of some regions of Kurdistan.

The Iraqi regime began its policy of ethnic cleansing in the Governorate of Kirkuk when the Ba'athist regime came to power in February 1963. This policy began in the Kirkuk region because of its oil fields and rich farm lands. It became the policy of each succeeding government and has been extended to include the region of Kanakeen (in Dyala Governorate) and Makhmur (in Arbil Governorate) and the Kurdish districts (in Mosul Governorate). It was carried out in a two-fold process, each stage complementing the other.

In the first phase of this process the Kurds were forced to move out of these areas. The second phase was accomplished by bringing thousands of Arab families from central and southern Iraq and settling them in these areas. They were provided with housing and were employed in various installations or in the repressive government machine, such as the military, the intelligence, the security service, the Ba'ath party organisation and the "Popular Army", etc..

Here are some examples of the policy as implemented in the Kirkuk Governorate:

1. The destruction of 13 Kurdish villages near the city of Kirkuk in mid-1963, in particular those near the oil fields.

2. The expulsion of all the Kurds living in 34 Kurdish villages which were under the jurisdiction of the sub-district of Dubz — now Arabized to Al-Dibiss — and the resettling of those villages with Arab tribes.

3. Changing the name of the Kirkuk Governorate to the Arabic "Al- T'ameem" (meaning nationalisation), with the aim of obliterating the name it had held throughout a thousand years of history. At the same time the regime changed the names of the Kurdish quarters, streets and schools to Arabic names and forced the owners of commercial establishments to change the names to Arabic.

4. Between 1970 and 1990, 732 Kurdish villages with their 493 schools, 598 mosques and 40 clinics were destroyed in this Governorate. 37,726 Kurdish families were deported.

5. The city and the surrounding area was converted into a large military camp and fortification. Its historic castle was turned into a military fort.

6. A major step in the process of the Arabization of Kirkuk was the settling of tens of thousands of Arab families, in successive waves, with guaranteed housing and jobs. Parallel to this, the regime announced the grant of a monetary gift or bonus to any Kurd who would leave Kirkuk, in addition to securing housing for him in southern or central Iraq. During this time more than ten new quarters were built in the city for "new Arab settlers". Many new quarters with Arab names were built for these new settlers.

7. All low-ranking civil servants, including Kurdish elementary and secondary school teachers, as well as workers in various government departments and in the oil company facilities, were transferred to areas outside the Kirkuk Governorate and replaced with Arab civil servants and workers.

8. The Kurds were forbidden to sell their homes and properties except to Arabs and were prevented from buying homes and property under any circumstances. The city administration refused to grant any "building permit" or "permit to renovate" to Kurds even if their homes were badly in need of renovation, in order to force them to sell their homes or to abandon them and move out of the city. From the early eighties, this policy was applied to the Turkman minority also.

9. Four out of the seven districts of the Governorate of Kirkuk were detached from it and attached to the neighbouring Governorates, in order to make the Kurds a minority in the Kirkuk Governorate.

Today, tens of thousands of Kurdish families from Kirkuk live in tents and camps in the region controlled by the Kurds in extremely harsh conditions, resulting in the deaths of many, especially among the children and the elderly. For the most part, they depend for their survival on assistance from relief organisations and international aid.

This same policy of deportation continues to this day. In May and June 1997, more than 3000 Kurds were deported from the city of Kirkuk and its environs in preparation for a government census in October 1997. The names of most of these people are in our possession.

In other parts of Iraqi Kurdistan still under the control of the Iraqi regime, the same policy was enforced. Kurds in all these areas were forced to register themselves as Arabs, under the threat of expulsion from these areas if they failed to do so by the time of the Census.

The expelled Kurds wish to return to their homelands in their cities and villages under the protection of the United Nations.

C- The deportation of tens of thousands of Kurdish Shi'ite families to Iran.

In 1971 the regime designated many groups, mainly Shi'ite Kurds living in Baghdad and other cities in central Iraq, as Iranian and deported them to Iran. This operation increased during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980 to 1988. All their personal belongings were confiscated, including their Iraqi nationality papers and passports. Most of these people and many of their parents and grandparents were born in Iraq before the creation of the state of Iraq in 1921. Many of them had completed their national service in Iraq. According to figures supplied by the Red Cross, they numbered about 400,000. They were deported in a most inhuman way. Taken by the Security Services to the Iranian border, they were forced to walk many miles in the cold weather, without food, during the war between Iraq and Iran. Their journey took several days and some were killed in the crossfire between the warring factions or by land- mines. In addition to children and old people there were, among them, pregnant women and physically and mentally disabled people.

The Iraqi authorities incarcerated more than 4,000 young people from among these deportees and, to this day, their families have no knowledge of their whereabouts as the Iraqi authorities did not give their names to the Red Cross or to any other organisation. Their families desperately wish to know what has happened to their children.

Some of these deportees now live in Europe and elsewhere as refugees, but most remain in Iran, living in abject poverty and considered neither as refugees in Iran nor as Iranian but as "Iraqi"! These people also wish to return to the land of their birth and to be compensated for their loss.

D. The use of chemical weapons on the Kurdish city of Halabja.

On 17th March, 1988, the city of Halabja, originally with a population of 70,000, was bombarded with cyanide, mustard gas and nerve gas by Iraqi military aircraft. The result was the death of more than 5000 civilians, mostly women, children and the elderly. About 10,000 more were injured and the bombardment devastated the entire area. No life remained. This was the first time in history that a government had used chemical weapons against its own civilian citizens.

In reality, the city of Halabja was not the only place on which chemical weapons were used by the Iraqi regime. Before this incident, many beautiful Kurdish villages in the sub-district of Aghjalar in Kirkuk Governorate, in the sub-district of Karadagh in Sulaimania Governorate, the valley of Balissan in Arbil Governorate and other villages in Duhok Governorate were also attacked. But the attack on a large city such as Halabja, under the direct orders of Saddam Hussein and without condemnation by the international community, encouraged the further use of chemical weapons in the mid-1990s against the marsh Arabs of southern Iraq.

In this criminal way the regime continued to kill hundreds of Kurdish Peshmerga (fighters), on many occasions when there was a general amnesty in force and they had surrendered their weapons. Hundreds of other young Kurds were tortured to death or killed after appearing before a formal tribunal. Some of them were children under fifteen years of age. After the uprising of March 1991, many mass graves were discovered near the cities of Arbil and Sulaimania where the corpses of whole family groups, including children, were found.

We consider these crimes to be genocide, committed deliberately by the Iraqi regime throughout three decades, in an attempt to eliminate more than four million Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan.

It was not only the Kurds who suffered at the hands of the regime. A great many Iraqis were subjected to a campaign of torture and mass execution, especially following the uprising of March 1991 in the Shi'ite cities and marshes of southern Iraq. During the Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988, chemical weapons were used extensively against Iranian military targets, and Iranian cities were regularly bombarded with artillery, aircraft and ballistic missiles not aimed at specific military targets. Later, on August 2, 1990, the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait in direct violation of Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter. The regime's obvious intention was the destruction of the sovereignty of the Kuwaiti state.

The perpetrators of all these crimes must be punished by the international community as were those of Nazi Germany, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, etc..

We appeal to the Security Council to create an international tribunal, or to extend the competence of the existing War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague, to bring the "higher echelons" of the Iraqi regime to justice.

1. The National Union of Teachers in Kurdistan.
2. The Farmworkers Union of Kurdistan.
3. The Artists Union of Kurdistan.
4. The Photographers Union of Kurdistan.
5. The Union of Agricultural Workers of Kurdistan.
6. The General Workers Union of Kurdistan.
7. The Engineering Union of Kurdistan.
8. The Association of the Clergy in Kurdistan.
9. The Association of Lawyers in Kurdistan.
10. The Association of Economists in Kurdistan.
11. The Association of Technical Engineers.
12. The Students' Union of Kurdistan.
13. The Association of Sociologists in Kurdistan.
14. The Association of War Veterans.
15. The Association of Cultural Workers.
16. The Organisation for Child Welfare in Kurdistan.
17. The Organisation for Graduates in Law in Kurdistan.
18. The Union of Veterinary Surgeons.
19. The Union of Doctors of Medicine.
20. The Union of Chemists and Pharmacists.
21. The Centre for the Care and Protection of Orphans.
22. The Christian Centre of Kurdistan.
23. The Association of Retired Workers.
24. The Union of Geologists.
25. The Union of Nurses and Ancillary Staff.
26. The Civil Service Union.
27. The Union of Working Women.
28. The Union of `Women Social Democrats in Kurdistan.
29. The Women's' Union of Kurdistan.
30. The Kurdistan Islamic Sisters Union.
31. The Salah Hawramy's Cultural Centre in Kurdistan.
32. The Democratic Youth Union in Kurdistan.
33. The Kurdistan Socialist Democracy Student and Youth Union.
34. The Union of Students of Zahmatkeshan of Kurdistan.
35. The Union of Women of Zahmatkeshan of Kurdistan.
36. The Social and Cultural Association of the Governorate of Kirkuk.
37. Ezidi's Centre Abroad.
38. The Labour Party for Independent Kurdistan – European Section.
39. The Kurdish Human Rights Organisation – Sweden.
40. SKKMR – Sweden.
41. The Islamic Union of Kurdistan – British Section.
42. The Kurdish Information Centre – London.
43. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights`– New York.
44. The Kurdish Organisation for Human Rights – U.K.


Kurdish Organisation for Human Rights – UK
London, September 18, 1997



Related: #unscr688 section of "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts".