from: [Eric LC]
to: [Chin-Kuei Tsui]
date: Aug 29, 2019, 5:55 PM
subject: Clarification of the Iraq issue in "Framing the Threat of Rogue States: Iraq, Iran and President Clinton’s Dual-Containment Approach to Middle East Peace"
Professor Tsui,
I use the primary source authorities, i.e., the set of controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts that define OIF's justification, at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ to clarify the Iraq issue and correct for the prevalent conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.
I appreciate your work illustrating the continuity of Middle East policy from President Clinton to President Bush, which is conspicuously missing in most discourse about the Iraq intervention. I've referred to your paper, The Myth of George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy Revolution.
In accord with your work, the Clinton-to-Bush continuity in the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement is a main theme of the OIF FAQ. Excerpt from the OIF FAQ answer to "What were President Bush’s alternatives with Iraq":
The key to understand President Bush's decision to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (Public Law 107-243) with Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) lies with President Clinton's enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire as it peaked in 1998 with Operation Desert Fox (ODF). Clinton's entire presidency was preoccupied with Saddam Hussein's noncompliance with the Gulf War ceasefire United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) resolutions (UNSCRs), principally UNSCRs 687 and 688. Bush's case against Saddam was really Clinton's case against Saddam, updated from 9/11. Likewise, Bush's enforcement procedure with OIF carried forward Clinton's enforcement procedure for Iraq, updated from ODF, the penultimate military enforcement step.With that, I am writing you to clarify the Iraq issue in your paper, Framing the Threat of Rogue States: Iraq, Iran and President Clinton’s Dual-Containment Approach to Middle East Peace.
Tsui:
After the 2001 World Trade Center Bombings, the George W. Bush administration discursively linked Iraq to al Qaeda and thereby justified the American-led war in Iraq.
The inference that President Bush justified Operation Iraqi Freedom by "discursively" blaming Iraq for al Qaeda and 9/11 is incorrect.
In fact, President Bush markedly did not hold Saddam culpable for the 9/11 attacks. The 9-11 Commission makes clear that while there was some initial suspicion that Saddam was complicit in the 9/11 attacks, with no confirmed link, Bush distinguished 9/11 from the Saddam problem. Hence, the distinct tracks of the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions.
Rather, the justification for President Bush's determination on Iraq is plainly stated to be Iraq's noncompliance with the Gulf War ceasefire mandates in line with "Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687" (UNSCR 1441). By procedure, OIF's casus belli was established when UNMOVIC confirmed Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" (UNSCR 1441).
Tsui:
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the George W. Bush administration discursively linked Saddam Hussein to Osama bin Laden and the World Trade Center bombings. In the name of counterterrorism, the Bush administration launched a global war on terror and overthrew Saddam’s regime (see Rogers, 2004, 2005, 2008).
The counterterrorism part of OIF's justification, Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441), is Saddam's extensive violation of the Gulf War ceasefire mandate to "condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism" (UNSCR 687). The terrorism-related mandate in UNSCR 687 is not limitedly defined as a link between Saddam and bin Laden or the 9/11 attacks.
In terms of the greater War on Terror, President Bush's statements show the significance of 9/11 regarding Iraq was not culpability in the 9/11 attacks but rather that 9/11 induced a heightened consideration of the threat posed by terrorism in general and the distinctive threat of Saddam's terrorism in particular, which boosted the urgency and political will to resolve Saddam's threat via Iraq's mandated compliance.
Tsui:
It is also worth noting that, until the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, there was no clear evidence to prove that Iraqi intelligence services were involved in any terrorist or assassination attacks aimed at killing American citizens or Western targets (Clarke, 2004: 84). This helps to explain why the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities were so doubtful about President George W. Bush’s interpretation of the link between Saddam Hussein, Usama bin Laden, and the 2001 World Trade Center Bombings (Ibid.).
Notably, the Iraqi Perspectives Project's post-war findings on Saddam's terrorism indicate that the pre-war assessment by the "U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities" represented by Richard Clarke significantly underestimated the scope of Saddam's terrorism, including Saddam's ties with the al Qaeda network. Excerpt:
Captured documents reveal that the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda-as long as that organization's near-term goals supported Saddam's long-term vision.
... Some aspects of the indirect cooperation between Saddam's regional terror enterprise and al Qaeda's more global one are somewhat analogous to the Cali and Medellin drug cartels. Both drug cartels (actually loose collections of families and criminal gangs) were serious national security concerns to the United States. Both cartels competed for a share of the illegal drug market. However, neither cartel was reluctant to cooperate with the other when it came to the pursuit of a common objective-expanding and facilitating their illicit trade.
...
Saddam supported groups that either associated directly with al Qaeda (such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led at one time by bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri) or that generally shared al Qaeda's stated goals and objectives.
...
Saddam's security organizations and bin Laden's terrorist network operated with similar aims, at least for the short term. Considerable operational overlap was inevitable when monitoring, contacting, financing, and training the regional groups involved in terrorism.
...
Under Saddam, the Iraqi regime used its paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam training camps to train terrorists for use inside and outside Iraq. In 1999, the top ten graduates of each Fedayeen Saddam class were specifically chosen for assignment to London, from there to be ready to conduct operations anywhere in Europe.
A Fedayeen Saddam planner outlines the general plan for terrorist operations in the Kurdish areas, Iran, and London, to "His Excellency, Mr. Supervisor" (the title for the head of the Fedayeen Saddam, a position occupied by Uday Hussein, Saddam's oldest son). This memorandum (Extract 1) specifically states that these "trainees" are designated for martyrdom [suicide or suicidal] operations.
... Two other documents present evidence of logistical preparation for terrorist operations in other nations, including those in the West.
Tsui:
After the first Gulf War, the George H. W. Bush administration decided to leave the Iraqi Saddam regime in place, expecting it could constrain Iran’s political influence in the Gulf.
Your characterization of President HW Bush's policy on Iraq is partially correct but omissive.
In 1991, President HW Bush did leave the Saddam regime in place with an eye towards Iran. However, you omit that the Gulf War was only suspended contingent on the condition that Saddam's Gulf War-established manifold threat would be resolved via Iraq's compliance with the measures purpose-designed to fulfill "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687).
The Gulf War ceasefire would become permanent only upon the fulfillment of Iraq's burden to prove its mandated compliance. Saddam was granted the power to switch off the US-led compliance enforcement, preclude resumption of the Gulf War, and thereby choose peace by proving compliance with the terms of ceasefire, which Iraq had accepted. President HW Bush and the international community's initial expectation was Iraq would come into compliance with the ceasefire terms, at least the UNSCR 687 WMD disarmament mandates, within a year.
Instead, Saddam chose to continually breach the Gulf War ceasefire and thereby resume the Gulf War. After UNMOVIC confirmed Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) and triggered OIF, the Iraq Survey Group confirmed "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions".
Your omission of President HW Bush's Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement results in a false dichotomy between Presidents HW Bush and Clinton, which skews your analysis with a faulty premise. In fact, President Clinton carried forward President HW Bush's enforcement of the UN resolutions on Iraq that were established with President HW Bush in the first place.
For a case in point, see President HW Bush's last report to Congress on Iraq per Public Law 102-1, Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance With United Nations Security Council Resolutions (19JAN93).
President HW Bush's report to Congress shows that the enforcement of "Saddam’s full compliance with all U.N. Security Council resolutions which were made during and after the first Gulf War, particularly Iraq’s military programme regarding weapons of mass destruction and the repression of the Iraqi people" (Tsui) preceded President Clinton; enforcement measures with Iraq that you suggest were initiated under President Clinton in fact began under President HW Bush; President HW Bush's January 1993 strikes on Iraq preceded President Clinton's "strikes to deter Iraq’s outlaw behaviours, such as the military operations in 1994, 1996, and 1998" (Tsui); the no-fly zones and related measures per UNSCR 688 preceded President Clinton; and support of the Iraqi National Congress preceded President Clinton.
In addition, consistent with his call for an Iraqi insurrection, UNSCR 688 enforcement, and support of the INC, President HW Bush implemented the Iraqi regime-change policy that developed into the "series of covert and overt actions targeting the Iraqi Saddam regime" (Tsui) under President Clinton. See, for example, National Security Advisor Scowcroft's November 1991 response to Congressman Murtha on Iraqi regime change.
Tsui:
Both [Ronald] Reagan and George H. W. Bush adopted a balance-of-power approach to tackle the threats posed by Iraq and Iran.
You're correct that the US wanted Iraq to "balance" Iran. However, your analysis is critically missing the greater need for Iraq to rehabilitate Saddam's Gulf War-established manifold threat.
As such, the priority initiated under President HW Bush was Iraq's compliance with the purpose-designed Gulf War ceasefire threat-resolution measures. The consequent policy on Iraq was essentially intact from President HW Bush through President Bush. What you interpret as a policy deviation between the HW Bush and Clinton administrations was in fact the continuous Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement adjusting to the dynamic situation with Iraq as it evolved with Saddam's continuing intransigence.
Over the intervening decade-plus, the lesser enforcement measures were exhausted with Iraq until the credible threat of regime change, i.e., resumption of the Gulf War, was the last remaining leverage to compel even deficient cooperation from by-then practically uncontained Saddam.
Tsui:
Bush’s 2002 speech in Cincinnati was seen as an important statement which launched the push for war in Iraq (Hodges, 2011: 72; 2007: 68).
President Bush's October 7, 2002 remarks on the threat posed by Iraq's ceasefire breach were important. However, again, your characterization is omissive. Bush emphasized that the choice for war, by not resolving "the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security" (UNSCR 1441), or peace, by resolving the threat with Iraq's mandated compliance, was Iraq's to make. Bush stressed the hope that the Saddam regime would use the opportunity to finally choose peace with Iraq's mandated compliance.
Excerpt from the OIF FAQ answer to "why did Bush go to the UN":
It only looks as though Bush was intent on invading Iraq because a credible threat of regime change was the necessary piece to compel Saddam’s cooperation with the inspections. Inserting UNMOVIC into Iraq required the US going to the UN, and UNMOVIC functioning in Iraq required a credible threat of regime change. However, as Bush explained on October 7, 2002, Saddam could have prevented regime change by complying with Iraq's ceasefire obligations:
America is challenging all nations to take the resolutions of the U.N. Security Council seriously. And these resolutions are clear. In addition to declaring and destroying all of its weapons of mass destruction, Iraq must end its support for terrorism. It must cease the persecution of its civilian population. It must stop all illicit trade outside the Oil For Food program. It must release or account for all Gulf War personnel, including an American pilot, whose fate is still unknown. By taking these steps, and by only taking these steps, the Iraqi regime has an opportunity to avoid conflict. Taking these steps would also change the nature of the Iraqi regime itself. America hopes the regime will make that choice. ... I hope this will not require military action, but it may. ... I have asked Congress to authorize the use of America's military, if it proves necessary, to enforce U.N. Security Council demands. Approving this resolution does not mean that military action is imminent or unavoidable. The resolution will tell the United Nations, and all nations, that America speaks with one voice and is determined to make the demands of the civilized world mean something....
If Saddam had accepted the lifeline from the chief enforcer of the Gulf War ceasefire to fully comply with all of Iraq's obligations under Security Council resolutions, then the Gulf War would not have resumed with Operation Iraqi Freedom in order to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L. 105-235).
Tsui:
Importantly, this specific interpretation established the parameters around how the subject of rogue states could meaningfully be discussed and comprehended. That is, they financed and supported terrorism, hungered for weapons of mass destruction, and violated the universal value of human rights.
According to those parameters, the terrorism, disarmament, and humanitarian-related fact findings confirm the Saddam regime was a fully fledged rogue state. In its "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), Iraq's ceasefire breach was categorical. Excerpt from the OIF FAQ answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom legal":
The subsequent Iraq Survey Group findings, including "In addition to preserved capability, we have clear evidence of his [Saddam's] intent to resume WMD", "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions ... [o]utward acts of compliance belied a covert desire to resume WMD activities", and "it has become evident to ISG that [Iraqi] officials were involved in concealment and deception activities" in breach of UNSCR 687, the subsequent non-WMD findings of Iraq's noncompliance, including the Iraqi Perspectives Project finding that "the Saddam regime regarded inspiring, sponsoring, directing, and executing acts of terrorism as an element of state power" in breach of UNSCR 687 and the UN Commission on Human Rights finding that "The new evidence, particularly that of eyewitnesses, added another dimension to the systematic crimes of the former [Saddam] regime, revealing unparalleled cruelty" (UNCHR) in breach of UNSCR 688, and the complicity of UNSC members with Saddam's noncompliance support President Bush's determination, "Because of the intransigence and defiance of the Iraqi regime, further continuation of these [diplomatic] efforts will neither adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq nor likely lead to enforcement of all relevant UNSC resolutions regarding Iraq."Indeed, the enforcement of Iraq's compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire mandates constitutes a paradigmatic test case for the international community confronting an exemplary rogue state. The US law and policy that have enforced the UNSCR 660 series reflect the diagnostic-cum-prescriptive "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) regarding aggression (UNSCR 949), terrorism (UNSCR 687), WMD and conventional armament (UNSCR 687), and human rights (UNSCR 688), which manifests a fully articulated "discursive framework" (Tsui) for enforcing the set of essential international norms, valuated with the full weight of US, allied, and international law.
I hope the OIF FAQ and these comments are helpful, Professor. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
Related: #hwbush section of "Perspective on Operation Iraqi Freedom" and #hwbush section of "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts".
