from: [Eric LC]
to: [Institute for the Study of Genocide]; Fwd: [Milton Leitenberg]
cc: [Ernesto Verdeja], [Joyce Apsel], [Alex Hinton]
date: Oct 19, 2021, 6:00 PM
subject: In praise of Helen Fein and Milton Leitenberg for ISG Newsletter #28, Spring 2002
Professor Fein, Mr. Leitenberg, and Institute for the Study of Genocide,
I clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ by organizing the primary source authorities, i.e., the set of controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts that define OIF's justification, to lay a proper foundation and correct for the prevalent conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.
I am writing you to appreciate Professor Fein's Editorial: Intervention and Responsibility - Afghanistan and Iraq Reconsidered and Mr. Leitenberg's Saddam is the Cause of Iraqis' Suffering in ISG Newsletter #28, Spring 2002.
The articles are included in the OIF FAQ's table of sources. While the Institute for the Study of Genocide is not a primary source authority, ISG Newsletter #28 nonetheless gives valuable contemporary context for President Bush's case against the Saddam regime that year and determination for Operation Iraqi Freedom the next year.
And, Professor Fein and Mr. Leitenberg's articles stand out today as remarkably astute knowing what we know now.
For example, you were skeptical then of Saddam's child mortality claims versus the sanctions, i.e., the diplomatic coercive alternative to military enforcement of Iraq's compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire terms, at the same time that American and British leaders bought the con hook, line, and sinker. You observed the child mortality stratagem undermining the sanctions.
We know now the Saddam regime fabricated the reported rise in Iraqi child mortality, which Saddam's international accomplices amplified to effectively defeat the sanctions by 2000-2001, which enabled the rise of "concomitant" Iraqi violations of UNSCR 687: "The Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council ... As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (Iraq Survey Group).
Saddam's victory over the sanctions impelled the ceasefire enforcers to fall back to military enforcement with Operations Desert Fox and Iraqi Freedom.
[You warned then of the growing harm and danger of tolerating the noncompliant unreconstructed Saddam regime to counterpoint the "safer" alternative of a "humanitarian intervention" where "Values, human rights and national interest coincided".]
We know now the Saddam regime's "regional and global terrorism" (Iraqi Perspectives Project), which included "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with al Qaeda, in violation of UNSCRs 687 and 949 and its sectarian tyranny in violation of UNSCR 688, already considered genocidal by outside observers, were "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq) than we knew before OIF.
You warned then that "toleration of Iraq's defiance of sanctions diminishes the credibility of any arms-control regime that is negotiated" much as President Clinton had warned, "If we fail to respond today, Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity".
We know now the Saddam regime's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire was categorical and "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" (Iraq Survey Group).
President Bush heeded your warning and acted correctly upon receipt of the determinative UNMOVIC report that confirmed Iraq did not resolve the "continued violations of its obligations" in Saddam's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). The subsequent principled, resolute adaptive American leadership with Iraq was necessary corrective to revitalize competitive American-led enforcement of liberal international order. The compliance enforcement and peace operations with Iraq were evidently succeeding at the pivot point that President Bush's successor chose to deviate course with an irresponsible exit from Iraq that has marginalized humanitarian liberal policy and degraded American leadership of the free world with still-compounding harmful consequences. President Obama should have heeded your warning like his predecessor did.
Finally, a comment on Mr. Leitenberg's article in particular:
I assume he and perhaps the Institute for the Study of Genocide by association were negatively impacted by the post-war criticism of the pre-war analysis of Iraq's UNSCR 687 violations based on that Mr. Leitenberg's analysis aligned with the stigmatized 2002 National Intelligence Estimate.
I reiterate, knowing what we know now, his pre-war analysis was astute.
Whereas the 09JUL04 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report on the U.S. intelligence community's prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq, while informative, is inapposite of OIF's justification because the SSCI report improperly shifted the burden of proof from Iraq to US Intelligence and dismissed Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) probationary status and established dual-use WMD method as preconceived bias.
In other words, the basic logic of the 09JUL04 SSCI critique of US Intelligence analytical tradecraft, although appropriate for the general case, is inappropriate for the particular case of Iraq's mandated disarmament pursuant the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441).
The basic logic of the 09JUL04 SSCI critique is akin to if the 9/11 hijackers escaped death on 9/11 and reiterated the established 'dual use' pattern that preceded 9/11 -- e.g., entering the US, flying lessons, packing utility blades in carry-on bags, etc. -- yet alternative nonthreatening explanations were prioritized and red-line threat analysis was deemed "overstated" (SSCI) until the unreconstructed recidivists again drew their 'dual use' knives in flight.
Suffice to say, UNSCRs 687, 707, 1441, etc. and the US law, policy, and precedent that enforced the Gulf War ceasefire mandates did not work that way.
Judged properly according to the operative context of the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement that's eschewed by the 09JUL04 SSCI critique, Mr. Leitenberg's and CIA's respective pre-war analyses of the indicators of Iraqi disarmament violation were responsible and proper.
It's critical to note that the Iraq Survey Group's non-findings are heavily qualified in the ISG report's Transmittal Message, Scope Note, and various sections. As David Kay clarified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 28JAN04, "at the end of the work of the [Iraq Survey Group] there's still going to be an unresolvable ambiguity about what happened ... [due to] the unparalleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program and their other programs as well". Which infers the ISG's findings -- rife with UNSCR 687 violations such as undeclared covert IIS biological laboratories and readily convertible BW production capability as is -- in effect constitute a floor only, not a complete account of Saddam's WMD. That key qualification is commonly missing in the discourse. For example, the false premise that ISG's non-findings are "clear" is a core premise of the Silberman-Robb Commission's 31MAR05 criticism of the pre-war analysis. Yet ISG's heavily qualified non-findings amount to an "unresolvable ambiguity" (Kay), not the "clear" premise on which the Silberman-Robb Commission's criticism depended.
The prevalent revisionism that has obfuscated OIF's justification since you published ISG Newsletter #28 does not change that Professor Fein and Mr. Leitenberg were right on Iraq in the first place.
I hope you find the OIF FAQ and these appreciative comments useful. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
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from: [Eric LC]
to: [Milton Leitenberg]
date: Oct 21, 2021, 12:36 PM
subject: Re: In praise of Helen Fein and Milton Leitenberg for ISG Newsletter #28, Spring 2002
Mr. Leitenberg,
You're welcome.
...
I'll say this again because I suspect you don't hear (read) it much elsewhere: Knowing what we know now, your prewar analysis on Iraq was astute.
After UNMOVIC confirmed Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) to establish casus belli per procedure, the Iraq Survey Group found incriminating, if not all of it definitive, evidence of an active Iraqi biological weapons program.
Just as significant, what ISG did not find was attributed to the "degradation" (ISG) of the "sanitized" (ISG) evidence. As such, ISG characterized those BW questions as unresolved, not an exoneration of the Saddam regime.
ISG found enough to conclude Saddam had an active BW program, but we can't know the extent of the BW reconstitution because Iraq rid evidence.
Yet the Silberman-Robb Commission, among others,
I assume I'm not saying anything you don't know already and better than I do. But you should know you're not the only one who has recognized the false narrative discrediting your work.
Again, you were right on Iraq in the first place.
