from: [Eric LC]
to: [Hal Brands]
date: Dec 31, 2025, 3:11 AM
subject: Criticism of your commentary on Iraq in "Reassessing Bush's Legacy: What the Transition Memoranda Do (and Don't) Reveal"
Professor Brands,
I clarify and relitigate the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ using the law and facts that define the Iraq issue.
I am writing to you to criticize your commentary on Operation Iraqi Freedom in "Reassessing Bush's Legacy: What the Transition Memoranda Do (and Don't) Reveal" in Hand-off: The Foreign Policy George W. Bush Passed to Barack Obama. I have previously criticized your 20JUN19 National Review article with Peter Feaver, "Lessons from the Iraq War", which you cite as your argument that OIF was a "mistake".
Bottom line up front, you need to stop making the problem worse with your expert influence validating the specious, degenerative Iraq Syndrome that has caused the "damage it did to the American psyche", "deep divisions in key international relationships", "eroded American credibility on the international stage", and "loss of leverage in promoting Bush's own Freedom Agenda".
You need to use your expert influence to solve the problem by eradicating the Iraq Syndrome in the politics and purging it as a policy premise, which begins by establishing the guiding premise that Operation Iraqi Freedom was justified pursuant to UNSCR 678 and a war of necessity according to Richard Haass's taxonomy. That is done by realigning the Iraq issue with its primary sources—i.e., the set of controlling law, policy, precedent and determinative facts that define OIF's justification—to correct the false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome and clarify OIF's justification to the public. As Hand-off illustrates, the 'factory reset' is needed as even top Bush officials mistake elements of the Iraq issue. The Iraq Syndrome slander of Vice President Cheney on his recent passing shows the problem is not going away on its own.
To repair the "damage it did to the American psyche", "deep divisions in key international relationships", "eroded American credibility on the international stage", and "loss of leverage in promoting Bush's own Freedom Agenda", first make the American and British public understand that their countries were right on Iraq in the first place. Then hold proponents of the Iraq Syndrome at home and abroad to account for tricking the world into the deviations that have caused so much damage. Censure Saddam's accomplices on the United Nations Security Council. Identify President Obama's choice to degrade and remove the vital OIF peace operations—in contravention of the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement and President Eisenhower's cardinal precedent—as the inflection point where the Iraq Syndrome metastasized and American leadership made the wrong turn off the right path. That will establish a clear reference point to orient "the American psyche" and "key international relationships" back to the right path of the principled, resolute, resilient, adaptive, competitively sufficient American leadership of the free world that crystallized in the crucible of Iraq under President Bush.
Brands:
A fully considered assessment of Bush's presidency will not be possible for many years. But the memoranda reproduced in this book, along with the accompanying postscripts, can allow historians to think more carefully about what Bush bequeathed to Obama—and what that tells us about his foreign policy record.
If not a "fully considered assessment of Bush's presidency", Professor Brands is fully able to critically assess every piece of commentary about OIF right now with a basic law-and-fact check to vet its fundamental validity. The bedrock law and facts that define the Iraq issue are straightforward, thorough, plain, and readily accessible. Impeachment by contradiction with OIF's primary sources is a litmus test: commentary on Iraq either credibly accords with the operative law and facts, which means it has a valid conception of the Iraq issue, or it contradicts the operative law and facts, which means it is misinformation.
For example, see my critical examination of the Chilcot report at Critical notes on the UK Iraq Inquiry Chilcot report. The Chilcot report is a primary embodiment of the Iraq Syndrome in America as well as in Britain. Chilcot's "lessons" have been instituted as a guiding premise of UK policy. Yet a basic law-and-fact check of the Chilcot report shows that it is specious, based on misrepresentation, cherry-picking, and omission. When the UK Iraq Inquiry's legal and factual misconceptions are corrected, the Chilcot report falls apart.
Brands:
The Iraq War was massively counterproductive from a counterterrorism perspective, because it reenergized a battered jihadist movement and unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East.
Partly as a result, the United States struggled under Bush—as it struggled under every post-9/11 president—to win the "war of ideas" by delegitimizing radical voices in the Islamic world. "Some 20 years after the attacks of September 11, 2002," one former official acknowledges, "America still has not 'won' the ideological battle originally outlined against Al Qaeda."
Partly as a result, the United States struggled under Bush—as it struggled under every post-9/11 president—to win the "war of ideas" by delegitimizing radical voices in the Islamic world. "Some 20 years after the attacks of September 11, 2002," one former official acknowledges, "America still has not 'won' the ideological battle originally outlined against Al Qaeda."
Correcting the false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome and clarifying the justification of the UNSCR 678 enforcement, including OIF, have always been necessary "to win the "war of ideas" by delegitimizing radical voices in the Islamic world" in the "ideological battle originally outlined against Al Qaeda".
The Iraq Syndrome is the primary reason that "Some 20 years after the attacks of September 11, 2002, America still has not 'won' the ideological battle originally outlined against Al Qaeda." Propaganda against the UNSCR 678 enforcement from jihadists since 1990-1991, augmented by propaganda from Saddam's international accomplices since the mid 1990s, was the cornerstone of al Qaeda's platform long before OIF. For example, note Iraq's central role in World Islamic Front Statement: Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders.
The Iraq Syndrome has continued to be effective propaganda since OIF. See, for example, Hassan Hassan's criticism of "leftists or anti-imperialists" for "fighting the Iraq war through Syria". The Iraq Syndrome forestalled the early enough humanitarian intervention with Syria that depended on President Obama, thereby enabling the extreme humanitarian toll in Syria caused by the Assad regime and its allies, in particular Iran and Russia, which added to the extreme humanitarian toll of Obama's radical deviation with Iraq per the Iraq Syndrome.
The substantive aspect of curing the Iraq Syndrome, i.e., realigning the Iraq issue with its primary sources, has always been readily accessible since the law and facts that define the Iraq issue are straightforward, thorough, and plain–immutable and incontrovertible. OIF's primary sources hold sway over leader, expert, and layman alike. Yet Professor Brands's commentary on Iraq markedly lacks primary sources. To help fix that, I show my work and cite the sources to model the corrective dialectic. Anyone can do it.
The hard part of curing the Iraq Syndrome has always been the political aspect of the task. It remains to be seen whether Professor Brands has the ethical character to relitigate the Iraq issue against the expert consensus propagating the emperor's new clothes of the Iraq Syndrome. I hope he does because Professor Brands's expert influence is urgently needed to establish the necessary premise to win the "war of ideas" in the "ideological battle originally outlined against Al Qaeda": the truth, that the UNSCR 678 enforcers led by America and Britain were right on Iraq in the first place.
Brands:
The Bush administration always viewed the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of a larger struggle to keep America safe from catastrophic terrorism.
... The Iraq War was massively counterproductive from a counterterrorism perspective, because it reenergized a battered jihadist movement and unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East.
... The Iraq War was massively counterproductive from a counterterrorism perspective, because it reenergized a battered jihadist movement and unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East.
The facts show the Bush administration was correct that Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom were both necessary "to keep America safe from catastrophic terrorism". The assertion that "The Iraq War was massively counterproductive from a counterterrorism perspective, because it reenergized a battered jihadist movement and unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East" is akin to blaming the medical team treating a cancer for causing the cancer.
OIF did not cause the "jihadist movement and unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East"; the Saddam regime did. The regime change exposed that Saddam's Iraq had festered over the twelve years that the UNSCR 678 enforcers vainly hoped Saddam would choose to comply with the Gulf War ceasefire mandates. Since 1991, Saddam's terrorism and corruption of Iraqi society became "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, 18MAR04) than the international community knew, which caused the mandated rehabilitation of Iraq to be harder than initially planned for.
To clarify the cause of the "unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East", see From Militant Secularism to Islamism: The Iraqi Ba’th Regime 1968-2003 by Amatzia Baram and The Islamic State Was Coming Without the Invasion of Iraq by Kyle Orton.
Kyle Orton: "To put it simply, the Saddam regime’s reputation for keeping a lid on religious militancy and sectarianism is exactly wrong; by commission and omission it brought both things to levels Iraq has scarcely ever known in its history."
To clarify the cause of the "jihadist movement", see Saddam: What We Now Know by Iraqi Perspectives Project co-author Jim Lacey. Excerpt:
... All of this is just the tip of the iceberg of available evidence demonstrating that Saddam posed a dangerous [terrorism and WMD] threat to America. There are other reports providing specific information on dozens of terrorist attacks, as well as details of how Iraq helped plan and execute many of them. Moreover, there is also proof of Saddam’s support of Islamic groups that were part of the al-Qaeda network. A good analogy for the links between Saddam and bin Laden is the Cali and Medellín drug cartels. Both drug cartels (actually loose collections of families and criminal gangs) were serious national-security concerns to the United States. The two cartels competed for a share of the illegal drug market. However, neither cartel was reluctant to cooperate with the other when it came to the pursuit of a common objective — expanding and facilitating their illicit trade. The well-publicized and violent rise of the Medellín cartel temporarily obscured and overshadowed the rise of, and threat posed by, the Cali cartel, in the same way that 9/11 camouflaged the terror threat posed by Saddam. In reality Saddam and bin Laden were operating parallel terror networks aimed at the United States. Bin Laden just has the distinction of having made the first horrendous attack.
Given the evidence, it appears that we removed Saddam’s regime not a moment too soon.
Given the evidence, it appears that we removed Saddam’s regime not a moment too soon.
The assertion that "it reenergized a battered jihadist movement" implies the false premise that the "jihadist movement" that attacked Iraq was primarily "reenergized" al Qaeda members "battered" in Afghanistan. Actually, the AQI/ISIS "jihadist movement" is primarily Saddamist terrorists and their "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with the al Qaeda network from before OIF. Excerpt from American Enterprise Institute panel discussion, "The Iraq War Series: The Conduct of the War":
Jack Keane:
The fact of the matter is, we were dealing with an enemy force that Saddam Hussein had before the invasion, that planned to do what he was doing. And we were conducting likely the most formidable insurgency the West has ever encountered. Why am I saying that? Human capital is usually an issue for insurgents. Sometimes they get it outside. But human capital, they had somewhere in the neighborhood, if you add up the Fedayeen, the Ba’ath Party militia, special Republican Guard, excuse me, and [inaudible 01:10:58] intelligence service, the numbers 130,000. I’m not suggesting that we’re all involved. But I’m suggesting to you that was a good place to start. Remember, this is Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-based insurgency to start with. He had an unlimited amount of money, billions and billions of dollars. Normally, in the typical Mao based insurgency, they’re starving for what? For capital. They had an unlimited amount of money. They had unlimited amount of arms and ammunition. ... And what else did they have? Well, hell, they ran the country for 35 years, and they wanted to take it back.
The fact of the matter is, we were dealing with an enemy force that Saddam Hussein had before the invasion, that planned to do what he was doing. And we were conducting likely the most formidable insurgency the West has ever encountered. Why am I saying that? Human capital is usually an issue for insurgents. Sometimes they get it outside. But human capital, they had somewhere in the neighborhood, if you add up the Fedayeen, the Ba’ath Party militia, special Republican Guard, excuse me, and [inaudible 01:10:58] intelligence service, the numbers 130,000. I’m not suggesting that we’re all involved. But I’m suggesting to you that was a good place to start. Remember, this is Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-based insurgency to start with. He had an unlimited amount of money, billions and billions of dollars. Normally, in the typical Mao based insurgency, they’re starving for what? For capital. They had an unlimited amount of money. They had unlimited amount of arms and ammunition. ... And what else did they have? Well, hell, they ran the country for 35 years, and they wanted to take it back.
Based on the Saddamist terrorists' insurgency and the post-war investigations of Saddam's UNSCR 687 terrorism and UNSCR 688 human rights violations, Operation Iraqi Freedom was necessary for the War on Terror. More than that, the facts show the Iraq regime change should have happened years earlier than the Afghanistan regime change to prevent the Saddam regime from fueling the dramatic growth of both the al Qaeda and Saddamist terrorist threats with the Iraqi state-level investment in "seeking and developing supporters from the same demographic pool" (IPP) that "increased the aggregate terror threat" (IPP).
Brands:
My own view is that objective historians may eventually be more sympathetic to the initial decision to invade, in light of several factors that are now well established: (1) that the containment policy of the 1990s was collapsing and Saddam Hussein was gaining greater freedom of action over time; (2) that non-military options for addressing the threat (whether "smart sanctions" or covert) seemed unavailing; (3) that after 9/11 any administration would have taken a harder line toward a dictator who combined extensive support for terrorism, known WMD aspirations, and a history of aggression; and (4) that the WMD-related intelligence failures were the result of analytical blunders rather than deliberate politicization. It is still possible, of course, to understand all of those factors and conclude—as I have elsewhere—that the invasion was nonetheless, on balance, a mistake.
See my criticism of Professor Brands's National Review article with Peter Feaver, "Lessons from the Iraq War", where he "conclude[s]...that the invasion was nonetheless, on balance, a mistake".
Professor Brands's "own view" on "the initial decision to invade" omits the factor of Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) in "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates that defined casus belli. Iraq's Gulf War ceasefire obligations were purpose-designed to solve the WMD, terrorism, human rights abuses, and other Iraqi threats that manifested with the Gulf War. Diagnostically, the ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) defined Iraq's threat, and the "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) measured Iraq's threat. The post-war fact findings on Iraq's UNSCR 687 disarmament, UNSCR 687 terrorism, and UNSCR 688 human rights violations show that over the twelve years that Saddam was allowed to continue ruling Iraq despite breaching the ceasefire all the while, the Saddam regime used the illicit time in power to reconstitute its WMD program and create the terrorism and societal conditions of the "jihadist movement and unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East".
To further clarify "(1) that the containment policy of the 1990s was collapsing and Saddam Hussein was gaining greater freedom of action over time", see the OIF FAQ answer to "Why did Bush leave the ‘containment’ (status quo)".
The 'containment' was chiefly sanctions-based. Iraq Survey Group findings show that Iraq defeated the sanctions with illicit diplomatic and economic means by 2001. Before that, the UNSCOM record shows that the sanctions had failed as coercive leverage by 1998. Following the Oil For Food adjustment in 1996, "As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (ISG). Along with supplying and paying for the reconstitution of Saddam's WMD program, the corrupted sanctions regime funded "Saddam’s use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups [that] remained strong up until the collapse of the regime" (IPP).
To further clarify "(2) that non-military options for addressing the threat (whether "smart sanctions" or covert) seemed unavailing", see the OIF FAQ answer to "Why did resolution of the Saddam problem require a threat of regime change" and the OIF FAQ retrospective #ultimatumoptions section.
The UNSCR 678 enforcement actually progressed to the point of regime change with Operation Desert Fox, when it should have happened. By 1998, all the lesser military and non-military alternatives to enforce UNSCR 678, including covert action and sanctions, had been tried and failed with the Saddam regime intransigently noncompliant. The post-ODF sanctions-based 'containment' was not real. President Clinton left office with the standing policy of direct military action to enforce UNSCR 678 since Saddam had killed the UNSCR 687 inspections in 1998. President Bush, Congress, and Prime Minister Blair took a step back from the standing policy and resurrected the UNSCR 687 inspections for Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) in 2002, but Saddam rejected the lifeline in 2003 as "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" (ISG).
To further clarify "(3) that after 9/11 any administration would have taken a harder line toward a dictator who combined extensive support for terrorism, known WMD aspirations, and a history of aggression", see the OIF FAQ answer to "Why not free a noncompliant Saddam".
Saddam's terrorist threat was more than "extensive support for terrorism" in violation of UNSCR 687. The Iraqi Perspectives Project found that the Saddam regime was a world-leading terrorist organization in its own right. Saddam's "WMD aspirations" were "known" because Iraq was caught red-handed reconstituting Saddam's WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687, "From 1999 until he was deposed in April 2003, Saddam’s conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs steadily grew in scale, variety, and efficiency ... Prohibited goods and weapons were being shipped into Iraq with virtually no problem" (ISG). Saddam's "history of aggression" was casus belli too. UNSCR 949 mandated "that Iraq not again utilize its military or any other forces in a hostile or provocative manner to threaten either its neighbours or United Nations operations in Iraq", which Iraq regularly violated with Saddam's "regional and global terrorism" (IPP) and attacks on the humanitarian UNSCR 688 no-fly zones.
For the President, the "harder line" on Iraq was reached by 1998. President Bush's case against Saddam for OIF reiterated President Clinton's case against Saddam for ODF.
For Congress, the "harder line" was reached by 2000. The March 22, 2000 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing on Iraq shows that what the President said on Iraq in 2002 Congress already understood in 2000: that the sanctions and UNSCR 687 inspections had failed, the sanctions-based 'containment' was not real, the Saddam problem was festering, including an active WMD program, and the UNSCR 678 enforcement had reached the line of regime change that Congress had codified in 1998.
The notable change is that Congress did not mention Saddam's terrorism when they reached (but not yet crossed) the line of regime change in 2000, unlike the President who was focused on Saddam's terrorist threat by 1998. After 9/11, Congress was focused on Saddam's terrorist threat when they crossed over the line of Iraq regime change with Public Law 107-243.
To clarify "(4) that the WMD-related intelligence failures were the result of analytical blunders rather than deliberate politicization", see the OIF FAQ answer to "Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq".
"WMD-related intelligence failures" were irrelevant "to the initial decision to invade" since by procedure the UNMOVIC Clusters document, which found "about 100 unresolved disarmament issues", established the WMD element of casus belli.
The "analytical blunders" were largely based on the UNSCR 687 inspection data, and it is unknowable whether those assessments were "blunders" since Iraq never accounted for Saddam's WMD per UNSCR 687, and the Iraq Survey Group was unable to account for Saddam's WMD per UNSCR 687 as the Iraqi "denial and deception operations" (ISG) that sabotaged the UNSCR 687 inspections continued in the OIF invasion and occupation to sabotage the ex post ISG investigation.
Nonetheless, the Iraq Survey Group confirmed the Iraq WMD threat. The ISG findings show a reconstituting WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687 with covert ready capability and ready capacity to scale up, and that is just a floor. Taken together, the large pile of WMD evidence that ISG uncovered despite the systematic Iraqi "denial and deception operations" (ISG) and "the unparalleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program" (David Kay, 28JAN04) strongly suggest Saddam possessed a vaster WMD program than we can know.
Before and after 9/11, Presidents Clinton and Bush were most concerned about Saddam's distinctive combined WMD-terrorism threat. The covert ready WMD capability found by ISG was markedly compatible with the deep terrorist capability found by IPP. Taken together, the ISG and IPP findings show that the growing and urgent Iraqi threat was substantially underestimated before OIF.
Brands:
Regarding Iraq, the Transition Memoranda are largely silent on the invasion itself and the course of the subsequent stabilization mission that was failing catastrophically by late 2006.
... I believe there will also be greater appreciation of some of the dilemmas the administration faced in Iraq after April 2003—the fact, for instance, that the alternative to a strict de-Baathification policy that helped provoke a Sunni uprising was a weak one that might have provoked a Shia uprising. Here, though, the president's consistent failure, through late 2006, to adjust course, to resolve crippling dysfunction, or even to fully acknowledge how badly things were going should continue to be judged harshly ...
Where this volume does promote a reassessment of Bush's legacy in Iraq is by providing greater perspective on the period from late 2006 through the end of 2008. Rather than accept the conventional critique of the war circa 2006—that it had failed and withdrawal was the only sensible option—the administration conducted a searching policy review that led to the commitment of additional troops, the implementation of a new counterinsurgency strategy, and other policy changes that collectively constituted the Surge.
... I believe there will also be greater appreciation of some of the dilemmas the administration faced in Iraq after April 2003—the fact, for instance, that the alternative to a strict de-Baathification policy that helped provoke a Sunni uprising was a weak one that might have provoked a Shia uprising. Here, though, the president's consistent failure, through late 2006, to adjust course, to resolve crippling dysfunction, or even to fully acknowledge how badly things were going should continue to be judged harshly ...
Where this volume does promote a reassessment of Bush's legacy in Iraq is by providing greater perspective on the period from late 2006 through the end of 2008. Rather than accept the conventional critique of the war circa 2006—that it had failed and withdrawal was the only sensible option—the administration conducted a searching policy review that led to the commitment of additional troops, the implementation of a new counterinsurgency strategy, and other policy changes that collectively constituted the Surge.
Hand-off clarifies that "the Transition Memoranda are largely silent on the invasion itself and the course of the subsequent stabilization mission" because the memoranda were focused on "the period from late 2006 through the end of 2008" in accordance with the mandate to help the Obama administration smoothly assume ongoing foreign affairs. However, "the invasion itself and the course of the subsequent stabilization mission" are discussed in the postscripts and commentary, which show that even top Bush officials and preeminent experts misconceive the Iraq issue.
Regarding the "subsequent stabilization mission", Hand-off's authors correctly point out that OIF was based on the Iraqi national security threat, not on the Freedom Agenda. However, in making that point, they mischaracterize Iraqi democratic reform as separate from OIF's national security basis and an impromptu decision after the regime change.
In fact, Iraqi democratic reform was not separate from OIF's national security basis. UNSCR 688 and Public Law 102-190 defined Iraqi human rights violations as a threat, and Iraqi democratic reform was the standing solution for the UNSCR 688 aspect of the Iraqi national security threat. And it was not an impromptu post-war decision. Iraqi democratic reform was longstanding law and policy that enforced the human rights mandates of UNSCR 688 per Public Law 102-190, which President Bush carried forward from Presidents HW Bush and Clinton with the rest of the UNSCR 678 enforcement.
Before OIF, Congress reiterated the standing law on Iraqi democratic reform which "expected...those actions described in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–338)" (Public Law 107-243), i.e., "once the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power in Iraq, the United States should support Iraq’s transition to democracy by providing immediate and substantial humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, by providing democracy transition assistance to Iraqi parties and movements with democratic goals" (Public Law 105-338). At the same time, President Bush reiterated the standing policy on Iraqi democratic reform, e.g., "If military action is necessary, the United States and our allies will help the Iraqi people...create the institutions of liberty" (President Bush, 07OCT02) and "United States objectives also support a transition to democracy in Iraq, as contemplated by the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–338)" (President Bush, 21MAR03).
Regarding "the dilemmas the administration faced in Iraq after April 2003", the misconception of Iraqi democratic reform goes hand in hand with the misconception of the cause and nature of the post-war insurgency. The misconception that Iraqi democratic reform was an impromptu post-war decision is a false premise for the misconception that the US therefore neglected to plan for the nation-building mission. Which is a false premise for the misconception that the post-war insurgency was therefore based on the Iraqi populace reacting to an ill-prepared occupation.
In fact, the US planned conscientiously for the post-war in accordance with the law and policy on Iraqi democratic reform. The US was prepared to occupy Iraq with the Iraqi populace that the US understood from twelve years enforcing UNSCR 688. However, the US was surprised by the post-war insurgency that derailed the initial post-war plan because the insurgency was based on Saddam's terrorism, which was substantially underestimated before OIF, not on the normal Iraqi populace.
The assertion that the post-war insurgency was based on "a strict de-Baathification policy that helped provoke a Sunni uprising" is a misconception based on the early misdiagnosis with the pre-war underestimation of Saddam's terrorism. We know now that the post-war insurgency was primarily pre-assembled by Saddam and his army of terrorists, not based on "a strict de-Baathification policy that helped provoke a Sunni uprising".
The assertion of "the president's consistent failure, through late 2006, to adjust course, to resolve crippling dysfunction" is incorrect. The OIF peace operations "adjust[ed] course" all along. The Iraq "surge" was not an overnight leap from think-tank theory to field deployment. Due to the debilitating Vietnam Syndrome, the counterinsurgency doctrine of the "surge" was not ready to go on a shelf in the Pentagon. While "the commitment of additional troops, the implementation of a new counterinsurgency strategy, and other policy changes that collectively constituted the Surge" seemed like a complete overhaul, in fact COIN was developed from the ongoing adjustments in Iraq from the beginning of the post-war "through late 2006" under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.
The criticism of "the president's consistent failure, though late 2006,...even to fully acknowledge how badly things were going" is unfair. Key benchmarks of the initial post-war plan were being met. The peacemaking tactics learned from the 1990s peace operations, Afghanistan, and in Iraq itself were being applied assiduously to the Iraqi populace. Until the Saddamist insurgency's bombing of the al-Askari mosque in February 2006, it was not obvious that the ongoing adjustments would not be enough. We know now the assessment of "how badly things were going" was skewed by Coalition officials looking at the normal Iraqi populace while not fully comprehending that the damage was being generated by Saddamist terrorists, and joined by their Iran-driven counterparts, from outside the normal Iraqi populace.
Brands:
Bush declared that "the United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most dangerous weapons."
President Clinton, December 16, 1998:
I made it very clear at that time what "unconditional cooperation" meant, based on existing U.N. resolutions and Iraq's own commitments. And along with Prime Minister Blair of Great Britain, I made it equally clear that if Saddam failed to cooperate fully, we would be prepared to act without delay, diplomacy or warning.
... This situation presents a clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere. The international community gave Saddam one last chance to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors. Saddam has failed to seize the chance. And so we had to act, and act now. Let me explain why. First, without a strong inspections system, Iraq would be free to retain and begin to rebuild its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs in months, not years. Second, if Saddam can cripple the weapons inspections system and get away with it, he would conclude that the international community, led by the United States, has simply lost its will. He will surmise that he has free rein to rebuild his arsenal of destruction. And some day, make no mistake, he will use it again, as he has in the past. Third, in halting our air strikes in November, I gave Saddam a chance, not a license. If we turn our backs on his defiance, the credibility of U.S. power as a check against Saddam will be destroyed. We will not only have allowed Saddam to shatter the inspections system that controls his weapons of mass destruction program; we also will have fatally undercut the fear of force that stops Saddam from acting to gain domination in the region.
... But once more, the United States has proven that, although we are never eager to use force, when we must act in America's vital interests, we will do so.
... This situation presents a clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere. The international community gave Saddam one last chance to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors. Saddam has failed to seize the chance. And so we had to act, and act now. Let me explain why. First, without a strong inspections system, Iraq would be free to retain and begin to rebuild its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs in months, not years. Second, if Saddam can cripple the weapons inspections system and get away with it, he would conclude that the international community, led by the United States, has simply lost its will. He will surmise that he has free rein to rebuild his arsenal of destruction. And some day, make no mistake, he will use it again, as he has in the past. Third, in halting our air strikes in November, I gave Saddam a chance, not a license. If we turn our backs on his defiance, the credibility of U.S. power as a check against Saddam will be destroyed. We will not only have allowed Saddam to shatter the inspections system that controls his weapons of mass destruction program; we also will have fatally undercut the fear of force that stops Saddam from acting to gain domination in the region.
... But once more, the United States has proven that, although we are never eager to use force, when we must act in America's vital interests, we will do so.
Since 1991, the policy on rogue-state disarmament and non-proliferation necessarily began with Iraq because the UNSCR 687 "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) comprised the highest international standard of disarmament and non-proliferation. The inspection regime, sanctions, and military action that coercively and invasively enforced the Gulf War ceasefire mandates comprised the highest standard of international law enforcement. Since 1991, US law and policy were fully committed to enforcing Iraq's mandated compliance pursuant to UNSCR 678.
Consequently, the UNSCR 678 enforcement of UNSCR 687 and related resolutions amounted to a proof-of-concept test for "pax Americana": Failure to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235) represented a model failure for the policy on rogue-state disarmament and non-proliferation specifically and of American-led enforcement of the post-Cold War liberal international order generally.
From 1991 to 2002, the United States failed in front of the world to enforce UNSCR 687 and related resolutions until President Bush, Congress, and Prime Minister Blair initiated the successful remedy to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (Public Law 107-243). In 2010, America officially passed the seminal leadership test of Iraq. But then President Obama radically deviated with Iraq to throw it away.
Brands:
It used coercive diplomacy (amplified by the initially successful invasion of Iraq) to induce Qaddafi's Libya to surrender most of its WMD stockpiles and become a partner in the global War on Terror.
... Bush declared that "the United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most dangerous weapons."
For a moment, in mid-2003, it appeared as though a then-successful invasion of Iraq might provide the coercive leverage necessary for that policy to succeed. But that leverage collapsed along with US policy in Iraq ...
... One of the great debates in international politics was whether the United States had too much power and influence for the good of the global system. ... Today, the question is not whether America is too strong and assertive; it is whether America is strong and assertive enough to defend a world order under strain.
... Bush declared that "the United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most dangerous weapons."
For a moment, in mid-2003, it appeared as though a then-successful invasion of Iraq might provide the coercive leverage necessary for that policy to succeed. But that leverage collapsed along with US policy in Iraq ...
... One of the great debates in international politics was whether the United States had too much power and influence for the good of the global system. ... Today, the question is not whether America is too strong and assertive; it is whether America is strong and assertive enough to defend a world order under strain.
President HW Bush, September 11, 1990:
The test we face is great, and so are the stakes. This is the first assault on the new world that we seek, the first test of our mettle. Had we not responded to this first provocation with clarity of purpose, if we do not continue to demonstrate our determination, it would be a signal to actual and potential despots around the world. America and the world must defend common vital interests -- and we will. America and the world must support the rule of law -- and we will. America and the world must stand up to aggression -- and we will. And one thing more: In the pursuit of these goals America will not be intimidated.
... Recent events have surely proven that there is no substitute for American leadership. In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt our staying power. We will stand by our friends. One way or another, the leader of Iraq must learn this fundamental truth.
... Recent events have surely proven that there is no substitute for American leadership. In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt our staying power. We will stand by our friends. One way or another, the leader of Iraq must learn this fundamental truth.
President Clinton, February 17, 1998:
Saddam Hussein's Iraq reminds us of what we learned in the 20th century and warns us of what we must know about the 21st. In this century we learned through harsh experience that the only answer to aggression and illegal behavior is firmness, determination, and, when necessary, action.
In the next century, the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now: a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals, who travel the world among us unnoticed. If we fail to respond today, Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity -- even in the face of a clear message from the United Nations Security Council and clear evidence of a weapons of mass destruction program.
In the next century, the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now: a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals, who travel the world among us unnoticed. If we fail to respond today, Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity -- even in the face of a clear message from the United Nations Security Council and clear evidence of a weapons of mass destruction program.
To help understand why Iraq answered the question of "whether America is strong and assertive enough to defend a world order under strain" for Presidents HW Bush and Clinton, see What American Credibility Myth? How and Why Reputation Matters by Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo.
When the UNSCOM Butler report confirmed "Iraq has abused its final chance" (President Clinton, 16DEC98) to comply with UNSCR 687, the threat of regime change in October 1998 paired with the Operation Desert Fox air campaign in December 1998 failed to "provide the coercive leverage necessary for that policy to succeed". The ODF failure to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235) left UNSCR 678 enforcers with the last option to "provide the coercive leverage necessary" for the threat of regime change that enabled UNSCR 687: a ground campaign, which became Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 when the UNMOVIC Clusters document confirmed Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" (UNSCR 1441).
Hand-off cites Qaddafi handing over WMD in reaction to the OIF invasion as proof that "a then-successful invasion of Iraq might provide the coercive leverage necessary for that policy to succeed". Whether other rogue-state leaders felt similarly moved by the OIF invasion to give up WMD is open to question.
What is not open to question is that the American leadership that debatably held "too much power and influence for the good of the global system" in the 1990s in reality lacked sufficient "coercive leverage necessary for that policy to succeed" as demonstrated by the non-disarmament and proliferation of WMD among rogue states including Libya, north Korea, Iran, and worst of all Iraq during the 1990s.
The assertion "that leverage collapsed along with US policy in Iraq" is incorrect as far as "collapsed" refers to the post-war insurgency. The premise that effective deterrence depends on the credible threat of American "successful invasion" as "the coercive leverage necessary for that policy to succeed" infers the opposite: that the contest for Iraq against the post-war insurgency was essential for American leadership to gain "the coercive leverage necessary for that policy to succeed".
Why? Because occupation and peace operations are elements of an American "successful invasion", and an insurgency like North Vietnam attacked South Vietnam, Saddamists attacked Iraq, and the Taliban attacked Afghanistan is a proven strategy against American occupation and peace operations. If we are lucky, the adversary may concede without a costly insurgency, like Serbia conceded Kosovo to NATO. But the possibility of insurgency can never be discounted, which automatically discredits the threat of American "successful invasion" if the United States is reputedly and implicitly averse to competing head on against an insurgency on the ground.
For example, Saddam chose to breach the Gulf War ceasefire from UNSCR 687 through UNSCR 1441 instead of simply complying at any time to switch off the UNSCR 678 enforcement because he assessed the threat of American "successful invasion" was not credible because Saddam believed the US was constitutionally averse to a hard occupation: the Vietnam Syndrome. For the sake of the "credibility of U.S. power as a check" (President Clinton, 16DEC98) moving forward, the United States needed to discredit that belief by beating the Saddamist insurgency on the ground with the world watching.
If the OIF invasion provided "the coercive leverage necessary for that policy to succeed ... for a moment, in mid-2003", the gain was conditional only. As President Kennedy forecast at West Point in June 1962, the real leadership test was always how the American president and our peace operators on the ground would respond when challenged by an insurgency that evoked the Vietnam Syndrome. The American president needed to hold onto the rope when it burned, which Bush did. The US forces in Iraq needed to prove to the watching world that when the OIF occupation lost the initiative to the Saddamist insurgency's vicious attacks on the Iraqi people like Saddam's genocidal rule of Iraq, the United States would respond to the setback by standing fast, staying resolute politically, and adjusting competitively on the ground to beat the Saddamist insurgency and thereby uphold the "US policy in Iraq". Which our soldiers did.
Brands:
That Surge was very much Bush's doing: it was chosen over the objections of some of his top military and civilian advisers. As careful scholarship has established, it allowed the United States to capitalize on the ongoing Anbar Awakening, leading to dramatic reductions in violence and moves toward political reconciliation. The war, it now appears, was on a trajectory toward success, or at least an acceptable outcome, when Bush left office.
The United States passed the seminal leadership test of Iraq with the counterinsurgency "surge" and Sahwa "awakening" like the US once passed the much harder seminal leadership test of Korea. President Bush's historic leadership on Iraq produced a vital corrective for American leadership at the dawn of the 9/11 era, analogous to President Truman's baseline-setting leadership on Korea at the dawn of the Cold War. Beating the Saddamist insurgency strengthened President Bush's successors with the proof of concept for "the coercive leverage necessary for that policy to succeed". Iraq reset the baseline for the competitively sufficient American leadership needed to correct the "weakness across an array of issues" by the American leadership that had fallen short of the festering al Qaeda and Saddam problems, among other issues, during the 1990s.
Brands:
Yet a Transition Memorandum authored by Brett McGurk also warned, presciently, that this progress was fragile and reversible. It would indeed be reversed, partially if not wholly because the Obama administration subsequently disengaged from Iraq's politics and prematurely ended the US military presence there. The resulting collapse precipitated another US military intervention, one that also created—albeit to a lesser degree—distraction and weakness across an array of issues. If nothing else, viewing the Iraq War against the longer arc of history reminds us that the eventual outcome was not written in stone from the moment the United States invaded—and that not all of its failures and disappointments can be laid at Bush's feet.
Brett McGurk's warning on Iraq "that this progress was fragile and reversible" in 2008-2009 was "prescient"—and normal. The same could have been said about West Germany or Japan at the five-year mark in 1950-1951. Even when there is no North Vietnam, Taliban, or Saddamists to contend with, building a nation to secure the peace does not happen faster or with less trial and error than raising a child.
McGurk's warning "that this progress was fragile and reversible" could not have been said about South Korea at the five-year mark in 1950-1951. Iraq was in far better condition in 2008-2009 than South Korea was at the presidential "hand-off" in 1952-1953. President Obama merely had to stay the course with Iraq like President Eisenhower stayed the course with South Korea. Instead, President Obama radically deviated from President Eisenhower's cardinal precedent with an irresponsible exit from Iraq that "collapsed...US policy in Iraq" with horrific and cascading consequences that remind us why US forces continue to serve in Germany, Japan, and South Korea approaching a century since World War Two and the Korean War.
Senator Daniel Moynihan famously counseled about the time and care needed for local community reforms in the United States, let alone the rehabilitation of Saddam-wrecked Iraq, "If you don't have 30 years to devote to social policy, don't get involved." President Obama started his career as a community organizer, so it is impossible to believe that he did not understand the risk when he "disengaged from Iraq's politics and prematurely ended the US military presence there". Obama's radical deviation placed the Iraqi people in great danger, crippled Iraq's nation-building progress, discarded the hard-won gain of real effective deterrence, restored the debilitating Vietnam Syndrome, and reified the degenerative Iraq Syndrome that misguided American leadership after President Bush left office.
Brands:
Here, though, the president's consistent failure, though late 2006, to adjust course, to resolve crippling dysfunction, or even to fully acknowledge how badly things were going should continue to be judged harshly, not least because it was the collapse of Iraqi stability that unleashed so many of the wider strategic consequences that persisted for years thereafter—indeed, in many cases those consequences could not be undone even when Iraq was temporarily stabilized a few years later.
President Obama, May 19, 2011:
Indeed, one of the broader lessons to be drawn from this period is that sectarian divides need not lead to conflict. In Iraq, we see the promise of a multiethnic, multisectarian democracy. The Iraqi people have rejected the perils of political violence in favor of a democratic process, even as they’ve taken full responsibility for their own security. Of course, like all new democracies, they will face setbacks. But Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress. And as they do, we will be proud to stand with them as a steadfast partner.
Professor Brands's criticism is misplaced when applied to President Bush on Iraq "through late 2006". The criticism is correctly applied to President Obama on Iraq from 2011 to 2014.
Blame for "the collapse of Iraqi stability that unleashed so many of the wider strategic consequences that persisted for years thereafter—indeed, in many cases those consequences could not be undone even when Iraq was temporarily stabilized a few years later" could apply to President Bush if President Obama had stayed the course with Iraq. But the blame cannot apply to President Bush because of Obama's radical deviation with Iraq. Professor Brands's criticism of Bush has the "America First" logic of blaming Presidents Roosevelt and Truman for the Soviet invasion that followed if President Eisenhower had withdrawn US forces from Europe like President Obama withdrew US forces from Iraq.
The Saddamist insurgency "battered" by OIF "reenergized" as ISIS in the Syria safe "space", where President Obama declined to intervene, and then went back to attacking "fragile and reversible" (McGurk) Iraq. Except now Iraq was stripped of the necessary American protection by Obama. Notably, when Iraq invoked the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement in their frantic calls for help, President Obama waited "to stand with them as a steadfast partner" until after the "collapse of Iraqi stability that unleashed so many of the wider strategic consequences that persisted for years thereafter—indeed, in many cases those consequences could not be undone even when Iraq was temporarily stabilized a few years later".
To help recall how President Obama replaced "Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress" in May 2011 with "the collapse of Iraqi stability that unleashed so many of the wider strategic consequences that persisted for years thereafter—indeed, in many cases those consequences could not be undone even when Iraq was temporarily stabilized a few years later", see Why Obama’s Foreign Policy Process is Broken by David Francis and Obama’s Syria achievement by Fred Hiatt.
Brands:
The Freedom Agenda resulted in a push to recalibrate key relationships across the Middle East ... the Arab Spring later validated one of its central insights by showing the absence of democracy was indeed a cause of radicalism and instability in the Muslim world. Yet the Freedom Agenda also proved very difficult to execute amid...the regional instability that the Iraq War created ...
I do not understand: Since Professor Brands ascribes the regional instability of the Arab Spring to "the absence of democracy was indeed a cause of radicalism and instability in the Muslim world" and not to OIF, then what was "the regional instability that the Iraq War created"?
To be sure, Arab Spring activists did risk their lives on the belief that the American leader of the free world would support them, which was based on the Freedom Agenda and the regional proof of Operation Iraqi Freedom. They trusted Nobel Peace Prize winner President Obama when he said America would stand by them, but then he did not. See, for example, Is Syria Obama’s Fault? by Syrian pro-democracy activist Ammar Abdulhamid who cites the Freedom Agenda and OIF to explain that President Obama's deviation to 'lead from behind' gravely harmed the moderate reformers in the Middle East who relied on American leadership of the free world.
Brands:
In dealing with Iran, moreover, the mishandled occupation of Iraq was a strategic millstone for Washington. "If the Bush administration's careful coalition-building and restraint of the nuclear front hemmed Iraq in," writes one administration official, "the international disunity and regional tumult that followed the initial US success in Iraq and Afghanistan produced the opposite."
The assertion that "In dealing with Iran, the mishandled occupation of Iraq was a strategic millstone for Washington" only makes sense up to the point of the Iraq "surge". A key component of the Iraq "surge" was the Iraq government satisfactorily dealing with the secondary Iran-driven insurgency that complemented the primary Saddamist insurgency. When that happened, the Iraq "surge" beat both the Saddamist insurgency and Iran.
As Peter Rodman explains, Operation Iraqi Freedom set up a better stable and ethical path to deal with Iran that relied on three prongs: stabilize Iraq as an American ally, increase sanctions pressure, and support civil reform in Iran. The three prongs were well within reach for President Obama when he entered office. Instead, as Michael Doran explains, President Obama did the opposite of all three.
Worse, President Obama's premature exit from Iraq in 2011, belated return to Iraq in 2014 only after Iraq was ravaged by the Saddamists and rendered vulnerable to Iran, circumscription of the 2014 return to counterterrorism without restoring the nation-building mission, and retraction of American leadership in the Syria crisis specifically and the Arab Spring generally were a stack of gift invitations that Iran accepted to take over the vital gap in Iraq that President Obama left behind. Iran's "regional tumult", which was hitherto contained, broke out from there.
Brands:
Most broadly, the human and material costs of the Iraq War, and the damage it did to the American psyche, probably retarded the country's reaction to a range of other, more severe, threats in subsequent years. As a result of 9/11, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Rice later wrote, America was simply "out of steam and out of ammunition."
The responsible and realistic way to lessen "the human and material costs of the Iraq War" was an earlier regime change. Procedurally, if not politically, the UNSCR 678 enforcement reached the point of Iraq regime change in 1998 with Operation Desert Fox. The longer the UNSCR 678 enforcers delayed resolving the Saddam regime's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441), the more that Saddam's terrorism and corruption of Iraqi society would have festered, which were already much worse than the international community knew, to drive up the unexpected difficulty and cost of rehabilitating Iraq per Public Law 105-338 pursuant to UNSCR 688.
"Most broadly", the assertion that "the human and material costs of the Iraq War, and the damage it did to the American psyche, probably retarded the country's reaction to a range of other, more severe, threats in subsequent years. As a result of 9/11, Iraq, and Afghanistan...America was simply "out of steam and out of ammunition"" contradicts the modern precedent of Cold War American leadership of the free world.
The "human and material costs" of either World War Two or the Korean War, or the back-to-back wars taken together, make "the human and material costs of the Iraq War" look like a minor line item. Yet obviously, the "human and material costs" that the US expended on war between 1941 and 1953 did not "retard the country's reaction to a range of other, more severe, threats in subsequent years" or make "America...simply "out of steam and out of ammunition"". The opposite happened. The two wars galvanized American leadership of the free world for the Cold War competition. The Korean War manifested both the Soviet and Communist Chinese threats, yet Presidents Roosevelt and Truman were not blamed for the loss of Hitler and Hirohito's 'stability' in Europe and Asia.
What is the difference between then and now? Obviously, it is not the "human and material costs", which were much less for Iraq than for Korea, let alone World War Two. That leaves "the damage it did to the American psyche" as the culprit, which implicates the false narrative of the degenerative Iraq Syndrome.
As for the "range of other, more severe, threats in subsequent years", they transformed into "more severe, threats in subsequent years" with the retraction of American leadership per the Iraq Syndrome in subsequent years that enabled the threats to become more severe.
Brands:
In Afghanistan, the administration should receive a great deal of credit for devising a plan that initially succeeded beyond all expectations—an innovative, agile approach that used airpower, special operations forces, CIA paramilitary assets, and other capabilities to rout al Qaeda and the Taliban in record time. The trouble came later, when key elements of the al Qaeda leadership slipped away in December 2001, and especially when America found itself stuck between the need to stabilize the country—the better to prevent a Taliban and al Qaeda resurgence—and a reluctance to invest large amounts of money and manpower on such unpromising terrain. The administration's chief failure, arguably, was that it did not so much reconcile these imperatives as elide the gap between them. As Paul Miller, Douglas Lute, and Meghan O'Sullivan write in this volume, "Initially, from 2001-2006, the Bush administration pursued a more limited, counterterrorism-centric approach while espousing ambitious state-building goals at the same time."
The resulting mismatch, combined with the policies of a fickle and hedging Pakistan, and exacerbated by the intense resource demands of the Iraq War from late 2002 onward, created space for a Taliban-led insurgency that was causing, by the end of Bush's presidency, an accelerating erosion of security.
... Fears of terrorism have faded significantly enough that the Biden administration could take the risk of accepting defeat in Afghanistan and trying to "demilitarize" the campaign against violent extremism.
The resulting mismatch, combined with the policies of a fickle and hedging Pakistan, and exacerbated by the intense resource demands of the Iraq War from late 2002 onward, created space for a Taliban-led insurgency that was causing, by the end of Bush's presidency, an accelerating erosion of security.
... Fears of terrorism have faded significantly enough that the Biden administration could take the risk of accepting defeat in Afghanistan and trying to "demilitarize" the campaign against violent extremism.
Although this part of the commentary is focused on Afghanistan, blaming "the intense resource demands of the Iraq War from late 2002 onward" for the Taliban insurgency places it in the scope of my criticism.
The assertion that "Initially, from 2001-2006, the Bush administration pursued a more limited, counterterrorism-centric approach while espousing ambitious state-building goals at the same time" implies the false premise that "initially" the post-war mission was limited to counterterrorism and only paid lip service to state-building. In fact, Operation Enduring Freedom's cutting-edge provincial reconstruction teams were fielded from the start of the post-war in early 2002. NATO literature makes clear that the state-building lessons of Kosovo were applied early on to Afghanistan.
The key facts to understand the post-war troop level and funding "initially, from 2001-2006" are the starting size from the war deployment and that insurgency violence was low until 2006. Regardless of "the intense resource demands of the Iraq War from late 2002 onward", there was no apparent need at the time for a military component of the post-war mission that was very much larger than the war deployment. Nonetheless, during that period and following it, when Afghanistan commanders requested more "manpower" as the post-war mission progressed, the Bush administration delivered it.
In terms of troop level, US forces in Afghanistan remained steady or increased during "the intense resource demands of the Iraq War from late 2002 onward". Of note, the US forces in Afghanistan "initially, from 2001-2006" were mainly elite soldiers with greater capability than their head count suggests. And the post-war was a NATO mission. Prior to the Afghanistan "surge", NATO's International Security Assistance Force deployed roughly the same number of troops to Afghanistan as the United States' Operation Enduring Freedom. (ISAF and OEF merged in 2007.)
In terms of funding, Defense funding did drop, but was not starved, during the first two years of OIF. Defense funding then returned to its pre-OIF level and increased. During those two years, State and USAID funding remained steady the first year and sharply increased the second year. State/USAID funding fluctuated after that, though that appears to be interdepartmental structuring rather than a reduction of the state-building mission.
Professor Brands is wrong that a "resulting mismatch" in the state-building mission "created space for a Taliban-led insurgency". The safe "space" where the Taliban set up their insurgency was in "fickle and hedging Pakistan", not "created" in Afghanistan. As Hand-off recounts, the Bush administration worked hard with Pakistan to solve the Taliban's safe "space" across the border, but that never happened. Taliban aside, it is not obvious that greater US, NATO, and UN investment would have significantly accelerated Afghanistan's state-building progress prior to the post-2006 proof of concept for counterinsurgency in Iraq given that the state-building mission was already state of the art in the context of Kosovo.
Realistically, the state-building mission could not have inoculated Afghanistan from the Taliban insurgency as long as Pakistan did not solve the Taliban's safe "space" across the border. Historically, insurgencies with Taliban-level motivation, capability, and safe "space" are able and willing to attack states and security forces that are significantly more advanced than the optimistic version of Afghanistan with ten years or even twenty years of state-building, let alone four or five years. "Initially, from 2001-2006" or prior to COIN, the best way within Afghanistan "to prevent a Taliban and al Qaeda resurgence" was exactly what OEF was fielding, the force mix "that initially succeeded beyond all expectations—an innovative, agile approach that used airpower, special operations forces, CIA paramilitary assets, and other capabilities to rout al Qaeda and the Taliban in record time". It worked for years until setback compelled adjustment, which is the normal pattern of competition.
It is normal that Presidents Bush and Obama increased the US forces in Afghanistan as the need for them arose. What was not normal is President Biden removing all the US forces from Afghanistan when the need for them arose in order to "take the risk of accepting defeat in Afghanistan...to "demilitarize" the campaign against violent extremism". What Biden did is the effective way to encourage insurgency against the United States.
Professor Brands's unrealistic notion under the circumstances of preventing the Taliban insurgency derives the wrong lesson of Afghanistan. The right lesson of Afghanistan—and Iraq—is the United States needed to learn to compete head on against an insurgency of the Taliban and Saddamists' caliber on the ground, which the US did in Iraq and was doing in Afghanistan until President Obama switched policy early in the Afghanistan "surge".
The effective way for the United States to deter insurgency is to prove to the world that American leadership has been cured of the debilitating Vietnam Syndrome and is now able and willing to defeat an insurgency of the Taliban and Saddamists' caliber in head-on competition on the ground. To that end, the Iraq "surge" and then the Afghanistan "surge" were obsoleting the Vietnam Syndrome until President Obama changed course with both missions to restore the Vietnam Syndrome and reify the degenerative Iraq Syndrome.
Sources:
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/afghanistan/
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020417-1.html
https://understandingwar.org/provincial-reconstruction-teams-prts
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf
https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/pdd25.htm
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/somalia
https://web.archive.org/web/20230629154247/https://nato.int/docu/review/articles/2023/06/20/nato-s-engagement-in-afghanistan-2003-2021-a-planners-perspective/index.html
https://web.archive.org/web/20220506131952/https://nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69366.htm
https://web.archive.org/web/20150311184722/https://nato.int/isaf/placemats_archive/2007-01-29-ISAF-Placemat.pdf
(There is a list of sources in this section because it is focused on Afghanistan. The sections focused on Iraq are better served by the OIF FAQ's main table of sources.)
Brands:
It is certainly fair to argue—and some of the Transition Memoranda obliquely acknowledge—that the Bush administration should have shown far greater urgency regarding terrorism before 9/11, even if it is far from clear that such a posture would have thwarted the attacks.
... The administration was simultaneously developing a longer-term counterterrorism program ... It was no exaggeration, as one administration official concluded, that America had deployed a "whole new set of tools and approaches for advancing our Nation's security."
... The administration was simultaneously developing a longer-term counterterrorism program ... It was no exaggeration, as one administration official concluded, that America had deployed a "whole new set of tools and approaches for advancing our Nation's security."
The argument that "the Bush administration should have shown far greater urgency regarding terrorism before 9/11" is unfair, and it is unrealistic. The argument is also unfair to the Clinton administration since the Clinton and Bush administrations had "significant continuity in counterterrorism policy" (9-11 Commission) and, related, significant continuity in Iraq policy.
The argument is unfair because the 9-11 Commission found that Bush officials paid heightened attention to intelligence warnings on the terrorist threat before 9/11, but they did so in a normal manner for the pre-9/11 context. The 9/11 attacks radically changed the context for the argument that "the Bush administration should have shown far greater urgency regarding terrorism before 9/11".
The argument is unrealistic because counterterrorism law and policy had reached the limits of the pre-9/11 context during the Clinton administration. The al Qaeda problem did not originate on 9/11. It grew during the 1990s with a platform clearly targeting the United States and attacks carried out on American targets. The Clinton administration responded to the growing terrorist problem with law enforcement, intelligence agency, and military action per enhanced counterterrorism law and policy of the same kind as, but of less degree than, the post-9/11 counterterrorism law and policy. See, for example, President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39.
Prior to 9/11, the Bush administration continued the counterterrorism and Iraq policies they inherited from the Clinton administration. Bush officials debated various adjustments to the standing "posture", but they could only be lateral changes. There was no more significant room to grow for "developing a longer-term counterterrorism program" inside the box of the pre-9/11 context.
Public Law 107-56 itself, which ushered in a "whole new set of tools and approaches for advancing our Nation's security", testifies to the limits of the pre-9/11 context. The legislative material in the USA Patriot Act of 2001 was recycled from the Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995 and Antiterrorism Amendments Act of 1995. The enhanced counterterrorism powers that the Clinton administration requested from Congress in 1995 were granted but watered down in Public Law 104-132, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
The United States was already showing "greater urgency regarding terrorism before 9/11". The "far greater urgency regarding terrorism" that "the Bush administration should have shown...before 9/11" only became realistic when the 9/11 attacks broke open the limited box of the pre-9/11 context.
The "far greater urgency regarding terrorism" compelled by 9/11 included "the very kind of threat Iraq poses now: a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists...who travel the world among us unnoticed" (President Clinton, 17FEB98). We know now "the very kind of threat Iraq poses now" included "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with the al Qaeda network and was substantially underestimated before OIF.
Brands:
Regarding Iraq, the Transition Memoranda are largely silent on the invasion itself and the course of the subsequent stabilization mission that was failing catastrophically by late 2006. Multiple memoranda do touch indirectly on the strategic consequences of that failure—cascading instability in the Middle East, deep divisions in key international relationships, a loss of leverage in promoting Bush's own Freedom Agenda, eroded American credibility on the international stage, weakness across critical issues ranging from North Korea to Iraq, and damage that outlasted the eventual righting of the situation in Iraq in 2007-08.
... It was slow to recognize, as were many American observers, the depth of Chinese and Russian hostility to the existing order—and the strength of those countries' desire to revise it to their liking.
... It was slow to recognize, as were many American observers, the depth of Chinese and Russian hostility to the existing order—and the strength of those countries' desire to revise it to their liking.
The failure of the baseline, paradigmatic post-Cold War American-led enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates from 1991 to 2002 "eroded American credibility on the international stage". Operation Iraqi Freedom's strategic victory in the primary mission to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235) and the Iraq "surge" in the "subsequent stabilization mission" restored "American credibility on the international stage".
President Obama's May 19, 2011 remarks on the Middle East recounts the winning hand he inherited to work towards peace in the Middle East. Preventing or solving the "cascading instability in the Middle East" depended on President Obama staying the course from President Bush with Iraq and the Freedom Agenda. More broadly, the Iraq "surge" provided President Obama with the "coercive leverage necessary for that policy to succeed" for "Bush's own Freedom Agenda" and "critical issues ranging from North Korea to Iraq". But Obama did not stay the course, which resulted in much cascading damage.
To establish the necessary premise for repairing the "deep divisions in key international relationships" and blunting "Chinese and Russian hostility to the existing order" vis-à-vis Iraq, Professor Brands needs to publicly censure France, China, and Russia, Saddam's accomplices on the United Nations Security Council, for their complicity in Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441).
Prime Minister Blair, July 6, 2016:
[A]s at 18 March 2003, there was gridlock at the UN. In resolution 1441, it had been agreed to give Saddam one final opportunity to comply. It was accepted that he had not done so.
In that case, according to 1441, action should have been agreed.
It was not because by then, politically, there was an impasse.
The undermining of the UN was in fact the refusal to follow through on 1441. And with the subsequent statement from President Putin and the President of France that they would veto any new resolution authorising action in the event of non-compliance, it was clearly not possible to get a majority of the UN to agree a new resolution. As the then President of Chile explained, there was no point since any decision by a majority would be vetoed.
In that case, according to 1441, action should have been agreed.
It was not because by then, politically, there was an impasse.
The undermining of the UN was in fact the refusal to follow through on 1441. And with the subsequent statement from President Putin and the President of France that they would veto any new resolution authorising action in the event of non-compliance, it was clearly not possible to get a majority of the UN to agree a new resolution. As the then President of Chile explained, there was no point since any decision by a majority would be vetoed.
Iraq Watch, April 13, 2003:
The data reveals that firms in Germany and France outstripped all others in selling the most important thing — specialized chemical-industry equipment that is particularly useful for producing poison gas. Without this equipment, none of the other imports would have been of much use.
Iraq Survey Group:
From Baghdad the long struggle to outlast the containment policy of the United States imposed through the UN sanctions seemed tantalizingly close. There was considerable commitment and involvement on the part of states like Russia and Syria, who had developed economic and political stakes in the success of the Regime.
... The MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] formulated and implemented a strategy aimed at ending the UN sanctions and breaching its subsequent UN OFF program by diplomatic and economic means. Iraq pursued its related goals of ending UN sanctions and the UN OFF program by enlisting the help of three permanent UNSC members: Russia, France and China. ... Saddam expressed confidence that France and Russia would support Iraq’s efforts to further erode the UN sanctions Regime.
... The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council.
... The number of countries and companies supporting Saddam’s schemes to undermine UN sanctions increased dramatically over time from 1995 to 2003 (see figure 54).
... In 2001, Tariq Aziz characterized the French approach to UN sanctions as adhering to the letter of sanctions but not the spirit. This was demonstrated by the presence of French CAs [diplomatic commercial attaches] in Baghdad, working to promote the interests of French companies while assisting them in avoiding UN sanctions.
... In May 2002, IIS correspondence addressed to Saddam stated that a MFA (quite possibly an IIS officer under diplomatic cover) met with French parliamentarian to discuss Iraq-Franco relations. The French politician assured the Iraqi that France would use its veto in the UNSC against any American decision to attack Iraq, according to the IIS memo.
... The MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] formulated and implemented a strategy aimed at ending the UN sanctions and breaching its subsequent UN OFF program by diplomatic and economic means. Iraq pursued its related goals of ending UN sanctions and the UN OFF program by enlisting the help of three permanent UNSC members: Russia, France and China. ... Saddam expressed confidence that France and Russia would support Iraq’s efforts to further erode the UN sanctions Regime.
... The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council.
... The number of countries and companies supporting Saddam’s schemes to undermine UN sanctions increased dramatically over time from 1995 to 2003 (see figure 54).
... In 2001, Tariq Aziz characterized the French approach to UN sanctions as adhering to the letter of sanctions but not the spirit. This was demonstrated by the presence of French CAs [diplomatic commercial attaches] in Baghdad, working to promote the interests of French companies while assisting them in avoiding UN sanctions.
... In May 2002, IIS correspondence addressed to Saddam stated that a MFA (quite possibly an IIS officer under diplomatic cover) met with French parliamentarian to discuss Iraq-Franco relations. The French politician assured the Iraqi that France would use its veto in the UNSC against any American decision to attack Iraq, according to the IIS memo.
President Bush and Prime Minister Blair's diplomatic decision to not hold Saddam's accomplices on the Security Council to account for their culpability on Iraq was a mistake. The United States and United Kingdom should have censured France, China, and Russia when the Iraq Survey Group report and IIC report on the Oil For Food scandal established that "The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council" (ISG).
Instead of being penalized for their wrongdoing, France, China, and Russia have benefited from helping Saddam violate the essential norms and rules codified in the Gulf War ceasefire mandates and propagating the false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome that has penalized America and Britain for properly enforcing UNSCR 678. Their profitable malfeasance on Iraq has empowered and emboldened China and Russia's pursuit of the "Chinese and Russian hostility to the existing order—and the strength of those countries' desire to revise it to their liking".
Brands:
In 2008, an overwhelming majority—98.2 percent—of historians considered Bush's presidency a failure, and a clear majority—61 percent—classified it as the worst in American history. Bush, by contrast, argued that his record would look better over time, much as another unpopular president, Harry Truman, later came to be regarded as one of America's great foreign policy presidents. Truman was not the only leader to benefit from such a reassessment: the historical treatment of other presidents, such as Eisenhower and Reagan, became more favorable as new records emerged and partisan rancor faded.
President Truman's Korea intervention is the modern analogue for President Bush's Iraq intervention in resetting the baseline for American leadership of the free world for the Cold War and 9/11 era, respectively.
Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan's records were positively reassessed because their successors in the White House stayed the course to see their initiatives to fruition. See, for example, The Myth of George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy Revolution by Chin-Kuei Tsui. In keeping with the norm of presidential continuity in foreign policy, the Iraq mission was a progressive continuum under Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush. However, President Bush's record on Iraq cannot be reassessed by the normal standard due to President Obama's radical deviation with Iraq.
Missing the normal continuity between presidents, a fair and accurate reassessment of Bush's record on Iraq will depend on an "historical treatment" that corrects the false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome, clarifies OIF's justification by hewing to the law and facts that define it, and distinguishes the Iraq mission under President Bush from President Obama's radical deviation.
Professor Brands, again, you need to stop making the problem worse with your expert influence validating the specious, degenerative Iraq Syndrome. Your expert influence is urgently needed to solve the problem by eradicating the Iraq Syndrome in the politics and purging it as a policy premise, which begins by making the public understand that the United States and United Kingdom were right on Iraq in the first place.
To help with the task, I show my work and cite the sources to model the corrective dialectic. I invite your critical feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
Related: Criticism of Melvyn Leffler's commentary on Iraq in Hand-off: "An Illuminating Hand-off".
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