* Update: In December 2021, Miller Center revised the "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs" essay. The original version of the essay, critiqued below, is archived here. Go here for my critique of the December 2021 revised version.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Gary Gregg]
date: Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 10:20 PM
subject: My explanation of Op Iraqi Freedom's law and policy, fact basis
Professor Gregg,
I read https://millercenter.org/president/gwbush/foreign-affairs with particular interest in the Iraq section.
I hope you'll be kind enough to give your feedback on my explanation of Operation Iraqi Freedom's law and policy, fact basis: https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/. It synthesizes the controlling law, policy, and precedent, and determinative facts that defined President Bush's decision for OIF.
Some highlights:
• A direct confrontation with Saddam actually was consistent with the enforcement position that President Clinton handed off to President Bush. Clinton's pronouncement "Iraq has abused its final chance" with Operation Desert Fox meant the compliance process was past, upon which Clinton policy had positioned the military to respond directly to any indication of Iraqi violation of the ceasefire terms. And there were indications across the board of Iraqi violation of UNSCRs 687 and 688. In other words, Clinton didn't pull the trigger before he left office, but he cocked the trigger for his successor. Bush going back to the UNSC for UNSCR 1441 was a step back from the enforcement position that Clinton had reached with ODF, tantamount to retracing to UNSCR 1205. Speculatively, going back to the UNSC likely made it worse for Saddam. A direct confrontation would have entailed a US-issued, rather than UN-issued "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). If Saddam had reversed his post-ODF policy on inspections upon a direct confrontation, then the guiding mandate for inspections more likely would have been the more pliable UNSCR 1284. Whereas the US going back to the UNSC ahead of confronting Saddam resulted in the strict UNSCR 1441. Either way, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) confirmed what everyone expected after a decade+ of intransigence: Saddam "never intended" to comply as mandated with the terms of ceasefire. However, sans UNSCR 1441, Iraq plausibly could have resorted to more "tactics of delay and deception" (Clinton) if UNSCR 1284 had been the guiding mandate for inspections.
• Preemption policy for the WMD and terrorism combination didn't begin with President Bush. Bush carried it forward from President Clinton's policy. Clinton had been chiefly concerned about Saddam's combined WMD and terrorism threat. That being said, while WMD-and-terrorism preemption was a policy position, the casus belli for OIF was the Saddam regime's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of ceasefire.
• The 'containment' was broken by 2000-2001 with "concomitant expansion" (ISG) of Saddam's conventional military and WMD-related proscribed procurement. Therefore, once Saddam failed his "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), the real alternative to OIF wasn't 'containment'. The other "choice" was compromising the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) to free a Saddam who was in categorical "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the ceasefire.
• Saddam's military-level conventional and WMD threats were degraded, although they were reconstituting in violation of UNSCR 687. However, the Iraqi Perspectives Project found that Saddam's terrorist threat, which also violated UNSCR 687, was worse than assessed before OIF, while the ISG findings indicate a ready terrorist-level WMD capability.
• The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) non-findings of WMD, including concerning stockpiles, although portrayed as unequivocal in the politics, are in fact heavily qualified in the ISG report.
• Note that Saddam did not unilaterally destroy his WMD "as requested" (Gregg). UNSCR 687 mandated or "requested" a verified total declaration of Iraq's entire WMD program and elimination of all proscribed items and activities "under international supervision". Recall that unilateral destruction prevented a verified total account which Saddam could exploit to hide proscribed items and activities, such as the IIS program uncovered by ISG. In fact, despite significant evidentiary gaps and other practical factors that limited the ex post investigation, the ISG report is rife with UNSCR 687-proscribed items and activities.
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Excerpt from Professor Gregg's e-mail: "Are there specific factual errors that need to be fixed, beyond the wider interpretive/ contextual picture you are pointing out problems in?"
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from: [Eric LC]
to: [Gary Gregg]
date: Tue, Oct 24, 2017 at 12:32 AM
subject: Re: My explanation of Op Iraqi Freedom's law and policy, fact basis
Professor Gregg,
I look forward to your feedback.
Critical comments on Iraq-related portions of https://millercenter.org/president/gwbush/foreign-affairs:
1. My general criticism is your omission of Clinton's Iraq enforcement is a fundamental oversight. The "crisis between the United States and Iraq" (Clinton) matured under Clinton. President Bush carried forward the case against Saddam and Gulf War ceasefire enforcement procedure from President Clinton.
2. Your phrasing "expanding the war to Iraq" in the Afghanistan section isn't wholly wrong, but it's ambiguous enough to be misleading in the context of the section.
OIF wasn't an expansion of OEF — the Saddam problem preceded the al Qaeda problem. President Bush didn't blame Saddam for 9/11. Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) with the terms of ceasefire was the coda of the decade-plus UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement which had come to a head in its own right.
However, while not an expansion, the two interventions were related under the War on Terror rubric insofar OIF's casus belli included Saddam's breach of the UNSCR 687 terrorism mandates with "regional and global terrorism" that included "considerable operational overlap" (Iraqi Perspectives Project) with the al Qaeda network. The "continuing unusual and extraordinary threat" (Clinton) posed by Saddam's WMD, terrorism, and other ceasefire breaches in particular and the threat posed by the WMD-terrorism combination in general had been marked under President Clinton. Their threat value, already pegged as the "highest priority" in US policy under Clinton, was heightened due to 9/11.
I clarify the link between 9/11 and the why of OIF at https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#911.
(Note: If you use Google Chrome version 61 or 62, the # anchor won't jump to the section. It works on other browsers. Or you can scroll down.)
3. "In his State of the Union speech in January 2002, President Bush called out an “Axis of Evil” consisting of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, and he declared all a threat to American security."
It's worth clarifying that Bush's statement has been oft mischaracterized in the politics. While Bush used the phrase "axis of evil", he warned about north Korea, Iran, and Iraq separately and did not characterize an alliance between the three nations. Substantively, Bush merely restated standing views on their illicit activities. In fact, the "axis" nations were (and in the case of Iran and north Korea are) cooperating in various illicit armament activities to a greater degree than Bush characterized in the 2002 SOTU.
See Iraq Survey Group: Regime Finance and Procurement:
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap2.html
Naval Post-Graduate School: The A. Q. Khan Network: Causes and Implications by Christopher Clary, December 2005:
http://fas.org/irp/eprint/clary.pdf
Congressional Research Service: Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation, 26FEB16:
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43480.pdf
4. "Bush Doctrine, officially traceable to September 2002" is misleading insofar it implies preventive counter-terrorism, right of defense, and liberal international leadership (a.k.a., American leadership of the free world) were novel policy.
Right of defense is as old as nations and counter-terrorism is intrinsically preventive. The "Bush Doctrine" is "traceable" to policy and precedent from the Clinton administration which had engaged the Saddam and al Qaeda problems and undertaken unilateral military action and post-Cold War liberal advocacy. To be fair, Clinton carried forward from his predecessors, too, but the policy evolution represented by the "Bush Doctrine" was mainly iterative update of post-Cold War developments under Clinton.
See The Myth of George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy Revolution by Chin-Kuei Tsui, 02DEC12:
http://www.e-ir.info/2012/12/02/the-myth-of-george-w-bushs-foreign-policy-revolution-reagan-clinton-and-the-continuity-of-the-war-on-terror/. Tsui does a fair job of describing the continuity from Clinton to Bush.
5. "As it turned out, Iraq was a war of choice rather than a war of necessity."
The 'containment' was broken. The alternative was giving up the ceasefire enforcement in the face of noncompliant Saddam, which was not a choice allowed in US policy.
6. "In light of intelligence reports describing an Iraqi plant that could be used to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the administration considered Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq a dangerous threat."
Recall that Saddam's pre-Gulf War WMD program was built with "dual use" items and activities, which informed the UNSCR 687 standard. The Iraq Survey Group, despite significant limitations, was able to confirm intent, procurement, a covert bio and chem lab network, readily convertible bio and chem production capability, nuclear and missile development, and deception.
7. "Bush and neoconservative members of his administration wanted to develop Iraq into a democratic country friendly to U.S. interests in the heart of the Middle East".
"Iraq liberation" was standing US law and policy that had progressed through HW Bush and Clinton's enforcement of the UNSCR 688 human rights mandates. The position was well mature by the time Bush entered office. It was simply part of the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, not novel policy.
8. "Many members of the Bush administration who had been in office during the Persian Gulf War of the early 1990s considered Iraq unfinished business."
Well yeah — so did members of the Clinton administration during the rest of the 1990s and everyone else in the US and around the world involved in the UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement. Until either Iraq proved compliance with the UNSCR 660 series or the UN (which meant the US and UK) gave in to noncompliant Saddam, Iraq was "unfinished business".
9. "President Bush had personally decided on the need to go to war, long before congressional or U.N. action."
That's not wholly wrong, but it is essentially misleading. Actually, Bush decided Iraq needed to be brought conclusively into compliance with the terms of ceasefire via Saddam's volitional compliance preferably, or via regime change if Saddam remained noncompliant. A credible threat of regime change — i.e., the "need to go to war" — was requisite for restoring the UN inspections.
Per the standing Iraq policy that Bush inherited from Clinton, the US could have attacked Iraq forthwith. Following Operation Desert Fox, Clinton's 'containment' policy included the contingency for direct military response to any indication of Iraqi violation of the ceasefire terms. And there were clear indications across the board of Iraqi violation. Casus belli was breach of ceasefire, and Iraq's breach of the Gulf War ceasefire was UNSC-established fact. Bush's decision to go back to the UNSC for UNSCR 1441 in effect stepped back from the position Clinton had reached with ODF, tantamount to retracing to UNSCR 1205.
Bush and Blair's approach to Iraq in 2002-2003 iterated Clinton and Blair's approach to Iraq in 1998, when it was established that compelling Saddam to cooperate at all with the UN inspections required the threat of regime change because Saddam was breaking the sanctions. The obstacle that Bush and Blair faced in 2002 was the bar for credible threat of regime change had been raised by Saddam successfully calling Clinton's bluff with ODF. Recall that after ODF until UNSCR 1441, Saddam refused UN inspections even when UNSCR 1284 held out the promise of a more pliable inspections regime.
Setting aside political and practical (military) considerations, there was little material difference between an ultimatum issued from the longstanding UNSCR 678-authorized ceasefire enforcers or from a new redundant UNSCR. Either way, Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) was established, compelling Saddam's cooperation required a credible threat of regime change, inserting the UNSCR 687 inspectors into Iraq required UNSC action, and enforcement pivoted on whether Iraq met its burden to prove compliance with the terms of ceasefire.
10. "In an August 2002 speech, Vice President Cheney made the Administration’s case quite clear: “Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use them against our friends, against our allies, and against us.”
I criticize how the pre-war intel was presented at https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#intelnotevidence.
That said, the view of possession was grounded in Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441), which imputed continued intent and possession, and was bolstered by the growing indicators of WMD-related activity, especially procurement.
ISG confirms at least intent and capability. Per UNSCR 687, there was no difference of enforceability between capability and stocks. There's a thin threat margin between them, and the margin shrinks with the IIS program.
11. "They believed that Iraq did, in fact, have WMDs, but that it did not necessarily have the capabilities to use them that Bush and Cheney believed."
This is a confusing statement. How would Saddam have WMDs but not the capability to use them? If you mean Saddam's WMD-terrorism combination, it does appear that pre-OIF analysis significantly underestimated Saddam's terrorism, though what was known was enough to breach UNSCR 687.
12. "Bush continued to assert that the United States could not trust Saddam Hussein with WMDs and that they could easily be transferred to terrorists."
The 1st part was a tenet of the Gulf War ceasefire. The 2nd part, Saddam's WMD-terrorism combined threat, was the standing US position from Clinton. Both parts were US positions as long as Saddam remained in breach of the UNSCR 687 WMD and terrorism mandates.
13. "A passionate debate ensued that ended with Congress passing a resolution authorizing the President to go to war with Iraq if he found it necessary."
"If he found it necessary" is ambiguous, which obscures that Public Law 107-243 wasn't ambiguous. It was particularly focused on enforcing Iraq's ceasefire-mandated compliance. It essentially reiterated and updated the standing US law and policy on Iraq.
14. "It later was discovered that the regime had actually disposed of its WMD stockpile as requested, but had hid its actions from the world."
If the Saddam regime hid its actions from the world, then ipso facto, it did not dispose of its WMD stockpile as mandated or "requested".
In fact, after Iraq did not account for its WMD stocks with UNMOVIC, ISG also did not account for WMD stocks as mandated in Saddam's stead. ISG gave the best assessment it could, but it's heavily qualified nonetheless. The ISG findings comprise a floor, not a complete account. And of course, the UNSCR 687 WMD standard covered more than stocks.
15. "Critics charged that the Bush administration did not have an adequate plan for Iraq after the initial war was won and Saddam Hussein was ousted from power."
I offer exposition about the initial post-war "humanitarian reconstruction" plan and early difficulties at https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#postwar.
Adequacy wasn't the basic problem. The basic problem was the humanitarian policy-oriented keystone premise that informed the "light footprint" calibration for the initial military role in the post-war peace operations. The same premise informed the UN's initial post-war approach to Iraq which resulted in the death of UN envoy Sergio Vieira.
The 2nd problem was the pre-war underestimation of Saddam's domestic rule by "widespread terror" (UNCHR) and world-leading "regional and global terrorism" (IPP), which converted to the terrorist insurgency that exploited the basic problem.
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from: [Eric LC]
to: [Gary Gregg]
date: Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 11:02 AM
subject: Re: My explanation of Op Iraqi Freedom's law and policy, fact basis
Professor Gregg,
An additional critical comment on Iraq-related portions of https://millercenter.org/president/gwbush/foreign-affairs:
It's a general criticism that's closely related to 1, so it's labeled 1a rather than 16.
1a. A fundamental oversight in your overview is the omission that Saddam's noncompliance with the Gulf War ceasefire terms established by UNSCRs 687 and 688 constituted ipso facto threat because the ceasefire terms were purpose-designed according to Saddam's established manifold threat. Therefore, measurement of Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) functioned as measurement of Saddam's outstanding threat. And Saddam's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the ceasefire regarding WMD and other areas was categorical.
In the operative enforcement procedure, Saddam's noncompliance was de jure threat, i.e., "Recognizing the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions ... poses to international peace and security" (UNSCR 1441), so that "it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced" (P.L. 107-243).
In the operative context, Iraq was on probation. Saddam's guilt with "the threat [of] Iraq’s non-compliance" (UNSCR 1441) was established and presumed until it was cured by Iraq proving it had rehabilitated with the mandated compliance. The post-Gulf War threat assessments and compliance enforcement decisions regarding Iraq were made in the operative context.
Whereas in the politics reflected in your overview, the operative context of Saddam's established and presumed guilt, which included UNSCR 687-proscribed intent and possession, has been replaced with an inapposite presumption of innocence, and the operative burden on Iraq to prove the mandated compliance has been replaced with an inapposite burden on the US to prove the predictive precision of pre-war estimates. The actual "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) regarding WMD that was enforced per US law and policy has been largely replaced in the politics by an inapposite narrow focus on whether the US found battlefield-ready WMD stockpiles.
It's also been obscured that in the operative context, the role of the intelligence regarding Iraq's WMD was ancillary: assist the UN inspections assess Iraq's compliance with the UNSCR 687 disarmament mandates. The intelligence was weighed upon the UNSCOM-established fact of Iraq's WMD and the overall outstanding threat of Saddam's noncompliance, which remained uncured due to Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441). As IIS counter-intelligence adapted expertly to thwart Western intelligence-gathering efforts, pre-war intelligence analysis practically relied on the UNSCR 687 findings, e.g., "With respect to stockpiles of bulk agent stated to have been destroyed, there is evidence to suggest that these was [sic] not destroyed as declared by Iraq" (UNMOVIC, 06MAR03).
Applying the operative context of the decade-plus UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement, particularly of the purpose-designed ceasefire terms, is necessary to filter all the data and discourse for a correct apposite understanding of the threat assessments and compliance enforcement decisions regarding Iraq. Trying to explain the why of OIF removed from its operative context is like trying to explain the why of World War One removed from the context of European treaties or World War Two removed from the context of autarky.
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from: [Eric LC]
to: [Gary Gregg]
date: Thu, Nov 2, 2017 at 2:54 PM
subject: Re: My explanation of Op Iraqi Freedom's law and policy, fact basis
Professor Gregg,
Pasted below is a longer version of my critical comment on "President Bush had personally decided on the need to go to war, long before congressional or U.N. action" from https://millercenter.org/president/gwbush/foreign-affairs. If the links in the text don't work in the e-mail, the text and embedded links are copied from https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#ultimatumoptions:
[Read it here.]
Of course, I continue looking forward to your feedback on https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/.
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from: [Eric LC]
to: [Gary Gregg]
date: Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 11:44 AM
subject: Detailed correction of "It later was discovered that the regime had actually disposed of its WMD stockpile as requested"
Professor Gregg,
Gordon Brown's calumnious accusation in his memoir that the US tricked the UK into war with Iraq by lying about Saddam's WMD (see my rebuttal) affirms the need to correct ASAP the flaws in your Miller Center account of President Bush's decision for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Miller Center's on-line resource is the kind of readily accessible, assumed credible source that high school students typically cite with the approval of their social science teachers, college underclassmen often cite with the approval of their instructors, and the public in general relies upon to be accurate.
I'll focus here on a readily correctable flaw that, if left uncorrected, will continue to propagate the prevalent fundamental misconceptions that underlie PM Brown's accusation: "It later was discovered that the regime had actually disposed of its WMD stockpile as requested, but had hid its actions from the world."
A: Iraq's unverified unsupervised hidden unilateral destruction of UNSCR 687-proscribed items was not "as requested", but in fact a critical violation of the UNSCR 687-mandated disarmament procedure and a longstanding tactic to subvert the mandated accountability of proscribed items and activities.
B: The notion that Iraq "actually disposed of its WMD stockpile" is unproven. Iraq did not account for its WMD as mandated with UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, and subsequently, the Iraq Survey Group was unable to account for Saddam's WMD as mandated. The ISG assessment that Iraq secretly unilaterally "disposed of its WMD stockpile" in violation of UNCR 687 is a heavily qualified best guess, not an "actually" proven disposition.
A: See paragraphs 8 to 13 in UNSCR 687 (1991) for the basic mandated — "as requested" — WMD disarmament procedure.
Following Operation Desert Fox, on January 25, 1999, UNSCOM executive chairman Richard Butler clarified the UNSCR 687 WMD disarmament procedure and summarized Iraq's strategy to undermine it:
3. For the conduct of this work [mandated by "Paragraphs 8 and 9, in section C of resolution 687 (1991)"], the resolutions of the Council established a three-step system: full disclosure by Iraq; verification of those disclosures by the Commission; destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all proscribed weapons, materials and facilities.On January 27, 2003, UNMOVIC executive chairman Hans Blix clarified the mandate for "substantive cooperation" to the UN Security Council:
4. From the inception of the relevant work, in 1991, Iraq's compliance has been limited. Iraq acknowledges that, in that year, it decided to limit its disclosures for the purpose of retaining substantial prohibited weapons and capabilities.
5. Actions by Iraq in three main respects have had a significant negative impact upon the Commission's disarmament work:
Iraq's disclosure statements have never been complete;
contrary to the requirement that destruction be conducted under international supervision, Iraq undertook extensive, unilateral and secret destruction of large quantities of proscribed weapons and items;
it also pursued a practice of concealment of proscribed items, including weapons, and a cover up of its activities in contravention of Council resolutions.
The substantive cooperation required relates above all to the obligation of Iraq to declare all programmes of weapons of mass destruction and either to present items and activities for elimination or else to provide evidence supporting the conclusion that nothing proscribed remains.UNSCR 687 integrated the destruction mandate with disclosure, verification, and supervision mandates. Unverified unsupervised hidden unilateral destruction of proscribed items violated UNSCR 687, subverted the mandated accountability, and enabled Iraq to hide proscribed items and activities, which Iraq did throughout the Gulf War ceasefire period. In fact, after Saddam chose to breach the ceasefire in his "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), ISG was able to confirm Iraq hid many proscribed items and activities that should have been declared in accordance with UNSCRs 687 and 1441.
Paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002) states that this cooperation shall be "active". It is not enough to open doors. Inspection is not a game of "catch as catch can".
It's important to be a stickler for clarifying the disclosure, verification, and supervision elements of the UNSCR 687 "three-step system" (Butler) because anti-OIF revisionists tout Iraq's unverified unsupervised hidden unilateral destruction of proscribed items as proof of false accusation by President Bush and exoneration of Saddam, when in fact, the opposite is true: unverified unsupervised hidden unilateral destruction was a critical ceasefire breach and a longstanding Iraqi tactic to hide proscribed items and activities.
B. The Iraq Survey Group's non-findings, which are prevalently interpreted in the politics as unequivocal evidence of absence, are in fact heavily qualified in the ISG report's Transmittal Message, Scope Note, and various sections with cautionary notes that the Saddam regime was expert at hiding proscribed items and activities, much evidence was lost before and during the ISG investigation, key Saddam regime officials were not forthcoming, statements conflicted, there were clear signs that suspect areas were "sanitized", and other practical factors, such as the terrorist insurgency, limited the ex post investigation. In other words, the ISG report is properly read as a floor, not a complete account of Saddam's WMD.
I address the issue in the OIF FAQ answer to "Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq"; note especially parts 5 to 7 of the answer. This excerpt addresses the popular misconception that Iraq "actually disposed of its WMD stockpile", which is actually unproven:
Six, OIF opponents who accuse Bush of lying his way to war with Iraq cite the ISG finding, "While it appears that Iraq, by the mid-1990s, was essentially free of militarily significant WMD stocks, Saddam’s perceived requirement to bluff about WMD capabilities made it too dangerous to clearly reveal this to the international community, especially Iran."
However, although OIF opponents represent the ISG finding as unequivocal, it is in fact heavily qualified in the Duelfer report:
With the degradation of the Iraqi infrastructure and dispersal of personnel, it is increasingly unlikely that these questions will be resolved. Of those that remain, the following are of particular concern, as they relate to the possibility of a retained BW capability or the ability to initiate a new one.[The Iraq Survey Group can offer a guess, but with its practical limitations, ISG can't be sure about the fate of all Saddam's secret stores and the extent Iraq's WMD program was retained and reconstituted. In many instances where ISG cited a lack of evidence, it meant the evidence required for a definite determination was missing or lost, not that absence of evidence was evidence of absence. With the burden on Iraq to prove the mandated disarmament and no mandate for the ceasefire enforcers to demonstrate Iraq's proscribed armament, the Iraq Survey Group's post hoc investigation was handicapped by that the UN inspections, OIF invasion, and post-war occupation simply were not designed to scour for, guard, and preserve evidence like a crime-scene forensic investigation. Concurrently, the systematic Iraqi "concealment and deception activities" (ISG), much unfettered, rid evidence of proscribed armament, e.g., "many of these [WMD-related] sites were either sanitized by the [Saddam] Regime or looted prior to OIF", "M23 [Directorate of Military Industries] officers also were involved in NMD [National Monitoring Directorate] document concealment and destruction efforts", and "extensive looting and destruction at military facilities during OIF" (ISG). The resulting evidentiary gaps prevented a complete account of Saddam's WMD by ISG.
• ISG cannot determine the fate of Iraq’s stocks of bulk BW agents remaining after Desert Storm and subsequent unilateral destruction. There is a very limited chance that continuing investigation may provide evidence to resolve this issue....
• The fate of the missing bulk agent storage tanks.
• The fate of a portion of Iraq’s BW agent seed-stocks.
• The nature, purpose and who was involved in the secret biological work in the small IIS laboratories discovered by ISG.
ISG’s investigation of Iraq’s ammunition supply points—ammunition depots, field ammunition supply points (FASPs), tactical FASPs, and other dispersed weapons caches—has not uncovered any CW munitions. ISG investigation, however, was hampered by several factors beyond our control. The scale and complexity of Iraqi munitions handling, storage, and weapons markings, and extensive looting and destruction at military facilities during OIF significantly limited the number of munitions that ISG was able to thoroughly inspect.
• ISG technical experts fully evaluated less than one quarter of one percent of the over 10,000 weapons caches throughout Iraq, and visited fewer than ten ammunition depots identified prior to OIF as suspect CW sites.
• The enormous number of munitions dispersed throughout the country may include some older, CW-filled munitions, and ISG cannot discount the possibility that a few large caches of munitions remain to be discovered within Iraq.
OIF opponents also overlook President Clinton's compliance-based Iraq enforcement escalated after the mid-1990s, peaking with Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, and the presumption of guilt for Iraq carried over to the post-ODF 'containment'. To fulfill its disarmament obligations, Iraq was required to prove it had disarmed with the particular steps that Saddam had agreed to abide by at the outset of the Gulf War ceasefire. The standard of compliance was set by UNSCR 687, which mandated Iraq to declare and yield all of its proscribed items and activities to the UN inspectors for "destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision" so that all of it would be accounted for sufficiently to verify Saddam had disarmed. As Iraq subverted the UNSCR 687 disarmament process, UNSCR 707 further mandated Iraq to, inter alia, "cease immediately any attempt to conceal, or any movement or destruction of any material or equipment relating to its nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or ballistic missile programmes, or material or equipment relating to its other nuclear activities without notification to and prior consent of the Special Commission". The disclosure and supervisory mandates were key because any undisclosed or unsupervised method, including the self-reported ridding touted by OIF opponents, prevented a verified total account and thus could be exploited by Saddam to retain and hide proscribed armament, such as the IIS program found by ISG. Therefore, any less than the mandated compliance kept Iraq at its default of presumed guilt.]
{...and so on...}
Add: Entreaty to Miller Center.
