from: [Eric LC]
to: [David French]
date: Apr 9, 2019, 4:11 PM
subject: For David French, recommendations regarding "In Defense of the Iraq War"
Mr. French,
I use the primary source authorities — i.e., the controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts — to clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ.
Before I respond to excerpts from your 20MAR19 National Review article, "In Defense of the Iraq War":https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/iraq-war-just-cause-saddam-hussein-threat-stability/, thank you for upholding Operation Iraqi Freedom. For reasons beyond the four corners of OIF, it is critical to set the record straight against the conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue. Basic issue-rule, fact pattern analysis shows President Bush's decision on Iraq was correct: the case against Saddam is substantiated. As I have done with the OIF FAQ, you can demonstrate the Iraq intervention was objectively justified on the law and facts as well as just according to personal belief.
David French:
He violated the Gulf War cease-fire accords,
I am addressing this excerpt up front because structuring the Iraq issue on the US-led Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement is key to lay the proper foundation and set the contextual frame necessary to counteract the prevalent anti-OIF false narrative.
Your article poses Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) as a separate issue from the WMD and terrorism issues when operatively they were the same issue. The fact that Saddam "violated the Gulf War cease-fire accords" (French) is not merely probative as your article implies; it is dispositive. The primary source authorities are clear that OIF's casus belli was Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire.
I recommend you clarify that the Gulf War ceasefire-mandated "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) was purpose-designed to resolve Iraq's Gulf War-established manifold threat, including Saddam's Gulf War-established WMD and terrorist threat. [Clarify that the burden of proof was on Iraq, which was on probation in its “final opportunity to comply” (UNSCR 1441).] Then clarify that the US mandate for the Gulf War ceasefire was to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (Public Law 107-243) and "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235).
Prescriptively, the Gulf War ceasefire mandates per UNSCRs 687, 688, 949, etc. defined the WMD, terrorism, human rights, and aggression issues for Iraq. Diagnostically, Iraq's unresolved established manifold threat, including Saddam's WMD and terrorist threat, was measured by Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441). The intelligence was evaluated in that context.
Operatively, Iraqi noncompliance equated to Iraqi threat; to wit, the UN Security Council "Recogniz[ed] the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security" (UNSCR 1441). Iraq's manifold threat was established and presumed until Iraq resolved its threat by proving the mandated compliance. In Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), "Iraq's non-compliance with Council resolutions" (UNSCR 1441) was confirmed to be categorical. The Iraq Survey Group confirmed Saddam "never intended" to comply as mandated.
For reference, review the dialectical structure of the OIF FAQ, which is purpose-designed to lay a proper foundation with the operative law and facts, and thereby correct the conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.
David French:
Today is the 16th anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, and Twitter is alive with condemnations of the conflict — countered by precious few defenses.
...
David French:
Even after American containment efforts attempted to lock into place and limit his malign reach,
I recommend you cite ISG findings that Saddam had broken "American containment efforts" (French) by 2000-2001 with "procurement programs supporting Iraq’s WMD programs" (ISG).
For reference, see the ISG (and IPP) findings cited in the OIF FAQ answer to "Why did Bush leave the ‘containment’ (status quo)".
David French:
... he was a prime supporter of a deadly Palestinian suicide-bombing campaign that caused proportionately more Israeli civilian casualties than American civilians lost on 9/11,
Your isolated example understates Saddam's UNSCR 687 terrorism violation because your article neglected to clarify the overall scope of Saddam's terrorism.
I recommend you cite Iraqi Perspectives Project findings that Saddam's "terror cartel" (IPP) was a principal source of global terrorism within and without Iraq, and included "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with al Qaeda.
For reference, see the IPP findings compiled at the #ipp section of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts".
David French:
... interfered with weapons inspections, and hid away chemical weapons by the thousands. No, his WMD program wasn’t nearly as extensive as we thought, but it is fiction to believe his weapons were entirely gone. Americans were injured by Saddam’s chemicals during the war.
You also understate Saddam's UNSCR 687 WMD violation.
First, again, I recommend you clarify that the operative WMD issue was Iraq's compliance with the UNSCR 687 WMD "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) and OIF's casus belli was principally established by UNMOVIC's confirmation of Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441). The UNMOVIC findings are rife with UNSCR 687 WMD violations.
Second, I recommend you clarify that the Iraq Survey Group corroborated UNMOVIC and further confirmed Iraq was reconstituting its WMD capabilities. The ISG findings are also rife with UNSCR 687 WMD violations.
Third, I recommend you clarify that the burden-shifting political demand that the US demonstrate Saddam's WMD matched pre-war estimates was always inapposite and unrealistic.
To that point, clarify that the ISG non-findings — i.e., the basis of the pervasive belief that "his WMD program wasn’t nearly as extensive as we thought" (French) — are in fact heavily qualified. When asked by Congress to assess the extent of Saddam's WMD program, Iraq Survey Group director David Kay answered it was an "unresolvable ambiguity" due to the large loss of evidence that was "directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program and their other programs as well".
Disarmament issues that Iraq failed to resolve with UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, including full and verified account of Iraq's WMD stocks, remained unresolved with the Iraq Survey Group. ISG cautioned its investigation was undermined by the same rigorous operational and information security that thwarted the UNSCR 687 inspections and Western intelligence in the first place. Iraqi counter-intelligence continued to systematically rid evidence ahead of and during the ex post ISG investigation. As such, ISG's assessment of the extent of Saddam's WMD program could only be a qualified best guess.
In effect, the ISG findings constitute a floor only, not a complete account of Saddam's WMD. We know from UNMOVIC that Iraq did not disarm Saddam's WMD as mandated, which triggered OIF. And we know from ISG that Iraq was reconstituting Saddam's WMD capabilities. Beyond that, with the numerous UNSCR 687 WMD violations and "fragmentary and circumstantial" indications of greater WMD activity reported by ISG, it is up to you to speculate on the mass of evidence that was "sanitized" (ISG) by Iraqi counter-intelligence when you consider the "unresolvable ambiguity" (Kay) of Saddam's WMD program.
For reference, the OIF FAQ and my 10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts cover the different aspects of the WMD issue across various sections.
I also recommend my Rebuttal of Prime Minister Brown's memoir argument against Operation Iraqi Freedom and Decision Points suggests President Bush has not read key fact findings on Iraq carefully as germane model answers.
David French:
Moreover, it’s easy to forget that before Barack Obama’s terrible decision to withdraw in 2011, the Iraq War had been won.
I recommend you clarify that President Obama's "terrible decision to withdraw in 2011" (French) contravened the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement, and that the conditions-based SFA — not the 2008-2011 SOFA — was (and is) the overarching agreement defining the US-Iraq relationship.
For reference, see the sources and commentary at An irresponsible exit from Iraq.
David French:
The first mistake belongs to George W. Bush and his commanders. It’s by now quite clear that we invaded with insufficient force to properly secure the country and then compounded that error with early blunders after Saddam was deposed. We not only failed to secure vast quantities of munitions, we disbanded the Iraqi Army and then pursued seriously flawed counterinsurgency tactics before righting the ship during the Surge.
First, see the clarification by CPA officials Dan Senor and Walter Slocombe regarding "we disbanded the Iraqi Army" (French); excerpt:
When the American-led coalition "disbanded" the Iraqi Army in May 2003, it was simply recognizing the fact that the army had long since dissolved itself -- in the Pentagon's jargon, "self-demobilized" -- as the mass of (mostly Shiite) conscripts fled the brutality of their (mostly Sunni) officers.At that point, moving ahead with building Iraq's post-Saddam military was more practical and a better ethical, economical, political, and securitywise option than attempting to restore Saddam's army.
Second, I recommend you clarify the initial "seriously flawed counterinsurgency tactics" were a consequence of the debilitating Vietnam War stigma that corrupted US politics and policy and undermined US peace operations capability. Realistically, the deep-seated Vietnam War stigma could only be corrected in Iraq through necessity on the ground and resolute adaptive leadership.
For reference, see When Anti-war is Anti-peace (15FEB07) about the Vietnam War stigma and the just-begun counterinsurgency "surge" with Iraq.
Third, I recommend you clarify, notwithstanding the above, that the initial "seriously flawed counterinsurgency tactics" involved a civilian-centered 'light footprint' approach that was valid in theory and consistent with the longstanding humanitarian law and policy for Iraq. But the initial post-war plan fell against the terrorist insurgency.
For reference, see the #postwar section of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts" for explication of the initial post-war plan and early difficulties, and the #unscr688 section of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts" for a listing of the humanitarian law and policy for Iraq.
David French:
Bush reinforced American forces as his commanders changed tactics
I recommend you clarify that the learning curve for the OIF peace operations matched a normal setback-and-adjustment pattern for any kind of real competition, including maximal contests of war and peace versus vicious enemies. There is a reason the low ebb of the Continental Army's winter camp at Valley Forge is featured in American history. The standard of preemptive perfection used to criticize the Iraq intervention is ahistorical. America's most important military successes, including the COIN "surge" with Iraq, routinely have been adjustments to traumatic setbacks.
For reference, see the #postwarmil section of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts" for my commentary on the US military's adjustment for the OIF peace operations.
I hope this is helpful. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
