Friday, May 29, 2026

The facts show Edward Feser was right on Iraq in the first place and changed his mind based on misinformation

PREFACE: Edward Feser is a professor of philosophy at Pasadena City College. Professor Feser says, "I supported it [Operation Iraqi Freedom] at first...on two main considerations", i.e., WMD and human rights. Yet Professor Feser now argues that "these considerations are not by themselves sufficient to justify going to war" with Iran based on "the example of the Iraq war, which is now widely acknowledged to have been a disastrous mistake". I explained to Professor Feser that the facts show he was right to support OIF in the first place and his keystone premise that OIF was "a disastrous mistake" is based on a demonstrably false narrative.

Professor Feser didn't respond to my e-mail, so I don't know whether he's read it.



from: [Eric LC]
to: [Edward Feser]
date: May 29, 2026, 10:00 PM
subject: The facts show you were right on Iraq in the first place and you changed your mind based on misinformation

Professor Feser,

I clarify and relitigate the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ using the law and facts that define the Iraq issue.

I am writing to you to clarify the Iraq issue in your 03MAR26 tweet explaining why you changed your mind on Iraq, 21APR26 tweet referencing Cardinal Ratzinger on Iraq, and your 11MAR26 Public Discourse article, America’s Conflict in Iran Is Not a Just War.

Clarifying the Iraq issue to you and the public is important. Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #americanprimacy section:

Stigmatizing right normalizes wrong in general. Stigmatizing an epochal paradigmatic right like the Iraq intervention fundamentally reshapes American culture, politics, policy, and leadership with metastatic premise. Clarifying and relitigating the Iraq issue means more than the 4 corners of the Saddam problem, President Bush's legacy, and Operation Iraqi Freedom itself. Since the 1990-2011 UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement and peace operations with Iraq activated all the elements of American leadership essential to compete for the dominance of pluralistic liberal world order in the geopolitical arena, the current prevailing revisionist narrative stigmatizing the Iraq intervention lays the foundation and sets the frame for a paradigm shift antithetical to American leadership of the free world.

The facts show you were right to support Operation Iraqi Freedom in the first place. You changed your mind based on misinformation. As you point out, the Iraq Syndrome is the context for the Iran issue, and the Iraq Syndrome "was one of the major factors behind the rise of Donald Trump". The Iraq Syndrome is based on a demonstrably false narrative. President Trump and his followers paved his way to the presidency by demeaning and discrediting the centrist Republican leadership with the same misinformation that changed your mind on Iraq.

Feser:
The strongest case for it (and the reason I supported it at first) rested on two main considerations: punishing Saddam's government for violating the terms of the first Iraq war's ceasefire vis-a-vis WMD; and freeing the Iraqi people from the terror of his murderous government. But the war failed on both counts, insofar as there were no WMD, and the civilian death toll that resulted from the war was horrific, an absolutely unacceptable price to pay.

See the OIF FAQ answer to "Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq".

Your assertion that "there were no WMD" in terms of "violating the terms of the first Iraq war's ceasefire vis-a-vis WMD" is incorrect. In fact, the UNMOVIC and Iraq Survey Group findings and Operation Avarice are rife with UNSCR 687 WMD violations.

By procedure, the UNMOVIC confirmation of Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) per the UNSCR 687 WMD disarmament mandates was the principal casus belli in President Bush's determination to use force per Public Laws 102-1, 102-190, and 107-243 pursuant to UNSCR 678 in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441).

Subsequently, the Iraq Survey Group corroborated UNMOVIC, "ISG judges that Iraq failed to comply with UNSCRs", and confirmed "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" and that the Saddam regime possessed an active WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687. From David Kay's report to Congress, 28JAN04:

In my judgment, based on the work that has been done to this point of the Iraq Survey Group, and in fact, that I reported to you in October, Iraq was in clear violation of the terms of [U.N.] Resolution 1441.
Resolution 1441 required that Iraq report all of its activities -- one last chance to come clean about what it had.
We have discovered hundreds of cases, based on both documents, physical evidence and the testimony of Iraqis, of activities that were prohibited under the initial U.N. Resolution 687 and that should have been reported under 1441, with Iraqi testimony that not only did they not tell the U.N. about this, they were instructed not to do it and they hid material.

In its assessment of Saddam's WMD program, the evidence found by the Iraq Survey Group constituted a floor only as the Iraqi "denial and deception operations" (ISG) that undermined the UNSCR 687 inspections continued to also undermine the ISG investigation. Iraqi counterintelligence got rid of evidence with a practically free hand during the inspections, invasion, and occupation, even during the ISG investigation. Consequently, the Iraq Survey Group largely characterized missing evidence as unaccounted for, "unresolvable ambiguity" (Kay), not "there were no WMD". From David Kay's report to Congress, 28JAN04:

I regret to say that I think at the end of the work of the [Iraq Survey Group] there's still going to be an unresolvable ambiguity about what happened.
A lot of that traces to the failure on April 9 to establish immediately physical security in Iraq -- the unparalleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program and their other programs as well, a lot of which was what we simply called Ali Baba looting. "It had been the regime's. The regime is gone. I'm going to go take the gold toilet fixtures and everything else imaginable."
I've seen looting around the world and thought I knew the best looters in the world. The Iraqis excel at that.
The result is -- document destruction -- we're really not going to be able to prove beyond a truth the negatives and some of the positive conclusions that we're going to come to. There will be always unresolved ambiguity here.

A reasonable assumption is that Iraqi counterintelligence prioritized higher value evidence than the proscribed items and activity that were left behind for ISG to find. A reasonable inference from the "unparalleled" (Kay) mass of evidence lost to the Iraqi "denial and deception operations" (ISG), taken together with the still large amount of evidence that ISG found, is that the Saddam regime possessed a vaster WMD program than we can know.

In short, you were right to support Operation Iraqi Freedom due to the Saddam regime's UNSCR 687 WMD violations.

Your opinion that "the civilian death toll that resulted from the war was horrific, an absolutely unacceptable price to pay" is an immoral position since "the civilian death toll" before, during, and after Operation Iraqi Freedom was primarily caused by "the terror of his [Saddam's] murderous government".

Iraq's Gulf War ceasefire obligations included the UNSCR 688 humanitarian mandates, per which Operation Iraqi Freedom defended the Iraqi people in accordance with American and international law.

Unfortunately, rather than choose peace with the regime change, Saddam and his army of terrorists converted "the terror of his murderous government" to the Saddamist insurgency that attacked the Iraqi people like Saddam ruled Iraq. Early on, the Saddamists' zeal and world-leading expertise at wrecking Iraq and terrorizing and mass-murdering Iraqis outmatched the US military's ability to defend the Iraqi people from Saddamists. The contemporary peace operations with Kosovo and Afghanistan simply could not adequately prepare American soldiers for Saddamists. The problem was made harder by the severe pre-war underestimation of Saddam's terrorism which led to the early misdiagnosis of the Saddamist insurgency as a reaction by normal Iraqis to occupation or de-Baathification. But the OIF peace operations adjusted to the competition relatively soon. Ultimately, the US military proved to be the only entity in the world willing and able to stop the Saddamist abuse of the Iraqi people in either their regime, AQI, or ISIS forms.

Since UNSCR 660, the majority of Iraqi "civilian death toll" was consequent to President HW Bush prematurely removing US boots on the ground from Iraq in 1991 and President Obama prematurely removing US boots on the ground from Iraq in 2011, which should be "an absolutely unacceptable price to pay" for (twice!) abandoning the Iraqi people to the Saddamists. From 2003 to 2011, the United States did not abandon the Iraqi people to the Saddamists.

In short, you were right to support Operation Iraqi Freedom due to the Saddam regime's UNSCR 687 terrorism and UNSCR 688 human rights violations.


Feser:
Cardinal Ratzinger on the Iraq war: “The concept of a ‘preventive war’ does not appear in the Catechism of the Catholic Church… It was right to resist the war and its threats of destruction. It should never be the responsibility of just one nation to make decisions for the world… Given the new weapons that make possible destructions that go beyond the combatant groups, today we should be asking ourselves if it is still licit to admit the very existence of a ‘just war.’” https://fff.org/2008/04/17/pope-benedict-bushs-war-iraq/

Cardinal Ratzinger misconceived Operation Iraqi Freedom as a "preventive war". The controlling law and policy on Iraq plainly show OIF was an international law enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates pursuant to UNSCR 678. The partial truth in Cardinal Ratzinger's view is that the Gulf War ceasefire obligated Iraq to "condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism" (UNSCR 687), which the Saddam regime extremely violated, and counterterrorism is intrinsically preventive.

Cardinal Ratzinger undermined international law by favoring the nations, led by France, Russia, and China, found to be complicit with the Saddam regime's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441)—"The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council" (ISG)—instead of the nations, led by the United States and United Kingdom, that faithfully enforced the Gulf War ceasefire mandates pursuant to UNSCR 678.

Interestingly, Cardinal Ratzinger's premise for questioning "the very existence of a 'just war'"—"Given the new weapons that make possible destructions that go beyond the combatant groups"—is also John Yoo's premise for revising the 'imminent' standard for anticipatory self-defense.


Feser:
But that these considerations are not by themselves sufficient to justify going to war should be obvious enough from the example of the Iraq war, which is now widely acknowledged to have been a disastrous mistake.

Operation Iraqi Freedom was not a "disastrous mistake". The basic flaw of your argument is that its keystone premise, "the Iraq war...is now widely acknowledged to have been a disastrous mistake", is based on a false narrative.

Properly understood, Operation Iraqi Freedom is not a cautionary example. Rather, OIF was correctly decided and its conduct was competitively corrective. President Bush's determination for OIF demonstrably was correct on law and fact. OIF was a war of necessity according to Richard Haass's taxonomy. And OIF was a vital corrective for effectual American leadership of the free world.


Feser:
Saddam Hussein’s fall was also cheered, but its sequel was not a happy one for the Iraqi people, who suffered between 100,000 and 200,000 civilian casualties (or even more, according to some estimates).
... Hence, suppose that, in removing an oppressive government that killed tens of thousands of protesters, U.S. military action were to plunge Iran into anarchy or civil war that resulted in hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths (which, again, is what happened in Iraq after Saddam was deposed). It would be quite absurd to pretend that the Iranian people would, in such a scenario, have been liberated.

The sequel to "Saddam Hussein's fall" was that Saddam and his terrorists converted their sectarian, terrorist, genocidal rule of Iraq to their sectarian, terrorist, genocidal insurgency against Iraq.

Operation Iraqi Freedom did not plunge Iraq into anarchy or civil war. Nor was the Saddam regime the antidote for anarchy and civil war. Rather, the Saddam regime created the corrupted Iraqi society that hindered the mandated rehabilitation of Iraq and produced the terrorists that manufactured chaos and faked a civil war. If Iraq was in anarchy and a real civil war, then there would not have been a Sahwa "awakening", and the counterinsurgency "surge" would not have turned the tide with such celerity.

Excerpt from Criticism of Hal Brands's commentary on Iraq in Hand-Off: "Reassessing Bush's Legacy: What the Transition Memoranda Do (and Don't) Reveal":

Brands:
The Bush administration always viewed the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of a larger struggle to keep America safe from catastrophic terrorism.
... The Iraq War was massively counterproductive from a counterterrorism perspective, because it reenergized a battered jihadist movement and unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East.

The facts show the Bush administration was correct that Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom were both necessary "to keep America safe from catastrophic terrorism". The assertion that "The Iraq War was massively counterproductive from a counterterrorism perspective, because it reenergized a battered jihadist movement and unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East" is akin to blaming the medical team treating a cancer for causing the cancer.

OIF did not cause the "jihadist movement and unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East"; the Saddam regime did. The regime change exposed that Saddam's Iraq had festered over the twelve years that the UNSCR 678 enforcers vainly hoped Saddam would choose to comply with the Gulf War ceasefire mandates. Since 1991, Saddam's terrorism and corruption of Iraqi society became "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, 18MAR04) than the international community knew, which caused the mandated rehabilitation of Iraq to be harder than initially planned for.

To clarify the cause of the "unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East", see From Militant Secularism to Islamism: The Iraqi Ba’th Regime 1968-2003 by Amatzia Baram and The Islamic State Was Coming Without the Invasion of Iraq by Kyle Orton.

Kyle Orton: "To put it simply, the Saddam regime’s reputation for keeping a lid on religious militancy and sectarianism is exactly wrong; by commission and omission it brought both things to levels Iraq has scarcely ever known in its history."

To clarify the cause of the "jihadist movement", see Saddam: What We Now Know by Iraqi Perspectives Project co-author Jim Lacey. Excerpt:

... All of this is just the tip of the iceberg of available evidence demonstrating that Saddam posed a dangerous [terrorism and WMD] threat to America. There are other reports providing specific information on dozens of terrorist attacks, as well as details of how Iraq helped plan and execute many of them. Moreover, there is also proof of Saddam’s support of Islamic groups that were part of the al-Qaeda network. A good analogy for the links between Saddam and bin Laden is the Cali and Medellín drug cartels. Both drug cartels (actually loose collections of families and criminal gangs) were serious national-security concerns to the United States. The two cartels competed for a share of the illegal drug market. However, neither cartel was reluctant to cooperate with the other when it came to the pursuit of a common objective — expanding and facilitating their illicit trade. The well-publicized and violent rise of the Medellín cartel temporarily obscured and overshadowed the rise of, and threat posed by, the Cali cartel, in the same way that 9/11 camouflaged the terror threat posed by Saddam. In reality Saddam and bin Laden were operating parallel terror networks aimed at the United States. Bin Laden just has the distinction of having made the first horrendous attack.

Given the evidence, it appears that we removed Saddam’s regime not a moment too soon.

The assertion that "it reenergized a battered jihadist movement" implies the false premise that the "jihadist movement" that attacked Iraq was primarily "reenergized" al Qaeda members "battered" in Afghanistan. Actually, the AQI/ISIS "jihadist movement" is primarily Saddamist terrorists and their "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with the al Qaeda network from before OIF. Excerpt from American Enterprise Institute panel discussion, "The Iraq War Series: The Conduct of the War":

Jack Keane:
The fact of the matter is, we were dealing with an enemy force that Saddam Hussein had before the invasion, that planned to do what he was doing. And we were conducting likely the most formidable insurgency the West has ever encountered.
Why am I saying that? Human capital is usually an issue for insurgents. Sometimes they get it outside. But human capital, they had somewhere in the neighborhood, if you add up the Fedayeen, the Ba’ath Party militia, special Republican Guard, excuse me, and [inaudible 01:10:58] intelligence service, the numbers 130,000. I’m not suggesting that we’re all involved. But I’m suggesting to you that was a good place to start. Remember, this is Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-based insurgency to start with. He had an unlimited amount of money, billions and billions of dollars. Normally, in the typical Mao based insurgency, they’re starving for what? For capital. They had an unlimited amount of money. They had unlimited amount of arms and ammunition. ... And what else did they have? Well, hell, they ran the country for 35 years, and they wanted to take it back.

Based on the Saddamist terrorists' insurgency and the post-war investigations of Saddam's UNSCR 687 terrorism and UNSCR 688 human rights violations, Operation Iraqi Freedom was necessary for the War on Terror. More than that, the facts show the Iraq regime change should have happened years earlier than the Afghanistan regime change to prevent the Saddam regime from fueling the dramatic growth of both the al Qaeda and Saddamist terrorist threats with the Iraqi state-level investment in "seeking and developing supporters from the same demographic pool" (IPP) that "increased the aggregate terror threat" (IPP).

Operation Iraqi Freedom liberated Iraq from the Saddam regime in 2003, but the Iraqi regime change was only the first step needed to solve the Saddam problem. It took longer to diagnose the "sequel" Saddamist insurgency, develop counterinsurgency, and defeat the Saddamist insurgency.


Feser:
The war also cost the U.S. dearly in blood and treasure.

The heightened cost of Operation Iraqi Freedom is a consequence of the Gulf War ceasefire enforcers allowing the noncompliant Saddam problem to fester for twelve years despite that from the start, President HW Bush, President Clinton, and Congress diagnosed that Iraqi regime change was needed to solve the Saddam problem. Saddam used the extra time in power to make his terrorism and human rights abuses "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, 18MAR04) than we knew, which preconfigured the Saddamist insurgency and created the corrupted condition of Iraqi society that drove up the cost of rehabilitating Iraq.

Excerpt from Review of Linda Robinson's "The Long Shadow of the Iraq War: Lessons and Legacies Twenty Years Later":

Robinson:
Senior regional experts warned of the perfect storm [PDF] that could ensue if Saddam were toppled, and of the massive years-long reconstruction project that would be required to restore stability.

Worrying about "the perfect storm that could ensue" when confronting a growing problem is a normal and useful exercise. But sooner or later, action towards solving that problem must happen. The solution needs to start somewhere. From there, setbacks and adjustments are normal. Otherwise, the problem will keep worsening, and what could have solved the problem yesterday won't be enough today and will be less adequate tomorrow. That's how an initial post-war plan that likely would have worked for an early-1990s, or even mid-1990s, Iraq proved insufficient in 2003. That's how the Powell Doctrine becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy.

As far as "the massive years-long reconstruction project that would be required to restore stability", that's not new for the American leader of the free world. There's a reason US forces have been stationed in Germany, Japan, and Korea since World War Two. The United States has understood that securing the long-term peace is necessary to win the short-term war, hence the Gulf War ceasefire.

The references at "perfect storm" and "years-long reconstruction project" help illustrate that the noncompliant-Saddam problem was growing worse. Concomitantly, the cost and difficulty of the "reconstruction project" with post-Saddam Iraq was growing as long as the noncompliant-Saddam problem was allowed to fester.

So while Ms. Robinson is correct that in 2003 the Iraqi regime change was costly and difficult, at the same time, nation-building post-Saddam Iraq was as cheap and easy as it ever was going to be moving forward. It would have been cheaper and easier in 1991 when the Powell Doctrine held back President HW Bush as the Iraqis who answered his call to revolt were slaughtered. Or in 1998 when Congress made Iraqi regime change the law to join the executive policy, but then ODF confirmed to Saddam that America was a paper tiger.

President HW Bush, President Clinton, and Congress all held up Iraqi regime change as the solution to the noncompliant-Saddam problem. Yet they kicked the can down the road as the problem festered until some successor was compelled to fix it. That successor turned out to be President Bush.

The lesson from the cost of Operation Iraqi Freedom for the Iran problem is that the President and Congress should resolve the analogous Iran problem as soon as possible and not allow it fester, the American mistake that drove up the cost of solving the Saddam problem.


Feser:
Anger over its failure was one of the major factors behind the rise of Donald Trump, who promised not to lead the country into another such war.

See the OIF FAQ epilogue answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory".

Operation Iraqi Freedom was not a failure. OIF was a strategic victory under President Bush. The "failure" was President Obama's strategic blunder of prematurely ending the OIF peace operations. President Obama's irresponsible exit from Iraq has resulted in cascading harms.

Excerpt from Criticism of Hal Brands's commentary on Iraq in Hand-Off: "Reassessing Bush's Legacy: What the Transition Memoranda Do (and Don't) Reveal":

Brands:
Here, though, the president's consistent failure, though late 2006, to adjust course, to resolve crippling dysfunction, or even to fully acknowledge how badly things were going should continue to be judged harshly, not least because it was the collapse of Iraqi stability that unleashed so many of the wider strategic consequences that persisted for years thereafter—indeed, in many cases those consequences could not be undone even when Iraq was temporarily stabilized a few years later.

President Obama, May 19, 2011:

Indeed, one of the broader lessons to be drawn from this period is that sectarian divides need not lead to conflict. In Iraq, we see the promise of a multiethnic, multisectarian democracy. The Iraqi people have rejected the perils of political violence in favor of a democratic process, even as they’ve taken full responsibility for their own security. Of course, like all new democracies, they will face setbacks. But Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress. And as they do, we will be proud to stand with them as a steadfast partner.

Professor Brands's criticism is misplaced when applied to President Bush on Iraq "through late 2006". The criticism is correctly applied to President Obama on Iraq from 2011 to 2014.

Blame for "the collapse of Iraqi stability that unleashed so many of the wider strategic consequences that persisted for years thereafter—indeed, in many cases those consequences could not be undone even when Iraq was temporarily stabilized a few years later" could apply to President Bush if President Obama had stayed the course with Iraq. But the blame cannot apply to President Bush because of Obama's radical deviation with Iraq. Professor Brands's criticism of Bush has the "America First" logic of blaming Presidents Roosevelt and Truman for the Soviet invasion that followed if President Eisenhower had withdrawn US forces from Europe like President Obama withdrew US forces from Iraq.

The Saddamist insurgency "battered" by OIF "reenergized" as ISIS in the Syria safe "space", where President Obama declined to intervene, and then went back to attacking "fragile and reversible" (McGurk) Iraq. Except now Iraq was stripped of the necessary American protection by Obama. Notably, when Iraq invoked the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement in their frantic calls for help, President Obama waited "to stand with them as a steadfast partner" until after the "collapse of Iraqi stability that unleashed so many of the wider strategic consequences that persisted for years thereafter—indeed, in many cases those consequences could not be undone even when Iraq was temporarily stabilized a few years later".

To help recall how President Obama replaced "Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress" in May 2011 with "the collapse of Iraqi stability that unleashed so many of the wider strategic consequences that persisted for years thereafter—indeed, in many cases those consequences could not be undone even when Iraq was temporarily stabilized a few years later", see Why Obama’s Foreign Policy Process is Broken by David Francis and Obama’s Syria achievement by Fred Hiatt.


Feser:
Anger over its failure was one of the major factors behind the rise of Donald Trump, who promised not to lead the country into another such war.

See my 24APR15 advice, How Republicans should talk about the Iraq issue, and 23OCT19 Recommendation: How Republicans should talk about the Iraq issue vis-à-vis Trump. Excerpt from my 24APR15 advice:

With few exceptions, prominent Republicans have adopted the tack of demurring to 're-litigate' the Iraq issue. This is a mistake. Their reticence is interpreted as implicit acknowledgement that the decision for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was wrong, thus invalidating the grounds for the Iraq intervention and dismissing its hard-won successes (such as the Counterinsurgency "Surge"), mitigating or altogether absolving President Obama of his missteps, and validating the guilty characterization of President Bush and the Republican Party with the blame for current events.

Moreover, the view that OIF was wrong is the basic justification for President Obama's policy choices with Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and others.

I can recommend a more constructive strategy for Republicans than the counter-productive demurral to 're-litigate' the Iraq issue: re-litigate it from the ground up to set the record straight.

Do not concede the opposition's misrepresentation of the reasons for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Conceding it sets you up for failure from the word go by boxing you into the frame of a strategically false narrative.

Break that box, instead. Constructive talk about the Iraq intervention requires a reset of the frame with wholesale correction of the popular misconceptions about the grounds — the 'why' — of the mission.

Use this explanation of the law and policy, fact basis for Operation Iraqi Freedom: https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/.
...
Once you have corrected the popular misconceptions about OIF, then — and only then — will you be able to talk about the Iraq issue in a constructive way that realigns the leadership course of our nation and properly honors our men and women and our partners who have served selflessly in Iraq for the right reasons.

At the same time, setting the record straight in the zeitgeist and resetting the frame of the national discussion on the Iraq intervention can focus an inquisitorial spotlight on those parties that have corrupted American leadership by misrepresenting the Iraq intervention. They have caused the harmful consequences of American leadership failure and dishonored our Iraq veterans by denigrating their mission with a false narrative.

In short, stop weakly shying away from the controversy. Vigorously re-litigate the Iraq issue with the basic truth of the matter. Flip the Iraq issue in the zeitgeist. Let the American people know that at the decision point in March 2003, President Bush made the right — the harder right — leadership decision and the Iraq intervention was an honorable, justified mission that was succeeding when President Bush left office in January 2009.

The centrist Republican leadership should have applied my advice a decade ago. You should apply my advice today.


Feser:
And unlike the Iraq war, Trump’s Iran war is being fought without a clear plan or congressional approval.

As you imply, the key for President Trump and Congress to get right on "Trump's Iran war" is to make it 'like the Iraq war'. The President and Congress should apply the Saddam precedent to the Iran problem because Congress provided Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush with sufficient means to solve the Saddam problem, and President Bush acted sufficiently to finally solve the festering Saddam problem with Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, a constructive legislative-executive process for the Iran problem requires purging the Iraq Syndrome and its self-neutering 'forever' or 'endless war' talking point at the premise level of our politics and policy. It requires the President and Congress to work together on Iran from the operative premise that America got it right on Iraq.

As I explained to Richard Epstein and John Yoo, The apt UN-based international law solution for Iran is the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent. In terms of the rules and standards needed to solve the Iran problem, the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) for aggression (UNSCR 949), weapons of mass destruction and conventional armament (UNSCR 687), terrorism (UNSCR 687), and repression (UNSCR 688) that solved the Saddam regime's manifold threat is the proper match for Iran's analogous manifold threat.

Set aside the international perspective on the (un)likelihood right now of the UN Security Council duplicating UNSCR 678 and the Gulf War ceasefire mandates for the Iran problem. From the domestic perspective, the US law and policy pursuant to UNSCR 678 that successfully solved the analogous Saddam problem are the proper precedent to develop "a clear plan" and "congressional approval" for the Iran problem. Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush and Congress's work together on the Saddam problem is the gold standard for President Trump and Congress to work together constructively on the Iran problem. Excerpt from The Forward Party should reconceive the Iran issue with the premise that we were right on Iraq, which is the truth:

At the dawn of the post-Cold War era, the American-led enforcement of UNSCR 678 was purposely designed as the baseline paradigm for the rules-based post-Cold War liberal international order, particularly to resolve rogue actors like Iran and Saddam's Iraq by upholding the aspirational rules of the reorganized international community. Iraq's mandated compliance with the comprehensive Gulf War ceasefire mandates was the primary test case for "pax Americana". With that essential evaluation of the Iraq intervention in mind, the HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations and Congress conscientiously worked together to enforce UNSCR 678 and related UN resolutions per Public Law 102-190 and related US law. The Iraq intervention set the gold standard for "a president who leads, a Congress that does its job, and a political system that rewards courage instead of silence" and "decisions about war would be debated openly and decided collectively by the representatives of the American people".

However, as the degenerative Iraq Syndrome has pervaded our politics and policy, among its harmful effects, "Presidents of both parties have increasingly used military force without clear authorization from Congress. Meanwhile, Congress has too often avoided the responsibility the Constitution assigns to it." President Trump's Constitutionally messy use of force with Iran follows the precedent of President Obama's Constitutionally messy use of force with Libya. Both messy actions follow the Iraq Syndrome. In order to correct course, to apply a computer analogy, the American 'system' needs to 'revert' to a 'previous restore point' from a healthy 'state' prior to the Iraq Syndrome: On the Iran issue, the Forward Party should hold the President and Congress accountable to the gold standard of Iraq.


Professor Feser, the facts show you were right to support Operation Iraqi Freedom in the first place. It is essential and urgent that you clarify OIF's actual justification first to yourself and then to the public in order to revive the resolute, principled, competitive, essential American leadership of the free world that crystallized with OIF in the crucible of Iraq—not only for the Iran problem.

I invite your critical feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.

P.S. If you are an ethical centrist who is concerned about the horseshoe theory come to life in American politics, then consider this excerpt from The Forward Party should reconceive the Iran issue with the premise that we were right on Iraq, which is the truth:

Political strategy point: Consider the instrumental role of the Iraq Syndrome in marginalizing the Republicans' and Democrats' ethical centrists (I have in mind Liz Cheney and the late Joe Lieberman) and replacing them with the "ideological extremes" and "“red versus blue” narrative" that now dominate both parties. The Iraq Syndrome discredited the moderate 'establishment' leaders on both sides of the aisle to enable the rise to power of President Obama, President Trump, and their polarizing factions.

Yet, while the Iraq Syndrome has been a successful strategy for the partisans, it is also a potential pivotal vulnerability for them, as yet unexploited, since the Iraq Syndrome is based on a demonstrably false narrative. To exploit the vulnerability, the Forward Party should vigorously relitigate the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative to discredit the partisans, and hold them to account for the essential damage caused by the Iraq Syndrome. And you should clarify the Iraq issue to restore the ethical centrists who were right on Iraq in the first place.



Related: Answer and solutions for Mark Hertling's "Tell Me How the Iran War Ends: What are we fighting for?", Cure the Iraq Syndrome to win America back from postliberals and leftists (Thomas Howes), Jakub Grygiel's "The Iran War and the Coming Global Struggle" comes of the Iraq Syndrome, The apt UN-based international law solution for Iran is the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent (Richard Epstein, John Yoo), The apt Iraq comparison for the Iran intervention is the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, not Desert Storm (Jonathan Allen), The Forward Party should reconceive the Iran issue with the premise that we were right on Iraq, which is the truth, and The Constitutional rule of law for war was skirted by President Clinton, reinforced by President Bush, and degraded by President Obama.

Friday, May 22, 2026

Jakub Grygiel's "The Iran War and the Coming Global Struggle" comes of the Iraq Syndrome

PREFACE: Jakub Grygiel is a professor of politics at the Catholic University of America. In 2017-2018 he was a senior advisor in the Office of Policy Planning at the U.S. Department of State. Professor Grygiel's 23APR26 Civitas Outlook article, "The Iran War and the Coming Global Struggle", is sobering. I explained to him that the dire situation comes of the Iraq Syndrome, and therefore, a constructive approach by America to the Iran war and the coming global struggle depends on first curing the Iraq Syndrome.

Professor Grygiel didn't respond to my e-mail, so I don't know whether he's read it.



from: [Eric LC]
to: [Jakub Grygiel], [Civitas Institute]
date: May 22, 2026, 5:27 PM
subject: Response to Jakub Grygiel's sobering "The Iran War and the Coming Global Struggle" (Civitas Outlook, 23APR26)

To Jakub Grygiel and the Civitas Institute,

I clarify and relitigate the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ using the law and facts that define the Iraq issue.

I am writing to you to respond to the main policy point and secondary strategic point in Professor Grygiel's sobering 23APR26 Civitas Outlook article, The Iran War and the Coming Global Struggle.

Grygiel:
It is telling that many critics of the current war, especially in Europe and Asia, complain that the U.S. has become a force of chaos, rather than order. They assess this as a negative development for themselves and suggest it for the U.S. But such criticism misses the shift in the American security calculus because it views current events through the prism of unchallenged American global supremacy. Then, Washington could afford to provide order benefiting all in the hopeful expectation of a growing harmonization of interests among all powers. This has not happened. China is not a friend, Russia has not become a democracy, and Iran is not a contained and satisfied power — all the while the U.S. was providing global order, especially on the seas. To continue to provide order that benefits our rivals is not merely naive; it is outright damaging to U.S. interests. It should not be surprising, therefore, that Washington is willing to endure unprecedented instability in the Persian Gulf: the costs to us are smaller than those to others. The idea of a U.S.-led global order as a central tenet of American foreign policy, treating stability everywhere as equally valuable, is a thing of the past.

Regarding Professor Grygiel's main policy point, the basic reason for the paradigm shift from the post-Cold War 'Pax Americana' rules-based order is that the UNSCR 678 enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates was the baseline paradigm for "Washington could afford to provide order benefiting all in the hopeful expectation of a growing harmonization of interests among all powers". Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #americanprimacy section:

The Gulf War ceasefire terms were purpose-designed to resolve Saddam's manifold threat established with the Gulf War. The scope of the ceasefire terms meant that enforcing Iraq's mandated compliance resonated beyond the 4 corners of the Saddam problem or even the Iraq intervention itself. In 1991, at the dawn of the post-Cold War, the Gulf War ceasefire was invested with all the essential international norms, including strict aggression, disarmament, human rights, and terrorism-related mandates, and vital enforcement principles that were required to reify the aspirational "rules" of the post-Cold War world order.

Due to the historical context, threats and interests at stake, comprehensive spectrum of the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), model enforcement procedure, and US-led UN-based structure, the UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement was tantamount to the flagship and litmus test of the US-led post-Cold War liberal international order.

Therefore, the basic cause of "The idea a U.S.-led global order as a central tenet of American foreign policy, treating stability everywhere as equally valuable, is a thing of the past" is the stigmatization of Operation Iraqi Freedom which ultimately enforced the Gulf War ceasefire mandates pursuant to UNSCR 678—in other words, the Iraq Syndrome. Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #americanprimacy section:

Stigmatizing right normalizes wrong in general. Stigmatizing an epochal paradigmatic right like the Iraq intervention fundamentally reshapes American culture, politics, policy, and leadership with metastatic premise. Clarifying and relitigating the Iraq issue means more than the 4 corners of the Saddam problem, President Bush's legacy, and Operation Iraqi Freedom itself. Since the 1990-2011 UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement and peace operations with Iraq activated all the elements of American leadership essential to compete for the dominance of pluralistic liberal world order in the geopolitical arena, the current prevailing revisionist narrative stigmatizing the Iraq intervention lays the foundation and sets the frame for a paradigm shift antithetical to American leadership of the free world.

The pivotal change that set the stage for "Russia’s war in Ukraine, China’s economic growth turning into military power, and Iran’s regional expansion fueled by nuclear ambitions" was President Obama's choice to make the Iraq Syndrome a guiding principle of American foreign policy. The reification of the Iraq Syndrome as an operative premise in American foreign policy started with President Obama's radical deviation with Iraq in contravention of President Eisenhower's cardinal precedent and the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement. The course change was further cemented by President Obama's 'lead from behind' approach to the Arab Spring, particularly with Syria, that undid the Bush Freedom Agenda and appeasement of Iran that undid the Clinton Iran-Iraq dual-containment framework. Even the Afghanistan "surge" was mortally undermined by the limits that President Obama imposed in accordance with the Iraq Syndrome. President Obama's promotion of the Iraq Syndrome from propaganda to guiding principle resulted in the retraction of American leadership of the free world and the power vacuum into which America's competitors advanced to inimically fill.

Notwithstanding their surface differences, President Biden and President Trump's continued obedience to the Iraq Syndrome has furthered the paradigm shift begun by President Obama.

For proponents of restoring "a U.S.-led global order as a central tenet of American foreign policy", the basic corrective step is curing the Iraq Syndrome at the premise level of our politics and policy, which begins by clarifying the Iraq issue and relitigating the prevailing yet demonstrably false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome. For example, excerpt from The apt UN-based international law solution for Iran is the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent addressing the international law aspect of the paradigm shift:

Today however, the Iraq Syndrome, e.g., the self-neutering "forever war" talking point that now predominates among both Republicans and Democrats, has stigmatized the Gulf War ceasefire formula and Saddam precedent with a prevailing yet demonstrably false narrative propagated by Saddam's accomplices in France, Russia, and China, which has effectively stripped the international rules-based order of the apt international law solution for the Iran problem. Disabling the Gulf War ceasefire formula has devolved that area to the pre-Gulf War Noriega precedent, which effectively restores the Noriega precedent as the principal way to deal with rogue actors that break the rules and pose a national security threat other than war. Consequently, President Trump has applied the Noriega precedent to the Venezuela and Iran problems.
. . .
The bottom-line need to restore the Gulf War ceasefire formula and Saddam precedent to solve rogue actors that break the rules and pose a national security threat other than war remains true. Therefore, the constructive response to anyone who criticizes the international law character of the the American and Israeli military action versus Iran is that if they are sincere in their concern, then it is incumbent on them to eradicate the Iraq Syndrome, uphold the Saddam precedent by clarifying the actual justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom, which in fact solved the festering Saddam problem pursuant to UNSCR 678 as purpose-designed, and restore the Gulf War ceasefire formula as the operative United Nations-based international law solution for threats other than war posed by rules-breaking rogue actors.

Anything short of making the public understand that President Bush and Prime Minister Blair properly upheld United Nations-based international law on behalf of the international rules-based order by enforcing the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) with Operation Iraqi Freedom pursuant to UNSCR 678 is tantamount to an implied admission that President Trump is justified—indeed, compelled—to apply the pre-Gulf War Noriega precedent to the Iran problem.

Regarding Professor Grygiel's secondary strategic point, it has become more and more apparent that Operation Epic Fury is Operation Desert Fox redux.

Recalling Operation Desert Fox in terms of "The military operations against Iran are simply an attempt to eliminate, or at least to minimize for some time, the threat of the radical and potentially nuclear-armed regime in Tehran", Operation Epic Fury's purpose to "eliminate, or at least to minimize...the threat" is problematic because, like ODF for Iraq, we cannot go into Iran to conduct a reliable battle damage assessment. It is striking that the Trump administration's characterization of OEF's BDA for Iran is virtually the same as the Clinton administration's characterization of ODF's BDA for Iraq at the time. Yet later, Clinton officials admitted that they did not, and could not, know ODF's actual impact on Saddam's Iraq.

Notably, the Iraq Survey Group, which conducted the post-war investigation of Saddam's WMD, says little about ODF's impact on Iraq. Where ISG does evaluate the American military damage to Iraq's WMD capabilities prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the damage is from Operation Desert Storm because we (or technically, the UNSCR 687 inspections) were able to conduct a BDA in Iraq after ODS. ISG's implication is that ODF was not effective versus Saddam's Iraq. The fear is that OEF is similarly ineffective versus Iran. Of course, by the time of ODF's aerial bombing in December 1998, Iraq had applied eight years of intensive lessons on how to keep away the important stuff from American aerial targeting. Hopefully, unlike Saddam's Iraq, Iran's important stuff was caught unprepared and vulnerable to OEF's aerial bombing.

Recalling Operation Desert Fox in terms of "The radical regime in Tehran may survive as a diminished power...It may also collapse under the strain of the war and domestic pressures...Or it may turn into an unstable rump polity", we know that President Clinton's choice to self-consciously limit ODF to aerial bombing emboldened Saddam by demonstrating to him and other rogue actors the limit of US military enforcement. Saddam evaluated ODF as confirmation that the US was a paper tiger, which guided Saddam's heightened noncompliance from 1998 to 2003, which caused Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Iraqi regime change in 2003. The self-conscious limits on OEF appear to be affecting Iran's evaluation of US military enforcement in a similar way.

Saddam's direct reaction to Operation Desert Fox was nullifying the Gulf War ceasefire mandates in Iraqi law, accelerating the breakdown of the international sanctions and 'containment' in concert with Saddam's international accomplices (e.g., the Iraq Survey Group found "The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council"), and pushing up the reconstruction of Iraq's WMD program.

Operation Desert Fox did nothing at all to set back Saddam's terrorist threat, which preconfigured the Saddamist insurgency against post-Saddam Iraq. The Iraqi Perspectives Project, which conducted the post-war investigation of Saddam's terrorism, found the Saddamist terrorist threat was substantially deeper than the pre-war intelligence assessment. While ODF did not seek to decapitate Saddam's Iraq like OEF did to Iran, like OEF, ODF did target security infrastructure. However, like OEF, ODF was insufficient to boost internal opposition to an internal regime change due to missing the necessary ground element like the armed opposition on the ground that effectuated the regime change for President Obama's aerial bombing of Libya.

Hopefully, the strategic results of Operation Epic Fury turn out better than they were for Operation Desert Fox, but so far, OEF is looking markedly similar to its predecessor.

The gold standard for President Trump and Congress to work together constructively on the Iran problem is the close collaboration by Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush and Congress on Iraq. But that requires the President to first purge the Iraq Syndrome and its 'forever' or 'endless war' talking point. So far, however, rather than clarify the Iraq issue and relitigate the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative, the President has sought to work around Congress. We can only hope that President Trump's distinctive approach to the Iran problem while handicapped by the Iraq Syndrome will produce better results than the harmful results from President Obama's work on the Syria and Iran problems while handicapped by the Iraq Syndrome.

Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #americanprimacy section:

Rather than build on the hard-earned lessons of Iraq to reset the baseline for effectual American leadership of the free world, OIF stigma has driven American politics towards a weak-willed American leadership that invites the competition to exploit a gaping self-imposed strategic vulnerability.

The keystone premise needed to revitalize US-led enforcement of liberal world order is a competitive embrace of the Iraq intervention by policy makers, like US leaders built on the Korea intervention to suit America for the global contest. Repudiation of the Iraq intervention undermines effectual American leadership of the free world and devalues the essential international norms the US enforced with Iraq, which encourages and enables the advance of avid illiberal competitors.
. . .
US strategic vulnerabilities derived from the Vietnam War stigma, e.g., the Powell Doctrine, undermined Presidents HW Bush and Clinton's UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement from the start, which subverted the mandated remedy for Iraq and allowed the Saddam problem to fester. A particularly harmful cascade effect of the Vietnam War stigma has been the crippling of US peace operations policy and capability. That fundamental flaw in US strategy was solved under President Bush with resolute leadership and a harsh learning curve in the crucible of Iraq. Yet in the current politics, rather than correct for the Vietnam War stigma-induced faults that led to Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), like the US corrected for the faults that led to the Korean War, President Obama has made sure to uphold and update the Vietnam War stigma instead by burning President Bush's hard-earned, vital corrective actions with Iraq. The essential lessons of Iraq have thus been stigmatized in the politics for future reference for US leaders. Meanwhile, with the Vietnam War stigma upheld as operative premise, President HW Bush's path-setting errors in the wake of Desert Storm that locked in the road to OIF and President Clinton's enforcement failures that moved the US to coda with Saddam are either ignored or even held up as examples for US leaders to emulate. By the same token, Obama's course deviation cannot be corrected as long as his keystone premise, OIF stigma, is an operative premise in US politics and policy.

The dire situation outlined by Professor Grygiel comes of the Iraq Syndrome, and so a constructive approach by America to the Iran war and the coming global struggle depends on first curing the Iraq Syndrome with influential voices like Professor Grygiel clarifying the Iraq issue to the public.


I invite your critical feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.



Related: Answer and solutions for Mark Hertling's "Tell Me How the Iran War Ends: What are we fighting for?", Cure the Iraq Syndrome to win America back from postliberals and leftists (Thomas Howes), The facts show Edward Feser was right on Iraq in the first place and changed his mind based on misinformation, The apt UN-based international law solution for Iran is the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent (Richard Epstein, John Yoo), The apt Iraq comparison for the Iran intervention is the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, not Desert Storm (Jonathan Allen), The Forward Party should reconceive the Iran issue with the premise that we were right on Iraq, which is the truth, and The Constitutional rule of law for war was skirted by President Clinton, reinforced by President Bush, and degraded by President Obama.

Monday, May 18, 2026

The apt UN-based international law solution for Iran is the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent

PREFACE: Richard Epstein is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law and Director of the Classical Liberal Institute at NYU School of Law and the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law Emeritus and a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago. John Yoo is the Emanuel Heller Professor of Law at UC Berkeley Law and Distinguished Visiting Scholar, School of Civic Leadership, and Senior Research Fellow, Civitas Institute, at the University of Texas at Austin. I responded to Professor Epstein's 29APR26 Civitas Outlook article, "Why America, Not Iran, Has the Stronger Legal Position in the Current War", and Professor Yoo's 03APR26 Civitas Outlook article, "Another Reason for Regime Change: Iran’s Flagrant Assault on the Rules of War", to fill in the missing yet essential piece in the international law debate over the American and Israeli military action versus Iran, i.e., the apt yet disabled Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent.

Neither Professor Epstein nor Professor Yoo responded to my e-mail, so I don't know whether they've read it.



from: [Eric LC]
to: [Richard Epstein], [John Yoo], [Civitas Outlook]
date: May 18, 2026, 7:29 AM
subject: The apt UN-based international law solution for Iran is the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent

To Richard Epstein, John Yoo, and the Civitas Institute,

I clarify and relitigate the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ using the law and facts that define the Iraq issue.

I am writing to you in response to Professor Epstein's 29APR26 Civitas Outlook article, Why America, Not Iran, Has the Stronger Legal Position in the Current War, and Professor Yoo's 03APR26 Civitas Outlook article, Another Reason for Regime Change: Iran’s Flagrant Assault on the Rules of War.

Both Civitas Outlook monographs push back against the assertion by international law experts that the American and Israeli military action versus Iran violates United Nations-based international law and fails to meet the 'imminent' standard for anticipatory self-defense. I have little to add to Professor Epstein and Professor Yoo's content beyond reiterating my criticism of Professor Yoo's longstanding attempt to revise the 'imminent' standard for anticipatory self-defense "to take account of weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, and rogue nations" (Yoo).

Rather, I am spotlighting an essential point that Professor Epstein, Professor Yoo, and other international law experts have overlooked in the Iran debate: There is in fact a well-established United Nations-based international law formula to solve rogue actors that break the rules and pose a national security threat other than war, i.e., the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent, which is apt for the manifold threat of Iran.

I strongly recommend that Professor Epstein, Professor Yoo, and the Civitas Institute make this point to the public.

Any international law-based criticism of the American and Israeli military action versus Iran that does not provide an effective international law-based alternative to solve the manifold threat of Iran is a suspect criticism. That kind of criticism implicitly delegitimizes the international rules-based order and supports President Trump's unilateral action by implying that international law does not solve the threat of rogue actors breaking the rules but protects that threat instead. As national security analyst Brian Dunn argues, "Some say the America-Israel campaign against Iran violates international law. But international law under the UN is supposed to stop threats to peace and order. See Russia. It does not. So we have to do it for ourselves."

Contrary to Mr. Dunn, "international law under the UN" does have an effective formula "to stop threats to peace and order" by rogue actors that break the rules and pose a national security threat other than war, i.e., the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent.

In the end days of the Cold War, the HW Bush administration prioritized the threat of rogue actors as evidenced by the American invasion of Panama in 1989 that arrested Manuel Noriega. Shortly after that in 1990-1991, at the dawn of the post-Cold War era, President HW Bush explicitly approached the Saddam problem as the baseline precedent for solving the threat of rogue actors in the new international rules-based order. For the conditional suspension of the Gulf War, the comprehensive Gulf War ceasefire mandates and their enforcement under UNSCR 678 were set up in a purposeful way to uphold the international rules-based order by solving the manifold threat of the rules-breaking by Saddam's Iraq, including but not limited to conventional invasion, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction.

In 1991, the Gulf War ceasefire formula, with its definitional "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) and enforcement procedure, effectively created a distinct class status and solution in the international law baseline of the post-Cold War international rules-based order for rogue actors like "Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps" (President Clinton, 17FEB98) that break the rules and pose a national security threat other than war.

In 1998 and 2003, the United States and United Kingdom conscientiously upheld the international rules-based order by strictly enforcing the Gulf War ceasefire mandates with Operation Desert Fox and Operation Iraqi Freedom pursuant to UNSCR 678. (See the OIF FAQ answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom legal" from an American perspective and Carl Gardner's The invasion of Iraq was lawful from a British perspective.) By procedure, casus belli was Iraq's evidential noncompliance with the Gulf War ceasefire mandates. The "threat [of] Iraq's non-compliance with Council resolutions" (UNSCR 1441) related to aggression (UNSCR 949), weapons of mass destruction and conventional armament (UNSCR 687), terrorism (UNSCR 687), and repression (UNSCR 688), which is analogous to the manifold threat posed by Iran.

The Saddam regime could have switched off the credible threat of regime change that capacitated the international law on Iraq by simply proving the mandated "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 1441). Instead, "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" (Iraq Survey Group). At Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), Saddam chose to keep breaking the rules of the Gulf War ceasefire and keep the proscribed threat of Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441), which caused Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Iraqi regime change pursuant to UNSCR 678.

President Bush and Prime Minister Blair's decision for Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrably was correct on law and fact. Thus upheld, the United Nations-based international law of the Gulf War ceasefire formula and Saddam precedent should have applied to the Iran problem. Iran poses a manifold threat that is analogous to the threat of the categorically noncompliant Saddam regime, and Iran is similarly intransigent and belligerent.

Today however, the Iraq Syndrome, e.g., the self-neutering "forever war" talking point that now predominates among both Republicans and Democrats, has stigmatized the Gulf War ceasefire formula and Saddam precedent with a prevailing yet demonstrably false narrative propagated by Saddam's accomplices in France, Russia, and China, which has effectively stripped the international rules-based order of the apt international law solution for the Iran problem. Disabling the Gulf War ceasefire formula has devolved that area to the pre-Gulf War Noriega precedent, which effectively restores the Noriega precedent as the principal way to deal with rogue actors that break the rules and pose a national security threat other than war. Consequently, President Trump has applied the Noriega precedent to the Venezuela and Iran problems.

A significant flaw of the older Noriega precedent is that it does not adequately address the international law issue of classification, unlike the Gulf War ceasefire formula and Saddam precedent which purposefully addressed the classification issue. Missing the Gulf War ceasefire formula's classification for rogue actors, the American and Israeli claim versus Iran is not distinguished clearly enough from the Russian claim versus Ukraine or Chinese claim versus Taiwan from an international law perspective. Displacing the Gulf War ceasefire definition, standard, and procedure that distinguished the class status of Saddam's Iraq under international law has enabled Russia and China to characterize the rogue actors that they patronize like Iran, America's actions versus rogue actors, and Russia and China's adverse actions with an inimical reformulation of international law that does not solve the threat of rogue actors but protects that threat instead.

The bottom-line need to restore the Gulf War ceasefire formula and Saddam precedent to solve rogue actors that break the rules and pose a national security threat other than war remains true. Therefore, the constructive response to anyone who criticizes the international law character of the the American and Israeli military action versus Iran is that if they are sincere in their concern, then it is incumbent on them to eradicate the Iraq Syndrome, uphold the Saddam precedent by clarifying the actual justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom, which in fact solved the festering Saddam problem pursuant to UNSCR 678 as purpose-designed, and restore the Gulf War ceasefire formula as the operative United Nations-based international law solution for threats other than war posed by rules-breaking rogue actors.

Anything short of making the public understand that President Bush and Prime Minister Blair properly upheld United Nations-based international law on behalf of the international rules-based order by enforcing the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) with Operation Iraqi Freedom pursuant to UNSCR 678 is tantamount to an implied admission that President Trump is justified—indeed, compelled—to apply the pre-Gulf War Noriega precedent to the Iran problem.

Professor Epstein, Professor Yoo, and the Civitas Institute should vigorously clarify the Iraq issue and relitigate the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative to the public now to replace the degenerative Iraq Syndrome that is corrupting our politics and policy at the premise level with the constructive lessons of Iraq. To help clarify the Iraq issue, I recommend the Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ base post, which synthesizes the primary law and fact sources into a coherent narrative form. To help relitigate the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative, I recommend my Criticism of Hal Brands's commentary on Iraq in Hand-Off: "Reassessing Bush's Legacy: What the Transition Memoranda Do (and Don't) Reveal", which corrects Professor Brands's specious validation of the Iraq Syndrome.

This task is essential and urgent. It needs your public expert authority to work.

I invite your critical feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.

---------------

from: [Eric LC]
to: [Richard Epstein], [John Yoo], [Civitas Outlook]
date: May 18, 2026, 8:51 AM
subject: Add regarding Iran, Congress, and the President Re: The apt UN-based international law solution for Iran is the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent

To Richard Epstein, John Yoo, and the Civitas Institute,

Add this point about Iran, Congress, and the President to my May 18, 2026 at 7:29 AM e-mail below. It responds to Professor Epstein's [argument] that "no declaration of war is needed to intervene in the midst of hostilities, ... the 1973 War Powers Act is both an unwise and unconstitutional restraint on Presidential Power, even on the blinkered domestic view that this began on February 28, 2026".

True to form, President Bush did not accept that the 1973 War Powers Act was a Constitutional requirement to invade Iraq (or Afghanistan for that matter). Nonetheless, President Bush conscientiously engaged Congress as a wartime president. The practical benefit, perhaps even necessity, of President Bush's choice with Congress on Iraq, and now President Trump's choice with Iran, is about more than upholding Constitutional checks and balances. Excerpt from The Constitutional rule of law for war was skirted by President Clinton, reinforced by President Bush, and degraded by President Obama with highlight added:

As with other of Bush’s hard-won gains as Commander-in-Chief, Obama has undone Bush’s reintegration of the legislative-executive process and, instead, returned to Clinton’s ad hoc approach.

The practical advantage of Clinton’s ad hoc approach is more flexibility to act free of legislative interference. The practical disadvantage of Clinton’s ad hoc approach is less ability to order an effective action should the needs of the mission exceed the resources available to the vested authority of the US President. Indeed, Clinton acted freely but often ineffectively as Commander-in-Chief, whereas Congress often interfered with Bush’s foreign affairs to detrimental effect, but also provided the resources when the needs of the mission exceeded the resources available to the US President. Obama has followed Clinton’s lead by acting more freely but also more ineffectively compared to Bush.
. . .
I'm not talking about episodic partisan climate as far as Bush's legislative-executive approach as Commander-in-Chief after 9/11. He set a baseline for how to do the CinC job in the 9/11 era. Although Clinton's pre-9/11 ad hoc approach would have been easier, quicker, and - I argue - more sensible for a President at war, Bush understood that reintegrating the legislative-executive process as CinC was a healthier approach for a legal-rational system for the long difficult challenge we entered on 9/11.

But for President Trump to constructively engage with Congress on Iran to the legislative-executive gold standard set by Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush and Congress with Iraq requires the President to clarify the Iraq issue and relitigate the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative, including and especially the self-neutering 'forever war' or 'endless war' talking point, at the premise level. Excerpt from https://www.murkowski.senate.gov/press/release/murkowski-addresses-iran-conflict-on-senate-floor with highlight added:

We now find our nation at war with Iran, and I'm not here to relitigate how we got into this conflict. The fact of the matter is we're in it. But we owe it to our service members and the Americans who are feeling the economic impacts of this war, we owe them a clear, a thoughtful, a rational plan for what comes next.

Some two months later, the regime retains the ability to strike across the region. They continue to disrupt shipping through the Straits of Hormuz. And while the administration may point to ongoing negotiations, events on the ground and the rhetoric coming out of Tehran tell a different story.

But if the US steps back abruptly and prematurely, we almost certainly leave their critical capabilities intact. We risk a new set of leaders who are even more radicalized against us. And we all but invite retaliation against American military forces, our allies, and the American people.

And those are not risks that I'm willing to take. But the answer is not a blank check for another endless war. Nor is it open ended authority for the administration with no guardrails, no oversight from Congress and no clearly defined mission.

The answer, I believe, relies on careful, deliberate use of congressional power. And this is where I think we're falling short. Because we are approaching the 60-day mark under the War Powers Act.

So, what comes next? The Constitution is clear on this point, Congress holds the power to declare war and authorize the use of military force. And yes, the President must have flexibility to respond to emergencies and imminent threats, and he does.

But those are not ongoing military campaigns like we find ourselves currently mired in. In such conflicts, the President and the administration must explicitly state their goals, their plans, and the metrics for success.

And if we don't press them to define those parameters, we may risk repeating history. One of the clearest lessons from the War on Terror is that the failure to think beyond the initial phase of military operations can lock us into a conflict that becomes more lengthy, more deadly, more costly and more difficult to unwind.

Contrary to Senator Murkowski's misconception, the US did plan conscientiously for the post-war stage with Iraq. The problem is that pre-war analysts severely underestimated the Saddam regime's terrorism, which preconfigured the Saddamist terrorist insurgency that caught the occupation by surprise and blew up the initial post-war plan. Yet setback and adjustment is a normal victory pattern in any kind of real competition, let alone maximal contests of war and peace. Like they did in other historical contests in places where American soldiers continue to serve many decades later, the American soldiers in Iraq adjusted to setbacks inflicted by the enemy in order to win. In order for Congress to work with the President constructively on Iran, Senator Murkowski and her fellow legislators need to understand that the very aspect of "the initial phase of military operations" in Iraq that Senator Murkowski cautions against was a vital corrective for America's real competitive capability that needs to be embraced.

It was in fact the anti-competitive radical deviation made by President Obama in service to the Iraq Syndrome that was the pivotal blunder that set off the compounding problems involving Iran that made the contest "more lengthy, more deadly, more costly and more difficult to unwind". See the OIF FAQ epilogue answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory".

In other words, Senator Murkowski and her fellow legislators need to learn that her Iraq Syndrome-based concept of the Iraq issue is falsely based and the opposite of what it needs to be for America to deal as effectively with Iran as we dealt with Saddam's Iraq in the analogous crisis. It is incumbent on President Trump to clarify the Iraq issue and relitigate the Iraq Syndrome to Congress and the American people. Excerpt from The Forward Party should reconceive the Iran issue with the premise that we were right on Iraq, which is the truth with highlight added:

I am writing to you in response to the Forward Party's 05MAR26 e-mail, "War, the Constitution, and Why Congress Must Do Its Job", and 03MAR26 Official Statement on Operation Epic Fury.

The "partisan battles" over Iran reinforce that the pervasive Iraq Syndrome, such as the misguiding "forever war" talking point, has become the operative political and policy context for today's Republicans and Democrats. As such, it is essential for the Forward Party's mission and your challenge to "the two major parties" that you establish the operative context that Operation Iraqi Freedom was justified and a war of necessity according to Richard Haass's taxonomy. Which is the demonstrable truth. In contrast, the Iraq Syndrome is based on a demonstrably false narrative.

The Iraq Syndrome is degenerative and toxic for the Forward Party's advocacy of "America can maintain a strong national defense and be a force for good in the world while honoring constitutional balance. A presidency that respects the law, matched with a Congress willing to act as a co-equal branch of government, strengthens our country, protects our troops, and upholds the rule of law that defines us as a nation." Whereas the 1990 to 2011 Iraq intervention, including OIF, embodies the elements of the Forward Party's platform.

At the dawn of the post-Cold War era, the American-led enforcement of UNSCR 678 was purposely designed as the baseline paradigm for the rules-based post-Cold War liberal international order, particularly to resolve rogue actors like Iran and Saddam's Iraq by upholding the aspirational rules of the reorganized international community. Iraq's mandated compliance with the comprehensive Gulf War ceasefire mandates was the primary test case for "pax Americana". With that essential evaluation of the Iraq intervention in mind, the HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations and Congress conscientiously worked together to enforce UNSCR 678 and related UN resolutions per Public Law 102-190 and related US law. The Iraq intervention set the gold standard for "a president who leads, a Congress that does its job, and a political system that rewards courage instead of silence" and "decisions about war would be debated openly and decided collectively by the representatives of the American people".

However, as the degenerative Iraq Syndrome has pervaded our politics and policy, among its harmful effects, "Presidents of both parties have increasingly used military force without clear authorization from Congress. Meanwhile, Congress has too often avoided the responsibility the Constitution assigns to it." President Trump's Constitutionally messy use of force with Iran follows the precedent of President Obama's Constitutionally messy use of force with Libya. Both messy actions follow the Iraq Syndrome. In order to correct course, to apply a computer analogy, the American 'system' needs to 'revert' to a 'previous restore point' from a healthy 'state' prior to the Iraq Syndrome: On the Iran issue, the Forward Party should hold the President and Congress accountable to the gold standard of Iraq.

Again, I invite your critical feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.



Related: Answer and solutions for Mark Hertling's "Tell Me How the Iran War Ends: What are we fighting for?", Cure the Iraq Syndrome to win America back from postliberals and leftists (Thomas Howes), The facts show Edward Feser was right on Iraq in the first place and changed his mind based on misinformation, Jakub Grygiel's "The Iran War and the Coming Global Struggle" comes of the Iraq Syndrome, The apt Iraq comparison for the Iran intervention is the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, not Desert Storm (Jonathan Allen), The Forward Party should reconceive the Iran issue with the premise that we were right on Iraq, which is the truth, and The Constitutional rule of law for war was skirted by President Clinton, reinforced by President Bush, and degraded by President Obama.