Clarification of the Iraq issue in Jeffrey Meiser's "Introducing Liberalism in International Relations Theory"

PREFACE: Jeffrey Meiser is an Assistant Professor in the Political Science Department at the University of Portland. I clarified the distortion of the Iraq issue in Professor Meiser's 18FEB18 E-International Relations article, Introducing Liberalism in International Relations Theory. I was struck to find a fundamental misconception of the Iraq intervention featured in basic pedagogic material. Professor Meiser's e-mails in the exchange are omitted.

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from: [Eric LC]
to: [Jeffrey Meiser]
date: Aug 27, 2022, 2:33 AM
subject: The Iraq issue is distorted in your "Introducing Liberalism in International Relations Theory"

Professor Meiser,

I clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ by organizing the primary source authorities, i.e., the set of controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts that define OIF's justification, to lay a proper foundation and correct for the prevalent conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.

I recently cited your 18FEB18 E-International Relations article, Introducing Liberalism in International Relations Theory, to define the international relations theory of liberalism.

While citing your article, however, I was compelled to clarify its distortion of the Iraq issue:

A third point is that while democracies are unlikely to go to war with one another, some scholarship suggests that they are likely to be aggressive toward non-democracies – such as when the United States went to war with Iraq in 2003.
... Nevertheless, there are costs for violating liberal norms. The costs can be direct and immediate. For example, the European Union placed an arms sale embargo on China following its violent suppression of pro-democracy protesters in 1989. The embargo continues to this day. The costs can also be less direct, but equally as significant. For example, favourable views of the United States decreased significantly around the world following the 2003 invasion of Iraq because the invasion was undertaken unilaterally (outside established United Nations rules) in a move that was widely deemed illegitimate.

On your first ("third") point, correlation does not infer causation. The Saddam regime was not a generic non-democracy; it was an exemplary rogue state whose probation per the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) pursuant to UNSCR 678 constituted the baseline-setting, paradigmatic test case for enforcing the essential norms of post-Cold War liberal international order. The relevance of "aggressive" to OIF's justification was not a vague prejudice by democracies against non-democracies that "some scholarship suggests", but rather the Saddam regime's violation of the aggression-related mandates for Iraq, including UNSCR 949.

On your second point, see the OIF FAQ answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom legal". Rather than "violat[e] liberal norms", OIF as the culmination of the baseline, paradigmatic Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement upheld the essential norms of post-Cold War liberal international order. OIF was undertaken neither unilaterally nor outside established UN rules. OIF was undertaken by a multilateral coalition purposed to enforce the "established United Nations rules" for Iraq, i.e., the established Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) pursuant to established UNSCR 678. Whereas OIF was "widely deemed illegitimate" by established accomplices of the Saddam regime's flagrant violation of the "established United Nations rules" for Iraq.

As Prime Minister Blair responded to the Chilcot report, "[A]s at 18 March 2003, there was gridlock at the UN. In resolution 1441, it had been agreed to give Saddam one final opportunity to comply. It was accepted that he had not done so. In that case, according to 1441, action should have been agreed. It was not because by then, politically, there was an impasse. The undermining of the UN was in fact the refusal to follow through on 1441."

I hope you find these corrective criticisms and the OIF FAQ useful. If you have questions about my work, please ask.

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from: [Eric LC]
to: [Jeffrey Meiser]
date: Sep 2, 2022, 4:40 PM
subject: Re: e-mail in the 2nd tweet Fwd: ... war taboo and consensus priority versus enforce liberal international order ... Fwd: The Iraq issue is distorted in your "Introducing Liberalism in International Relations Theory"

Professor Meiser,

The OIF FAQ works on the premise that I'm not "the only one with true knowledge on [the Iraq] issue". My clarification of the Iraq issue doesn't rest on personal expert authority. It rests on primary source authority, which precedes expert authority on the order of merit. The primary sources that define the Iraq issue are public domain and readily accessed on-line. I show my work and cite the sources: the OIF FAQ's corrective content is really basic research that should have grounded your conception of OIF's justification in the first place.

Excerpt from the OIF FAQ's Critical responses to leaders and pundits page:

PREFACE: ... In that light, I'll just say this about the leaders and pundits who misrepresent the Iraq issue to the public: Wherever a public expert authority contradicts the bedrock law, policy, precedent, and facts that define the Iraq issue, it's the public expert authority — not the primary source authorities — that's discredited. The OIF FAQ is designed as a cheat sheet as well as a study guide to help readers learn the primary source authorities for themselves, so they can determine where a leader or pundit credibly accords with the operative law and facts and where he or she has misinformed the public contra the operative law and facts.

A distortion (or misrepresentation if you prefer) of the Iraq issue is not inherently willful or nefarious if it comes from honest ignorance, especially when that ignorance has been stoked by "most experts in international law or IR theory".

Honest ignorance is a correctable shortcoming, which is why we have teachers like you. We're fortunate that the necessary corrective content, OIF's primary sources, is extraordinarily straightforward, thorough, and plainly stated, as well as public domain and readily accessed on-line. You know OIF's primary sources now, so I hope you'll clarify the Iraq issue for your students in both the classroom and virtual public and stand up to the "experts in international law or IR theory" who've misinformed the public.

However, a distortion or misrepresentation of the Iraq issue is evidently willful, and perhaps nefarious, if it continues after the necessary corrective content is provided. You know OIF's primary sources now, so we'll see.

As for "objective truth", it's objective truth on the operative law and facts that OIF successfully enforced international law per Public Laws 102-1, 102-190, 107-243 etc. pursuant to UNSCR 678 upon the UNMOVIC confirmation of Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) with "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 1441). It's also objective truth that the US mandate to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (P.L. 107-243) intrinsically upheld the liberal norms embodied by the paradigmatic Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441).

For the question of "whether OIF violated ... international law" while enforcing the international law on Iraq, see part A2 of the OIF FAQ answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom legal", which unpacks the international legal controversy. (Note that the OIF FAQ answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom legal" focuses on the procedural aspect, while the OIF FAQ answer to "Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq" focuses on the substantive aspect.)

The question of "whether OIF ... strengthened liberal norms and international law" is naturally more subjective though it too is properly grounded on the operative law and facts. To answer the question, read through the #americanprimacy section of the OIF FAQ's retrospective survey.

As you said, expert opinions do vary. But now that you know OIF's primary sources, you can and should always check whether an expert opinion credibly accords with the operative law and facts. For example, George Washington University law professor Sean Murphy's Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq notably misrepresents UNSCR 1441, omits the UNMOVIC Clusters document, and then decides on that basis he's unpersuaded of OIF's legality. (Naval War College law professor Raul Pedrozo does better.)

Keep in mind that beyond the UNMOVIC confirmation of Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) at the decision point so that "Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687" (UNSCR 1441) for casus belli, the post-war investigations also corroborated Iraq's ceasefire violations, including its UNSCR 687 WMD violations, and discovered Saddam's UNSCR 687 terrorism violations and UNSCR 688 human rights violations -- essential causes of OIF in their own right -- were "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq) than had been believed before OIF. And, "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" (Iraq Survey Group).

[I welcome critical feedback on the OIF FAQ from you and your students (classroom and virtual public) and colleagues. If you have questions about my work, please ask.]