GEN David Petraeus' year-end letter to the troops

GEN Petraeus' letter is copied from the excellent Small Wars Journal.

HEADQUARTERS
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE – IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09342-1400

28 December 2007

Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Civilians of Multi-National Force-Iraq:

As 2007 draws to a close, you should look back with pride on what you, your fellow troopers, our Iraqi partners, and Iraqi Coalition civilians have achieved in 2007. A year ago, Iraq was racked by horrific violence and on the brink of civil war. Now, levels of violence and civilians and military casualties are significantly reduced and hope has been rekindled in many Iraqi communities. To be sure, the progress is reversible and there is much more to be done. Nonetheless, the hard-fought accomplishments of 2007 have been substantial, and I want to thank each of you for the contributions you made to them.

In response to the challenges that faced Iraq a year ago, we and our Iraqi partners adopted a new approach. We increased our focus on securing the Iraqi people and, in some cases, delayed transition of tasks to Iraqi forces. Additional U.S. and Georgian forces were deployed to theater, the tours of U.S. unites were extended, and Iraqi forces conducted a surge of their own, generating well over 100,000 more Iraqi police and soldiers during the year so that they, too, had additional forces to execute the new approach. In places like Ramadi, Baqubah, Arab Jabour, and Baghdad, you and our Iraqi brothers fought—often house by house, block by block, and neighborhood by neighborhood—to wrest sanctuaries away from Al Qaeda-Iraq, to disrupt extremist militia elements, and to rid the streets of mafia-like criminals. Having cleared areas, you worked with Iraqis to retain them—establishing outposts in the areas we were securing, developing Iraqi Security Forces, and empowering locals to help our efforts. This approach has not been easy. It has required steadfastness in the conduct of tough offensive operations, creative solutions to the myriad problems on the ground, and persistence over the course of many months and during countless trying situations. Through it all, you have proven equal to every task, continually demonstrating an impressive ability to conduct combat and stability operations in an exceedingly complex environment.

Your accomplishments have given the Iraqi people new confidence and prompted many citizens to reject terror and confront those who practice it. As the months passed in 2007, in fact, the tribal awakening that began in Al Anbar Province spread to other parts of the country. Emboldened by improving security and tired of indiscriminate violence, extremist ideology, oppressive practices, and criminal activity, Iraqis increasingly rejected Al Qaeda-Iraq and rogue militia elements. Over time, the desire of Iraqis to contribute to their own security has manifested itself in citizens volunteering for the police, the Army, and concerned local citizen programs. It has been reflected in citizens providing information that has helped us find far more than double the number of arms and weapons caches we found last year. And it has been apparent in Iraqi communities now supporting their local security forces.

As a result of your hard work and that of our Iraqi comrades-in-arms—and with the support of the local populace in many areas—we have seen significant improvements in the security situation. The number of attacks per week is down some 60 percent from a peak in June of this year to a level last seen consistently in the early summer of 2005. With fewer attacks, we are also seeing significantly reduced loss of life. The number of civilian deaths is down by some 75 percent since its height a year ago, dropping to a level not seen since the beginning of 2006. And the number of Coalition losses is down substantially as well. We remain mindful that the past year’s progress has been purchased through the sacrifice and selfless service of all those involved and that the new Iraq must still contend with innumerable enemies and obstacles. Al Qaeda-Iraq has been significantly degraded, but it remains capable of horrific bombings. Militia extremists have been disrupted, but they retain influence in many areas. Criminals have been apprehended, but far too many still roam Iraqi streets and intimidate local citizens and Iraqi officials. We and our Iraqi partners will have to deal with each of these challenges in the New Year to keep the situation headed in the right direction.

While the progress in a number of areas is fragile, the security improvements have significantly changed the situation in many parts of Iraq. It is now imperative that we take advantage of these improvements by looking beyond the security arena and helping Iraqi military and political leaders as they develop solutions in other areas as well, solutions they can sustain over time. At the tactical level, this means an increasing focus on helping not just Iraqi Security Forces—with whom we must partner in all that we do—but also helping Iraqi governmental organizations as they endeavor to restore basic services, to create employment opportunities, to revitalize local markets, to refurbish schools, to spur local economic activity, and to keep locals involved in contributing to local security. We will have to do all of this, of course, while continuing to draw down our forces, thinning our presence, and gradually handing over responsibilities to our Iraqi partners. Meanwhile, at the national level, we will focus on helping the Iraqi Government integrate local volunteers into the Iraqi Security Forces and other employment, develop greater ministerial capacity and capability, aid displaced persons as they return, and, most importantly, take the all-important political and economic actions needed to exploit the opportunity provided by the gains in the security arena.

The pace of progress on important political actions to this point has been slower than Iraqi leaders had hoped. Still, there have been some important steps taken in recent months. Iraq’s leaders reached agreement on the Declaration of Principles for Friendship and Cooperation with the United States, which lays the groundwork for an enduring relationship between our nations. The United Nations Security Council approved Iraq’s request for a final renewal of the resolution that authorizes the Coalition to operate in Iraq. Iraq’s leaders passed an important Pension Law that not only extends retirement benefits to Iraqis previously left out but also represents the first of what we hope will be additional measures fostering national reconciliation. And Iraq’s leaders have debated at length a second reconciliation-related measure, the Accountability and Justice Bill (the de-Ba’athification Reform Law), as well as the 2008 National Budget, both which likely will be brought up for a vote in early 2008. Even so, all Iraqi participants recognize that much more must be done politically to put their country on an irreversible trajectory to national reconciliation and sustainable economic development. We will, needless to say, work closely with our Embassy teammates to support the Iraq Government as it strives to take advantage of the improved security environment by pursing political and economic progress.

The New Year will bring many changes. Substantial force rotations and adjustments already underway will continue. One Army brigade combat team and a Marine Expeditionary Unit have already redeployed without replacement. In the coming months, four additional brigades and two Marine battalions will follow suit. Throughout that time, we will continue to adapt to the security situation as it evolves. And in the midst of all the changes, we and our Iraqi partners will strive to maintain the momentum, to press the fight, and to pursue Iraq’s enemies relentlessly. Solutions to many of the tough problems will continue to be found at your level, together with local Iraqi leaders and with your Iraqi Security Force partners, in company and battalion areas of operation and in individual neighborhoods an towns. As you and your Iraqi partners turn concepts into reality, additional progress will emerge slowly and fitfully. Over time, we will gradually see fewer bad days and accumulate more good days, good weeks, and good months.

The way ahead will not be easy. Inevitably, there will be more tough days and tough weeks. Unforeseen challenges will emerge. And success will require continued hard work, commitment, and initiative from all involved. As we look to the future, however, we should remember how far we have come in the past year. Thanks to the tireless efforts and courageous actions of the Iraqi people, Iraq’s political and military leaders, the Iraqi Security Forces, and each of you, a great deal has been achieved in 2007. Thus, as we enter a new year, we and our Iraqi partners will have important accomplishments and a newfound sense of hope on which we can build.

As always, all or your leaders, our fellow citizens back home, and I deeply appreciate the dedication, professionalism, commitment, and courage you display on a daily basis. It remains the greatest of honors to serve with each of you in this critical endeavor.

Sincerely,

David H. Petraeus

Violence works

"Violence works" was Professor Thad Russell's repeated mantra in his Barnard history class, "American Civilization after the Civil War". His point was about American activist history and that diplomatic means of political advocacy could not match the change wrought by insurgent tactics.

My gut reaction is that the removal of humanitarian people and organizations from places like Afghanistan and Iraq is devastating to the greater political process because they — perhaps more than our military civil affairs and government-based aid/development orgs — embody the positive (progressive) promise of the Western relationship in its most interactive form.

Further, I believe their introduction, relationship-building, and then removal under threat has been more damaging to our mission and empowering to the insurgents than if they had been absent from the beginning. The tactic of targeting "non-combatants" has been repeatedly validated as effective, and more significantly, the gap left by the aid groups' removal has severely undermined the full-spectrum interactions necessary to bring about the so-called "political" solution in the peace-building process.*

Read this and despair: YONHAP NEWS: Afghanistan kidnappings keep Korean missionaries from going overseas

Excerpt:

Rev. Park Eun-jo of Sammul Church in Seongnam, south of Seoul, to which all the hostages belong, said Monday that the church will stop volunteer services unwanted by the Afghan government and is taking steps to pull the remaining volunteers out of the war-torn country. "Some already began preparations to return home," a church official said.

In Afghanistan, volunteer workers affiliated with about 10 nongovernmental organizations were to soon close their medical and educational aid activities and return home. "The South Korean Embassy in Afghanistan sent a public document recommending we immediately leave the country, but we have yet to decide when to leave," a medical aid worker operating in Kandahar told Yonhap News Agency by phone, requesting anonymity.

According to the Middle East Team, a Seoul-based Christian group working to help evangelical missionaries and volunteer workers abroad, seven teams had plans to leave for Afghanistan and other Islamic countries in late July, but three cancelled the planned trips and four postponed trips indefinitely in the wake of the kidnapping.

"They already finished reserving air tickets between April and May, but cancelled or indefinitely postponed their trips after learning about the Taliban's kidnapping of Koreans," said Kim Do-heon, a manager of the group. "We persuaded them to make the decision to cope with a possible recurrence of the kidnapping crisis even if they intended to stay in relatively safer regions."

Four Christian evangelical churches in Seoul and its suburbs also changed their plans to dispatch missionary and volunteer teams composed of 10 to 20 members each to such Middle East countries as Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan, according religious sources.

* Update: For what it's worth, the SMEs at Small Wars Journal assure me that the actual impact by private aid groups like the Korean missionary group has been minor to the point of insignificance.

When Anti-war is Anti-peace (2007)

I'm back in the Columbia Spectator today (15FEB07) with my column, When Anti-war is Anti-peace. I have mixed feelings about it because the version that's printed is not the preferred version I revised with the Spec editor assigned to me, but rather a rougher edited-not-with-me version of my original draft that I didn't approve. The substance of the message didn't change that much from the original submission to the unpublished revision, and I did submit the original draft, so I can't cry foul (too loudly). The upside is that the article is more timely in today's Spec given the anti-war protests on campus, and that was my original hope and intent.

Here's my preferred yet unpublished revised version of the article — enjoy:

UNPUBLISHED REVISION:

When Anti-War is Anti-Peace
By [Eric LC]

The calls for the United States to leave Iraq are reaching a frantic crescendo, and the precedent they most often cite is how Congress ended support for South Vietnam. However, while the Vietnam precedent for withdrawing from war is widely known, less understood has been the damage to peace caused by that retreat. The traumatic Vietnam episode convinced American leaders that peace operations in "non-permissive" environments were a misguided national security strategy. As a result, the peace-building options we needed at the outset of our current conflict were unavailable.

Since 9/11, peace building has returned to our strategic thinking, and the Iraq mission has become our greatest test for peace operations in "non-permissive" environments. What are peace operations? Essentially, they are the full-spectrum processes that transform failed regions into viable states that are secure, can sustain development and integrate into the international community, and are stable and effectively governed. Peace operations also encompass the organizations—private sector, government, international, and military civil affairs—that engage in humanitarian intervention, development, and aid.

If we make the deliberate decision to abandon Iraq, then we can forget about peace building in other "non-permissive" environments. Our peace-building capability will be swept away in the political fall-out, just as it was after the Vietnam War. Leading "anti-war" Congressman John Murtha, for example, is actually very hawkish . . . about China. He just vehemently opposes peace operations, whether they are in 2003 Iraq or 1993 Somalia.

I'm not as hard on President Bush's administration for our post-war planning failures in Iraq because I understand much of it was due to the lack of pre-mission capability. After all, how do you fix a country with an absence of tools and know-how for doing it? The easy answer is that you call someone else to fix it, and that's basically how we planned for the post-war in Iraq. We've learned the hard way that there is no one else to call and we are responsible for completing the job we started.

The solution to the mess depends on whether the peace operations community, thrown into the deep end of the pool since 9/11, can struggle out from the legacy of the Vietnam War. Doing so requires a bloody, expensive learning curve. Unfortunately, too many people we mean to help and protect, as well as our own peace operators, have died as the price for learning fundamental lessons while opposed by enemies who expertly attack our weaknesses.

But, are we learning? I contend that we are. Recently, I had the privilege of attending two peace operations conferences, the first in Washington DC and the second in SIPA. I was impressed by the dedication of both military and civilians to win the war by building peace and struck by the degree to which the Vietnam War had undermined the ability of peace agencies to handle the "operations other than war" that are center-stage in the War on Terror. Nonetheless, I was buoyed by the candid admissions of failure and the progress that has been made toward reforming everything from personnel to doctrine to institutional cultures. Participants spoke about the General Petraeus-led troop surge, with its accompanying strategic shifts, as a necessary re-orientation for the peace process in Iraq. It was hammered home – mostly by civilian peace operators humbled in Iraq — that in "non-permissive" environments, the military must be the main agent of peace. As a senior USAID representative stated, "if you [the military] expect a follow-on civilian force to replace you, don't. It's not coming."

My final impression was more emotional. My heart broke as I listened to the lessons learned by peace operators and their hopes for the future while knowing that outside, the "anti-war" movement was tearing down their mission. I especially was moved by the desire of the military officers to secure a better future for the Iraqi people — all the military participants had served in Iraq and expected to return. During the Washington conference, I studied the reactions of two Iraqi embassy liaisons while they listened intently to Americans taking personal responsibility for the fate of Iraq. I wondered how they reconciled the peace operators with the "anti-war" activists who accuse coalition forces of "[refusing] to even validate the lives of Iraqis." At the end of the Columbia conference, a United Nations representative asked whether the American commitment to peace operations would outlast a "regime change" in the next presidential election. Her fear was a massive, and most likely untenable, shift of responsibility to the UN in Iraq should the United States abandon our peace operations there.

Retreat from Iraq won't end the American commitment to peace around the world. However, our success or failure in Iraq sets the benchmark for intervention anywhere, such as Darfur, defined by violent opposition. Today, I am afraid the rising tide of the "anti-war" movement will destroy our capability to build peace, gained through so great a sacrifice, in the places of the world that need our help the most.

Related: 15DEC06 US Army counterinsurgency FM (field manual) 3-24.

ADD: Also see my 2002 Spec article, Weighing in on Iraq, the sources and commentary at An irresponsible exit from Iraq, my expository commentary on the post-war planning, setbacks, and adaptations, and the explanation why upholding the Iraq intervention is vital to reviving American leadership of the free world (US-led liberal world order).

Happy Veterans Day: Call to Duty: Boots on the Ground

Originally posted on November 1st, but I'm moving it up to celebrate Veterans Day. Watch the video.

Description: Call to Duty: Boots on the Ground
Boots on the Ground represents the commitment of the United States of American [sic] and the multiple capabilities of the American Soldier. It reflects the physical and mental aspect of being the ultimate instrument of national resolve that is both ready to meet and relevant to the challenges of the dangerous and complex 21st century security environment.
Airdate: October 9, 2006
Run Time: 00:12:00

*** Open the video here or here. ***



I consider "Call to Duty: Boots on the Ground" a must-see video.

Its illustration of "the commitment of the United States of American [sic]" and "the ultimate instrument of national resolve that is both ready to meet and relevant to the challenges of the dangerous and complex 21st century security environment", combined with President Bush's 06OCT05 defense of the Iraq mission and War on Terror, provides a benchmark for real competitive resolute American leadership of the free world.

The video rings true with the perception of the Army I learned from my experience as a soldier. Its message is from the heart and true to the Army heritage. While "Call to Duty: Boots on the Ground" seems to be designed for young soldiers to explain the 'Why We Fight', I believe this is the message that should be presented to the public as the Army face. It's stupid to pretend soldiers don't go to war or that they don't die at war. The better way is to put the hard facts into context. I prefer it over the new Army recruiter slogan of "Army Strong", although the Army Strong video is pretty good.

Happy Veterans Day. I wish all Americans who have served, are serving and will serve in our Armed Forces a Happy Veterans Day. May we live long, fruitful and meaningful lives, for ourselves and for our brothers and sisters who don't make it to come back home.

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Also see Army Lieutenant Benjamin Colgan, Castillo, and New York Times writer posits "Thank you for your service" is offensive to veterans. I disagree..

Senator Kerry insults the American soldier.

John Kerry: "You know, education, if you make the most of it, if you study hard and you do your homework, and you make an effort to be smart, uh, you, you can do well. If you don't, you get stuck in Iraq."

Kerry's response to the criticism of his remark:

"If anyone thinks a veteran would criticize the more than 140,000 heroes serving in Iraq and not the president who got us stuck there, they're crazy. This is the classic G.O.P. playbook. I'm sick and tired of these despicable Republican attacks that always seem to come from those who never can be found to serve in war, but love to attack those who did.

I'm not going to be lectured by a stuffed suit White House mouthpiece standing behind a podium, or doughy Rush Limbaugh, who no doubt today will take a break from belittling Michael J. Fox's Parkinson's disease to start lying about me just as they have lied about Iraq. It disgusts me that these Republican hacks, who have never worn the uniform of our country lie and distort so blatantly and carelessly about those who have.

The people who owe our troops an apology are George W. Bush and Dick Cheney who misled America into war and have given us a Katrina foreign policy that has betrayed our ideals, killed and maimed our soldiers, and widened the terrorist threat instead of defeating it. These Republicans are afraid to debate veterans who live and breathe the concerns of our troops, not the empty slogans of an Administration that sent our brave troops to war without body armor.

Bottom line, these Republicans want to debate straw men because they're afraid to debate real men. And this time it won't work because we're going to stay in their face with the truth and deny them even a sliver of light for their distortions. No Democrat will be bullied by an administration that has a cut and run policy in Afghanistan and a stand still and lose strategy in Iraq."

Senator, you have a history. Just stop the excuses and apologize, okay?

P.S. Contra Kerry's misrepresentation, President Bush's decision for Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrably was correct on the law and facts. The US case versus Saddam is substantiated, Iraq was evidentially in categorical breach of the Gulf War ceasefire.

Iraqi Sanctions: Were They Worth It?

One reason I support Operation Iraqi Freedom is my opposition to the toxic alternative in the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, namely the pre-OIF status quo with Saddam of the dangerous, costly, vilified, and eroding ad hoc 'containment'. Among its drawbacks, which included that Saddam had broken the UNSCR 687 arms embargo as the Iraqi people continued to suffer, was the 'containment' was exploited by al Qaeda as a cornerstone of terrorist propaganda.

Iraqi Sanctions: Were They Worth It?
by Sheldon Richman, January 2004 [POSTED FEBRUARY 9, 2004]

In May 1996 Madeleine Albright, who was then the U.S. ambassador to the UN, was asked by 60 Minutes correspondent Lesley Stahl, in reference to years of U.S.-led economic sanctions against Iraq,

We have heard that half a million children have died. I mean, that is more children than died in Hiroshima. And, you know, is the price worth it?

To which Ambassador Albright responded,

I think that is a very hard choice, but the price, we think, the price is worth it.

[Read the rest.]*

See An Appeal to Indict the Iraqi Regime for Crimes of Genocide (1997), the 1997-2003 Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq, the UN Security Council (S/1999/100) panel assessment of the humanitarian situation in Iraq (1999), and the Independent Inquiry Committee report on the manipulation of the Oil-for-Food programme (2005).

OIF was a controversial, difficult decision by President Bush. But the alternatives to the regime change — letting Saddam escape from Iraq's ceasefire obligations and the toxic, broken 'containment' — aren't better. At least we're trying our best to help the Iraqi people now with nation-building peace operations instead of the pre-OIF status quo of our effective complicity with intransigently noncompliant, unreconstructed Saddam in purposely, indefinitely, and uselessly causing Iraqi suffering.

* London School of Economics researchers have found the Saddam regime fabricated the reported rise in Iraqi child mortality blamed on sanctions.

Get it through your heads: REP John Murtha is a realist!!

When will people realize that REP Murtha's position on Iraq doesn't have anything to do with his party affiliation?

Murtha opposes OIF because he is a textbook dogmatic Cold War realist (poli sci sense). Realists are traditionally pro-military and pro- National Security. They are genuinely hawkish. Realists are also traditionally against liberal endeavors like nation building and internationalist intervention. The Bush admin's chosen strategy in the WOT, including Iraq, is a liberal strategy.

I bet Murtha is not a fan of the UN. I also bet that if you get him talking about China, he'd be very hawkish and enthusiastic about competing with a 'near-peer' state-actor competitor. The liberal strategy we're employing in the War on Terror, including Iraq, is simply contrary to Murtha's dogma.

More evidence from Newsbusters: REP Murtha opposed the Somalia operation.

Update from my comment on Neptunus Lex:

badbob,

Thanks. Regarding Murtha compared to other reformed realists, he does seem particularly inflexible, hence the qualifier as “dogmatic”.

As a liberal, I don’t ideologically agree with the realist school, but I agree with you: as individual thinkers, not all realists are as rigid as Murtha. I like the idea of a neo-realist school; I’ll just call it the liberal security model.

My point in bringing this up is that I think the focus on Dems vs GOP, doves vs hawks, and Left vs Right has been harmfully misleading when analysing Murtha and those like him. Our concepts are still stuck on the Vietnam War debate. Popular discourse in the WOT needs to be reshuffled to fit a different kind of war.

In the WOT, to include Iraq, we are following a liberal (or neo-realist) strategy. That strategy since Day One has been harshly attacked and undermined by dogmatic realists on the homefront. These people are not ‘hippies’ or ‘moonbats’; they’re established experts — Cold War hawks — in the national security field who were raised in the Cold War balance of power. Their dogmatic worldview is misapplied in the WOT, but just the same, they are still treated as The American Authority in the field of war and national security . . . even if they are dangerously obsolete.

Like I said, I know the type. They dominate the poli sci department at Columbia.

Dogmatic realists have been getting away with attacking OIF because our national debate about war is still stuck on Vietnam. We know enough to disparage ‘hippies’ and moonbats’, but we fail to recognize and respond to the ‘hawkish’ experts who ceaselessly attack the Bush admin’s WOT strategy. Until WOT supporters recognize that threat in our domestic debate and face it head-on, dogmatic realists will continue to erode domestic support for the WOT.

In my opinion, the unchecked opposition to the WOT by these ‘expert’ right-wing dogmatic realists poses a FAR greater domestic threat to our ability to prosecute the WOT than radical leftist ‘moonbats’. Keep in mind, the American people who dismiss anti-war ‘hippies’ out-of-hand have been raised to deeply respect the views of the victorious realist Cold Warriors.

I do respect our dogmatic realists for winning the Cold War and their opinions are not without merit, but this War on Terror must be won by our liberal warriors.

I would like to issue a democratic ‘call to arms’ in the domestic debate so that we can focus on the dogmatic realist threat. To do so, we have to get over the red herrings of Vietnam War ‘anti-war’ stereotypes and recognize the enemy at home for what he is.

Update 12Dec05: Was REP Murtha driven to act now to protect his realist worldview because the future of military funding is at stake? Read Tom Barnett's latest post and decide for yourself.

Demobilizing Iraq Army: a good call, after all?

I've been undecided on the early CPA decision to demobilize the old Iraqi Army. I believe security, stability and control is the necessary foundation for everything else, and it makes sense to co-opt the existing security apparatus. But I also believe that a short-sighted fix is usually a poor replacement for a long-term solution, and if use of the old Iraqi Army would have undermined everything else, that's a problem, too.

For the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) perspective, see the archived CPA website, including order 1, De-Ba`athification of Iraqi Society, 16MAY03, and the 2004 insight, 2005 insight, 2006 insight, and 2011 insight from CPA senior adviser Dan Senor.

Note: Saddam's regime was not a secular bulwark, as it is often erroneously represented by OIF opponents. Saddam's terrorism included jihadists, including affiliates of al Qaeda, and he had undertaken the sectarian radicalization of Iraqi society since the Iran-Iraq War. The Saddam regime's terroristic rule was why the de-Ba'athication was considered necessary, per UNSCR 1483 and Public Law 105-338, by the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Dale Franks of QandO (a milblog with a strong libertarian bent) provides an interesting point of view (archived) on this issue:

Excerpt from New York Times:
Too Few Good Men by Dan Senor and Walter Slocombe
Published: November 17, 2005

"This would have been a political disaster, alienating the Kurds and Shiites who make up more than 80 percent of Iraq's population and who understandably saw the old army as a key enforcer of Saddam Hussein's tyranny."

That very last sentence also captures the reason I've always thought that, on balance, demobilizing the Iraqi Army—for all the perceived difficulties it brought us after the major combat phase ended—was probably the best course of action.

While it's tempting to believe that a competent Iraqi army, available right from the beginning, would've made the occupation mush easier for us, to seriously make that argument you have to believe two fairly unlikely things.

First, you'd have to believe the Iraqi Army actually was competent, which is not really supported by its actual performance. Unless, by "competent" you mean "able to cow the Iraqi civilian population". For that purpose, of course, it seems to have been pretty capable, admittedly.

Second, you'd have to believe that the Iraqi Army was trustworthy enough to trust with guns at the US Army's back. The fact that we could beat the Iraqi army—or really, any other army in the world—on the battlefield still doesn't mean that some Sunni general with his eye on a palace and gold-plated toilet of his own wouldn't've tried it. Even worse, it's almost guaranteed that an army led mainly by holdovers from the previous regime would've been even more keen to get arms into the hands of insurgents—or become insurgents themselves—than an army recruited from scratch. Although, in the event, recruiting from scratch was troublesome enough as far as inside assistance to the insurgency goes.

And, of course, the effect on the Shiite and Kurdish population, seeing what would've appeared to be a US policy of keep[ing Sunnis running the show, would've probably resulted in a lot more intransigence in those portions of the population.

On balance, it's difficult to see how we had any choice other than eliminating the old Iraqi army, and starting over from scratch.

Honor Casey Sheehan and sympathize with Cindy Sheehan

On this Veterans Day weekend, Army Specialist Casey Sheehan deserves to be remembered much better than for his mother's sad quest.

SPC Sheehan died a hero's death, honorably, as an American soldier. He volunteered to return to Iraq for a 2nd tour. He was on a rescue mission when he was killed. We must make a special effort to defend his memory and his sacrifice from the ugly smear perpetrated by his mother's furious anger and those who exploit his death (however willingly on his mother's part).

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Add: Blackfive's 29MAR15 memorial post for Casey Sheehan:

This is an annual repost honoring Casey Sheehan who gave his life in a fight to save his brothers...

Casey Sheehan grew up in a devout Catholic home. He served as an altar boy and then as a key member of his church's youth group for years.

When he was old enough, Casey joined the Boy Scouts, becoming the very second Eagle Scout out of his troop.

He enlisted in the Army when he was twenty years old. He decided to be a mechanic. He would undergo Combat Lifesaver training - a class on how to give IVs and treat trauma only second in intense learning to combat medic training. He was also certified to assist with giving communion to soldiers while in the field.

Specialist Sheehan re-enlisted in the Army in 2004 knowing full well that he could be sent into a combat zone.

Casey Sheehan was a Humvee mechanic with the 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery Regiment.

On April 3rd, 2004, forces loyal to Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al'Sadr stormed police stations and government offices in Sadr City (a city of over 2 million). They knew the Americans would come, and they wanted a fight. Muqtada Sadr was working them up into a religious frenzy. And he had his thugs murder anyone who he thought might stand in his way - even other Shi'ite clerics. His forces were known as the Mahdi Army.

American forces quickly surrounded Muqtada al'Sadr's quarters.

On April 4th, 2004, al'Sadr's Mahdi forces blocked roadways and bridges with burning tires, vehicles and trash. Visibility was less than 300 meters anywhere in the city. They began to attack American vehicles on patrol throughout Sadr City - some were protecting Shia worshipers (Holy Arbayeen) while others were escorting city government vehicles.

A battle raged across Sadr City. Insurgents assaulted American troops while looters and mobs formed and stormed through the streets. Word spread quickly across the American FOBs that there was trouble.

Soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment were ambushed with RPGs and pinned down and dying. While fighting off an attack himself, the Commander of the 2/5th, LTC Volesky, called for help. A Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was formed of volunteers - their mission was to go out and rescue the American troops.

Casey Sheehan's Sergeant asked for volunteers. Sheehan had just returned from Mass. After Sheehan volunteered once, the Sergeant asked Sheehan again if he wanted to go on the mission. According to many reports (and according to his own mother), Casey responded, "Where my Chief goes, I go."

The QRF was launched. Not long after entering the Mahdi area, the QRF was channeled onto a dead-end street where the roofs were lined with snipers, RPGs, and even some militia throwing burning tires onto the vehicles. The Mahdi blocked the exit and let loose with everything they had.

Sheehan's vehicle was hit with multiple RPGs and automatic-weapons fire.

Specialist Casey Sheehan and Corporal Forest J. Jostes were killed.

A second QRF was formed - all volunteers - to go rescue the first. Specialist Ahmed Cason was hit in the second QRF - but kept fighting until he bled to death.

Seven men died with Casey Sheehan on Sunday, April 4th, 2004.

They were Spc. Robert R. Arsiaga, Spc. Ahmed Cason, Sgt. Yihjyh L. "Eddie" Chen, Spc. Stephen D. Hiller, Spc. Israel Garza, Cpl. Forest J. Jostes, and Sgt. Michael W. Mitchell.

It was Palm Sunday.

Palm Sunday commemorates the day that Jesus entered Jerusalem. Back then, the palm frond was a symbol of victory - laid beneath the feet of those of the highest honor and triumph. Some believe it was this honor fit for a king that forced Jesus's enemies to act and crucify him.

In recognition of Casey, the Catholic Chapel at Fort Hood, Texas (where Sheehan was stationed) named the Knights of Columbus chapter the "Casey Austin Sheehan Council".

Casey also received the Bronze Star for his Valor that day.

Palm fronds for the most honored.

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I have strong feelings about Cindy Sheehan's protest. But balancing my great sympathy for her loss as an Army mom (I've had one of my own), my disgust over the petty exploitation of her grief and her son's death — twisting them into a perversion that aids the same intolerable enemy who killed her son and so many like him —, my hatred of the groups who shamelessly use her as a shield for their own evil agendas, and my distress over the embarrassment caused to the honor of her son's service and sacrifice . . . it's not a commentary to be taken lightly nor expressed glibly.

In Mrs. Sheehan's defense, her son died as an American soldier. Mrs. Sheehan didn't volunteer, her son Casey did. He died in a tradition and as part of a heritage, and in a cause, she clearly does not and probably cannot understand. She can only interpret the life and death of her beloved son the best she is capable, and in that, I can't fault her. After all, I've had an Army mom, too, who was not a soldier and resisted giving her son to the Army. When Casey became a soldier, for whatever reason that motivated him, he entered a world and joined with a reality that is other than what she is.

Vaya con Dios, Specialist Sheehan — Casey. We, your brothers and sisters in arms, understand you and honor you. Your mother knows not what she does, but we love her just the same, as we love our moms who have borne the helpless weight of their love and their children's sacrifice.

Contextualizing the argument over Operation Iraqi Freedom

Introduction. I think the major disagreements over Operation Iraqi Freedom can be simplified to three divergent areas, which I have labelled the Three Strategic Forks. This is probably an over-simplified explanation, but that's just how smart I am not. I use the terms "realist" and "liberal" in the political science international relations sense, and I incorporate the terminology of Tom Barnett, of whom I am a big fan.

The first fork is Isolationism versus Intervention.

Isolationists come from a broad swathe, from radicals who want to remove US influence from the world, to dogmatic realists who see 9/11 as the punishment for liberal Wilsonianism, to Michael Moore types who see the War on Terror as the elites' distraction from the masses-versus-elites populist issues they care about.

Interventionists would be the majority of us, folks who accept the notion of US intervention overseas, although the range and type of preferred intervention differs. For example, if you think the US was right to topple the Taliban and disrupt al Qaeda's terrorist factories, even if you do not support OpIF, then you are an interventionist.

After taking the Intervention fork, the second fork is what I call the Revenge Mission versus Global Solutions.

Most realists equate security with threat, so they prefer the revenge mission option for the War on Terror, i.e., kill the terrorists (the symptoms) — which makes Operation Enduring Freedom acceptable — and focus on keeping the wild things out of the homeland by building higher walls and stronger gates.

Most liberals — the majority of Americans — prefer global solutions, i.e., addressing the global causes of the 9/11-related terrorist phenomenon as well as the symptoms. Liberals consider the spread of democracy and globalisation as the best solution for 9/11-related terrorism.

A good summary of President Bush Jr's liberal approach to the War on Terror:
Among the momentous effects of Al-Qaeda's violent strikes against the United States on September 11, 2001, was a re-orientation of American policy toward the Middle East. The new paradigm adopted in Washington viewed much of the world as being divided into opponents versus supporters of terrorism. Furthermore, the roots of terrorism were ascribed to Mideast regimes that caused social and economic failures while pursuing the interests of small groups of ruling elites.

After taking the Global Solutions fork, the third fork is what I call the Slow Burn versus the Race.

After more-or-less marching in step at the first two forks, many folks disagree at this third strategic fork.

At this stage, the "Core" (a Tom Barnett term) actors who oppose Operation Iraqi Freedom want a Slow Burn. They agree with the liberal belief that the Middle East must be reformed, but they want to make a realist compromise. As such, they concede Operation Enduring Freedom and a limited increase in engagement with the Middle East, but they are unwilling to bear the commitment, cost and uncertainty of comprehensively engaging the causes of terrorism in the "Gap." Instead, they would rather remain with pre-9/11 rituals and processes (e.g., the President Clinton approach to terrorism) where they are comfortable. They believe, or convince themselves, the natural flow of globalisation will eventually solve the causes. Beyond the Slow Burn, they will react to symptoms as they flare up.

The "Core" actors who support OpIF view the war on terror as a race where the "Core" must 'connect' the Middle East to democracy and globalisation before this proactive, aggressive, and capable enemy can 'disconnect' the region. The attacks of 9/11 were intended as an opening 'System Perturbation' (again, Barnett-speak) to disconnect the democratic, globalised community from encroaching on the Muslim world. OpIF, in this context, is an opening counter-Perturbation that replaces the pre-9/11 paradigm of the West's limited, self-conscious and self-serving engagement in the Middle East with intensive interaction between the globalised "Core" community and the region.

The greater purpose of OpIF for those who support the Race, therefore, is to compel the globalised community to a deeper, long-term commitment to the Middle East — the same deeper commitment many other folks in the "Core" oppose. This assessment further holds forth that the terrorists are rapidly moving to sever the vital connections between the Middle East and the globalised community, using the methodology exemplified by the enemy in Iraq with his 'anti-war' enabler in the West. If we fail to succeed in this strong liberal push now, in OpIF, then we will lose the connections needed to effect change in the oppression-extremism dichotomy squeezing the Middle East.

In sum, those who support the Slow Burn refuse to reach past their own comfort zone. Those who support the Race believe the Slow Burn by itself cannot work, because of the existing pre-9/11 conditions that extinguished liberalization in the region, and because post-9/11, the proactive terrorists will do their best to disallow the Slow Burn to work.

We must respect the enemy. In my opinion, the terrorists are racing and they fully realize what is at stake for them in Iraq. For those in the race — terrorists, Iraqis and nation builders — the central battle of the War on Terror, in the present and for the future, is unequivocally being fought right now in Iraq.