Tuesday, January 22, 2019

Criticism and suggestions regarding the "Iraq Syndrome" in Cathy Young's "Confessions of a Libertarian Neocon"

PREFACE: Cathy Young is a Newsday columnist, an Arc Digital associate editor, a Reason contributing editor, and tweets at @CathyYoung63. I responded to her discussion of the "Iraq Syndrome" in her 26DEC18 Arc Digital article, "Confessions of a Libertarian Neocon". Ms. Young's e-mail in the exchange is omitted.



from: [Eric LC]
to: [Cathy Young]
date: Jan 22, 2019, 6:15 PM
subject: Regarding the "Iraq Syndrome" at "Confessions of a Libertarian Neocon"

Ms. Young,

I'd like to share some reactions to the "Iraq Syndrome" in your 26DEC18 article, "Confessions of a Libertarian Neocon":https://arcdigital.media/confessions-of-a-libertarian-neocon-e10042d21369.

My equivalent term for "Iraq Syndrome" is OIF stigma, which I regularly discuss with reference to Vietnam War stigma; for example.

First, regarding "Moreover, American opinion is still fairly divided about the war in Iraq; the public consensus is far less skewed against the war than the pundit consensus seems to be. In a Pew poll earlier this year, 48 percent said going to war was the wrong decision, while 43 percent said it was right."

Criticism: Citing to poll numbers in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, either at the time or current, is a nothing defense — a non-rebuttal. To be sure, you're not alone in using the argument. For example, Pete Hegseth and Stephen Knott are guilty of making it their lead argument. Worse than providing no substantive defense of the OIF decision, when it's used sans operative context, the 'public support' argument serves OIF opponents by, one, working hand-in-hand with the "false pretenses" assertion ('It was only supported because Bush lied') and, two, validating the justification for President Obama's exit from Iraq ('The public supported leaving Iraq').

The proper argument on both points is the substantive merits: uphold the OIF decision on the merits and criticize Obama's 2011 exit from Iraq on the merits. Incontrovertible plain law and facts make for a far stronger argument than poll numbers; objectively, the case against Saddam is substantiated. Fact pattern-type analysis that hews to the operative law, policy, precedent, and facts that define the Iraq issue shows that President Bush's decision on Iraq was substantively correct on the facts, procedurally correct on law and precedent, and justified on the policy. For example, see my law-and-fact clarification of the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ, which is oriented on the main points of the prevailing anti-OIF narrative.

Second, regarding "Who’s to say that Saddam Hussein would not have started another regional war, leading to his downfall and to an Iraqi civil war with even more casualties? There is an odd U.S.-centrism in the assumption that without our involvement, the Middle East after 2001 would have seen no wars, no revolutions, and no other catastrophes."

Suggestion: Clarify that Saddam's threat was not limited to Iraq's military and, at the point of Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) in 2002-2003, the Saddam problem was neither stable nor contained (in either sense). Critically, the operative context of the question, "Who's to say Saddam Hussein would not have started another regional war", was the burden on Iraq to prove it cured Saddam's standing Gulf War-established manifold threat in accordance with the comprehensive prescriptive-cum-diagnostic Gulf War ceasefire terms.

Any counterfactual that follows the premise of the US and UK backing down when Saddam chose to call the Gulf War ceasefire enforcers' bluff by breaching his "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) needs to factor that Saddam's leading "regional and global terrorism" (Iraqi Perspectives Project), which included "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with al Qaeda, and his radically sectarian rule by "widespread terror" (UNCHR) were actually "far worse" (UNCHR) than we knew before OIF. Coupled with those ceasefire breaches, Saddam was in fact reconstituting Iraq's WMD and conventional armament in violation of UNSCR 687.

Recall that the Iraq Survey Group's post-war findings corroborated UNMOVIC's confirmation of Iraq's ceasefire breach (ie, casus belli) and confirmed Saddam "never intended" to comply as mandated. At the same time, the ISG report is heavily qualified as a survey of Saddam's WMD due to Iraq's rigorous counter-intelligence, which included systematic ridding of evidence even during the post-war ISG investigation. Which is to say, the ISG's findings comprise a floor only, not a complete account of Saddam's WMD. We know Saddam had not disarmed as mandated per UNSCR 687, and we know Saddam was reconstituting his conventional arms and WMD program in breach of UNSCR 687, but we don't know the extent that Saddam had preserved and reconstituted his WMD program. Also recall in light of Saddam's principal terrorist threat and his "sanitized" secret IIS labs that terrorism and military-based standards for WMD threat are different.

In any case, knowing what we know now, we can be sure Saddam had broken 'containment' and was past red line and worsening in every ceasefire-mandated facet. So, what if Saddam was in power for the Arab Spring? Given the extreme harm that Saddam's allies have caused in the Arab Spring by merely copying Saddam's tactics and re-purposing Saddam's terrorists, one shudders to imagine how a Saddam in power — noncompliant, ambitious, unreconstructed, and triumphantly strengthened for years past a hypothetical American and British capitulation to his categorical ceasefire breach — might have opportunistically engaged the Arab Spring.

Third, regarding "I warned against assuming easy success and wrote that visions of a liberated and reconstructed Iraq as a model of freedom and prosperity in the region was “just the kind of noble dream that has a way of turning to a nightmare.”"

Suggestion: To establish the proper law-and-policy context for the nation-building mission, I suggest the OIF FAQ answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom about WMD or democracy". The OIF regime change was principally a Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement measure.

As I like to say, building a nation to secure the peace does not happen faster than raising a child. The Iraq mission was evidently succeeding before President Obama's course change prematurely withdrew the necessary peace operations with Iraq. To help you address the events that have followed Obama's radical deviation, I suggest the OIF FAQ answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory" and the #bushwaswinning section of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts"; excerpt:
With American leadership tempered by the crucible of Iraq, the next step of winning the War on Terror was building peace in the Middle East based on new norms. How? Carry forward the Bush Freedom Agenda and continue the steadfast American partnership developing the emerging pluralistic, liberalizing post-Saddam Iraq as the keystone building block.

While the Arab Spring happened during the Obama administration, the Bush Freedom Agenda had positioned America to boost liberal reform in the Middle East. Concurrently, OIF had set up a better stable and ethical path to deal with Iran that relied on 3 prongs: stabilize Iraq as an American ally, increase sanctions pressure, and support civil reform in Iran. President Obama, instead, did the opposite of all three.

In his benchmark May 2011 address, Obama pledged "steadfast" support for progressing Iraq and the Arab Spring. Middle East activists took the US president's pledge to heart to risk their lives, but Obama subsequently proudly reneged. In the singular window to make a historic difference, in the moment America held — as President Clinton had envisioned — "a remarkable opportunity to shape a future more peaceful than the past", President Obama astonishingly, instead, appeased Iran, disengaged the vital peace operations with Iraq, dropped the Bush Freedom Agenda, and opted to 'lead from behind' with predictable and evitable tragic consequences.
The key corrective premises that must be impressed on the politics, including upon your colleagues at Reason, is that the American and British decision on Iraq was demonstrably, objectively correct in the first place, the Iraq mission was evidently succeeding before Prime Minister Brown and President Obama's radical deviation, and the subsequent harms followed their course change. Fixing the foundation and frame of the Iraq issue in the politics would lift up your "neocon" advocacy and discredit your opposition. I hope this is helpful.



Related: Regarding pundits and David Brooks's "Saving the System".

No comments:

Post a Comment