Miscellaneous tweets

PREFACE: This post includes tweets moved from the Miscellaneous page to make their content searchable. Later selected tweets will be posted here directly.

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#bushlied4bulletpoints



Original source (h/t).

Tweets on 28FEB22:

... To clarify [the 4 bullet points]:

1. WMD stocks estimates were based on UNSCOM analysis rather than US intel-sourced "specific info" as such. US intel supported UNSCOM's mission & incorporated UNSCOM data. [The "massive stockpiles" reference is from Bush's 07OCT02 speech.]
...
2. The Dec 2002 [31DEC02] press Q&A Bush answer is apparently an off-the-cuff outlier since the Bush admin position was consistently in line with "we don't know...how close Saddam Hussein is to developing a nuclear weapon" (Bush 07OCT02).
...
3. Rice's [08SEP02 CNN] statement re aluminum tubes was consistent with CIA & majority intel analysis.

4. Cheney's [14NOV01, 09DEC01, 10SEP06] statements re Atta were consistent with [the Czech] intel. And, "He said this after the CIA and FBI concluded this meeting never took place" is incorrect b/c CIA & FBI didn't conclude that. [Notice that Cheney's statements re Atta were in response to media inquiries about the 27OCT01 New York Times report on the Czech intel on Atta in the 1st place.]

Tweets on 22MAY22:

Clarifications:
1st bullet point: The "massive stockpile" of BW in Bush's O7OCT02 speech https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html was not "literally just made up". Bush clearly cites UNSCOM, not US intel-sourced "specific information", consistent w/ US intel analysts' reliance on UNSCOM analysis.
...
2nd bullet point: The quote from a 31DEC02 press Q&A https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021231-1.html is a non-representative off-the-cuff answer that's understandably close to the intel & regular Bush admin position of "we don't know...how close Saddam...is to developing a nuclear weapon"(Bush 07OCT02).
...
3rd bullet point: Rice's 08SEP02 statement http://cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/08/le.00.html on the proscribed high-grade aluminum tubes was consistent with the majority analysis of the 2002 NIE https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/iraq-wmd.html DOE's partial dissent was an outlier & 'possible use' isn't the same as 'suitable use'.
...
4th bullet point: US relied on foreign intel re terrorism, eg, Czech intel re Atta-IIS meeting. The timeline of Cheney's evolving view on it matches US intel's investigation. US intel did not conclude the "meeting never took place", only that it was unconfirmed & seemed unlikely.
...
More on the 2nd bullet point: Setting aside that 'don't know if any' is an understandable off-the-cuff contraction of 'don't know how close to any', 'don't know if any' is right too if we factor the AQ Khan WMD network, which we know at least tried to sell ready WMD tech to Iraq.
...
More on the 4th bullet point: For better context re the Czech intel Atta-IIS Prague meeting https://nytimes.com/2001/10/27/world/nation-challenged-investigation-czechs-confirm-iraqi-agent-met-with-terror.html controversy, I recommend reviewing @KyleWOrton's exceptional write-up https://kyleorton.co.uk/2015/06/21/saddam-al-qaeda-stephen-hayes-the-connection/, which Orton has newly updated. Read the whole post. Excerpt:

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#ellemanunmovic

A striking 19MAR18 tweet from UNMOVIC inspector and Director of Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy at IISS, Michael Elleman:

We acted on the best intelligence provided by "member states" including the US. But nothing found. We were prepared to state there were no WMD in Iraq, but needed another 3-6 weeks to resolve residual issues from the 1990s. The rush to war prevented a conclusive finding. 2/x
March 19, 2018

My response to Elleman's admission:

Tweet, 21DEC20:

Why do you believe you only "needed another 3-6 weeks to resolve residual issues from the 1990s" given those issues included the verified total declaration of Iraq's WMD program--the baseline step of the UNSCR 687 disarmament process--that Iraq failed to provide through 12 years?

Tweet, 21DEC20:

The kernel of truth in @EllemanIISS's "3-6 weeks" is Iraq could&should have disarmed w/in weeks of the ceasefire. Yet in 12 yrs & 4 mo under Res1441 Iraq refused even the basic disarm step--a verified total declaration--that was required w/in 15 days of Res687's 03APR91 adoption.

Tweet, 21DEC20:

Given UNMOVIC & ISG's reports are rife with UNSCR 687 violations, including IIS's large covert procurement program & chem&bio labs Iraq hid from UNSCOM&UNMOVIC, your admission "We were prepared to state there were no WMD in Iraq" in "3-6 weeks" is terrifying malfeasance averted.

Tweet, 25DEC20:

I assume the 15 days mandated by Res687 for the verified total declaration of Iraq's WMD program is the basis for @EllemanIISS's claim he needed only "another 3-6 weeks". That might be plausible if Iraq immediately took the 1st&2nd disarm steps. But Iraq "never intended"(ISG) to.

Note: To clarify Elleman's disinformation, "nothing found", see the 25JAN99 UNSCOM report that set the baseline WMD status for Iraq's "final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" (UNSCR 1441) and the 06MAR03 UNMOVIC report that confirmed Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) on WMD.

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#schwarztheintercept

I criticized the faulty premises of Jon Schwarz's 10APR15 The Intercept article, Twelve Years Later, US Media Still Can’t Get Iraqi WMD Story Right, in response to this tweet:

Are you referring to the weapons described here regarding saddam? Would be interested to hear a different side.
https://t.co/c8aGReqHhC
January 25, 2023

Tweet, 25JAN23:

FYI, contra The Intercept, in fact, UNSCOM/UNMOVIC lost oversight of the al Muthanna site upon the 1998 expulsion & Duelfer's claim that Iraq innocently lost track of WMD is 1, not an excuse under UNSCR 687 & 2, speculation not evidenced by ISG findings.
@ https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#duelferreport
[Screenshot from the [Chemical] subsection]

Tweet, 25JAN23:

...Also, The Intercept misrepresents the poor control & unreliability of UNSCOM's oversight of the al Muthanna site even before UNSCOM was expelled in 1998, eg, ISG marks 1994 for possible Iraqi abuse of the site.

Excerpt from the ISG report's CW section re the al Muthanna site:

Tweet, 26JAN23:

...A 4th misleading premise by The Intercept is its cherry-picked reliance on ISG finding Saddam ordered cooperation w/ inspectors. In fact, UNMOVIC & ISG found the order was false: Iraq "concealment & deception" continued "up to OIF & beyond" (ISG).
@ ISG https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#duelferreport
[Screenshot from the [Biological] subsection]

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#congressviewbeforebush

Tweet, 28SEP21:

Your Reddit Leitenberg paper [link], whose citations imply is end 2000, early 2001, juxtaposed w/ the 22MAR00 Senate hearing on Iraq https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67659/html/CHRG-106shrg67659.htm, illustrates the crisis w/ Iraq matured long before 9/11, even before Bush became POTUS. Eg, Senator Biden at the 22MAR00 hearing:

Tweet, 28SEP21:

Relevant insight on Senator Biden's position on the Iraq crisis from the 22MAR00 Senate hearing on Iraq https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67659/html/CHRG-106shrg67659.htm: Biden believes President HW Bush made a "fundamental mistake" at the outset by suspending Desert Storm short of Iraqi regime change.

Excerpt:

Tweet, 28SEP21:

Relevant insight from 22MAR00 Senate hearing on Iraq https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67659/html/CHRG-106shrg67659.htm: Contra the narrative re 2002 AUMF that Congress was negligent, tricked or bullied into accepting Bush's view on Saddam's WMD, in fact POTUS only echoed Congress's standing view on Saddam's WMD. Excerpt:

Tweet, 30SEP21:

Interesting insight from the 22MAR00 Senate hearing on Iraq https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67659/html/CHRG-106shrg67659.htm:
Congress's view that Saddam was likely hiding nuclear weapon capability was largely based on testimony from Scott Ritter, the same Scott Ritter made famous for disputing the US re Iraq.

Excerpt:

Tweet, 30SEP21:

Relevant insight from the 22MAR00 Senate hearing on Iraq https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67659/html/CHRG-106shrg67659.htm:
Congress knew the fundamental difference b/w mandated Iraqi compliance vs "report that no evidence of violations had been detected". Bush's Iraq enforcement applied the compliance criteria.
Excerpt:

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#pnacconspiracy

PNAC is Project for a New American Century.

Tweet, 17JUN23:

The underlined phrase in https://web.archive.org/web/20130817122719/http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf is cited out of context to accuse PNAC of exploiting (maybe orchestrating) 9/11 to invade the Middle East, particularly Iraq. Yet the actual context of the phrase is a discussion of DoD reforms, not a conspiracy to invade anyone.
+

Tweet, 17JUN23:

Moreover, the PNAC source for the "like a new Pearl Harbor" phrase is focused on peer/near-peer nation-v-nation conventional armament, not counter-terrorism/insurgency. The DoD adjustments compelled by 9/11 were CT/COIN-focused & dissimilar to the DoD reforms advocated by PNAC.
+

Tweet, 17JUN23:

To be sure, PNAC did call for Iraq regime change, but that advocacy was distinct from its advocacy of DoD reforms whence stated the "like a new Pearl Harbor" phrase. PNAC called for Iraq regime change based on Iraq's festering noncompliance w/ UNSCR 687, not a 9/11-level event.
=

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#sasonotequalcoin

Tweet, 13MAY24:

"methods are more important than force size" & "Bigger force-COIN+guerilla insurgency=more KIA" sum up my disagreement with Stephan on this point: SASO≠COIN. More, pre-surge, exceptions like Petraeus made a difference with good method even w/ fewer troops.

@StephanAJensen tweet, 12MAY24:
I might be oversimplifying this massively, but at the end of the day, I think it's even more "micro" than that: Rumsfeld and the people around him rejected the idea that a large number of troops are needed for stabilisation and peacekeeping after an initially successful military intervention. The lack of sufficient troops (by at least a factor of 10) for stabilisation in the immediate aftermath of the toppling of the Taliban and then Saddam was, more than any other factor, what led to failure in both wars.

Tweet, 12MAY24:

"The lack of sufficient troops...for stabilisation in the immediate aftermath of the toppling of...Saddam" was not "more than any other factor, what led to failure" with Iraq.

The top factor is Obama's deviation contra SFA. The 2nd factor was underestimating Saddam's terrorism.

Tweet, 15MAY24:

"The lack of sufficient troops...for stabilisation in the immediate aftermath of...toppling...Saddam was, more than any other factor, what led to failure" overlooks 1, Iraq was on track by 2008 w/ SFA & 2, post-2008 errors w/ Iraq. @joel_rayburn points out https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2024/03/review-of-aei-iraq-war-series-20-years-later.html

Tweet, 13MAY24:

Here's elaboration on my "SASO≠COIN" criticism of @StephanAJensen's "lack of sufficient troops" for SASO:
1. US troops aren't magical peacekeepers. If the issue was simply "lack of sufficient troops" for SASO, more Iraqi troops would've met the need better than more US troops.
+

Tweet, 13MAY24:

2. Pre-COIN Iraqi forces trained & deployed for SASO were beat by insurgents. More US troops deployed for SASO pre-COIN would've been beat by insurgents too.
3. Post-invasion looting & lawlessness did not create the insurgency. Saddamists created it like the Taliban did in AFG.
+

Tweet, 13MAY24:

4. Adding US troops made sense when tied to OIF strategic adjustments. From the initial 'light footprint' plan, as OIF adjusted vs the insurgency, US troops were added as needed. Including the COIN surge, OIF's US troop level never needed to multiply "by at least a factor of 10".

Tweet, 14MAY24:

Add: Top experts state @StephanAJensen's view, but it's contradicted when scrutinized. For a more-detailed commentary abt "SASO≠COIN" vs "lack of sufficient troops", see my review of 14APR23 AEI panel "The Iraq War Series: The Conduct of the War" https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2024/03/review-of-aei-iraq-war-series-20-years-later.html#conductofwarpanel Excerpt:

Tweet, 20MAY24:

I guess Stephan's math for "lack of sufficient troops (by at least a factor of 10)" re SASO w/ AFG in 2003 is based on 5K ISAF in 2003 vs 50K KFOR in 2000. But again, in 2003, the 10-13K OEF force also did SASO w/ AFG.

Next, compare the value of the typical OEF/ISAF trooper...
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Tweet, 20MAY24:

...Compare the practical value of the typical OEF/ISAF special forces soldier in 2003 to the typical KFOR regular-army soldier in 2000. For OEF/ISAF SASO in 2003 vs KFOR SASO in 2000, was 1x SF soldier in Afghanistan equivalent to 3, 4, even 10x regular-army soldiers in Kosovo?
+

Tweet, 20MAY24:

...Finally, what was the ratio of front-line soldiers to support soldiers in ISAF/OEF's 15-18K in 2003 vs KFOR's 50K in 2000? Generally speaking, SF is significantly leaner re support staff on the ground than regular forces. I assume that held true for OEF/ISAF 2003 vs KFOR 2000.

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#oeflearningcurvenotnegligence

Tweet, 16MAY24:

B/c setback—esp early shortfalls—is normal in military history, Stephan's thesis blaming early setbacks in AFG for ultimate failure, in spite of OEF's midstream adjustments, sets a standard that obviates US & West entering any military contest requiring normal setback-adjustment.

Tweet, 17MAY24:

Sure, we take preemptive perfection if we can get it. But that's rare in military history and rarer for extreme tasks like AFG. Per NATO, Kosovo lessons were applied to AFG—AFG was just harder. The early shortfalls look like normal develop/learn process.
@ https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#postwarmil
[Screenshot from the OIF FAQ retrospective #postwarmil section]

Tweet, 17MAY24:

Your own narrative of pre-9/11 AFG points up why AFG proved harder than the 'state of the art' Kosovo peace ops. That wasn't going to be solved quickly & smoothly. The learning curve for AFG was always going to take time—eg, the 2010s adjustments you hold up followed OIF lessons.

Tweet, 17MAY24:

Re "2010s adjustments you [Stephan] hold up followed OIF lessons", there's a reason Petraeus was put in command of OEF/ISAF at that time. Criticizing OEF in 2003 w/ 2010s adjustments is ahistorical. They needed 'proof of concept' from Iraq—that meant 08-09 earliest for AFG surge.

Tweet, 19MAY24:

BTW, the answer to "Dunno why US wasn't counted w/ ISAF number in 2003," yet US was counted w/ ISAF in 2007, is ISAF & OEF were distinct missions in 2003: ISAF:Kabul—OEF:rest-of-AFG (not ISAF:SASO—OEF:CT). In 2007, US was counted w/ ISAF b/c ISAF mission expanded & merged w/ OEF.

Tweet, 19MAY24:

FYI for Stephan's project, roundup of ex-OIF FAQ sources I've cited in the thread:
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/afghanistan/
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020417-1.html
https://nato.int/docu/review/articles/2023/06/20/nato-s-engagement-in-afghanistan-2003-2021-a-planners-perspective/index.html
https://nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69366.htm
https://nato.int/isaf/placemats_archive/2007-01-29-ISAF-Placemat.pdf
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf
https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/pdd25.htm
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/somalia

Tweet, 19MAY24:

Add to roundup: https://understandingwar.org/provincial-reconstruction-teams-prts
Stephan's thesis that US initially eschewed SASO & neglected to project new AFG to the provinces is incorrect. Actually, US's PRT-based SASO "originated in AFG in early 2002". PRTs were all-in-one SASO units that rep'd AFG in the provinces.

Tweet, 19MAY24:

Stephan blames US & NATO negligence on SASO based on the Kosovo standard per 2003 snapshot. Yet in fact, there was no OEF:CT—ISAF:SASO division & in 2003 the SF-heavy 10-13K US + 5K NATO forces' SASO in AFG ≥ KFOR's SASO.
It fell short, but that's learning curve, not negligence.

Note: In the same thread, be sure to read the 22MAY24 tweets from @StephanAJensen and me that follow up the 19MAY24 tweets.

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#humanitarianliberalparadigmvsiraqsyndrome

Tweet, 12MAY24:

Yeah, that was key: HW Bush hopefully envisioned the UNSCR 660-series enforcement as the new paradigm & baseline for the international community coming together for the post-Cold War liberal world order. In that regard, I'm angrier at France's complicity w/ Saddam than at Russia.

Tweet, 12MAY24:

To circle back to @StephanAJensen, given his age (he says he was a child in the 90s), I'm not sure he realizes that the essential premises of his thesis on AFG are not universal & in fact depend on the primacy of the paradigm reified by the UNSCR 660-series enforcement with Iraq.

@StephanAJensen tweet, 12MAY24:

Hey - not 100% what you mean here (which may be, at least in part, evidence that you are correct).

Care to elaborate?

Tweet, 12MAY24:

Your thesis & ethical appeal for what we owe Cold War proxy AFG depend on the humanitarian liberal paradigm based on the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement that culminated w/ OIF. The Iraq Syndrome displaces that paradigm w/ defaults inimical to your thesis.
@ https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#americanprimacy
[Screenshot from the OIF FAQ retrospective #americanprimacy section]

Tweet, 12MAY24:

The humanitarian nation-building, peace ops standard you witnessed w/ the Balkans interventions & carried out & now advocate for AFG is based on the UNSCR 688 enforcement https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#unscr688 Its roots aren't deeper than that. The 'realist' standard it replaced is the default.

Tweet, 13MAY24:

And, as I said, your advocacy depends on reinstating the corrective Bush Doctrine that competed for the humanitarian liberal paradigm in its essential test w/ Iraq & your mission w/ AFG. That means curing the Iraq Syndrome.

Excerpt https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040602.html

Tweet, 10MAY24:
"US was in a position to provide this"—ie, AFG nation-building—did not exist in the 1990s. It only came to be after 9/11 with the Bush Doctrine, in policy terms https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/freedomagenda/. Your advocacy requires reinstating the Bush Doctrine, which requires curing the Iraq Syndrome.

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#timwalzopposediraqsurge

Tweet, 08AUG24:

.@Tim_Walz's Army retirement b/c of Iraq is less relevant to his VPOTUS fitness than the disqualifying fact he is [on record] opposing the Iraq "surge" as a House Armed Services Committee member, a litmus test for any prospective V/POTUS which Walz failed.
@ https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2014/01/infuriating.html

@JDVance tweet, 07AUG24:
You know what really bothers me about Tim Walz?

When the US Marine Corps asked me to go to Iraq to serve my country, I did it.

When Tim Walz was asked by his country to go to Iraq, he dropped out of the Army and allowed his unit to go without him. I think that's shameful.
[Embedded Youtube video]

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#weaponizeiraqissueagainstmaga&dems

Tweet, 30AUG24:

You should weaponize the law & facts of the Iraq issue in the politics against both MAGA GOP & the Democrats b/c both factions depend on the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative at their base & use it to discredit anti-MAGA GOP. And, OIF's justification manifests your core principles.

@QuinHillyer tweet, 30AUG24:
I go back and forth between desperate fear that Trump wil get elected and desperate fear that Harris will -- and then desperate fear that whichever of them gets in will need to step down, to be replaced by either Vance or Walz, both of whom inspire desperate fear.

Follow-up direct message to @QuinHillyer:

One of them is going to be elected. You can't help that. But you have it in your power to turn the tables on both MAGA Republicans and the Democrats by taking the Iraq Syndrome, on which they both depend at their base, from its current factor as a policy and political premise that they nakedly wield to discredit and marginalize your political faction, and transforming the Iraq Syndrome into an exposed fundamental metastatic lie that you can wield to hold both factions to account, restore credit to anti-MAGA GOP, and establish Bush's historic resolute principled corrective necessary leadership on Iraq as the standard and landmark to correct our nation's course.
Really, you don't have a choice: Your core principles are manifested in and inseparable from the UNSCR 678 Iraq intervention. As the political value of the Iraq intervention goes in the politics, so goes the political value of anti-MAGA GOP--MAGA Republicans and Democrats have made sure of that. You can and should use that against them. It's your path to save the nation.

Aug 30, 2024, 7:45 PM

Tweet, 29AUG24:

Notice that the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative is @willchamberlain's go-to move to discredit anti-MAGA GOP—in this case the falsehood that Saddam's confirmed ties to al Qaeda are a @stephenfhayes "conspiracy theory". Anti-MAGA GOP needs to clarify the Iraq issue. cc @QuinHillyer

@willchamberlain tweet, 28AUG24:
Replying to @stephenfhayes
You were saying something about conspiracy theories?
[Cover of Stephen Hayes's The Connection: How al Qaeda's Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America]

Tweet replying to @willchamberlain and @stephenfhayes, 29AUG24:

Saddam did in fact have operational ties with al Qaeda. See @KyleWOrton's analysis of @stephenfhayes's book https://kyleorton.co.uk/2015/06/21/saddam-al-qaeda-stephen-hayes-the-connection/ & the Iraqi Perspectives Project's post-war investigation of Saddam's terrorism, which I cover at https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#ipp

@ https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2022/01/critique-iraq-portions-miller-center-december-2021-revised-georgewbush-foreign-affairs.html
[Screenshot of the post's section on Saddam's terrorism]

Tweet, 19JUL24:

Re the @dcexaminer article, see my "Comment on Timothy Carney's answer to "What is the most important lesson of the Iraq War?"" https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2023/03/review-of-washington-examiner-symposium-what-is-most-important-lesson-of-iraq-war.html#carney-we, where @TPCarney does "define a neocon" sophistically. When addressing Carney's views, it's essential to clarify the Iraq issue.
[Screenshot of my "Comment on Timothy Carney's answer to "What is the most important lesson of the Iraq War?""]

@bstewart1776 tweet, 16JUL24:
I’d like to see them try to define a neocon.

@dcexaminer tweet, 16JUL24:
‘I’m tired of the neocons’: Republicans embrace Trump-Vance turn on foreign policy [by @TPCarney]
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/beltway-confidential/3083893/tired-of-neocons-republicans-embrace-trump-vance-turn-foreign-policy/

Tweet, 12SEP24:

Here's another case of a MAGA world builder, @tabletmag's @Jacob__Siegel, who depends on the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative as an essential premise of his thesis: https://x.com/tabletmag/status/1641029719935033346

* You can read the excerpted clarification of the Iraq WMD issue at https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2024/03/review-of-aei-iraq-war-series-20-years-later.html#operationiraqifreedompanel

Comment on Brian Dunn's "What Shall Phase IX in Iraq Look Like?"

PREFACE: Brian Dunn is a national security analyst who blogs at The Dignified Rant. I commented critically on his benchmark 04FEB20 post, What Shall Phase IX in Iraq Look Like?. My related advice to Joanne Munisteri and Adad Shmuel in response to their 27JAN20 Small Wars Journal article, Iraq: Time for A Different Approach, recommendation to Michael Knights in response to his 05JAN20 Politico article, How Soleimani’s Killing Could Make a Stronger Iraq, and advice to Will Roberts in response to his 16FEB24 Providence article, The Road to Deterring Iran Goes Through Iraq, are additionally included.

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from: [Eric LC]
to: [Brian Dunn]
date: Feb 18, 2020, 5:44 PM
subject: Comment on "What Shall Phase IX in Iraq Look Like?"

Brian,

This critical comment responds to your 04FEB20 post, What Shall Phase IX in Iraq Look Like?. ...

Brian:

How shall we win the current phase--the ninth--in the Iraq War? Will it be a military or societal main effort?

You quote 27OCT19 [27JAN20] Small Wars Journal article, Iraq: Time for A Different Approach, to describe a "societal main effort" as "[h]umanitarian programs in the fields of education, health and job skill training" that are American supplied and Iraqi run "without the use of outside military and civilian contractors". Ms. Munisteri and Mr. Shmuel implicitly reject US military or commensurate alternative management of the humanitarian effort on the ground.

I agree with you and them that society-transforming humanitarian programs are urgently needed in Iraq. It's a good idea. It's the right idea.

However, it's not a novel idea. Therein, your "military or societal" framing is problematic.

Years before Operation Iraqi Freedom, long before we were able to learn the full extent that the Saddam regime corrupted Iraqi society and traumatized the Iraqi people, the international community understood Iraq required extensive humanitarian aid to recover from Saddam's rule.

Accordingly, at the same time and on the same track per UNSCR 688, the US law and policy on Iraq developed a core humanitarian component. The Iraq intervention was formulated with the core humanitarian component, which was the primary focus throughout the OIF peace operations. OIF's security component served the humanitarian component to the degree that initially the humanitarian component was conflated with the security component.

In OIF, we learned that the Saddam-corrupted Iraqi civil infrastructure was unable to take on the multi-thread humanitarian effort. We also learned that US, other-nation, international (which is to say, UN), and NGO civilian-led humanitarian aid was insufficient, and markedly vulnerable and fragile versus the terrorists, when separate from the US military.

We learned the hard way that ultimately the only organization that could viably manage both the core humanitarian component and security component of nation-building Iraq was the US military. The OIF peace operations adjusted and proved to work before they were ended.

We learned in Iraq that an effectual humanitarian "societal main effort" and "military...main effort" are one and the same.

Yet despite the lessons we learned with hard costly experience, Munisteri and Shmuel advocate for Iraq to now take on the urgently needed comprehensive multi-thread humanitarian effort sans US military or commensurate alternative management on the ground. Despite that, as you point out, Iraq's civil infrastructure falls far short of the Roosevelt administration that managed the WPA program in their analogy.

If Iraq's progression had not been degenerated by President Obama's deviation, then the option of an Iraqi "societal main effort" sans US military or commensurate alternative management on the ground likely would be realistic by now.

As is, I doubt that Iraq in its current condition is able to carry out their recommendation. Based on lessons learned, Iraq's current condition, and the peace-building tools available, the US military strikes me as indivisible from a viable "societal main effort": A sufficient nation-building multi-thread "societal main effort" with Iraq is necessarily at least enabled by the backing of the US military, à la OIF's initial post-war plan, and quite likely needs to be managed again by the US military.

Leaving the Iraqis to sink or swim with arms-length US supply strikes me as deliberately repeating President Obama's errors, which Mi[u]nisteri and Shmuel speciously conflate with Presidents Clinton and Bush's Iraq enforcement.

Alternatively, if there were a sufficient, like-minded, reliable US non-military, other-nation, or international organization that could manage the multi-thread nation-building needed for Iraq, then I would support that non-existent organization taking the lead on the ground, so the US military could be left to notional warfighting and other preferred missions.

Like the CIA was built from the OSS of WW2, a sufficient alternative peace-building capability could have been built from the COIN of OIF. In fact, a commensurate non-military "surge" was promised to Iraq to pave the way for the 2011 military withdrawal. But the US reneged, and no peace-building alternative has been developed by the Obama and Trump administrations.

Further development of peace-building policy and capability, either military or alternatively based, has been curtailed by the politics of the prevailing inimical narrative of the Iraq intervention. Mi[u]nisteri and Shmuel are not helpful in that regard.

The reality is that the US military is the only organization in the world proven capable of effectually managing the humanitarian multi-thread "societal main effort" that you, I, and they recognize is urgently needed in Iraq.


Brian:

Phase VII went from May 2008 through December 2013.

The Iraq intervention did not progress through "Phase VII" from 2008 to 2013. Obama's deviation with Iraq during that period broke from Phase VII.

Correctly diagnosing the inflection point as a path progression or path deviation is essential to prescribe the correct political and policy solution. Misinterpreting a path deviation as a path progression causes the assumption of premises that are no longer operative and the overlooking of current operative premises. More on that below.

Your description of Phase VII matches our continuing post-WW2 strategic partnerships in Europe and Asia, whose progress have been based on and enabled by constant US military posture. It mismatches Obama's deviation with Iraq that interrupted the US military posture at a pivotal point, contravened the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement, and crippled Iraq's progress.

In a critical window, President Obama prematurely removed the vital peace operations with Iraq, appeased Iran, reneged his pledges to the Arab Spring protests, and surrendered the "red line" with Syria, all of which emboldened and enabled the terrorists, Assad, and his allies. Obama denied Iraq when it first invoked the SFA to request US assistance, when Phase VII could have been readily recovered from the 2011 error. Instead, Obama returned US forces to Iraq too late and too limited to either save Iraq's surge-and-Sahwa progress, cut off the ISIS invasion, or deter the concomitant Iranian intervention.


Brian:

Phase VIII was the rise of ISIL in Iraq and our re-intervention to defeat the Islamic State caliphate in September 2014, what I have called Iraq War 2.0. ... The liberation of Mosul by June 2017 when the ISIL defenses were broken signaled the end of Phase VIII and the beginning of a new defense of what we achieved.

While there is a conjunction, counterterrorism is different than war.

We did belatedly return to Iraq per the SFA from OIF. However, "Iraq War 2.0" is a misleading label because the "2.0" parameters are defined by counterterrorism in conscious contrast to the inclusive parameters of the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement — the Iraq half of the Clinton dual-containment framework — that defined 'Iraq War 1.0'.

Again, misinterpreting a path deviation as a path progression obfuscates the current operative premises.

Your characterization of "Iraq War 2.0" assumes a progressive frame that carries forward the OIF parameters from the Clinton dual-containment framework, which covers the nation-building of Iraq after Saddam. However, the mission parameters assumed by your advocacy are not now operative. President Obama broke from the Clinton dual-containment framework, and President Trump has not restored the 'Iraq War 1.0' parameters.

In order to effectually pursue the tactical adjustment you advocate, we need to pursue a policy restoration of the OIF parameters. In order to effectually pursue a policy restoration of the OIF parameters, we need to pursue a political correction of the prevailing inimical narrative of the Iraq intervention. Until the politics of Iraq are corrected and the OIF parameters are restored, your advocacy for Iraq is a non-starter.


Brian:

So call it Phase IX to defeat Iran in Iraq since July 2017.
... What we are doing is not working.
The question is, should American tactics shift--again--to deal with the new threats that the tactics appropriate for the last phase no longer no longer work for the existing threat and the fragmentation of Iraqi governance into virtual fiefdoms based on tribes, militias, and political parties:
... I'm open to something like this in pursuit of new tactics appropriate for the new phase of war we are facing in Iraq.

Based on the proven tactics with Iraq, your question is easy to answer: Phase IX should derive from Phase VI.

We know when and how what the US was doing with Iraq was working. And we know when and how we deviated from that which was working with Iraq. The practical solution is already developed and proven, notwithstanding that if and when the proven tactics from Phase VI are retrieved off the shelf, they will need to be adapted to and updated for the current situation.

The "pursuit of new tactics appropriate for the new phase of war" is best begun by setting the benchmark at when and how what we were doing with Iraq was evidently working to achieve the policy objectives in line with the Clinton dual-containment framework that you advocate: OIF, 2008. Upon that constructive baseline, diagnose the disease of the Obama deviation with Iraq. That diagnosis informs the prescription of working back through Obama's deviation and restoring the proven "new tactics" from 2008, updated for the current situation.


Brian:

Work the problem.

Yes. My follow-up question to your question is, given Iraq's current situation (conditions), what needs to be done politically, policy-wise, and practically in order to abjure Obama's deviation and reset the necessary constructive baseline (task) by restoring the US-Iraq strategic partnership to its 2008 condition (standard)?

We clearly advocate the same goal for Iraq, but perhaps our views differ on the tactics to achieve it.

In any case, first things first: Whatever our differences at the practical step, there's no difference for what's needed to work the problem at the preceding political and policy steps.

The foundational step towards our goal for Iraq is upholding the Iraq intervention for the public by clarifying the origin story — the basic justification — which reframes and revaluates everything else. Or else, as long as OIF's justification is not upheld in the politics, your advocacy will be discredited at go, hawking the fruit of a poisoned tree. Again, Munisteri and Shmuel are not helpful in that regard.

The practical step of fixing our tactics with Iraq follows the policy step of fixing the parameters, which follows the political step of fixing the premises. Fixing the politics of Iraq establishes the necessary foundation and frame to fix our Iraq policy, which sets the necessary stage to fix our tactics with Iraq.

At the same time, upholding the Iraq intervention, discrediting Obama's deviation, and restoring the OIF parameters aren't just vital for correcting our politics, policy, and tactics. They are also essential for the coalition following America and the Iraqis.

The OIF peace ops that stood up a strategic partner in Iraq are of a kind with our WW2 peace ops, i.e., the baseline precedent for American leadership of the free world, which speaks to the radical character of Obama's deviation with Iraq.

President Obama fecklessly discarded the vital Iraqi trust in American leadership that had been resolutely hard-earned under President Bush. In the wake of Obama's cold-blooded betrayal of the US-Iraq partnership in the face of the SFA and the blood and treasure — American, Iraqi, and other allied — that informed the SFA, why should Iraq trust partnership with America again?

Similarly, in the wake of Obama's deviation, why should our other coalition partners follow such evidently irresponsible American leadership on Iraq past the self-conscious limitations of counterterrorism?

What evidence has President Trump, or any of our other prospective Commanders in Chief for that matter, shown that the American president will revive President Bush's principled resolute leadership on Iraq?

Iranian intervention is bad for Iraq. But at least Iran can be counted on not to do to Iraq what we did to Iraq with Obama's deviation from Phase VII. Rebuilding the Iraqi trust in America needed for Phase IX and beyond requires substantial political, policy, and practical proof. We can't assume any of it.

As you say, work the problem. That doesn't begin with tactics.

---

PREFACE: Joanne Munisteri is an independent specialist, researcher and educator who has worked for universities, organizations and the US Department of State, DOD, USAID, IREX and private contracting companies. Adad Shmuel is a student in the International Relations department of the Catholic University in Erbil, Iraq. Brian Dunn's benchmark 04FEB20 post is based on their 27JAN20 Small Wars Journal article, Iraq: Time for A Different Approach.

from: [Eric LC]
to: [Joanne Munisteri]
cc: [Dave Dilegge]
date: Mar 10, 2020, 5:11 PM
subject: Your 27JAN20 Small Wars Journal appeal for Iraq is self-defeating

Ms. Munisteri and Mr. Shmuel,

I use the primary source authorities, i.e., the set of controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts that define OIF's justification, at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ to clarify the Iraq issue and correct for the prevalent conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.

With that, I am writing you to share my recommendation to national security analyst Brian Dunn in response to his benchmark 04FEB20 post, What Shall Phase IX in Iraq Look Like?. The recommendation applies to your advocacy because Brian's post is based on your 27JAN20 Small Wars Journal article, Iraq: Time for A Different Approach.

Rather than repeat the recommendation here, I suggest reading it at Comment on Brian Dunn's "What Shall Phase IX in Iraq Look Like?["]. My related recommendation to noted Iraq advocate Michael Knights is appended to the post.

In addition, I'll emphasize these points:

Your 27JAN20 Small Wars Journal appeal for Iraq is self-defeating because it follows the otherwise readily correctable distorted, inimical narrative of the Iraq intervention.

Logically, a request to renew American investment in Iraq only works if it is premised upon the understanding that the noncompliant Saddam regime plus its fellow travelers, enablers, and accomplices are the source of the problem, the Iraq intervention is basically justified, and America's commitment to Iraq is the keystone for curing the problem.

Whereas if, as your SWJ article poses, the Iraq intervention is the cause of Iraq's troubles, ill-justified, even malevolent, and a colossal waste of our blood and treasure, then the logical inference is the US (and consequentially our allies) should pull stakes and divest from Iraq with alacrity.

Thus your appeal for Iraq discredits itself by implicitly opposing America's commitment to Iraq. Your blame of the Iraq intervention as the source of the problem and portrayal of American investment in Iraq as futile, even harmful, frames your appeal as an unreasonable request for the US to invest deeper into a gross mistake and exacerbate a monumental wrong.

Clearly, your pitch is a non-starter.

To effectually ground your appeal, you should clarify for the public that the noncompliant Saddam regime plus its fellow travelers, enablers, and accomplices are to blame for the problem, the Iraq intervention is justified as such, and sufficient American commitment to Iraq is the key to cure the problem.

From that basis, an effective request to renew American investment in Iraq requires censure of President Obama's course deviation with Iraq because Obama's deviation degraded America's commitment to Iraq to a patently insufficient level. Clarify that the OIF peace operations, which embody sufficient American commitment to Iraq, were curing the problem before Obama's deviation set back Iraq's progress. The point provides you a critical benchmark that shows American investment in Iraq can cure the problem, which makes your request reasonable, and focuses a solution for the setbacks in your SWJ article that have resulted from Obama's deviation.

In other words, your advocacy is coherent if it designs to remedy Obama's deviation by restoring America's commitment to Iraq and Iraq's concomitant progress to their pre-Obama state. A constructive benchmark is Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2008. Your advocacy is incoherent as long as it effectively opposes a sufficient American commitment to Iraq by misrepresenting the Clinton/Bush Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement and conflating it with Obama's deviation.

Your SWJ article hints at an understanding of the pivotal detriment of Obama's deviation, to wit, "For over a decade “civil society” and “capacity building” programs paid for with American dollars have yielded few sustainable results." However, your appeal critically neglects to clarify the Saddam regime's causal fault, the actual (legal-factual) justification of the Iraq intervention therefrom, and Iraq's progress with the OIF peace operations that were curtailed by Obama's deviation.

These references are already linked in the text of my comment to Brian, but they're worth highlighting here to help your appeal:

The OIF FAQ epilogue answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory" provides a model for effectually grounding your appeal;
The #unscr688 section of "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts" provides a compilation of humanitarian US law and policy on Iraq per UNSCR 688 to recall America's commitment to Iraq;
An irresponsible exit from Iraq provides sources and expository commentary on President Obama's course deviation with Iraq.

First and foremost, review the OIF FAQ base post to lay a proper foundation for understanding and representing the Iraq issue.

---

PREFACE: Michael Knights is a senior fellow of The Washington Institute. In his 05JAN20 Politico article, How Soleimani’s Killing Could Make a Stronger Iraq, Dr. Knights used the occasion of the killing of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Major General Qassem Soleimani to urge the American-led coalition and Iraqi government to recommit to rehabilitate the Iraqi nation-building project to, in effect, its 2008-2009 condition. Dr. Knights's e-mail in the exchange is omitted.

from: [Eric LC]
to: [Michael Knights]
date: Jan 21, 2020, 5:31 PM
subject: Sanders vs Biden and "How Soleimani’s Killing Could Make a Stronger Iraq" (Politico)

Dr. Knights,

I agree with you that the killing of Qassem Soleimani should not be the limit of nor set the standard for American engagement with Iraq moving forward.

I agree with your advocacy of recommitting the US-led coalition and Iraqi government to rehabilitating the Iraqi nation-building project to, in effect, as described in your Politico article, its 2008-2009 condition.

On the American end, rehabilitating the Iraqi nation-building project to its 2008-2009 condition — which at that would only restore a constructive baseline — requires convincing American leadership and the American people to recommit to Iraq at an Operation Iraqi Freedom level. You are, in effect, calling for America to work back through the missteps and setbacks of this last decade-plus and restoring the Clinton dual-containment framework in its 2008 form, updated for the 2020 situation.

So, what will it take for America to move beyond the limitations of post-OIF anti-ISIS counterterrorism and restore a sufficient, OIF-level commitment to Iraq?

First things first. Senator Sanders and Vice President Biden's exchange on Iraq in last week's Democratic foreign policy debate amply demonstrates that the fundamental step needed for America to recommit to Iraq per your advocacy requires looking back and correcting the popular origin story — the basic justification — of the Iraq intervention. Operation Iraqi Freedom must be upheld in the politics: Only upon such assured footing can America resolutely move forward with Iraq per your advocacy.

My work on the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ is purpose-designed to clarify the Iraq issue and thereby lay the foundation needed to uphold the Iraq intervention in the politics. For example, see the OIF FAQ epilogue answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory".

---

PREFACE: Will Roberts is a Government Relations Associate at In Defense of Christians.

from: [Eric LC]
to: [James Diddams], info@indefenseofchristians.org
cc: [Marc LiVecche]
date: Mar 15, 2024, 7:43 AM
subject: Advice to Will Roberts for "The Road to Deterring Iran Goes Through Iraq"

To Will Roberts in care of Providence Magazine and In Defense of Christians,

I clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ by realigning the Iraq issue with its primary sources to correct the faulty premises and historical distortion from experts that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.

I am writing to you with advice in response to your 16FEB24 Providence article, The Road to Deterring Iran Goes Through Iraq. I also tweeted the advice in a short thread to @ProvMagazine and @indefchristians.

Actualizing your argument, "Only through robust American and international engagement can Iran’s malign influence over the Near East be countered, and that’s only possible with an American military presence in Iraq," first requires conducively reframing the policy discourse on Iraq with these operative premises:

1. The American and British-led intervention with Iraq pursuant to UNSCR 678 has always been fundamentally justified and an essential corrective;
2. By the same token, the actors who delegitimate and undermine the Iraq intervention have always depended on a false narrative;
3. The US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement;
4. President Obama's exit (preceded by Prime Minister Brown's exit) from Iraq was an inhumane and irresponsible course deviation that contravened the US-Iraq SFA and resulted in a still-compounding strategic blunder that needs to be corrected;
5. A constructive model standard for the American military in Iraq based on what we know worked.

I recommend national security analyst Brian Dunn's discussion of What Shall Phase IX in Iraq Look Like?, which shares your advocacy, and my Comment on Brian Dunn's "What Shall Phase IX in Iraq Look Like?", which responds to Brian's analysis with a discussion of these premises.

I emphasize to you, as I did with Brian and Frank Sobchak, that you must establish the foundational premise that, in essence, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair were right on Iraq in the first place, and President Obama and Prime Minister Brown were wrong to deviate from their predecessors on Iraq. As long as the policy discourse on Iraq is missing that premise, your advocacy is hamstrung and doomed to fail.