Tuesday, April 18, 2017
PREFACE: The 1st section is the e-mail from The Strategy Bridge (TSB) rejecting my article. The 2nd section is my critical responses to the substantive criticisms from the TSB editors who reviewed my submission. The 3rd section is my article submission to TSB criticizing Jordan Chandler Hirsch's National Review article, “Freedom from Iraq: How the GOP Can End the War over the War". It's the same as the draft reviewed by the TSB editors (in other words, there are no grammatical, stylistic, formatting, or substantive alterations), except I changed the too-uncomfortable passive-voice opening as marked. Had the editing process with TSB progressed further, I expected to and would have made edits to the article, such as updating links, better fleshing out some points, and more clearly identifying the supplemental references to my other work on the Iraq issue. Several likely edits are addressed in the 2nd section. Enjoy:
from: [The Strategy Bridge]
to: [Eric LC]
date: Wed, Mar 15, 2017 at 1:32 AM
subject: Re: Submission for The Strategy Bridge
[Eric LC],
I’m extremely sorry it took so long for us to get you a complete edit, especially as we’re getting close to your requested publication date.
I also regret to inform you that we won’t be able to publish your article. While mechanically well written, we find its main arguments lack substantive (and sometimes credible) sourcing…and frequently the facts in the credible sourcing are misrepresented. We also strive for balanced content; this article definitely has a more one-sided oped feel to it.
We apologize for not being able to fit it into our publication, as well as delaying the bad news inadvertently. We do our best to work with authors to get to “yes” for publication, but this one just seems a bit too far outside of our mission and style.
You can find our edits and recommendations/comments here, however. We hope they're useful in your efforts to get this published…we recommend War on the Rocks or the Institute for the Study of War as possible outlets based on the article.
Again, our sincere apologies for the delay.
Best,
The Strategy Bridge Team
—NF
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Bridge Submissions]
date: Apr 18, 2017, 10:42 AM
subject: Re: Submission for The Strategy Bridge
Hi NF,
...
Below are my responses to the substantive criticisms by The Strategy Bridge team that reviewed my article. Please forward them to Ms. [OG] and Messrs. [SF] and [NF] with my appreciation again for their care with my submission. Responding to their criticisms was a constructive exercise. If I missed a criticism they'd like my feedback on, let me know.
...
TSB: The Strategy Bridge
[Reviewing editors]
SF: ...
OG: ...
NF: ...
OG re "tyrannical":
Bad link_Link to the 2004 UNCHR report: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/committees/afet/20040405/un%20mavrommatis%20addendum.pdf.
FYI, I usually cite the 2002 UNCHR report: http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-2002-15.doc but I couldn't get the link to work with the Word doc.
NF re "revitalized international enforcement in the defining international enforcement of the post-Cold War":
Another bold statement without a ton of evidence. What exactly do you mean here?_That the US-led enforcement of Iraq's compliance with the UNSCR 660 series set the baseline for post-Cold War international enforcement is general knowledge. That the failure to enforce Iraq's mandated compliance risked a model failure for US-led international enforcement is also general knowledge. To wit, "If we fail to respond today, Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity -- even in the face of a clear message from the United Nations Security Council and clear evidence of a weapons of mass destruction program." (Clinton, 17FEB98)
[PS: The Operation Iraqi Freedom enabling of the UNSCR 660-series compliance process, which succeeded per the 15DEC10 UNSC assessment, was a necessary corrective for the failed penultimate enforcement step in the US-led Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, the December 1998 Operation Desert Fox bombing campaign. ODF encouraged Saddam — with the complicity of UNSC permanent members — to escalate Iraq's noncompliance with the Gulf War ceasefire including NBC+M reconstitution in violation of UNSCR 687, nullify Iraq's ceasefire obligations in Iraqi law, and dismiss US-led enforcement even as President Clinton was touting 'containment' after the compliance process was cut off. The post-ODF ad hoc 'containment' was broken by 2001, if it ever worked at all.
In relation to OIF, Iraq's judgement of the US as "weak" (Duelfer) due to ODF and consequential dismissal of US-led enforcement was a key factor in Saddam's decision to not comply with the "final opportunity to comply" of the UNSCR 1441 inspections which established casus belli for OIF.]
NF re "resolved the festering problem":
A very strong assertion without evidence at this point. Compliance with UNSCR does not equal national stability or good governance...as ISIS and factional politics in Iraq has shown._Your criticism conflates the task of nation-building post-Saddam Iraq with the resolution of the specified "festering problem", ie, the categorically noncompliant Saddam regime.
NF re "devastated the terrorists with the counterinsurgency "Surge"":
My understanding is that most of these terrorists just "reincarnated" as ISIS. Some could argue this means they were not "devastated"._Again, you're criticizing general knowledge. "Devastated" doesn't mean the cancer was killed. The post-Surge "reincarnation" occurred with the radically changed condition in the region due to the corruption of the Arab Spring, which was worsened by Obama's deviation with Iraq, Iran, and from the Bush Freedom Agenda.
See http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSCOL462053._CH_.2400 for a typical contemporary account of the Surge effect on the terrorists. Also see (well, hear) the Columbia SIWPS assessment of Osama bin Laden's reaction to the Surge and Sahwa at http://www.siwps.org/watch-video-of-siwps-panel-discussion-isis-in-iraq-syria-and-the-us/.
NF re "December 15, 2010, the United Nations declared victory in Iraq":
Again, pretty strong language...my read is they recognized progress, and that there was work to be done. For instance, see: "The Security Council underscores UNAMI’s important role in supporting the Iraqi people and Government to promote dialogue, ease tension, and encourage a negotiated political agreement to the nation’s disputed internal boundaries, and calls upon all relevant parties to participate in an inclusive dialogue to this end.”_Again, you're conflating the intrinsically long task of nation-building post-Saddam Iraq with the resolution of Iraq's mandated compliance, which was the policy objective of the US-led enforcement of the UNSCR 660 series and the main point of the 15DEC10 UNSC press release.
NF re "Vice President Biden, serving as the Council president, observed Iraq was on the cusp of “something remarkable”":
Citation?_I should have linked it again — the Biden quote is pulled from his opening remarks in the 15DEC10 UNSC press release.
NF re "respects the rights of its people":
I'd bet there are a ton of Sunnis in Iraq that would disagree with the idea that we helped honor this part of the commitment._The standing US policy per UNSCR 688 carried forward by Bush was pluralistic inclusion. The Surge was a strategic adjustment, not a policy change. As much as they would join it, Sunnis were included in the political process from the beginning. The Sahwa was as much due to the Sunnis coming around to take the American hand that had been offered to them from day one as it was due to the strategic adjustment by coalition forces that sufficiently countered the insurgents' deterrent strategy.
NF re "compliant":
Why is compliance with political documents/agreements your main metric of "victory"? Still struggling to see its relevance to actual progress on the ground or a metric of strategic success..._Strategy follows policy. Your question goes to the fundamental policy objective of the Iraq intervention since its 1990 inception, which was the enforcement of Iraq's mandated compliance with the UNSCR 660 series. The comprehensive Gulf War ceasefire measures were purpose-designed to resolve the manifold Iraqi threat manifested with the Gulf War in order to satisfy "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions" (UNSCR 687). In other words, Iraq's mandated compliance was the defining metric prescribed in the law and policy. Hence, the benchmark value of the 15DEC10 UNSC assessment. If you haven't known the compliance piece, that means you've fundamentally misconceived the Iraq intervention.
For a basic understanding of the Iraq intervention, see these key UNSCRs, US laws, and US presidential policy statements, which are listed in chronological order:
United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Iraq, 1990-2002:
https://web.archive.org/web/20140701184550/http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/index.html
Public Law 102-1, Authorization for Use of United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, 14JAN91:
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-105/pdf/STATUTE-105-Pg3.pdf
Section 1095 (Iraq and the Requirements of Security Council Resolution 687) and Section 1096 (Iraq and the Requirements of Security Council Resolution 688) of Public Law 102-190 are addenda to Public Law 102-1, 05DEC91:
http://www.lawandfreedom.com/site/historical/PL102-190.pdf
President HW Bush letter to Congressional Leaders reporting on Iraq's compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, 19JAN93:
http://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/5191
Secretary of State Albright speech on President Clinton’s 2nd term policy on Iraq, 26MAR97:
https://web.archive.org/web/20140701184550/http://fas.org/news/iraq/1997/03/bmd970327b.htm
Public Law 105-235, Iraqi Breach of International Obligations, 14AUG98:
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-105publ235/pdf/PLAW-105publ235.pdf
President Clinton letter to Congress on the legal authority for Operation Desert Fox, 18DEC98:
http://clinton6.nara.gov/1998/12/1998-12-18-text-of-a-letter-from-president-on-iraq.html
President Bush remarks to the United Nations General Assembly, 12SEP02:
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html
Public Law 107-243, Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, 16OCT02:
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ243/pdf/PLAW-107publ243.pdf
President Bush letter to Congress on the determination and legal authority for Operation Iraqi Freedom, 18MAR03:
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-108hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-108hdoc5
NF re "severing the essential peace operations with Iraq":
False flag here...on a couple of accounts. 1) the source talks about removing intel resources in Iraq, not troops/resources to conduct/support peace operations, and 2) Obama did not "sever" the SOFA, it was due to expire in Dec and because the US govt and the Iraqi govt couldn't agree to critical stipulations (i.e. that US troops would not be charged under Iraqi law), it was no renewed. Under the SOFA SIGNED BY BUSH, troops were required to be removed — "All U.S. forces are to withdraw from all Iraqi territory, water and airspace no later than the 31st of December of 2011." http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article24511081.html_Your criticisms are incorrect.
1) The 15AUG16 Propublica/Washington Post article addresses the losses of both "intel resources in Iraq" and "troops/resources to conduct/support peace operations". Indeed, the article discusses the loss of intelligence mainly within the scope of the loss of the peace operations.
2) I didn't write that President Obama severed the SOFA. I wrote, "severing the essential peace operations with Iraq in contravention of the conditions-based US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement". First, the peace operations and SOFA are not interchangeable terms. Second, the SFA and SOFA are related, but they're different documents. See the SFA, SOFA fact sheet: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/. Your McClatchy citation omits the SFA; yet the conditions-based SFA — not the 2008-2011 SOFA — is the overarching guide for the long-term US-Iraq relationship.
Think about it: if "troops were required to be removed", then there would have been no US-Iraq negotiation by the Obama administration for a post-2011 US military presence in Iraq. The US-Iraq negotiation took place because the SFA, not the SOFA, was the overarching guide. The concept of the SFA and SOFA was the US and Iraq would continue mission with the 2008-2011 SOFA while assessing the situation, and then per the SFA mutually determine the next partnership arrangement based on conditions. As you pointed out with the 15DEC10 UNSC press release, the 2010-2011 conditions in Iraq dictated continued peace operations. As such, Iraq offered the US an executive arrangement which Obama rejected with the rationale that Iraqi parliamentary approval was necessary. Yet US forces returned to Iraq in 2014 without an Iraqi legislative codification, with only a(n executive) diplomatic assurance that was weaker than the 2010-2011 Maliki offer. The implication is the SFA was a sufficient basis all along to house the executive arrangement that Obama rejected in 2010-2011. Hence, Obama severing the peace operations with Iraq in spite of conditions in light of the SFA was an Executive determination that was not "required" by the 2008-2011 SOFA. For further unpacking of the 2011 exit issue, see the sources and my commentary on Obama's "irresponsible exit from Iraq" at http://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2012/09/an-irresponsible-exit-from-iraq.html.
NF re "victory":
A word that can be debated, and which you provide no evidence for._To support the victory characterization and set up criticism of Obama's deviation, I provided the 15DEC10 UNSC press release as a benchmark for the principal basis and metric for the Iraq intervention, ie, Iraq's mandated compliance with the UNSCR 660 series, especially the Gulf War ceasefire measures. I also provided President Obama's 19MAY11 regional assessment at the dawn of the Arab Spring, which included an assessment of Iraq's nation-building progress, as a benchmark. Again, take care not to conflate the fundamental policy objective of the Iraq intervention, ie, resolution of Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441), with the intrinsically long task of nation building, which according to the UNSC and Obama 2010-2011 benchmarks was making solid progress before Obama's deviation. While both aspects — accomplishing the principal purpose of the Iraq intervention and the progress of the nation building — are relevant, my article distinguished them in terms of the victory characterization.
NF re "Obama proudly reneged":
Not at all seeing this in your source...and that's assuming it's a credible source, which is dubious._It's general knowledge that President Obama backing down from the "red line" with the Assad regime foreclosed a UNSCR 688 or Responsibility-to-Protect-type humanitarian intervention in the Syria crisis. See the Doran and Abdulhamid articles I linked in the same sentence.
I'm surprised that you consider Kyle Orton (http://henryjacksonsociety.org/people/professional-staff/research-staff-and-associates/kyle-orton/) to be a "dubious" source; I wasn't citing the Chicago Bears quarterback.
Granted, Orton is relatively young. But his analysis and commentary are well regarded. Orton's work at his personal blog is meticulous and exceptionally enriched with content. His added content pertinent to my article is why I linked to Orton's review of The Atlantic Jeff Goldberg article (https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2016/03/11/barack-obama-comes-clean/ re http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/). The characterization of Obama's "proud" decision on Syria is in and of itself straightforward and carried through from Goldberg's article to Orton's review.
To wit, Kyle Orton:
"Obama announces himself “very proud” of his decision on August 30, 2013, to stand down from his threat to punish Bashar al-Assad for gassing to death 1,400 people nine days earlier."
Compare to Jeff Goldberg:
"Obama understands that the decision he made to step back from air strikes, and to allow the violation of a red line he himself had drawn to go unpunished, will be interrogated mercilessly by historians. But today that decision is a source of deep satisfaction for him.
“I’m very proud of this moment,” he told me."
SF re "President Obama needs to be held to account for his transformation of the critical strategic victory with Iraq into a rippling strategic blunder":
Held to account in what manner? Not sure what the implication is here, if it's the "public airing" as the following quote implies, then I'd say there has been plenty of litigation and relitigation of the merits of the decision not to further pursue the SOFA. Just a thought, this is a fairly loaded sentence, politically speaking._Correct, a "public airing" that sets the record straight on the justification of the Iraq intervention and the error of Obama's deviation with Iraq.
Politically speaking, my article addresses the political problem in Hirsch's article that has profoundly affected American politics, policy, and thus strategy. I recommend an alternative prescription to Hirsch's proposal. The "litigation and relitigation of the decision not to further pursue the SOFA" speaks to the second piece of the political problem. The primary piece of the political problem in Hirsch's article is the prevalent misconceptions about the justification of the Iraq intervention. As NF's faulty criticisms exemplify, "litigation and relitigation" of the various aspects of the Iraq issue have been corrupted by basic misconceptions.
SF:
Further, declaring Iraq a "critical strategic victory" it seems only applies in this context as it relates to the UNSCRs and Saddam's repeated failure to comply. Consider the views counter to the narrative being pushed here (post-war governance planning, sectarian considerations that sparked insurgencies, power vacuums vis a vis Iran's neighboring malign influence, etc)_Again, I distinguish the two aspects. The success of the principal policy objective is usually distinguished from the subsequent progress of the peace process. At the same time, I cited the 15DEC10 UNSC and 19MAY11 Obama benchmarks to address both aspects.
Following the WW2 victories, the post-WW2 peace operations weren't quickly completed with short, simple occupations, either. Among other post-WW2 challenges for American leadership, five years after VJ day, the soldiers of Task Force Smith were sacrificed to buy time against a Soviet-armed north Korean blitzkrieg. In comparison, at the five-year point of OIF, the US was wrapping up the COIN "Surge". Of course, the ROK is what it is today, despite worse hardships for the US in the Korea intervention and the continued nK threat, because the leader of the free world didn't irresponsibly disengage the peace operations with Korea like Obama did with Iraq.
Regarding Saddam nostalgia, that's reminiscent of blaming our troubles with the Soviets on our choice to take sides against the Nazis, especially in the early 1950s when the Communists seemed ascendant worldwide.
I unpack the post-war planning issue here: http://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#postwar.
The US planned extensively for post-war Iraq. In terms of governance, the CPA hit its political objectives on schedule. Plan A was derailed by insufficient security versus a terrorist insurgency that caught the US-led coalition off guard, not insufficient planning. The enemy competes, too, and the OIF peace operations weren't the first instance in US military history that success followed setback and adaptation rather than perfection as planned.
The pre-war underestimation of the difficulties that confronted the OIF peace operations is explained by the underestimation of Saddam's tyranny that corrupted Iraqi society worse than even the Iraqi expats who advised the US realized and the underestimation of the depth of Saddam's terrorism inside and outside Iraq which included "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with the al Qaeda network. The rapid rise of the organized insurgency that derailed the post-war Plan A is most readily explained by a conversion of Saddam's terroristic governance and terrorism to guerilla operations that strategically targeted sectarian fault lines that Saddam had worsened, rather than a spontaneous sectarian social combustion.
Keep in mind that the UN mandates, including the ceasefire mandates on terrorism and human rights, were purpose-designed to rehabilitate Iraq from the manifold Iraqi threat that manifested with the Gulf War. Saddam's categorical failure to comply measured Iraq's unreconstructed threat. By the same token, Iraq's mandated compliance was the principal metric for the Iraq intervention.
Addressing the "malign influence" of the Saddam problem was more urgent than the Iran problem. Iran's influence only subsequently metastasized in the corruption of the Arab Spring enabled by Obama's deviations with Iraq and Iran. Saddam's ambitions were intact, Iraq had no intention to disarm as mandated, and far from 'contained', was in fact rearming in breach of UNSCR 687 with the complicity of UNSC permanent members. Saddam's terrorism and human rights abuses, also in violation of the ceasefire, were found to be worse than they were assessed before OIF.
Neither the Saddam problem nor the challenges of Iraqi regime change would have improved by kicking the can any further on Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). Obama's notion as an Illinois state senator that Saddam "can be contained until, in the way of all petty dictators, he falls away into the dustbin of history" was not realistic. Jim Lacey, who authored the Iraqi Perspectives Project post-war assessment of Saddam's terrorism, referred to his work with IPP and the ISG findings to conclude, "Given the evidence, it appears that we removed Saddam’s regime not a moment too soon."
SF re "Republican elites":
Who is this? Any Republican that doesn't think OIF was an overwhelming victory?_Whomever Hirsch means by "Republican elites". As I wrote in the sentence, Hirsch's article addresses ""Republicans elites" who have criticized Obama's foreign affairs while hamstrung by their reluctance to advocate for alternatives that are reminiscent of the Iraq intervention".
NF re "As General David Petraeus stated in 2008, “If we are going to fight future wars, they’re going to be very similar to Iraq,” he says, adding that this was why “we have to get it right in Iraq”":
This pushes to a comment on a Sunday Times article...and doesn't have the following quote at all..._My mistake. I forgot the article excerpts at the Small Wars Journal post don't include the Petraeus quote. The Sunday Times article link stopped working, so I linked the Small Wars Journal post where I had learned about the article. The Sunday Times article and the Petraeus quote can be reviewed at https://web-beta.archive.org/web/20081010234241/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article4212055.ece.
NF re "Said another way, “U.S. primacy in the global order” can only work when the means sufficient to achieve America’s policy ends, such as the regime change and peace operations that were ultimately necessary to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations":
I don't get this at all from the Petraeus quote._Your confusion is the sort that's usually cleared up by a writer working with his editor. Upon your criticism, I agree "said another way" is too ambiguous to express the sequence of the paragraph's 3 parts: the Hirsch reference, the deterrence model of American leadership, and the Petraeus reference. The intended point of the paragraph is, one, affirmation of American primacy in the world order per Hirsch requires, two, the American capability to enforce the American-preferred ("U.S. primacy") world order over the spectrum of war and peace per the deterrence model, which requires, three, mastering the kinds of methods and conditions — both practical and political — the US competed with in the Iraq intervention per Petraeus's “If we are going to fight future wars, they’re going to be very similar to Iraq ... we have to get it right in Iraq".
That paragraph is a linchpin for the article, so clarifying its meaning would have been critical in the editing process.
NF re "Yet the “Iraq problem” outlined by Hirsch stems from the Republican failure in the first place to uphold OIF's "credibility" versus the conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that flooded the politics to discredit the mission. But rather than make amends for the seminal Republican failure, Hirsch instead concedes the faulty premises that Republicans should have counteracted all along":
So the issue is an image problem? A narrative problem of who agreed or disagreed with the results of OIF?_In contrast to your confusion over the Petraeus quote in relation to my ambiguous "said another way", the flaw with this paragraph isn't clear to me since the point of the paragraph ought to be clear in context as a set with the prior and following paragraphs. Furthermore, the confusion in your 3rd question is belied by the understanding in your 1st 2 questions.
I am completely confused by this paragraph. What are you trying to say?
Indeed, the "image problem" and "narrative problem" are core aspects of the political problem in Hirsch's article. Again, Hirsch proposes a prescription for the political harm to the GOP from the stigmatization of the Iraq intervention. According to Hirsch, "Republican elites" should solve the political problem by accepting the stigma and disclaiming OIF. With TSB, I had hoped to recommend the alternative prescription that Republicans should instead solve the problem by vigorously correcting the prevailing revisionist narrative that has stigmatized the Iraq intervention.
SF re "President Bush’s determination for Operation Iraqi Freedom was justified on policy, substantively correct on fact, and procedurally correct on law and precedent":
Would recommend primary source documentation to substantiate this sweeping assertion, rather than a personal blog. Understand that the blog uses the primary sources, but for the purposes of our publication, and the scrutiny our readers may place on this already politically charged narrative, I'd recommend sticking to the primaries._With http://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/, since I assume TSB doesn't publish the kind of fleshed-out novelette-length articles featured in trade political science or law journals, cite-linking to my fact pattern-type analysis of the Iraq issue is a necessary compromise for the format. I did both in the article: link to the fleshed-out exposition on my site and cram key primary and corroborative sources into the condensed exposition in the article.
When a publication's format significantly limits content, a writer usually is afforded the liberty of referring to his own work as a supplement as opposed to a source as such. Clarifying the self reference is a reason I amended my short bio statement. If I've assumed wrong about the limits of TSB's format, the fleshed-out exposition at my site could be incorporated in the article. But an enhanced article that covers the ground on my site would be much longer and digressive due to the breadth of the Iraq issue and the misconceptions.
I encourage readers to critically engage the content on my site. I don't expect readers to accept my take on faith. I'm not the authority; the sources are the authority. And the sources are plain. I just synthesized them into a coherent narrative to set the record straight.
NF re "which set the stage for OIF":
There is no causation here. One operation flowed from it, but ODF was in no way designed to set the stage for a regime-changing invasion. It was designed for a specific purpose — per DoD: "To strike military and security targets in Iraq that contribute to Iraq's ability to produce, store, maintain and deliver weapons of mass destruction." http://archive.defense.gov/specials/desert_fox/_Actually, the Operation Desert Fox bombing campaign included targets "on Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programs, on the command structures that direct and protect that capability, and on his military and security infrastructure" (Clinton, 19DEC98).
The targeting for ODF either was not limited to WMD or considered an expansive range of regime targets to be related to WMD, which wouldn't have been wrong. At the same time, the regime targets in the ODF bombing campaign were notable in light of the threat of Iraqi regime change in US policy that backed the UNSCRs 1154, 1194, and 1205 inspections that triggered ODF.
It should be apparent from context that I don't mean the ODF bombing campaign operationally prepared the battlefield for OIF which commenced over 4 years after ODF. By "set the stage", I mean that from a policy standpoint at the presidential level of the Iraq enforcement, Operation Desert Fox cleared the penultimate enforcement step and set the baseline precedent for the ultimate enforcement step, Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The continuity from Clinton to Bush in the progression of the Iraq enforcement is a core theme of my OIF FAQ explanation. When the law and policy underlying OIF is compared to the law and policy underlying ODF, it’s apparent that President Bush’s case against Saddam was really President Clinton’s case against Saddam, updated from 9/11, and Bush’s enforcement procedure for Iraq carried forward Clinton’s enforcement procedure with Iraq, updated from ODF.
Read the December 16, 1998 announcement of ODF from a policy-making perspective. President Clinton pronounced, “Iraq has abused its final chance,” and enunciated a fully formed policy for Iraqi regime change justified by the threat posed by Saddam’s intransigent noncompliance with the UNSCR 660-series resolutions. While Clinton didn’t fulfill the regime-change policy with ODF, the ODF action completed the set of law, policy, and precedent developed by the President to set the stage for the coda of the US-led enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire, which was brought to bear with his successor's enforcement of Saddam’s “final opportunity to comply” (UNSCR 1441).
After ODF, Clinton's alternative for the US with the Saddam problem was 'containment', which really meant maintaining standing measures indefinitely with the compliance process cut off, poised to react to signs of Iraqi violation and oriented on regime change. Except ODF encouraged Saddam to breach and the 'containment' was broken by 2001, if it ever worked at all. With the 'containment' broken, the President's options were reduced to conclusively enforce Iraq's mandated compliance, which meant regime change if Saddam did not comply volitionally, or allow US leadership to fall to the categorically noncompliant uncontained Saddam.
SF re "he confirmed that he had been ready and willing to absorb another bombing campaign like ODF":
Source?_FBI Agent Piro: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/interrogator-shares-saddams-confessions/4/
"...He thought the United States would retaliate with the same type of attack as we did in 1998 under Operation Desert Fox. Which was a four-day aerial attack. So you expected that initially," Piro says.
Piro says Saddam expected some kind of an air campaign and that he could he survive that. "He survived that once. And then he was willing to accept that type of attack. That type of damage," he says."
The Iraq Survey Group, to which Agent Piro reported, corroborates that Saddam's reaction to ODF was to escalate Iraq's noncompliance and the regime was prepared for an ODF-type bombing campaign: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap1.html.
13AUG99 New York Times article describes Iraq's fast recovery from ODF and the recognition that, after ODF, the next enforcement step was regime change:
http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/081399iraq-conflict.html.
Charles Duelfer refers to the confident Iraqi reaction to the American "weakness" of ODF in his recollection of the UNSCR 1205 inspections: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/in-iraq-done-in-by-the-lewinsky-affair/2012/02/21/gIQA7dKfYR_story.html?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.d407b2e43b39.
OG re "cause":
I'm not sure causality is the right word, but that's up to you.SF:
Agreed. Recommend rewording_Cause is the right word. The operative enforcement procedure for the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) was clear. As Secretary Powell reiterated at the UNSC on 05FEB03, "Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance, one last chance to come into compliance or to face serious consequences. No council member present in voting on that day had any illusions about the nature and intent of the resolution or what serious consequences meant if Iraq did not comply."
Iraq did not comply. Saddam's choice not to cure Iraq's "material breach" with the required "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions" in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) established casus belli. That's straightforward causality.
OG re "record":
I suggest indicating that you are citing yourself (as you do above). Since you have very solid references, I recommend acknowledging where you've come to these conclusions elsewhere.SF:
Agreed. As stated above, primary sources are best, but be very specific if citing a personal blog._I don't cite to my site as a source but rather as a supplement for my content in this article. That aside, I don't understand this suggestion since "record" doesn't link to my content as such. Rather, it links to my selection of basic essential sources, comprised of first-among-primary UNSCRs, US laws, US presidential statements, and fact findings, for properly understanding OIF. The selection linked at "record" is equivalent to the required readings for a course section, not the professor's lecture notes.
OG re "principles":
A refresher of just what these principles are would be helpful for those who don't remember exactly what is in the two laws you cite._If a refresher is needed after 70+ years of American leadership of the free world since WW2, nearly 30 years of American primacy since the end of the Cold War, and over 15 years since 9/11, that helps explains why the paradigmatic Iraq intervention, despite being headline news since 1990-1991 with a readily accessible, exceptionally plain law, policy, precedent, fact record, has somehow been misunderstood even by ostensible experts.
That being said, my citation of the particular UNSCRs and US laws in the sentence is the refresher. Which is to say, those who don't remember what's in them should read them to refresh what should already be general knowledge.
OG re "deterrence sufficient to effect compliance":
What is the distinction you are making from deterrence as such?SF:
Agreed. This is generally implied in the definition of deterrence. Moreover, I'd posit that we may well be referring to a strategy of coercion vice deterrence in the context of the pre-OIF Iraq period. Up for debate, but something to consider._Right. I'm not defining deterrence differently from the standard meaning in terms of a model or strategy. Rather, the restatement is meant to focus on sufficiency of application in terms of effect.
OG re "Korean War":
Interesting comparison._As inflection points, the Korean War is the analogue for the Iraq intervention. Secretary Rumsfeld made the comparison. It caught my attention at the time because most of my military service was with USFK. The baseline policy effect of the Korean War is touched on here: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/NSC68.
At their respective inflection points, Eisenhower followed Truman by going one way, but at the analogous point, Obama followed Bush by going the other way, as Jeff Goldberg explained in The Atlantic article reviewed by Kyle Orton.
[See What American Credibility Myth? How and Why Reputation Matters by Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, War On the Rocks, 04OCT16.]
OG re "They":
Who's the they? The "Republican elites"?_Yes.
SF re "OIF-level force":
Which, it's important to note, was markedly less than the plans called for, due to Rumsfeld's desire to fight the war with a leaner force._Rumsfeld was a "light footprint" proponent, which, to be fair, worked well enough for the MCO and matched the initial post-war plan: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030224-11.html.
By "OIF-level force", though, I mean the level of force needed for the mission to succeed in the context of the Petraeus quote. Mindful of Petraeus's prognostication, I'm implicitly criticizing Hirsch's prescription which would have Republicans politically sabotage American leadership from even credibly bluffing the level of force proven needed for “If we are going to fight future wars, they’re going to be very similar to Iraq".
As stated, my meaning with "OIF-level force" is ambiguous and would have been clarified in the editing process.
OG re "deviation":
Is it a deviation or more of a severance?_President Obama severed the peace operations with Iraq in 2011 but the US is not severed from Iraq. The US and Iraq still share the SFA and the underlying reasons for it, although as Obama showed in 2011, the US commitment to honoring the SFA can be reneged by an irresponsible President with harmful consequences. Part of my hope with my submission to TSB was to start the ball rolling on fixing the politics of the Iraq issue, including President Trump's misconceptions about the Iraq intervention, so hopefully Trump will correct rather than exacerbate Obama's errors.
See https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/iraqi-prime-minister-my-country-needs-more-help-from-the-us/2017/03/23/3fff51a0-0fdb-11e7-ab07-07d9f521f6b5_story.html?utm_term=.0e705137833d.
On December 15, 2010, the United Nations declared victory in Iraq. With the adoption of resolutions 1956, 1957, and 1958, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) recognized that Iraq was compliant with its major obligations under the UNSCR 660 series and lifted restrictions incurred by the Saddam regime that had been in place since 1990-1991. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon proclaimed, “This meeting is a milestone for Iraq. Today we recognize how far the country has come in key aspects of its journey to normalize its status in the community of nations.” Vice President Biden, serving as the Council president, observed Iraq was on the cusp of “something remarkable”.
The December 15, 2010 Council meeting marked the accomplishment of the two-decade-long mission to enforce Iraq's compliance with the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) mandated with the Gulf War ceasefire to satisfy "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687).
Pursuant to UNSCR 688 and UNSCR 1483, President Bush had enabled American and allied forces to honor President Clinton’s pledge to “help a new leadership in Baghdad that abides by its international commitments and respects the rights of its own people” and carry out Congress’ instruction to "support Iraq’s transition to democracy ... once the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power in Iraq" (Public Law 105-338). The emerging pluralistic, liberalizing, compliant post-Saddam Iraq provided the US with a keystone "strategic partner” in the region.
Accordingly, at the dawn of the Arab Spring, President Obama marked the historic opportunity for peace in the Middle East where “one of the broader lessons to be drawn from this period is that sectarian divides need not lead to conflict. In Iraq, we see the promise of a multiethnic, multisectarian democracy. The Iraqi people have rejected the perils of political violence in favor of a democratic process, even as they’ve taken full responsibility for their own security. Of course, like all new democracies, they will face setbacks. But Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress. And as they do, we will be proud to stand with them as a steadfast partner.”
However, while Iraq was evidently on the right track, building a nation to secure the peace does not happen faster than raising a child, no less with post-Saddam Iraq than the World War 2 peace operations with post-Axis Germany, Japan, and Korea. The OIF peace operations were not yet complete when President Obama chose to break with the cardinal precedent for American leadership of the free world by severing the essential peace operations with Iraq in contravention of the conditions-based US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement.
America’s hard-earned victory with Iraq should have set the cornerstone for steadfast American leadership in the post-9/11 era. Yet the opposite has happened. President Obama’s radical shift of American foreign policy has resulted in disastrous consequences for Iraqis and others who staked their lives on the American president’s pledge to “stand with them [Iraqi people] as a steadfast partner” and “stand squarely on the side of those who are reaching for their rights”, which Obama proudly reneged.
President Obama needs to be held to account for his transformation of the critical strategic victory with Iraq into a rippling strategic blunder. In the November 21, 2016 issue of National Review (“Freedom from Iraq: How the GOP Can End the War over the War"), Jordan Chandler Hirsch, a visiting fellow at Columbia University, writes, “Only that kind of public airing can telegraph that Republican elites are grappling with America’s legacy in the Middle East and plotting a course forward.”
Hirsch diagnoses well the quandary for "Republican elites" who have criticized Obama's foreign affairs while hamstrung by their reluctance to advocate for alternatives that are reminiscent of the Iraq intervention. Unfortunately, Hirsch’s prescription for the GOP's "Iraq problem" is misguided and muddled: "foreign-policy leaders must forswear further Iraqs but affirm U.S. primacy in the global order. Their post-Iraq foreign policy should have three watchwords: humility, credibility, and prudence."
The design flaw of Hirsch's "public airing" is it effectively stipulates a revisionist narrative of the "Iraq War's legacy" that is stitched from conjecture, distorted context, and readily debunked misinformation.
Fundamentally, Hirsch’s prescription of "foreign-policy leaders must forswear further Iraqs but affirm U.S. primacy in the global order" is a contradiction for deterrence-based American leadership. As General David Petraeus stated in 2008, “If we are going to fight future wars, they’re going to be very similar to Iraq,” he says, adding that this was why “we have to get it right in Iraq”. Said another way, “U.S. primacy in the global order” can only work when the means sufficient to achieve America’s policy ends, such as the regime change and peace operations that were ultimately necessary to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235), are understood by allies and enemies alike to be a viable option for the leader of the free world.
Hirsch is not alone. His article joins a self-defeating trend among center-right national security voices that have called for repudiating the Iraq intervention. Hirsch's jumping off point is President Trump’s electoral victory, but before Trump won the election, Jeb Bush and Evan McMullin were disclaiming OIF as a "mistake" during their respective presidential campaigns.
Yet the “Iraq problem” outlined by Hirsch stems from the Republican failure in the first place to uphold OIF's "credibility" versus the conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that flooded the politics to discredit the mission. But rather than make amends for the seminal Republican failure, Hirsch instead concedes the faulty premises that Republicans should have counteracted all along.
I concur with Hirsch that “Republican elites” should grapple with the legacy of the Iraq intervention for similar reasons as Hirsch states. However, my prescription is based on correcting the prevalent revisionist narrative.
Whatever is one's subjective opinion of the mission's "humility" and "prudence", objectively, President Bush’s determination for Operation Iraqi Freedom was justified on policy, substantively correct on fact, and procedurally correct on law and precedent.
President Bush had inherited from his predecessor the “crisis between the United States and Iraq” in which "Iraqi actions pose a continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States" along with President Clinton’s solution: “the Administration's strong commitment to the objective of removing Saddam Hussein from power, and to bringing him and his inner circle to justice for their war crimes and crimes against humanity. Saddam's removal is the key to the positive transformation of Iraq's relationship with the international community and with the United States, in particular.”
Before Iraq “abused its final chance” to cause Operation Desert Fox (ODF), which set the stage for OIF, President Clinton had warned of the wider importance of the US-led enforcement of Iraq’s mandated compliance: "If we fail to respond today, Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity".
Yet by 2000-2001, the international order-defining challenge to American leadership had come to a head. Saddam had broken the containment by “enlisting the help of three permanent UNSC members: Russia, France and China. ... Saddam expressed confidence that France and Russia would support Iraq’s efforts to further erode the UN sanctions Regime” (Iraq Survey Group). The picture emerging outside Iraq was clear: the sanctions had been de facto neutralized and the ceasefire disarmament process had been undermined by Saddam’s accomplices on the Security Council, and the growing flow of proscribed items into Iraq indicated the reconstitution of Iraq’s WMD and conventional armament. Meanwhile, Saddam's terrorist activity and human rights abuses continued unabated.
Saddam's attack on Irbil in August 1996 effectively defeated the internal threat to his regime and the ODF bombing campaign "on Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programs, on the command structures that direct and protect that capability, and on his military and security infrastructure" passed the penultimate enforcement step. When Saddam was debriefed after his capture, he confirmed that he had been ready and willing to absorb another bombing campaign like ODF. The next — and last — step up from the ODF bombing campaign was a ground campaign, which President Bush activated in 2002-2003 to enforce Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441).
Saddam should have switched off the enforcement threat with the “full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations” (UNSCR 1441) that Iraq had been obligated to provide promptly in 1991, let alone in its “final opportunity to comply” (UNSCR 1441) in 2002-2003. Instead, Saddam chose to cause OIF with evidential categorical “material breach” (UNSCR 1441) of the ceasefire measures, including the disarmament mandates of UNSCR 687, terrorism mandates of UNSCR 687, and human rights mandates of UNSCR 688.
On the UNSCR 687 WMD disarmament mandates alone, Iraq’s “continued violations of its obligations” (UNSCR 1441) were established by UNSCOM, decided by the UNSC, confirmed by UNMOVIC for casus belli, and corroborated by the Iraq Survey Group. Over twelve years, the Saddam regime failed to satisfy even the baseline-setting step of the ceasefire declare/yield/eliminate-under-international-supervision disarmament process, a verified total declaration that accounted for Iraq's entire WMD-related program, which Iraq was obligated to provide within 15 days of the adoption of UNSCR 687 — in 1991.
At the same time, the Saddam regime's “regional and global terrorism”, which included “considerable operational overlap” with al Qaeda, and Saddam’s rule by “widespread terror” were each a trigger in their own right to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (Public Law 107-243).
Saddam’s categorical “material breach” in Iraq’s “final opportunity to comply” (UNSCR 1441) obliged President Bush to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” (Public Law 107-243) from the “continued violations of its [Iraq’s] obligations” bearing "the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security" (UNSCR 1441).
Hirsch's call for “Republican elites” to repudiate the Iraq intervention in disregard of the operative law, policy, precedent, and facts of President Bush’s decision can only worsen the “Iraq problem”. Instead, the solution begins with re-laying the foundation of the political discourse by de-stigmatizing OIF by setting the record straight on the justification of the Iraq intervention. In other words, the first step to "affirm U.S. primacy in the global order" is to re-litigate the Iraq issue, a needed reformative measure that Hirsch explicitly rejects at the outset of his article.
From a center-right national security standpoint, Hirsch's plan for "grappling with America’s legacy in the Middle East and plotting a course forward" by disclaiming OIF is self-defeating because he purports to revive the same national security principles that were embodied by the 1990-2011 Iraq intervention, most of all with the enforcement of UNSCR 1441 per Public Law 107-243 and the UNSCR 1483 peace operations per Public Law 105-338. America's rivals stigmatized OIF, which manifested those principles, in order to disqualify them. Yet quixotically, Hirsch concedes the very inimical premises cutting off his objective.
Per President Clinton’s warning on Iraq before ODF, the wider importance of the Iraq issue boils down to basic political science. American leadership since World War 2 has been based on deterrence sufficient to effect compliance. Deterrence sufficient to effect compliance is based on the credible threat and use of force.
As such, the US-led enforcement of Iraq's compliance with the UNSCR 660 series in the Gulf War set the baseline for the liberal international order in the post-Cold War era. The subsequent US-led enforcement of Iraq's compliance with the UNSCR 660 series in the Gulf War ceasefire was, in essence, the litmus test for the credibility of post-Cold War American leadership.
By kicking the can versus Saddam's "intransigence", the credibility of American leadership eroded as Presidents HW Bush and Clinton persistently failed to bring Iraq into its mandated compliance. At the turn of the post-9/11 era, American leadership under President Bush belatedly passed the litmus test.
As a matter of policy, Hirsch's view that "foreign-policy leaders must forswear further Iraqs" undermines his objective to "affirm U.S. primacy in the global order". The opposite is true – US leaders must tout the Iraq intervention as a manifestation of America’s abiding dedication to the liberal international order. Passing the test to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235) was fundamental for re-establishing the credibility of the threat and use of force that is essential for the deterrence base of American leadership.
OIF-level use of the military need not be usual, but to "affirm U.S. primacy in the global order", America's allies and rivals must respect that an OIF-level exercise of American power is politically and practically viable when warranted to uphold the liberal international order. Whereas advocating for American enforcement of the liberal international order while also advocating for a cap up front on the threat and use of force below a level proven necessary to enforce the liberal international order is an obvious misalignment of means to ends that invites ambitious rivals to key in on the self-imposed American restriction to assert their alternatives.
For example, Saddam refused his “final opportunity to comply” (UNSCR 1441) and caused OIF because he believed he had marked the limit of the American threat with Presidents HW Bush and Clinton. As the Iraq Survey Group puts it, "By late 2002 Saddam had persuaded himself, just as he did in 1991, that the United States would not attack Iraq ... Saddam speculated that the United States would instead seek to avoid casualties and, if Iraq was attacked at all, the campaign would resemble Desert Fox."
The success of OIF should have functioned for the post-9/11 era like the Korean War set the baseline for the Cold War era, a distinctive affair that nonetheless established the cornerstone for American leadership of the free world. With proper follow-up, President Obama should have cemented the baseline for credible American threat and use of force that was hard earned in Iraq like President Eisenhower cemented the harder earned baseline in Europe and Asia — earned doubly hard with Korea — at the turn of the Cold War era. Instead, President Obama broke from the cardinal precedent by employing the misinformation-based stigmatization of OIF as the keystone premise for choices that severely degraded the credibility of American leadership.
The solution for the “Iraq problem” all along has been to clarify that President Bush, America, and our allies were right on Iraq while their detractors, most of all Saddam’s “key advocates in the Security Council”, were wrong. Whereas Hirsch’s prescription dangerously overlooks the core requirement for effective deterrence-based leadership and sets up the US, and anyone still depending on American leadership of the free world, for the consequences of feckless leadership being suffered by Syrians and Iraqis. Republican concession of the prevalent revisionist narrative can only further cement the disqualification of American leadership instituted by President Obama.
For Hirsch’s objective of “Republican elites…grappling with America’s legacy in the Middle East and plotting a course forward” that re-normalizes steadfast American leadership of the free world, the proper prescription is essentially, "make us to choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong, and never to be content with a half truth when the whole can be won" (West Point cadet prayer). They must de-stigmatize Operation Iraqi Freedom with a “public airing” that sets the record straight on the justification of the Iraq intervention, discredits the mission’s false detractors, normalizes the American threat and use of OIF-level force needed for effective deterrence, and holds President Obama to account for his deviation with Iraq.
By-line: [Eric LC] is a graduate of Columbia University and Rutgers School of Law, and re-litigates the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ.
Related: How Republicans should talk about the Iraq issue.
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