Ms. Robinson didn't respond to my e-mail, so I don't know whether she's read it.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Linda Robinson]
cc: [Noël James]
date: Mar 7, 2025, 8:06 AM
subject: Review of "The Long Shadow of the Iraq War: Lessons and Legacies Twenty Years Later"
Ms. Robinson,
I clarify and relitigate the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ using the law and facts that define the Iraq issue.
I critically reviewed your 20MAR23 Council on Foreign Relations article, The Long Shadow of the Iraq War: Lessons and Legacies Twenty Years Later, for the 22nd anniversary of Operation Iraqi Freedom. I hope my comments help you understand OIF's justification and in turn help you clarify the Iraq issue to the public. It's important.
Robinson:
The long shadow of Iraq extends beyond these quantifiable effects. The toll the war’s decision-making has taken on U.S. democracy has been equally grievous. The absence of any formal reckoning eats at our soul. No leader has stepped forward with a full and honest mea culpa, as Robert McNamara did after the Vietnam War. Instead, a Vietnam era–like erosion of public confidence continues, stoking a current of isolationism that calls for no foreign involvement at all, and even more corrosive, a culture of brazen, arrogant mendacity that infects American politics.
Unlike in Britain, where the Chilcot inquiry forced all senior officials to testify in an exhaustive investigation and exposed the decision-making that led to the rush to war, the absence of sound rationale, and lack of preparation for the aftermath, there has been no effort in the United States to hold senior U.S. officials accountable for the failure to conduct a deliberate process. Sadly, none of the principal officials have publicly regretted the invasion and the enormous toll it took on both the United States and Iraq.
Lesson: Take measures to hold officials accountable and restore public confidence in government when you fail.
Unlike in Britain, where the Chilcot inquiry forced all senior officials to testify in an exhaustive investigation and exposed the decision-making that led to the rush to war, the absence of sound rationale, and lack of preparation for the aftermath, there has been no effort in the United States to hold senior U.S. officials accountable for the failure to conduct a deliberate process. Sadly, none of the principal officials have publicly regretted the invasion and the enormous toll it took on both the United States and Iraq.
Lesson: Take measures to hold officials accountable and restore public confidence in government when you fail.
In other words, the Iraq Syndrome. I agree the Iraq Syndrome is "a Vietnam era–like erosion of public confidence [that] continues, stoking a current of isolationism that calls for no foreign involvement at all, and even more corrosive, a culture of brazen, arrogant mendacity that infects American politics," and it urgently needs to be cured. I agree the "long shadow" of the Iraq Syndrome continues to corrupt our politics and policy. I agree "The absence of any formal reckoning eats at our soul. No leader has stepped forward with a full and honest mea culpa". And, I agree the Chilcot report is a way to "Take measures to hold officials accountable and restore public confidence in government".
The way to cure the Iraq Syndrome is to correct the false narrative it's based on. Publicly criticizing the Chilcot report is a good place to start as it's a primary embodiment of the Iraq Syndrome. For a model criticism, see my Critical notes on the UK Iraq Inquiry Chilcot report where I examine how the Chilcot report distorts the Iraq issue.
I recommend that Ms. Robinson apply the OIF FAQ's methodology to "hold officials accountable" if they have propagated the Iraq Syndrome by misinforming the public contra the law and facts that define the Iraq issue. Use the same methodology to "restore public confidence in government" by showing that President Bush's "decision to go to war" was correct—Operation Iraqi Freedom was justified—in the first place.
Robinson:
Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction ...
Ms. Robinson is incorrect. The Iraq Survey Group confirmed the Saddam regime had a reconstituting WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687, e.g., "From 1999 until he was deposed in April 2003, Saddam’s conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs steadily grew in scale, variety, and efficiency" (ISG). In addition, ISG reported a large loss of evidence to Iraq's "denial and deception operations" (ISG) during the invasion and occupation, which infers the evidence that ISG found in hand constitutes a floor only and Saddam actually possessed a vaster WMD program than we can know.
Robinson:
As was subsequently discovered, the justification for going to war was based on scanty and deeply flawed intelligence: ... the U.S. intelligence community knew that “Curveball,” a principal source of that bad intelligence, was not reliable.
Reliable or not, "Curveball" was not OIF's justification. Casus belli was not "based on scanty and deeply flawed intelligence" because it couldn't be. By procedure, casus belli was Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) in "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire. President Bush's determination for Operation Iraqi Freedom is clear that the principal trigger was the UNMOVIC Clusters document, which confirmed Saddam did not comply in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" (UNSCR 1441), in the same way the UNSCOM Butler report triggered President Clinton's determination for Operation Desert Fox, the penultimate enforcement step and baseline precedent for OIF.
To clarify, the pre-war intelligence on Saddam's WMD wasn't all "scanty and deeply flawed", such as the UNSCOM/UNMOVIC record which was the basis for key assessments. Where the intelligence was "scanty and deeply flawed", that was because of Iraq's "denial and deception operations" (ISG) which in and of themselves violated UNSCR 687 for casus belli.
Robinson:
Secretary of State Colin Powell presented a stitched-together case for war before the United Nations, claiming that “what we’re giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.”
Robert Draper needs remedial reading of the law and facts that define the Iraq issue.
See Regarding Secretary of State Powell's speech at the UN Security Council on February 5, 2003 where I unpack Colin Powell's case presentation. Knowing what we know now, the speech holds up well. The main points are validated nearly across the board. The core "facts" of Secretary Powell's speech merely reiterated the operative procedure and established fact record of the UNSCR 687 compliance process. Where Powell additionally presented "conclusions based on solid intelligence" that ISG findings did not match, for the most part, the substantive element of the UNSCR 687 violation is validated.
For example, the Iraq Survey Group famously did not find the “mobile production facilities used to make biological agents” (Powell, 05FEB03). Instead, ISG found the equivalent UNSCR 687 violations in "the secret biological work in the small IIS [Iraqi intelligence service] laboratories discovered by ISG ... The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories were never declared to the UN" and “The UN deemed Iraq’s accounting of its production and use of BW [biological weapon] agent simulants—specifically Bacillus subtilis, Bacillus lichenformis, Bacillus megaterium and Bacillus thuringiensis to be inadequate … the equipment used for their manufacture can also be quickly converted to make BW agent.”
Robinson:
It is tempting to ask what if Colin Powell, the most likely candidate, had stepped down in protest? He voiced reservations but neither he nor any other principal explicitly argued against going to war. A former four-star general and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who presided over the earlier Desert Storm operation to evict Iraq from Kuwait, his resignation could have set off a chain reaction of resignations and congressional opposition sufficient to stop the invasion. He could have insisted on abiding by the Powell Doctrine, which was violated in every precept.
... [Lesson: ...] vigorously debate all your decisions. Listen to your experts and do not go to war when intelligence is weak.
... [Lesson: ...] vigorously debate all your decisions. Listen to your experts and do not go to war when intelligence is weak.
I imagine President Bush was bemused listening to experts "vigorously debate" that the "intelligence is weak" when casus belli was plainly Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441), which were evidential, the same as always since 1991.
As he stated to the UN Security Council, Secretary Powell's criterion for war was "Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance, one last chance to come into compliance or to face serious consequences. No council member present in voting on that day had any illusions about the nature and intent of the resolution or what serious consequences meant if Iraq did not comply." On March 7, 2003, Powell accepted the UNMOVIC confirmation that "Iraq did not comply". It would have been illogical and erratic for Colin Powell to resign in protest because his own criterion for war had been met.
Since casus belli was Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire, if "Colin Powell ... had stepped down in protest", it would have also shown a sociopathic lack of personal accountability on his part. The UNSCR 687 "need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" was made necessary in the first place because Operation Desert Storm was knowingly suspended short of resolving the noncompliant-Saddam problem. President HW Bush, 01MAR91:
In my own view I've always said that it would be -- that the Iraqi people should put him [Saddam] aside, and that would facilitate the resolution of all these problems that exist and certainly would facilitate the acceptance of Iraq back into the family of peace-loving nations.
... You mentioned World War II; there was a definitive end to that conflict. And now we have Saddam Hussein still there, the man that wreaked this havoc upon his neighbors.
... I still have a little bit of an unfinished agenda.
... You mentioned World War II; there was a definitive end to that conflict. And now we have Saddam Hussein still there, the man that wreaked this havoc upon his neighbors.
... I still have a little bit of an unfinished agenda.
The Bush officials who were guilty of suspending the Gulf War short of a resolution in 1991, in part due to the Powell Doctrine, carried a special responsibility to resolve the failing Gulf War ceasefire enforcement and festering noncompliant-Saddam problem in 2003. Vice President Cheney seemed to understand that. I believe Secretary of State Powell did, too.
Robinson:
If the executive branch cannot apply these [Powell Doctrine] guidelines, Congress should.
Lesson: Adopt the Powell Doctrine ...
Lesson: Adopt the Powell Doctrine ...
"Adopt the Powell Doctrine" is exactly the wrong lesson from Iraq. The Powell Doctrine positively influenced Saddam's choice to breach the Gulf War ceasefire, thus causing the Gulf War to resume. Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #postwar section:
The Army's shortcomings in the immediate post-war were due to an institutional mindset deeply rooted in the fall-out of the Vietnam War, exemplified by the Powell Doctrine, that was averse to nation-building occupation. The resulting Pentagon culture was critically misaligned with White House policy on Iraq where the Gulf War ceasefire, evinced by the breadth of the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) that was enforced under US law and President HW Bush's path-setting policy decisions at the outset, effectively required Iraqi regime change — with or without Saddam staying in power. Yet Saddam felt uncompelled to comply as mandated with the Gulf War ceasefire because he interpreted from his 1991 Operation Desert Storm and 1998 Operation Desert Fox experiences that the US was bluffing. Due to the self-imposed limitations typified by the Powell Doctrine, Saddam believed the US was unwilling to enforce the terms of ceasefire with a credible threat of regime change, thus the chief enforcer of the Gulf War ceasefire could be defeated.
In effect, the Powell Doctrine represented an obvious design flaw in American leadership that provided a foundational building block for Saddam, his allies, and other like-minded actors to develop a template for effectively rendering American-led international enforcement obsolete.
Implicating the Powell Doctrine, GEN Petraeus again: “If we are going to fight future wars, they’re going to be very similar to Iraq,” he says, adding that this was why “we have to get it right in Iraq”.
In effect, the Powell Doctrine represented an obvious design flaw in American leadership that provided a foundational building block for Saddam, his allies, and other like-minded actors to develop a template for effectively rendering American-led international enforcement obsolete.
Implicating the Powell Doctrine, GEN Petraeus again: “If we are going to fight future wars, they’re going to be very similar to Iraq,” he says, adding that this was why “we have to get it right in Iraq”.
It doesn't make sense that "Congress should ... apply these guidelines" given that the Powell Doctrine undermined Congress's mandates on Iraq. The 22MAR00 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing on Iraq shows that by March 2000, Congress understood the UN sanctions and UN inspections had failed, the 'containment' was not real, the problem was growing worse, and the UNSCR 678 enforcement had reached the line of Iraqi regime change codified in Public Law 105-338, albeit many (not all) US officials still balked at crossing the line with force. Excerpt:
Senator Biden. I do not disagree with anything any of you said except none of you have a damn solution. You do not have any idea of what you are talking as to what to do from here. You are right in the criticism. I think the criticism is dead right. We made a fundamental mistake that everybody underestimated when George Bush stopped us going into Baghdad. One of the things no one figured was that it would be read as a conclusion that possession of or the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons would hold off the giant. And that is the reason why he did not occupy Baghdad is because we had these weapons, thereby emboldening them to hang onto them closer. So, a fundamental mistake. It is easy to Monday morning quarterback now and say it, but a fundamental mistake made. And we continue to make mistakes as we go along.
The Powell Doctrine was one of the reasons for the "fundamental mistake that everybody underestimated when George [HW] Bush stopped us going into Baghdad" (Biden).
Iraq shows us that the self-limiting formula of the Powell Doctrine undermines our ability to deter adversaries, match capability to need, and solve problems in the global arena. The United States should not handicap itself as a competitor with the inherent incompetence and vulnerability of the Powell Doctrine. The constructive lesson of Iraq is that the American leader of the free world should seek practical and political mastery of all relevant forms of competition, including counterinsurgency, in order to competently and confidently champion our interests across the spectrum of the global arena, and deter or counteract our adversaries who might otherwise exploit the Powell Doctrine to advance inimical interests and deter the US.
Robinson:
Groupthink infected the U.S. government to an alarming degree.
To clarify, the "Groupthink [that] infected the U.S. government to an alarming degree" was "Our view, which is unshakable, is that Iraq must prove its peaceful intentions. It can only do that by complying with all of the Security Council resolutions to which it is subject. ... And the evidence is overwhelming that Saddam Hussein's intentions will never be peaceful" (Secretary of State Albright, 26MAR97).
The "Groupthink [that] infected the U.S. government" is validated as the Saddam regime's noncompliance with the Gulf War ceasefire terms at Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) is confirmed across the board.
As the March 2000 Senate hearing shows, President Bush did not tell Congressional leaders anything about Iraq in 2002 that they did not already know. Notably, Iraq's UNSCR 687 terrorism violation was not a focus of the March 2000 Senate hearing. As reflected in Public Law 107-243, Saddam's terrorism became a priority for Congress after 9/11. Add the 9/11-increased weight of Saddam's terrorism plus two and a half more years of the sanctions-based 'containment' failing with Saddam's WMD program clearly reconstituting, e.g., "As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation" (ISG)—it made sense in October 2002 for Congress to cross the line of Iraqi regime change that it had already reached in October 1998.
Robinson:
The Iraq War did not involve a clearly demonstrated vital interest;
Ms. Robinson is incorrect that "The Iraq War did not involve a clearly demonstrated vital interest". The vital national security interest to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235) was established and reiterated by the President and Congress since 1990-1991 with policy roots older than that. Excerpt from my Correction of Richard Haass's "Revisiting America’s War of Choice in Iraq":
President HW Bush decided and Congress agreed that the need to resolve the Iraqi threat that manifested in 1990-1991 was a vital national security interest. The President and Congress agreed that the Iraqi threat would be resolved by enforcing Iraq's compliance with the UNSCR 660 series. Operation Desert Shield/Storm failed to resolve the Iraqi threat with Iraq's mandated compliance, so the Gulf War was only suspended with a conditional ceasefire whose "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) was purpose-designed with diagnostic measurements-cum-prescriptive measures that defined the Iraqi threat and its solution pursuant to "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait [and]...to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687). The President and Congress agreed that "Iraq's noncompliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 [and 688] constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region [and]...the Congress supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of Security Council Resolution 687 [and 688]" (Public Law 102-190).
"Iraq's noncompliance with [the Gulf War ceasefire terms] constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region" (P.L. 102-190) meant the threat of Iraq's noncompliance was by definition a vital national security interest per the Reagan corollary to the Carter doctrine that impelled President HW Bush to remedy the Saddam problem in the first place.
On the law and policy, Congress and Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush reiterated that the mandate to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L.105-235) was a vital national security interest — "We are convinced that as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, he will continue to threaten the well-being of his people, the peace of the region, and vital U.S. interests...Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security. I remain determined to see Iraq fully comply with all of its obligations under Security Council resolutions" (Clinton, 02AUG99), "it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced" (P.L. 107-243).
"Iraq's noncompliance with [the Gulf War ceasefire terms] constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region" (P.L. 102-190) meant the threat of Iraq's noncompliance was by definition a vital national security interest per the Reagan corollary to the Carter doctrine that impelled President HW Bush to remedy the Saddam problem in the first place.
On the law and policy, Congress and Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush reiterated that the mandate to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L.105-235) was a vital national security interest — "We are convinced that as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, he will continue to threaten the well-being of his people, the peace of the region, and vital U.S. interests...Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security. I remain determined to see Iraq fully comply with all of its obligations under Security Council resolutions" (Clinton, 02AUG99), "it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced" (P.L. 107-243).
My explanation to Dr. Haass should make sense to Ms. Robinson and any CFR member. If a more particular "clearly demonstrated vital interest" is wanted, paragraph 32 of UNSCR 687, UNSCR 1373, and Public Law 107-40 stand out. Iraq's UNSCR 687 terrorism violation was already a principal element of President Bush's case and determination on Iraq, yet the post-war Iraqi Perspectives Project investigation found Saddam's terrorism had been substantially underestimated. IPP co-author Jim Lacey, 14SEP11:
... All of this is just the tip of the iceberg of available evidence demonstrating that Saddam posed a dangerous [terrorism and WMD] threat to America. There are other reports providing specific information on dozens of terrorist attacks, as well as details of how Iraq helped plan and execute many of them. Moreover, there is also proof of Saddam’s support of Islamic groups that were part of the al-Qaeda network. ... In reality Saddam and bin Laden were operating parallel terror networks aimed at the United States. Bin Laden just has the distinction of having made the first horrendous attack.
Given the evidence, it appears that we removed Saddam’s regime not a moment too soon.
Given the evidence, it appears that we removed Saddam’s regime not a moment too soon.
Robinson:
... there has been no effort in the United States to hold senior U.S. officials accountable for the failure to conduct a deliberate process.
There was no "failure to conduct a deliberate process" on Iraq. It doesn't get more deliberate than the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement. Counting from the adoption of UNSCR 660 in August 1990, the American-led enforcement of the UNSCR 660 series was a priority for the President and Congress for twelve and a half years. The progression from Operation Desert Shield to Operation Iraqi Freedom exhausted the non-military and lesser military means to "uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 678). If anything, the process was too deliberate: UNSCR 678 did not obligate the Gulf War ceasefire enforcers to try everything else and then try it again and again for years and years while the noncompliant Saddam regime festered. But that's what the US and UK chose to do.
For Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), in 2002, President Bush made doubly sure that the non-military means were exhausted by stepping back from the post-ODF Iraq enforcement position that he inherited from President Clinton and resurrecting the UN inspections-centered compliance process that had died four years earlier to, in effect, repeat the UNSCR 1154, 1194, 1205 inspections that triggered ODF. Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #ultimatumoptions section:
The direct confrontation option actually was consistent with the Iraq enforcement position that President Clinton handed off to President Bush. The 1998 penultimate push to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L. 105-235) with UNSCRs 1154, 1194, and 1205 was enabled by a capacitating threat of regime change. The enhanced military threat was necessary because by 1998, Saddam’s intransigence was underpinned by his strong progress breaking the non-military threat, sanctions, with help from his accomplices on the UNSC. Saddam was proven right when the capacitating threat and therefore the compliance enforcement were undermined by Saddam's accomplices, which emboldened his noncompliance with UNSCOM, which caused Operation Desert Fox. Clinton's pronouncement "Iraq has abused its final chance" with Operation Desert Fox and Saddam's response of nullifying the ceasefire in Iraqi law, which included rejection of further UNSCR 687 inspections, meant the UN inspections-centered compliance process was past. Clinton's post-ODF 'containment' policy positioned the military to respond directly to any indication of Iraqi violation of the ceasefire terms. And there were clear indications across the board of Iraqi violations. In other words, Clinton didn't pull the trigger before he left office, but he had fired the "final" warning shot, aimed the gun, and cocked the hammer for his successor. Bush opting to go back to the UNSC for UNSCR 1441 was in effect a step back from the Iraq enforcement position that Clinton had reached with ODF, tantamount to retracing to UNSCR 1205 (1998).
Notably, "senior U.S. officials" who supported the direct confrontation option in early 2002 have been accused of eschewing the UN inspections-centered compliance process. Yet they were simply being realistic since the UN inspections did not exist as an option after 1998 because Saddam disallowed them. The UN inspections only became an option again in late 2002 when President Bush, Congress, and Prime Minister Blair brought them back to life with the 2002 AUMF, i.e., the credible threat of regime change required to compel Saddam, and UNSCR 1441.
Robinson:
... nonmilitary means were not exhausted.
See the OIF FAQ answer to "Why did resolution of the Saddam problem require a threat of regime change" and OIF FAQ answer to "Did Bush allow enough time for the inspections".
At the decision point of Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), the UN sanctions had already failed, which meant the sanctions-based 'containment' had failed. The "nonmilitary means" for UNSCR 678 ended with the UNMOVIC Clusters document.
Saddam's accomplices rejected the US-backed UK "second resolution" proposal that upheld the integrity of the UNSCR 1441 "enhanced inspection regime". The UNSCR 678 enforcers could not agree to the ad hoc 1441-replacement pushed by Saddam's accomplices that would have compromised the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441). President Bush heeded President Clinton's guidance on the matter:
There can be no delusion or diminishment of the integrity of the inspection system that UNSCOM has put in place. Now, those terms are nothing more or less than the essence of what he [Saddam] agreed to at the end of the Gulf War.
The Security Council many times since has reiterated this standard. If he accepts them, force will not be necessary. If he refuses or continues to evade his obligation through more tactics of delay and deception, he, and he alone, will be to blame for the consequences.
...
Now, let's imagine the future. What if he fails to comply and we fail to act, or we take some ambiguous third route which gives him yet more opportunities to develop this program of weapons of mass destruction and continue to press for the release of the sanctions and continue to ignore the solemn commitments that he made? Well, he will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will then conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction. And some day, some way, I guarantee you, he'll use the arsenal.
The Security Council many times since has reiterated this standard. If he accepts them, force will not be necessary. If he refuses or continues to evade his obligation through more tactics of delay and deception, he, and he alone, will be to blame for the consequences.
...
Now, let's imagine the future. What if he fails to comply and we fail to act, or we take some ambiguous third route which gives him yet more opportunities to develop this program of weapons of mass destruction and continue to press for the release of the sanctions and continue to ignore the solemn commitments that he made? Well, he will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will then conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction. And some day, some way, I guarantee you, he'll use the arsenal.
Robinson:
... the risks and costs were not fully analyzed;
How "fully" did the HW Bush administration analyze the "risks and costs" of suspending the Gulf War with comprehensive ceasefire conditions, which Saddam violated immediately, instead of resolving the noncompliant-Saddam problem on the spot?
With or without 9/11, the 'containment' had come to a head by 2001. We know now that Saddam's distinctive ambitious and aggressive threatening "intentions" (UNSCR 687) were unreconstructed as "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" (ISG) mandated for "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions" (UNSCR 687). We know the non-military means to enforce Iraq's mandated compliance had failed as "The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council" (ISG). We know Saddam possessed a reconstituting WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687 with, at minimum, covert ready capability and ready capacity to scale up. We know Saddam's UNSCR 687 terrorism and UNSCR 688 human rights violations were both "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, 18MAR04) than we thought.
With the benefit of hindsight, how "fully" has Ms. Robinson "analyzed ... the risks and costs" of allowing the noncompliant Saddam regime to fester any more? Or allowing the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement to fail completely?
Robinson:
Senior regional experts warned of the perfect storm [PDF] that could ensue if Saddam were toppled, and of the massive years-long reconstruction project that would be required to restore stability.
Worrying about "the perfect storm that could ensue" when confronting a growing problem is a normal and useful exercise. But sooner or later, action towards solving that problem must happen. The solution needs to start somewhere. From there, setbacks and adjustments are normal. Otherwise, the problem will keep worsening, and what could have solved the problem yesterday won't be enough today and will be less adequate tomorrow. That's how an initial post-war plan that likely would have worked for an early-1990s, or even mid-1990s, Iraq proved insufficient in 2003. That's how the Powell Doctrine becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy.
As far as "the massive years-long reconstruction project that would be required to restore stability", that's not new for the American leader of the free world. There's a reason US forces have been stationed in Germany, Japan, and Korea since World War Two. The United States has understood that securing the long-term peace is necessary to win the short-term war, hence the Gulf War ceasefire.
The references at "perfect storm" and "years-long reconstruction project" help illustrate that the noncompliant-Saddam problem was growing worse. Concomitantly, the cost and difficulty of the "reconstruction project" with post-Saddam Iraq was growing as long as the noncompliant-Saddam problem was allowed to fester.
So while Ms. Robinson is correct that in 2003 the Iraqi regime change was costly and difficult, at the same time, nation-building post-Saddam Iraq was as cheap and easy as it ever was going to be moving forward. It would have been cheaper and easier in 1991 when the Powell Doctrine held back President HW Bush as the Iraqis who answered his call to revolt were slaughtered. Or in 1998 when Congress made Iraqi regime change the law to join the executive policy, but then ODF confirmed to Saddam that America was a paper tiger.
President HW Bush, President Clinton, and Congress all held up Iraqi regime change as the solution to the noncompliant-Saddam problem. Yet they kicked the can down the road as the problem festered until some successor was compelled to fix it. That successor turned out to be President Bush.
Robinson:
... clear and obtainable goals and an exit strategy were not established;
... The error of the invasion was immediately compounded by the absence of an agreed exit strategy and the decision to embark on a massive, open-ended nation-building project.
... The error of the invasion was immediately compounded by the absence of an agreed exit strategy and the decision to embark on a massive, open-ended nation-building project.
President Bush's decision for OIF was correct on the law and the facts, not an "error".
As for the "decision to embark on a massive, open-ended nation-building project", see the OIF FAQ answer to "Was the invasion of Iraq perceived to be a nation-building effort". The decision to nation-build post-Saddam Iraq was implicit with President HW Bush, made official by President Clinton and Congress, reiterated by Congress in the 2002 AUMF, and honored by President Bush.
According to Ms. Robinson's standard of "clear and obtainable goals and an exit strategy were not established", President Roosevelt should have agreed with the "America First" isolationists, or at least President Truman should not have stuck around Europe and Asia after VE and VJ days.
Which is to say, the standard practices of American leadership of the free world were not invented after 9/11. The "massive, open-ended nation-building project" with post-Saddam Iraq followed in essence the approach and "exit strategy" we have had with post-Nazi Germany, post-Imperial Japan, and post-Japan Korea.
Robinson:
The occupation authority’s first acts were to disband the Iraqi army and the Ba’athist governing party, igniting what would become a lethal, long-running insurgency and eventually a multinational terrorist organization that took over most of the country.
Ms. Robinson is incorrect that the de-Baathification "ignit[ed] what would become a lethal, long-running insurgency and eventually a multinational terrorist organization that took over most of the country". While we can assume Saddam's terrorists felt ostracized by the de-Baathification, we know now that the insurgency was pre-assembled and "ignit[ed]" by Saddam and his army of terrorists before the occupation. Excerpt from American Enterprise Institute panel discussion, "The Iraq War Series: The Conduct of the War":
Jack Keane:
The fact of the matter is, we were dealing with an enemy force that Saddam Hussein had before the invasion, that planned to do what he was doing. And we were conducting likely the most formidable insurgency the West has ever encountered. Why am I saying that? Human capital is usually an issue for insurgents. Sometimes they get it outside. But human capital, they had somewhere in the neighborhood, if you add up the Fedayeen, the Ba’ath Party militia, special Republican Guard, excuse me, and [inaudible 01:10:58] intelligence service, the numbers 130,000. I’m not suggesting that we’re all involved. But I’m suggesting to you that was a good place to start. Remember, this is Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-based insurgency to start with. He had an unlimited amount of money, billions and billions of dollars. Normally, in the typical Mao based insurgency, they’re starving for what? For capital. They had an unlimited amount of money. They had unlimited amount of arms and ammunition. ... And what else did they have? Well, hell, they ran the country for 35 years, and they wanted to take it back.
The fact of the matter is, we were dealing with an enemy force that Saddam Hussein had before the invasion, that planned to do what he was doing. And we were conducting likely the most formidable insurgency the West has ever encountered. Why am I saying that? Human capital is usually an issue for insurgents. Sometimes they get it outside. But human capital, they had somewhere in the neighborhood, if you add up the Fedayeen, the Ba’ath Party militia, special Republican Guard, excuse me, and [inaudible 01:10:58] intelligence service, the numbers 130,000. I’m not suggesting that we’re all involved. But I’m suggesting to you that was a good place to start. Remember, this is Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-based insurgency to start with. He had an unlimited amount of money, billions and billions of dollars. Normally, in the typical Mao based insurgency, they’re starving for what? For capital. They had an unlimited amount of money. They had unlimited amount of arms and ammunition. ... And what else did they have? Well, hell, they ran the country for 35 years, and they wanted to take it back.
By the same token, the "multinational terrorist organization that took over most of the country" was a descendant of Saddam's "regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations" (IPP). For clarification on ISIS, see The Islamic State Was Coming Without the Invasion of Iraq by Kyle Orton.
Robinson:
This effort achieved a short-lived effect of dampening the violence but did not address the root causes of violence, which was the lack of a governance arrangement that Iraqis would accept.
... The military’s record in intrastate counterinsurgency suggests that it often does more harm than good: Soldiers adopted the term “COIN math” to refer to the proliferation of enraged surviving family members who take up arms to avenge those who have been killed by foreign forces.
... The military’s record in intrastate counterinsurgency suggests that it often does more harm than good: Soldiers adopted the term “COIN math” to refer to the proliferation of enraged surviving family members who take up arms to avenge those who have been killed by foreign forces.
The "proliferation of enraged surviving family members who take up arms to avenge those who have been killed by foreign forces" does not seem to have been substantial given that the insurgency overwhelmingly targeted Iraqis. That's a hallmark of the Saddamist terrorists who carried forward their standard practice of torturing and killing Iraqis from the Saddam regime to their insurgency and ISIS.
Ms. Robinson is technically correct that Saddamist insurgents would accept a "governance arrangement" like they had with the Saddam regime, i.e., the "systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror" (UNCHR, 19APR02). However, the "root causes of violence" for Saddamists do not represent what normal "Iraqis would accept".
Robinson:
By 2007 Iraq was on fire, and after numerous deliberations, the third major erroneous decision was reached, to double down on a military strategy with a “surge” of U.S. troops. ... The overarching lesson is that foreign militaries are ill equipped to serve as social engineers,
...
Lesson: Do not use the U.S. military to conduct large-scale counterinsurgency or nation building.
...
Lesson: Do not use the U.S. military to conduct large-scale counterinsurgency or nation building.
Keep in mind that peace operations, which encompass counterinsurgency and the military role in nation-building, are an element of US Army doctrine. Defense and security are basic needs for any nation, which means a "military strategy" is a normal part of nation-building.
That being said, the "use [of] the U.S. military to conduct large-scale counterinsurgency or nation building" was not the initial post-war plan. The initial post-war plan took a light-footprint, civilian-centered approach that was enabled by but not based on soldiers. The COIN "surge" could not "double down on a military strategy" since the occupation did not start with COIN. The COIN capability was developed in competition as an organic adjustment to the Saddamist insurgency. While preserving the original nation-building objectives, the civilian-centered light-footprint plan-A was adjusted to a soldier-centered heavy-footprint plan-B in response to the necessity (the mother of invention) imposed by the Saddamist insurgency.
The COIN adjustment did what it was supposed to do and secured the fundamental space to enable everything else that needed to be done. The "surge" was not meant to be an overnight cure-all. COIN may seem like a cure-all because its intersectional nature may demand soldiers take on a hybrid role, e.g., "social engineers" in the morning, peacekeepers in the afternoon, counterterrorists at night. But that depends on the needs of the mission, normally due to an area being too dangerous for civilian specialists, yet "social engineers" are needed right now nonetheless.
The COIN "surge" is an invaluable [case study] of resolute leadership, resilient mission, and adaptation in competition. Ms. Robinson characterizing it as a "major erroneous decision" seems odd, but it is consistent with her advocacy of the Powell Doctrine.
Robinson:
This effort achieved a short-lived effect of dampening the violence but did not address the root causes of violence ...
To clarify, "This [COIN "surge"] effort achieved a short-lived effect of dampening the violence but did not address the root causes of violence" only because President Obama prematurely removed the essential peace operations.
The OIF invasion led by US forces was necessary to stop the Saddam regime's "systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror" (UNCHR) and "predominant targets of Iraqi state terror operations were Iraqi citizens, both inside and outside of Iraq" (IPP).
Unfortunately, Saddam and his terrorists chose to convert their sectarian, terrorist, genocidal regime to the Saddamist insurgency that viciously attacked the Iraqi people like the Saddamists ruled Iraq. Once more, the counterinsurgency "surge" led by US forces was necessary to stop the Saddamist insurgency.
It should have been crystal clear by then that Iraq needed US forces to stay long-term like US forces have stayed in Germany, Japan, and Korea. But President Obama callously, or cruelly, removed the peace operations anyway. Saddamists accepted Obama's gift opportunity, reformed inside the degeneration of the Arab Spring, and attacked Iraq again. But this time, with Iraq stripped of the US forces that had twice proven necessary to stop the Saddamists, their "multinational terrorist organization ... took over most of the country".
What President Obama did to Iraq helps us imagine how the Soviet-driven "intrastate" north Koreans or east Germans might have responded to a gift opportunity of President Eisenhower prematurely removing the US forces from South Korea or West Germany in the 1950s. If Eisenhower had done what Obama did to Iraq, our post-World War Two efforts in Korea and Germany, which we know today as old nation-building successes, might well have turned into a "short-lived effect" too.
Robinson:
The use of military force deserves to be carefully circumscribed and large-scale counterinsurgency eschewed. Foreign militaries may successfully eject invading forces, as occurred in Desert Storm, but an even more effective approach is to help the national forces defend their own country as currently in Ukraine.
...
[Lesson: Do not use the U.S. military to conduct large-scale counterinsurgency or nation building.]
...
[Lesson: Do not use the U.S. military to conduct large-scale counterinsurgency or nation building.]
Ms. Robinson's "lesson" to eschew "large-scale counterinsurgency" creates an ingrained vulnerability that invites our adversaries to apply insurgency, or simply the threat of it, to deter the United States and advance inimical interests at no/low risk in the self-imposed gaps, such as Saddam's ceasefire breach, or counteract the US military on the ground by attacking the self-imposed weakness, such as the Saddamist insurgency.
The constructive lesson of Saddam's ceasefire breach is the political need, in terms of deterrence as well as not being deterred, for the world to believe that the US military is ready and willing to do COIN competently.
The constructive lesson of the Saddamist insurgency is the practical need for the US military to master COIN so the capability is on the shelf and ready whenever the needs of the mission call for it. As General David Petraeus understood, “If we are going to fight future wars, they’re going to be very similar to Iraq,” he says, adding that this was why “we have to get it right in Iraq”.
Robinson:
... societies only evolve at a generational pace.
I agree with Ms. Robinson that "societies only evolve at a generational pace". The generations of American soldiers stationed in Germany, Japan, and Korea show the vital constructive effects of US forces in nation-building in their direct effect in the short term and indirect effect over the long term by securing the fundamental space, anchoring the bilateral relationship for the broader set of ties and exchanges, and enabling the progressive learning curve of everything else. The US forces in Iraq should have had the same direct and indirect constructive effects for Iraq's generational development, except President Obama chose to contravene the Eisenhower precedent and deny them to Iraq.
After a deadly delay, President Obama belatedly honored the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement by sending US forces back in 2014 to stop the Saddamists for a third time. However, Obama did not restore the presence of US forces that should have secured the fundamental space, anchored the bilateral relationship, and enabled the progressive learning curve of everything else for the good of Iraq's generational development. Instead, Iran accepted Obama's gift opportunity and has occupied the vital gap that Obama left behind.
Robinson:
Instead, the U.S. government decided to back sitting Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s bid for continued power, despite the fact that Iyad Allawi won a plurality in the 2010 election with broader support. Maliki’s sectarian and personal ambitions were well known, and his subsequent actions in purging and politicizing the military and government set the stage for the advent of the Islamic State and the collapse of the Iraqi army, which had been built with billions of dollars of U.S. security assistance.
Lesson: Back democratic processes and leaders with broad-based support.
Lesson: Back democratic processes and leaders with broad-based support.
I can't say for sure why President Obama chose to back Maliki. I only know that President Obama did not care about nation-building Iraq in accordance with the US-Iraq SFA like President Bush did. Obama's priority was using the out in the 2008-2011 SOFA instead of using Section X of the SFA to secure the next SOFA per Section III, as had been expected. Another Obama priority was pandering to Iran. The reason that Obama backed Maliki over the good of Iraq's "democratic processes and leaders with broad-based support" may be found within those two priorities.
To clarify, what "set the stage for the advent of the Islamic State" was the same thing as for the insurgency: Saddamist terrorists. While the Saddamists would exploit any opportunity that came out of Maliki's actions, just as they did against the OIF occupation, Maliki didn't "set the stage" for ISIS.
Maliki's actions did partially "set the stage for ... the collapse of the Iraqi army, which had been built with billions of dollars of U.S. security assistance". However, the other part is the peculiar trait of US military relations that allied forces, including and perhaps especially those "built with billions of dollars of U.S. security assistance", are structurally designed to work with US forces to the point of reliance, if not dependency. That's true for NATO as well as Iraq and Afghanistan. Again, there's a reason US forces are still stationed in Germany, Japan, and Korea. President Obama knew or should have known that removing US forces from Iraq in the way he did would significantly undermine the Iraqi military apart from Maliki's actions. The same goes for the crippling effect of President Biden's removal of US forces on the Afghan military.
Robinson:
The decision to withdraw in 2011 was also beset by a series of errors. In 2008, the U.S. government negotiated a bilateral strategic framework agreement that was intended to pave the way for a more normal relationship with this significant Middle Eastern country via trade, cultural, and educational exchanges, with political and diplomatic ties taking precedence over military ones. This agreement has not been robustly implemented to this day.
See the sources and expository commentary at OIF FAQ post An irresponsible exit from Iraq.
To clarify "the U.S. government negotiated a bilateral strategic framework agreement that was intended to pave the way for a more normal relationship ... with political and diplomatic ties taking precedence over military ones", the US-Iraq SFA does cover military relations, which are a normal part of international relations along with "political and diplomatic ties". SFA excerpt:
Section III: Defense and Security Cooperation
In order to strengthen security and stability in Iraq, and thereby contribute to international peace and stability, and to enhance the ability of the Republic of Iraq to deter all threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, the Parties shall continue to foster close cooperation concerning defense and security arrangements without prejudice to Iraqi sovereignty over its land, sea, and air territory.
...
Section X: Implementing Agreements and Arrangements
The Parties may enter into further agreements or arrangements as necessary and appropriate to implement this Agreement.
In order to strengthen security and stability in Iraq, and thereby contribute to international peace and stability, and to enhance the ability of the Republic of Iraq to deter all threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, the Parties shall continue to foster close cooperation concerning defense and security arrangements without prejudice to Iraqi sovereignty over its land, sea, and air territory.
...
Section X: Implementing Agreements and Arrangements
The Parties may enter into further agreements or arrangements as necessary and appropriate to implement this Agreement.
Note, Section III isn't detailed because that's what Section X is for.
Ms. Robinson's "list of lessons that should be ingrained in the collective memory to avoid future blunders" exemplify why "This agreement has not been robustly implemented to this day".
If, as Ms. Robinson incorrectly premises, Operation Iraqi Freedom was illegitimate and "did not involve a clearly demonstrated vital interest" in the first place, and is the root cause of death, dysfunction, and suffering in Iraq, then the logic of her "lessons" dictates that the United States and Iraq should definitely not seek a "more normal relationship" with "trade, cultural, and educational exchanges, with political and diplomatic ties" pursuant to the SFA. The logic of Ms. Robinson's "lessons" dictates that the American-Iraqi relationship is fundamentally toxic and the US should renege on the SFA and abandon Iraq "to avoid future blunders".
I don't believe that's what she wants.
If instead Ms. Robinson wants the United States and Iraq to robustly implement the SFA, then as Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow she needs to discredit the Iraq Syndrome and clarify the Iraq issue at the premise level of our politics and policy. She needs to make the public understand that OIF was justified and involved vital national security interests. That Saddamists have been the root cause of the death, dysfunction, and suffering in Iraq before, during, and after OIF. And that our intervention with Iraq has been the necessary cure for the Saddamist cancer in all its forms, Saddam regime, Saddamist insurgency, Saddamist ISIS, and also for the opportunistic disease of Iran in Iraq.
In other words, robust implementation of the SFA will make logical sense only when Ms. Robinson clarifies to the public that President Bush and Prime Minister Blair were right on Iraq, President Obama and Prime Minister Brown were wrong to leave Iraq, and the Chilcot report is a distortion of the Iraq issue. That's the premise needed for the public and our leaders to believe that "a more normal relationship with [Iraq] via trade, cultural, and educational exchanges, with political and diplomatic ties" is constructive.
Robinson:
A sectarian government stacked with elite politicians took root, along with a patronage system to divide the spoils of the hydrocarbon industry, further supercharging the insurgency.
...
As of today, the political imperative of a functioning and responsive government remains unmet. In late 2019, the country’s young population—the majority of Iraqis are under age twenty-five—exploded in frustration. Months of protest were met by violence, mostly from Iranian-backed militias who have gained a strong foothold in the security service and in a segment of the Iraqi Shi’a political parties. High abstention rates in the last two elections indicate an alarming disillusionment with Iraq’s democratic experiment. Modest electoral reform may be reversed by sectarians, and the government has yet to agree on a hydrocarbons law, resolution of disputed territories, and a truly democratic system.
...
As of today, the political imperative of a functioning and responsive government remains unmet. In late 2019, the country’s young population—the majority of Iraqis are under age twenty-five—exploded in frustration. Months of protest were met by violence, mostly from Iranian-backed militias who have gained a strong foothold in the security service and in a segment of the Iraqi Shi’a political parties. High abstention rates in the last two elections indicate an alarming disillusionment with Iraq’s democratic experiment. Modest electoral reform may be reversed by sectarians, and the government has yet to agree on a hydrocarbons law, resolution of disputed territories, and a truly democratic system.
As Ms. Robinson points out, "societies only evolve at a generational pace". Keep in mind that Iraq is coming from Saddam regime governance that was deeply corrupt as well as deeply abusive. Even if President Obama had stayed the course with President Bush's nation-building priority and US forces had stayed in Iraq in an analogous role to 20th-century US forces in Germany, Japan, and Korea, I expect corruption would have persisted as a systemic Iraqi problem for a generation or more. That's the way it was with Korea.
Germany, Japan, and Korea have experienced many protests over the decades that US forces have been there, and they've turned out okay because the US forces stationed there were instrumental establishing a conducive setting for nation-building. In the generational context, if not for President Obama's radical deviation, US forces would have helped Iraq move in the right direction, like they have helped Germany, Japan, and Korea, by securing the fundamental space versus Saddamist and Iranian interference, anchoring the bilateral relationship for the "trade, cultural, and educational exchanges, with political and diplomatic ties" to positively influence Iraq's progress, and enabling the progressive learning curve of everything else for the "country's young population", protests and all.
We can only speculate how much healthier Iraq's nation-building development would be today if President Obama had not radically deviated from President Bush's course with Iraq.
Robinson:
The costs of the Iraq War have been calculated at $8 trillion if the veterans’ health-care costs are included; some 300,000 Iraqi civilians were killed, over 9 million displaced, and 4,598 U.S. troops and 3,650 contractors were killed.
Ms. Robinson is incorrect. Operation Iraqi Freedom, the "Iraq War", ended in 2011 with a cost of $823.2 billion. That's not cheap, but it's not "$8 trillion" either. According to its cited source, the "$8 trillion" figure is the total amount on a chart of overall spending from FY2001 to FY2022 plus estimated future spending for a wide range of departments related to the broad War on Terror. The chart does not give a spending figure for OIF.
The "300,000 Iraqi civilians were killed" is an estimate through 2023, twelve years after OIF ended, and it doesn't tabulate when, who, and how. The article says the figure includes deaths that aren't conflict-related.
The when in particular makes a difference because President Obama radically deviated by removing the US forces protecting Iraq despite the danger growing in the degenerating Arab Spring. The enormous ISIS-caused spike of Iraqi victims after 2011 would not have happened with Iraqi forces defending Iraq shoulder-to-shoulder with COIN-veteran US forces. Generally speaking, OIF shouldn't be blamed for Saddamist victims since Saddamists have zealously killed Iraqis before, during, and after OIF. US forces have been the only thing in the world that has stopped Saddamists in their various forms from wrecking Iraq and mass-murdering Iraqis.
The "9 million displaced" covers 2001 to 2022 and the "4,598 U.S. troops and 3,650 contractors were killed" covers 2003 to 2023. That includes years before OIF for the "9 million displaced" and many years after President Obama's radical deviation. I'm not sure if the figures are wholly Iraq-specific.
Notably, the source for Ms. Robinson's figures is the "Costs of War" project which is notorious for their blatant bias, creative accounting, and rewarding of propaganda points to any adversary who maximizes civilian victims by framing the US as somehow the cause.
Robinson:
On this twentieth anniversary, amid attempts to rationalize the decision to go to war, I offer this short list of lessons that should be ingrained in the collective memory to avoid future blunders.
Ms. Robinson's "lessons" should not "be ingrained in the collective memory" because they are based on a fundamental misconception of OIF's justification. A correct conception of the Iraq issue is necessary to make a constructive "list of lessons that should be ingrained in the collective memory". I recommend that Ms. Robinson learn the OIF FAQ base post, which is purpose-designed to lay a proper foundation with the law and facts that define the Iraq issue.
Ms. Robinson, I appreciate the opportunity to critically review your 20th anniversary article for the 22nd anniversary of Operation Iraqi Freedom. We agree that the Iraq Syndrome has caused "grievous" harm, continues to corrupt our politics and policy, and it urgently needs to be cured. I hope my comments on your work help you cure the Iraq Syndrome. I invite your feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
Related: Correction of Richard Haass's "Revisiting America’s War of Choice in Iraq" and Review of Council on Foreign Relations panel "Lessons From History Series: The U.S. Invasion of Iraq—Twenty Years Later".
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