from: [Eric LC]
to: [Brian Dunn]
date: Feb 18, 2020, 5:44 PM
subject: Comment on "What Shall Phase IX in Iraq Look Like?"
Brian,
This critical comment responds to your 04FEB20 post, What Shall Phase IX in Iraq Look Like?. ...
Brian:
How shall we win the current phase--the ninth--in the Iraq War? Will it be a military or societal main effort?
You quote
I agree with you and them that society-transforming humanitarian programs are urgently needed in Iraq. It's a good idea. It's the right idea.
However, it's not a novel idea. Therein, your "military or societal" framing is problematic.
Years before Operation Iraqi Freedom, long before we were able to learn the full extent that the Saddam regime corrupted Iraqi society and traumatized the Iraqi people, the international community understood Iraq required extensive humanitarian aid to recover from Saddam's rule.
Accordingly, at the same time and on the same track per UNSCR 688, the US law and policy on Iraq developed a core humanitarian component. The Iraq intervention was formulated with the core humanitarian component, which was the primary focus throughout the OIF peace operations. OIF's security component served the humanitarian component to the degree that initially the humanitarian component was conflated with the security component.
In OIF, we learned that the Saddam-corrupted Iraqi civil infrastructure was unable to take on the multi-thread humanitarian effort. We also learned that US, other-nation, international (which is to say, UN), and NGO civilian-led humanitarian aid was insufficient, and markedly vulnerable and fragile versus the terrorists, when separate from the US military.
We learned the hard way that ultimately the only organization that could viably manage both the core humanitarian component and security component of nation-building Iraq was the US military. The OIF peace operations adjusted and proved to work before they were ended.
We learned in Iraq that an effectual humanitarian "societal main effort" and "military...main effort" are one and the same.
Yet despite the lessons we learned with hard costly experience, Munisteri and Shmuel advocate for Iraq to now take on the urgently needed comprehensive multi-thread humanitarian effort sans US military or commensurate alternative management on the ground. Despite that, as you point out, Iraq's civil infrastructure falls far short of the Roosevelt administration that managed the WPA program in their analogy.
If Iraq's progression had not been degenerated by President Obama's deviation, then the option of an Iraqi "societal main effort" sans US military or commensurate alternative management on the ground likely would be realistic by now.
As is, I doubt that Iraq in its current condition is able to carry out their recommendation. Based on lessons learned, Iraq's current condition, and the peace-building tools available, the US military strikes me as indivisible from a viable "societal main effort": A sufficient nation-building multi-thread "societal main effort" with Iraq is necessarily at least enabled by the backing of the US military, à la OIF's initial post-war plan, and quite likely needs to be managed again by the US military.
Leaving the Iraqis to sink or swim with arms-length US supply strikes me as deliberately repeating President Obama's errors, which M
Alternatively, if there were a sufficient, like-minded, reliable US non-military, other-nation, or international organization that could manage the multi-thread nation-building needed for Iraq, then I would support that non-existent organization taking the lead on the ground, so the US military could be left to notional warfighting and other preferred missions.
Like the CIA was built from the OSS of WW2, a sufficient alternative peace-building capability could have been built from the COIN of OIF. In fact, a commensurate non-military "surge" was promised to Iraq to pave the way for the 2011 military withdrawal. But the US reneged, and no peace-building alternative has been developed by the Obama and Trump administrations.
Further development of peace-building policy and capability, either military or alternatively based, has been curtailed by the politics of the prevailing inimical narrative of the Iraq intervention. M
The reality is that the US military is the only organization in the world proven capable of effectually managing the humanitarian multi-thread "societal main effort" that you, I, and they recognize is urgently needed in Iraq.
Brian:
Phase VII went from May 2008 through December 2013.
The Iraq intervention did not progress through "Phase VII" from 2008 to 2013. Obama's deviation with Iraq during that period broke from Phase VII.
Correctly diagnosing the inflection point as a path progression or path deviation is essential to prescribe the correct political and policy solution. Misinterpreting a path deviation as a path progression causes the assumption of premises that are no longer operative and the overlooking of current operative premises. More on that below.
Your description of Phase VII matches our continuing post-WW2 strategic partnerships in Europe and Asia, whose progress have been based on and enabled by constant US military posture. It mismatches Obama's deviation with Iraq that interrupted the US military posture at a pivotal point, contravened the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement, and crippled Iraq's progress.
In a critical window, President Obama prematurely removed the vital peace operations with Iraq, appeased Iran, reneged his pledges to the Arab Spring protests, and surrendered the "red line" with Syria, all of which emboldened and enabled the terrorists, Assad, and his allies. Obama denied Iraq when it first invoked the SFA to request US assistance, when Phase VII could have been readily recovered from the 2011 error. Instead, Obama returned US forces to Iraq too late and too limited to either save Iraq's surge-and-Sahwa progress, cut off the ISIS invasion, or deter the concomitant Iranian intervention.
Brian:
Phase VIII was the rise of ISIL in Iraq and our re-intervention to defeat the Islamic State caliphate in September 2014, what I have called Iraq War 2.0. ... The liberation of Mosul by June 2017 when the ISIL defenses were broken signaled the end of Phase VIII and the beginning of a new defense of what we achieved.
While there is a conjunction, counterterrorism is different than war.
We did belatedly return to Iraq per the SFA from OIF. However, "Iraq War 2.0" is a misleading label because the "2.0" parameters are defined by counterterrorism in conscious contrast to the inclusive parameters of the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement — the Iraq half of the Clinton dual-containment framework — that defined 'Iraq War 1.0'.
Again, misinterpreting a path deviation as a path progression obfuscates the current operative premises.
Your characterization of "Iraq War 2.0" assumes a progressive frame that carries forward the OIF parameters from the Clinton dual-containment framework, which covers the nation-building of Iraq after Saddam. However, the mission parameters assumed by your advocacy are not now operative. President Obama broke from the Clinton dual-containment framework, and President Trump has not restored the 'Iraq War 1.0' parameters.
In order to effectually pursue the tactical adjustment you advocate, we need to pursue a policy restoration of the OIF parameters. In order to effectually pursue a policy restoration of the OIF parameters, we need to pursue a political correction of the prevailing inimical narrative of the Iraq intervention. Until the politics of Iraq are corrected and the OIF parameters are restored, your advocacy for Iraq is a non-starter.
Brian:
So call it Phase IX to defeat Iran in Iraq since July 2017.
... What we are doing is not working.
The question is, should American tactics shift--again--to deal with the new threats that the tactics appropriate for the last phase no longer no longer work for the existing threat and the fragmentation of Iraqi governance into virtual fiefdoms based on tribes, militias, and political parties:
... I'm open to something like this in pursuit of new tactics appropriate for the new phase of war we are facing in Iraq.
... What we are doing is not working.
The question is, should American tactics shift--again--to deal with the new threats that the tactics appropriate for the last phase no longer no longer work for the existing threat and the fragmentation of Iraqi governance into virtual fiefdoms based on tribes, militias, and political parties:
... I'm open to something like this in pursuit of new tactics appropriate for the new phase of war we are facing in Iraq.
Based on the proven tactics with Iraq, your question is easy to answer: Phase IX should derive from Phase VI.
We know when and how what the US was doing with Iraq was working. And we know when and how we deviated from that which was working with Iraq. The practical solution is already developed and proven, notwithstanding that if and when the proven tactics from Phase VI are retrieved off the shelf, they will need to be adapted to and updated for the current situation.
The "pursuit of new tactics appropriate for the new phase of war" is best begun by setting the benchmark at when and how what we were doing with Iraq was evidently working to achieve the policy objectives in line with the Clinton dual-containment framework that you advocate: OIF, 2008. Upon that constructive baseline, diagnose the disease of the Obama deviation with Iraq. That diagnosis informs the prescription of working back through Obama's deviation and restoring the proven "new tactics" from 2008, updated for the current situation.
Brian:
Work the problem.
Yes. My follow-up question to your question is, given Iraq's current situation (conditions), what needs to be done politically, policy-wise, and practically in order to abjure Obama's deviation and reset the necessary constructive baseline (task) by restoring the US-Iraq strategic partnership to its 2008 condition (standard)?
We clearly advocate the same goal for Iraq, but perhaps our views differ on the tactics to achieve it.
In any case, first things first: Whatever our differences at the practical step, there's no difference for what's needed to work the problem at the preceding political and policy steps.
The foundational step towards our goal for Iraq is upholding the Iraq intervention for the public by clarifying the origin story — the basic justification — which reframes and revaluates everything else. Or else, as long as OIF's justification is not upheld in the politics, your advocacy will be discredited at go, hawking the fruit of a poisoned tree. Again, Munisteri and Shmuel are not helpful in that regard.
The practical step of fixing our tactics with Iraq follows the policy step of fixing the parameters, which follows the political step of fixing the premises. Fixing the politics of Iraq establishes the necessary foundation and frame to fix our Iraq policy, which sets the necessary stage to fix our tactics with Iraq.
At the same time, upholding the Iraq intervention, discrediting Obama's deviation, and restoring the OIF parameters aren't just vital for correcting our politics, policy, and tactics. They are also essential for the coalition following America and the Iraqis.
The OIF peace ops that stood up a strategic partner in Iraq are of a kind with our WW2 peace ops, i.e., the baseline precedent for American leadership of the free world, which speaks to the radical character of Obama's deviation with Iraq.
President Obama fecklessly discarded the vital Iraqi trust in American leadership that had been resolutely hard-earned under President Bush. In the wake of Obama's cold-blooded betrayal of the US-Iraq partnership in the face of the SFA and the blood and treasure — American, Iraqi, and other allied — that informed the SFA, why should Iraq trust partnership with America again?
Similarly, in the wake of Obama's deviation, why should our other coalition partners follow such evidently irresponsible American leadership on Iraq past the self-conscious limitations of counterterrorism?
What evidence has President Trump, or any of our other prospective Commanders in Chief for that matter, shown that the American president will revive President Bush's principled resolute leadership on Iraq?
Iranian intervention is bad for Iraq. But at least Iran can be counted on not to do to Iraq what we did to Iraq with Obama's deviation from Phase VII. Rebuilding the Iraqi trust in America needed for Phase IX and beyond requires substantial political, policy, and practical proof. We can't assume any of it.
As you say, work the problem. That doesn't begin with tactics.
PREFACE: Joanne Munisteri is an independent specialist, researcher and educator who has worked for universities, organizations and the US Department of State, DOD, USAID, IREX and private contracting companies. Adad Shmuel is a student in the International Relations department of the Catholic University in Erbil, Iraq. Brian Dunn's benchmark 04FEB20 post is based on their 27JAN20 Small Wars Journal article, Iraq: Time for A Different Approach.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Joanne Munisteri]
cc: [Dave Dilegge]
date: Mar 10, 2020, 5:11 PM
subject: Your 27JAN20 Small Wars Journal appeal for Iraq is self-defeating
Ms. Munisteri and Mr. Shmuel,
I use the primary source authorities, i.e., the set of controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts that define OIF's justification, at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ to clarify the Iraq issue and correct for the prevalent conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.
With that, I am writing you to share my recommendation to national security analyst Brian Dunn in response to his benchmark 04FEB20 post, What Shall Phase IX in Iraq Look Like?. The recommendation applies to your advocacy because Brian's post is based on your 27JAN20 Small Wars Journal article, Iraq: Time for A Different Approach.
Rather than repeat the recommendation here, I suggest reading it at Comment on Brian Dunn's "What Shall Phase IX in Iraq Look Like?["]. My related recommendation to noted Iraq advocate Michael Knights is appended to the post.
In addition, I'll emphasize these points:
Your 27JAN20 Small Wars Journal appeal for Iraq is self-defeating because it follows the otherwise readily correctable distorted, inimical narrative of the Iraq intervention.
Logically, a request to renew American investment in Iraq only works if it is premised upon the understanding that the noncompliant Saddam regime plus its fellow travelers, enablers, and accomplices are the source of the problem, the Iraq intervention is basically justified, and America's commitment to Iraq is the keystone for curing the problem.
Whereas if, as your SWJ article poses, the Iraq intervention is the cause of Iraq's troubles, ill-justified, even malevolent, and a colossal waste of our blood and treasure, then the logical inference is the US (and consequentially our allies) should pull stakes and divest from Iraq with alacrity.
Thus your appeal for Iraq discredits itself by implicitly opposing America's commitment to Iraq. Your blame of the Iraq intervention as the source of the problem and portrayal of American investment in Iraq as futile, even harmful, frames your appeal as an unreasonable request for the US to invest deeper into a gross mistake and exacerbate a monumental wrong.
Clearly, your pitch is a non-starter.
To effectually ground your appeal, you should clarify for the public that the noncompliant Saddam regime plus its fellow travelers, enablers, and accomplices are to blame for the problem, the Iraq intervention is justified as such, and sufficient American commitment to Iraq is the key to cure the problem.
From that basis, an effective request to renew American investment in Iraq requires censure of President Obama's course deviation with Iraq because Obama's deviation degraded America's commitment to Iraq to a patently insufficient level. Clarify that the OIF peace operations, which embody sufficient American commitment to Iraq, were curing the problem before Obama's deviation set back Iraq's progress. The point provides you a critical benchmark that shows American investment in Iraq can cure the problem, which makes your request reasonable, and focuses a solution for the setbacks in your SWJ article that have resulted from Obama's deviation.
In other words, your advocacy is coherent if it designs to remedy Obama's deviation by restoring America's commitment to Iraq and Iraq's concomitant progress to their pre-Obama state. A constructive benchmark is Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2008. Your advocacy is incoherent as long as it effectively opposes a sufficient American commitment to Iraq by misrepresenting the Clinton/Bush Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement and conflating it with Obama's deviation.
Your SWJ article hints at an understanding of the pivotal detriment of Obama's deviation, to wit, "For over a decade “civil society” and “capacity building” programs paid for with American dollars have yielded few sustainable results." However, your appeal critically neglects to clarify the Saddam regime's causal fault, the actual (legal-factual) justification of the Iraq intervention therefrom, and Iraq's progress with the OIF peace operations that were curtailed by Obama's deviation.
These references are already linked in the text of my comment to Brian, but they're worth highlighting here to help your appeal:
The OIF FAQ epilogue answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory" provides a model for effectually grounding your appeal;
The #unscr688 section of "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts" provides a compilation of humanitarian US law and policy on Iraq per UNSCR 688 to recall America's commitment to Iraq;
An irresponsible exit from Iraq provides sources and expository commentary on President Obama's course deviation with Iraq.
First and foremost, review the OIF FAQ base post to lay a proper foundation for understanding and representing the Iraq issue.
PREFACE: Michael Knights is a senior fellow of The Washington Institute. In his 05JAN20 Politico article, How Soleimani’s Killing Could Make a Stronger Iraq, Dr. Knights used the occasion of the killing of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Major General Qassem Soleimani to urge the American-led coalition and Iraqi government to recommit to rehabilitate the Iraqi nation-building project to, in effect, its 2008-2009 condition. Dr. Knights's e-mail in the exchange is omitted.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Michael Knights]
date: Jan 21, 2020, 5:31 PM
subject: Sanders vs Biden and "How Soleimani’s Killing Could Make a Stronger Iraq" (Politico)
Dr. Knights,
I agree with you that the killing of Qassem Soleimani should not be the limit of nor set the standard for American engagement with Iraq moving forward.
I agree with your advocacy of recommitting the US-led coalition and Iraqi government to rehabilitating the Iraqi nation-building project to, in effect, as described in your Politico article, its 2008-2009 condition.
On the American end, rehabilitating the Iraqi nation-building project to its 2008-2009 condition — which at that would only restore a constructive baseline — requires convincing American leadership and the American people to recommit to Iraq at an Operation Iraqi Freedom level. You are, in effect, calling for America to work back through the missteps and setbacks of this last decade-plus and restoring the Clinton dual-containment framework in its 2008 form, updated for the 2020 situation.
So, what will it take for America to move beyond the limitations of post-OIF anti-ISIS counterterrorism and restore a sufficient, OIF-level commitment to Iraq?
First things first. Senator Sanders and Vice President Biden's exchange on Iraq in last week's Democratic foreign policy debate amply demonstrates that the fundamental step needed for America to recommit to Iraq per your advocacy requires looking back and correcting the popular origin story — the basic justification — of the Iraq intervention. Operation Iraqi Freedom must be upheld in the politics: Only upon such assured footing can America resolutely move forward with Iraq per your advocacy.
My work on the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ is purpose-designed to clarify the Iraq issue and thereby lay the foundation needed to uphold the Iraq intervention in the politics. For example, see the OIF FAQ epilogue answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory".
PREFACE: Will Roberts is a Government Relations Associate at In Defense of Christians.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [James Diddams], info@indefenseofchristians.org
cc: [Marc LiVecche]
date: Mar 15, 2024, 7:43 AM
subject: Advice to Will Roberts for "The Road to Deterring Iran Goes Through Iraq"
To Will Roberts in care of Providence Magazine and In Defense of Christians,
I clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ by realigning the Iraq issue with its primary sources to correct the faulty premises and historical distortion from experts that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.
I am writing to you with advice in response to your 16FEB24 Providence article, The Road to Deterring Iran Goes Through Iraq. I also tweeted the advice in a short thread to @ProvMagazine and @indefchristians.
Actualizing your argument, "Only through robust American and international engagement can Iran’s malign influence over the Near East be countered, and that’s only possible with an American military presence in Iraq," first requires conducively reframing the policy discourse on Iraq with these operative premises:
- The American and British-led intervention with Iraq pursuant to UNSCR 678 has always been fundamentally justified and an essential corrective;
- By the same token, the actors who delegitimate and undermine the Iraq intervention have always depended on a false narrative;
- The US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement;
- President Obama's exit (preceded by Prime Minister Brown's exit) from Iraq was an inhumane and irresponsible course deviation that contravened the US-Iraq SFA and resulted in a still-compounding strategic blunder that needs to be corrected;
- A constructive model standard for the American military in Iraq based on what we know worked.
I emphasize to you, as I did with Brian and Frank Sobchak, that you must establish the foundational premise that, in essence, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair were right on Iraq in the first place, and President Obama and Prime Minister Brown were wrong to deviate from their predecessors on Iraq. As long as the policy discourse on Iraq is missing that premise, your advocacy is hamstrung and doomed to fail.
#festeringsaddamknowableprice
PREFACE: Brian Dunn reiterates his "Phase IX" advocacy for greater US engagement with Iraq that's sufficient to stand up Iraq as a strategic partner in the region. However, because Brian did not clarify why "We paid a higher price than I would like to win in Iraq" and why "the price we could have paid had we left Saddam or his spawn in charge is unknowable" (note, Brian meant 'unknowably high', not "unknowable"), he did not substantiate his basic hypothesis that OIF is a justified "noble sacrifice" that's worthy to "not throw...away by letting enemies--either Iran's mullahs or Sunni jihadis--win in Iraq". The problem is the unsubstantiated premise of Brian's argument assumptively defaults the public to the prevailing premise of the Iraq Syndrome, which enables the predominant 'lessons' of the Iraq Syndrome to keep sabotaging his "Phase IX" advocacy. Here I model dialectical material to fill the basic hole in Brian's argument.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Brian Dunn]
date: Sep 5, 2025, 5:36 PM
subject: I disagree "the price we could have paid had we left Saddam or his spawn in charge is unknowable"
Brian,
To open https://thedignifiedrant.blogspot.com/2025/08/america-should-stay-in-iraq.html, you say, "We paid a higher price than I would like to win in Iraq (although the price we could have paid had we left Saddam or his spawn in charge is unknowable)."
I disagree. The "price we could have paid had we left Saddam or his spawn in charge" is knowable, if not precisely predictable, in terms of Saddam's threat and peace operations with Iraq.
The reason that "price" is knowable coincides with a specious 'lesson' versus a constructive lesson of Iraq: The specious 'lesson' is unrealistic (and ahistorical) preemptive or prophylactic pre-war planning, which depends on abnormal perfect knowledge, versus the constructive lesson of normal competitive adjustment to usually imperfect knowledge and an enemy exploiting it, such as the COIN "surge".
In terms of the peace operations with Iraq, the initial post-war plan was state of the art for 2002. The problem is it was based on a conception of Iraq that was valid in the early 1990s and still prevalent leading into OIF, but we didn't know it was obsolete by 2003. The reason "We paid a higher price than I would like to win in Iraq" is that, as we now know, the conditions of Saddam's Iraq that particularly raised the "price"—the Saddam regime's world-leading terrorist capability and terrorist governance, which converted to the Saddamist insurgency, and radical sectarianism and overall human rights abuses corroding and corrupting Iraqi society, which the Saddamist insurgency exploited—had greatly festered since 1991 outside of our knowledge. (Notice the experts who to this day ignorantly assert the Saddam regime was secular, anti-terrorist, etc. in order to blame OIF for causing the insurgency and degraded condition of Iraqi society which were actually Saddamist products. The Iraq intervention was the needed cure for them, not the cause.)
The key to knowing the "price we could have paid had we left Saddam or his spawn in charge" is appreciation of the growing gap between the festering condition of Saddam's Iraq, which we found to be "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, 18MAR04) than we thought, and the post-war planning that was based on a prevalent conception of Iraq that we didn't know was obsolete. As with any festering problem, the "price we could have paid had we left Saddam or his spawn in charge" would not have shrunk by itself. The "price" gap would have continued growing outside of our knowledge as long as "we left Saddam or his spawn in charge".
Simply consider the fatal flaw in the initial post-war plan, i.e., the severe underestimation of Saddam's terrorism that constituted the insurgency that exploited the gap. The Iraqi Perspectives Project found that Saddam reacted to Operation Desert Storm by prioritizing terrorism for investment and strategy. Yet prior to OIF, counterterrorism officials weren't close to predicting the extent of Saddam's terrorism, which caused the coalition to be caught off guard by the Saddamist insurgency ambush and misdiagnose it. Apt excerpt from https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2025/03/review-of-council-on-foreign-relations-panel-lessons-from-history-series-the-us-invasion-of-iraq-twenty-years-later.html:
Professor Leffler is incorrect that "American policymakers seemed to think that Iraqis cared more about freedom and democracy than they cared about order, and stability, and security of their personal lives". It wasn't either/or. The theory of the initial post-war plan was that liberal pluralistic political reform would defuse sectarian flashpoints and spread civic ownership stakes in post-Saddam Iraq, and that would lay the foundation for a population-based order and stability that could do away with foreign peacekeepers sooner rather than later. Knowing what we know now, the fatal flaw in the theory is that it was designed to prevent an insurgency from materializing from the normal Iraqi populace, but it did nothing to counteract the ready insurgency that Saddam and his army of terrorists pre-assembled before the occupation.
A reason that the CPA and coalition forces struggled to achieve order, stability, and security is peacemaking efforts were focused on the normal Iraqi populace when the disorder, instability, and insecurity were being generated by the Saddamist insurgency, not the normal Iraqi populace. The relatively rapid success of the COIN "surge" and Sahwa "awakening" exposed the divide between the Saddamist insurgency and normal Iraqi populace. Yet even today, many experts erroneously assert that the insurgency was an organic reaction by normal Iraqis to negligent planning, incompetent occupation, or de-Baathification. In fact, the insurgency was a distinct campaign by Saddam and his army of terrorists that was organized before the occupation.
A reason that the CPA and coalition forces struggled to achieve order, stability, and security is peacemaking efforts were focused on the normal Iraqi populace when the disorder, instability, and insecurity were being generated by the Saddamist insurgency, not the normal Iraqi populace. The relatively rapid success of the COIN "surge" and Sahwa "awakening" exposed the divide between the Saddamist insurgency and normal Iraqi populace. Yet even today, many experts erroneously assert that the insurgency was an organic reaction by normal Iraqis to negligent planning, incompetent occupation, or de-Baathification. In fact, the insurgency was a distinct campaign by Saddam and his army of terrorists that was organized before the occupation.
As far as "the price we could have paid had we left Saddam or his spawn in charge" in terms of Saddam's threat as it was officially evaluated by the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441)—“Iraq's noncompliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 [and 688] constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region” (Public Law 102-190)—, we now know that Saddam's manifold threat was practically uncontained, underestimated, and growing.
The post-Operation Desert Fox ad hoc sanctions-based 'containment', the pre-OIF status quo, was not real: "From 1999 until he was deposed in April 2003, Saddam’s conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs steadily grew in scale, variety, and efficiency" (ISG). Before the Bush presidency, 9/11, the 2002 AUMF, and the Iraq Survey Group's confirmation that Saddam had defeated the sanctions, the 22MAR00 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing on Iraq shows Congress recognized with deep alarm that the sanctions-based 'containment' of Iraq wasn't real.
UN mandate as well as US law defined Saddam's threat as Iraq's noncompliance, "Recognizing the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security" (UNSCR 1441). Under the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), Iraq was obligated to prove Iraq's "peaceful intentions" (UNSCR 687) with the mandated compliance with the purpose-designed Gulf War ceasefire terms in order to rehabilitate the threatening intentions that Saddam established with the Gulf War. Instead, Iraq's noncompliance is confirmed across the board, and ISG confirmed "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions". So Saddam's Gulf War-established threatening intentions continue to stand.
A reconstituting WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687 is confirmed with a floor of covert ready terrorism-level capability and ready capacity to scale up. Although UNMOVIC, the Iraq Survey Group, and Operation Avarice found plenty of UNSCR 687 WMD violations, the evidence found in hand was just the scraps left behind by Iraq's systematic "denial and deception operations" (ISG), which carried on even after the invasion. Thus, we can't know the extent that Iraq retained and reconstituted Saddam's WMD above the floor due to the "unparalleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program and their other programs as well" (David Kay, 28JAN04). However, the "unparalleled" (Kay) degree of "sanitized" (ISG) evidence strongly suggests that at the point of Iraq's "final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" (UNSCR 1441), Saddam's WMD program was substantially vaster than we can know.
A substantially underestimated "regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations" (IPP) capability in violation of UNSCR 687 (and UNSCR 949) is confirmed. Saddam's greater terrorist threat included the growth of the al Qaeda threat as Saddam and bin Laden’s respective “terror cartel[s]” “increased the aggregate terror threat” by “seeking and developing supporters from the same demographic pool” (IPP). Yet, while IPP found plenty of UNSCR 687 terrorism violations and the Saddamist terrorist insurgency itself is a strong indicator, we can't know the extent of Saddam's terrorism since, per IPP, much of that evidence was "sanitized" (ISG) like the WMD evidence.
Substantially underestimated human rights abuses by the Saddam regime in violation of UNSCR 688 are confirmed, which were a codified threat per UNSCR 688 and the US law that enforced UNSCR 688. UNCHR and IPP found that the Saddam regime governed with terrorism in violation of UNSCRs 687 and 688, the forerunner roots of ISIS. The Saddam regime's consequent corrosion and corruption of Iraqi society raised the "price" of the OIF reconstruction and stabilization operations.
There were two ways to reduce the "price...to win in Iraq". The first way was the Saddam regime proving compliance with the UNSCR 660 series, Gulf War ceasefire terms pursuant to UNSCR 678, but again, "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" (ISG). The second way was an earlier Iraqi regime change in order to disallow or minimize the Saddam problem festering, either with Operation Desert Storm or as soon as Iraq demonstrated that Saddam would not comply with the Gulf War ceasefire terms.
As it happened, "We paid a higher price than I would like to win in Iraq" because the UNSCR 678 enforcers chose to hold out for Saddam's volitional compliance with "Our view, which is unshakable, is that Iraq must prove its peaceful intentions. It can only do that by complying with all of the Security Council resolutions to which it is subject" (Secretary of State Albright, 26MAR97) for 12 years, despite that continuously from the start, "the evidence is overwhelming that Saddam Hussein's intentions will never be peaceful" (Albright, ibid.). The 12-year procrastination by the UNSCR 678 enforcers allowed the Saddam problem to metastasize to what we found in 2003 Iraq and concomitantly raise the "price" of solving it.
We now know that "the price we could have paid had we left Saddam or his spawn in charge", both in terms of Saddam's threat and the peace operations, was growing as the codified threat of Iraq's Gulf War ceasefire violations continually worsened all the while we held out for the Saddam regime to prove the mandated compliance that was never coming. Apt excerpt from https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2025/03/review-linda-robinson-the-long-shadow-of-the-iraq-war-lessons-and-legacies-twenty-years-later.html:
Robinson:
Worrying about "the perfect storm that could ensue" when confronting a growing problem is a normal and useful exercise. But sooner or later, action towards solving that problem must happen. The solution needs to start somewhere. From there, setbacks and adjustments are normal. Otherwise, the problem will keep worsening, and what could have solved the problem yesterday won't be enough today and will be less adequate tomorrow. That's how an initial post-war plan that likely would have worked for an early-1990s, or even mid-1990s, Iraq proved insufficient in 2003. That's how the Powell Doctrine becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy.
As far as "the massive years-long reconstruction project that would be required to restore stability", that's not new for the American leader of the free world. There's a reason US forces have been stationed in Germany, Japan, and Korea since World War Two. The United States has understood that securing the long-term peace is necessary to win the short-term war, hence the Gulf War ceasefire.
The references at "perfect storm" and "years-long reconstruction project" help illustrate that the noncompliant-Saddam problem was growing worse. Concomitantly, the cost and difficulty of the "reconstruction project" with post-Saddam Iraq was growing as long as the noncompliant-Saddam problem was allowed to fester.
So while Ms. Robinson is correct that in 2003 the Iraqi regime change was costly and difficult, at the same time, nation-building post-Saddam Iraq was as cheap and easy as it ever was going to be moving forward. It would have been cheaper and easier in 1991 when the Powell Doctrine held back President HW Bush as the Iraqis who answered his call to revolt were slaughtered. Or in 1998 when Congress made Iraqi regime change the law to join the executive policy, but then ODF confirmed to Saddam that America was a paper tiger.
President HW Bush, President Clinton, and Congress all held up Iraqi regime change as the solution to the noncompliant-Saddam problem. Yet they kicked the can down the road as the problem festered until some successor was compelled to fix it. That successor turned out to be President Bush.
Senior regional experts warned of the perfect storm [PDF] that could ensue if Saddam were toppled, and of the massive years-long reconstruction project that would be required to restore stability.
Worrying about "the perfect storm that could ensue" when confronting a growing problem is a normal and useful exercise. But sooner or later, action towards solving that problem must happen. The solution needs to start somewhere. From there, setbacks and adjustments are normal. Otherwise, the problem will keep worsening, and what could have solved the problem yesterday won't be enough today and will be less adequate tomorrow. That's how an initial post-war plan that likely would have worked for an early-1990s, or even mid-1990s, Iraq proved insufficient in 2003. That's how the Powell Doctrine becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy.
As far as "the massive years-long reconstruction project that would be required to restore stability", that's not new for the American leader of the free world. There's a reason US forces have been stationed in Germany, Japan, and Korea since World War Two. The United States has understood that securing the long-term peace is necessary to win the short-term war, hence the Gulf War ceasefire.
The references at "perfect storm" and "years-long reconstruction project" help illustrate that the noncompliant-Saddam problem was growing worse. Concomitantly, the cost and difficulty of the "reconstruction project" with post-Saddam Iraq was growing as long as the noncompliant-Saddam problem was allowed to fester.
So while Ms. Robinson is correct that in 2003 the Iraqi regime change was costly and difficult, at the same time, nation-building post-Saddam Iraq was as cheap and easy as it ever was going to be moving forward. It would have been cheaper and easier in 1991 when the Powell Doctrine held back President HW Bush as the Iraqis who answered his call to revolt were slaughtered. Or in 1998 when Congress made Iraqi regime change the law to join the executive policy, but then ODF confirmed to Saddam that America was a paper tiger.
President HW Bush, President Clinton, and Congress all held up Iraqi regime change as the solution to the noncompliant-Saddam problem. Yet they kicked the can down the road as the problem festered until some successor was compelled to fix it. That successor turned out to be President Bush.
The "price we could have paid had we left Saddam or his spawn in charge" is knowable, if not precisely predictable.
