Documentary: Combat Support Hospital in Iraq 2003 and our post-war doctrinal flaws

Watch the moving 2004 NOVA documentary Life and Death in the War Zone about the 21st Combat Support Hospital, CSH or "cash", in OIF I:



The documentary is a snapshot of the Army's dedicated medical units in Iraq in 2003. Windows into the 2003 military that invaded Iraq, like this documentary, hit close to home. The Army that invaded Iraq in 2003 was still the same Army I left in 2001, down to the woodland BDUs, soft skinned HMMWV's, and sprinkling of old-style gray PTs.

The CSH and its personnel, as an operational unit, are as impressive as the military's post-war doctrinal flaws are glaring. Most poignant for me are the revealed flaws in the documentary of the military's post-war planning because I anticipated those flaws from my pre-9/11 service in Korea.

The poor bridge from the war to post-war in Iraq that was exploited so bloodily by insurgents and terrorists is usually blamed on poor planning by the Bush administration. In fact, the post-war flaws were a fundamental feature of 'Powell Doctrine'-era military planning. In the traumatized wake of the Vietnam War, the military viewed its mission as winning wars in terms of "major combat" only. The post-war phase was cast aside as someone else's responsibility. Essentially, the military doctrinally refused to do occupation and, as I learned in Korea, purposely planned for itself a very limited civil affairs role in the post major combat phase.

The war-focused mindset was ingrained in soldiers. When I was exposed to post-war plans in Korea, my initial reaction to "civil affairs" and "Phase IV" was typical of a GI: I saw myself as a combat support troop trained for war; the post-war was out of my lane. The concept of civil affairs was just strange. At the time, I even scoffed at the Civil Affairs branch as somehow unsoldierly — ironic given my present enthusiasm for civil affairs. As an MI troop, though, I was troubled by the lack of planning for the post-war and the fuzzy assumption that at the close of major combat, we would end-ex (end exercise), hand off occupation duties to an unknown transition force in an unknown manner, and go home. My Korea-born concerns about our post-war planning became realized in Iraq.

Add: For an outline of the initial post-war plan, see the White House Briefing on humanitarian reconstruction issues, 24FEB03: "provision for humanitarian support in Iraq in the event of any military action".

In fact, at that time, rather than a fully empowered and dedicated capacity, the Army civil affairs role was effectively limited to post-war assessment and transition coordination with other entities. As shown in the documentary, the limited role for civil affairs proved to be insufficient. The reality after major combat ended in Iraq was that, after regime change, US military forces proved to be the only effective system on the ground for the entire spectrum of societal functional needs, not just combat operations and national defense. Local Iraqi infrastructure, IOs, NGOs and other GOs proved to be woefully inadequate to provide for those needs in the immediate post-war. But the US military, as shown in the documentary, was stuck firmly in the 'Powell Doctrine' mindset that swore off occupation as anathema and deprioritized 'operations other than war'. In other words, in the 'golden hour' of the immediate post-war period where Iraq desperately needed an effective occupation, the only force in Iraq positioned and equipped to be an effective occupier — the US military — could not bring itself nor was it tasked to do what was needed to secure and build the peace. (That being said, to be fair, it's probable the nation-building infrastructure for the initial civilian-centered post-war plan would have caught up to the needs of the mission given more time with sufficient security. But the US-led coalition failed to "secure access" versus the terrorist insurgency, which precluded the adjustment period that the initial post-war plan needed to find its footing.)

The price of our immediate post-war failures has been high and we've learned the hard way that all soldiers are responsible for civil affairs in the post-war. The close of the documentary mentions that assisting local medical capacity eventually became a priority for the CSH. Since 2003, at great pain and cost, including lost opportunities, the US military has learned to leave behind the fundamentally flawed and destructive 'Powell Doctrine' and build an effective post-war occupation doctrine . . . I hope. I also hope it's not too late.

Green Zone – upsetting movie

Stylistically, the Green Zone movie is a lot like the Bourne movies. Okay as far as that goes. But I agree with Kyle Smith's NY Post review and Russ Douthat's NY Times commentary. I was angered by the movie's conspiratorial fill-in-the-blank fictions and contrarian views about the Iraq intervention. I'm frustrated that no matter how inaccurate or debateable, those fictions and views are asserted as settled truth by OIF opponents. Early on, I could still explain the justification for Operation Iraqi Freedom with people willing to listen and consider, but by now due to prolonged and heavy repetition, people refuse to even reconsider what for them has become axiomatic.

The core premise of Green Zone is the prevalent myth religiously asserted by OIF opponents that Saddam was falsely accused of WMD. In fact, Saddam's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire WMD mandates was established by UNSCOM, decided by the UN Security Council, confirmed by UNMOVIC to trigger the decision for OIF, and corroborated post hoc by the Iraq Survey Group.

Iraq's guilt of proscribed armament was established and presumed in the UNSCR 687 disarmament process. The burden was on Saddam's Iraq to prove it was disarmed and rehabilitated according to the standard set by the Gulf War ceasefire. The US-led UN burden under the Gulf War ceasefire was not to discover and prove; instead, it was to enforce and verify the mandated performance by the guilty party. Iraq should have satisfied its burden in 1991-1992, but Saddam's repeated noncompliance and added abuses meant the proof requirement was more stringently enforced. It's true the intelligence was uncertain by 2002-2003, but that was not due to a conspiracy like Green Zone contends. Rather, the quality of the intel was a consequence of the deteriorated disarmament-turned-containment and Iraq's "denial and deception operations" (Iraq Survey Group) in violation of UNSCR 687. Because Saddam's guilt of proscribed armament was established, any intel was rightly and necessarily viewed in an unfavorable light for Iraq.

In fact, the pre-war intelligence estimates were not an element of the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441). Contrary to Green Zone's core premise that the US went to war with Iraq based on unverified intel, the UNSCR 1441 inspections provided the verification of Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) that established casus belli. The intel didn't — and by procedure couldn't — trigger the invasion in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). The principal enforcement trigger for the Operation Iraqi Freedom ground campaign in 2003 was the same enforcement trigger for the Operation Desert Fox bombing campaign in 1998: the confirmation by the UN weapons inspectors that Iraq failed to prove "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations" (UNSCR 1441).

In other words, Green Zone's core premise is wrong — Saddam's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) is confirmed. According to the operative law, policy, and precedent, and determinative facts, President Bush's decision for OIF was correct.

Even more than the movie's fundamental mischaracterization of the casus belli for OIF, I was disappointed by Green Zone's displayed preference for tyranny over liberalism. For example, the movie contends that contra the humanitarian mandates of UNSCR 688 (1991) and Public Law 105-338 (1998) reiterated in Public Law 107-243 (2002) and the compliance and nation-building processes mandated by UNSCR 1483 (2003), we should have immediately turned Iraq over to the same actors who carried out the brutality of Saddam's regime and the terrorist insurgency. I wonder how badly the critical discussion about liberalization on the Arab street has been corrupted by the revisionist anti-OIF narrative and rejection of liberal strategy demonstrated by Green Zone. When I visited Egypt earlier this year, local newspapers parroted the most caustic Western anti-war rhetoric. I believe anti-OIF Westerners have caused great harm to the progressive liberal cause around the world. Green Zone will only cause more damage at a time when the emerging democratic Iraq should be an inspiration. The Iraq intervention should be upheld by the world's liberals, not discredited as a lie and conspiracy.

My comment at a movie review:

"... war as the first, best solution to the real but immensely complex problem of Iraq"

Not first at all. We invaded Iraq only after 12 years, across 3 US presidencies, of intensively attempted but failed alternate solutions to the worsening problem of Iraq — hardly war as a first resort. Regime change for Iraq became US policy under Clinton [correction: Iraqi regime change became US law under Clinton but became US policy under HW Bush], and became the next-up solution in 1998 after Clinton declared Saddam's Iraq had failed "its final chance" and bombed Iraq in Operation Desert Fox — without going to the UN for permission. Contrary to the movie's emphasis on the intel, intel wasn't even a requirement for Operation Iraqi Freedom because Saddam's Iraq's guilt was established and had only deepened with every act of noncompliance and abuse. So, the Green Zone got its premise fundamentally wrong: the intel — whatever its quality — did not trigger any invasion. Through much of 2002, President Bush even gave Saddam ample warning and he tried the UN process, ignoring Clinton's precedent of bypassing the UN. Despite the generous opportunity to finally comply and resolve the problem peacefully, Saddam instead opted to repeat his pattern of noncompliance. Therefore, the trigger for the invasion was not the intel, but the same trigger for Clinton's order to bomb Saddam's Iraq in Dec 98: Saddam's Iraq's failure to meet the standard of proof required to establish its innocence.

Blackwater contractors helped fight terrorists in Iraq

EXCERPT: "One former Blackwater guard recalled a meeting in Baghdad in 2004 in which Erik Prince addressed a group of Blackwater guards working with the C.I.A. At the meeting in an air hangar used by Blackwater, the guard said, Mr. Prince encouraged the Blackwater personnel “to do whatever it takes” to help the C.I.A. with the intensifying insurgency, the former guard recalled."

Blackwater contractors helped fight terrorists in Iraq. Good thing, right? To my dismay, this story is being reported as a scandal.

The situation in 2004-2006 Iraq was critical and worsening. The terrorists were escalating their campaign and trying their hardest to collapse the fragile, post-Saddam Iraq with massive death and destruction. Iraqi society was tearing apart and people were dying in the streets by the hundreds. With the insurgency in Iraq reaching its height, the highest imperative for our side was to do everything we could do in order to protect Iraq and the Iraqi people from the terrorists. The Blackwater contractors, already hired and on the ground, were at least as well prepared as their overwhelmed counterparts in the CIA and US military. As the NY Times article describes the Blackwater contractors, "many of them [were] former members of units of the Navy Seals or Army Delta Force".

Despite the exigent circumstances of 2004-2006 Iraq, Representative Rush D. Holt believes the use of Blackwater contractors was "a scandal" and "very troubling to a lot of people.”

I disagree with Representative Holt. Not using the best people who were available on the ground at that time under those circumstances in Iraq would have qualified as 'very troubling' and a 'scandal'. Those Blackwater contractors should be commended, instead of treated as criminals. They weren't hired to fight terrorists in Iraq, but in an emergency situation, the Blackwater contractors understood the importance of the mission and the dangers faced by their short-handed government comrades. They responded like soldiers and placed their lives in more danger by volunteering their abilities to help their comrades and serve the greater good for their nation and Iraq.

Blackwater helping to fight terrorists in 2004-2006 Iraq: right. Rep Holt: wrong.

Closer reading of Nobel speech: Obama redefined "just war" and justified Iraq intervention

Many columns and blog posts about President Obama's Nobel speech have mistaken this statement as his operating definition of "just war":

The concept of a "just war" emerged, suggesting that war is justified only when certain conditions were met: if it is waged as a last resort or in self-defense; if the force used is proportional; and if, whenever possible, civilians are spared from violence.

In fact, the President considers that definition obsolete and used it as a jumping-off reference point to redefine "just war" for the 9/11 generation to include American-led liberal military interventions:

And it will require us to think in new ways about the notions of just war and the imperatives of a just peace. . . . So yes, the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace.

Some pundits have also tried to find a rebuke of the Iraq intervention in the speech. However, in defining “just war” for the 9/11 generation, Obama actually raised all the justifications for the Iraq intervention, though conspicuously without citing Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The President’s message was plain: when non-military means fail to achieve the “imperatives of a just peace” — which is what happened for Saddam’s Iraq — then the “instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace”. Compare the justifications for military intervention against Saddam's Iraq in President Clinton's 16DEC98 speech and President Bush's 07OCT02 speech, Public Law 107-243 (the 2002 AUMF), and UN Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002) to President Obama's following criteria for "just" military intervention excerpted from his Nobel speech:

To begin with, I believe that all nations -- strong and weak alike -- must adhere to standards that govern the use of force. I -- like any head of state -- reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend my nation.
...
Likewise, the world recognized the need to confront Saddam Hussein when he invaded Kuwait -- a consensus that sent a clear message to all about the cost of aggression.
...
And this becomes particularly important when the purpose of military action extends beyond self-defense or the defense of one nation against an aggressor. More and more, we all confront difficult questions about how to prevent the slaughter of civilians by their own government, or to stop a civil war whose violence and suffering can engulf an entire region.
I believe that force can be justified on humanitarian grounds, as it was in the Balkans, or in other places that have been scarred by war. Inaction tears at our conscience and can lead to more costly intervention later. That's why all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace.
America's commitment to global security will never waver.
...
First, in dealing with those nations that break rules and laws, I believe that we must develop alternatives to violence that are tough enough to actually change behavior -- for if we want a lasting peace, then the words of the international community must mean something. Those regimes that break the rules must be held accountable. Sanctions must exact a real price. Intransigence must be met with increased pressure -- and such pressure exists only when the world stands together as one.
One urgent example is the effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons ...
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But it is also incumbent upon all of us to insist that nations like Iran and North Korea do not game the system. Those who claim to respect international law cannot avert their eyes when those laws are flouted. Those who care for their own security cannot ignore the danger of an arms race in the Middle East or East Asia. Those who seek peace cannot stand idly by as nations arm themselves for nuclear war.
The same principle applies to those who violate international laws by brutalizing their own people. When there is genocide in Darfur, systematic rape in Congo, repression in Burma -- there must be consequences. Yes, there will be engagement; yes, there will be diplomacy -- but there must be consequences when those things fail. And the closer we stand together, the less likely we will be faced with the choice between armed intervention and complicity in oppression.
...
For peace is not merely the absence of visible conflict.
...
It is undoubtedly true that development rarely takes root without security; it is also true that security does not exist where human beings do not have access to enough food, or clean water, or the medicine and shelter they need to survive. It does not exist where children can't aspire to a decent education or a job that supports a family. The absence of hope can rot a society from within.

"[S]top a civil war whose violence and suffering can engulf an entire region" and the last excerpted paragraph about "development rarely takes root without security" match our post-war efforts, most notably the COIN "Surge", to build the peace in Iraq after regime change — the jus post bellum of "just war" as distinct from jus ad bellum. I posted comments about Obama's speech and OIF on The Strategist blog (archived), which belongs to an anti-OIF poli sci guy from New Zealand.

Add: Compare President Obama's redefinition of "just war" with the law and policy, fact basis of Operation Iraqi Freedom, which I explain here.

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Also see Gripe: "expedience sake" and Comments on Obama inaugural address.

The Power of Diversity (2001)

PREFACE: I wrote this column for my school paper less than 2 months after the attacks of 9/11.

The Power of Diversity
by [Eric LC]
November 9, 2001, 12:00am

In our war against terrorism, diversity should be the greatest strength of the American people. Our country is not defined by any ethnicity or religion. We share a concept of country that embraces every person, no matter where he traces his family’s roots. Every language, every culture, every religion, every ethnicity, and every race of the world can be found in our American mosaic. To fight this war, our country should be able to draw upon an abundance of diverse human resources.

We have been raised, however, to think of our differences as a source of conflict. Politically correct culture has tried to downplay our differences when we should cherish our diversity and recognize that it makes us stronger people. Now that peacetime discourse has been replaced by wartime necessity, we have the opportunity to transform American diversity from a source of domestic conflict into a powerful weapon. The nation demands the unity of the American people in confronting our common enemy, but the diversity of the American people is the key to American victory.

Osama bin Laden, on his side, views our diversity as a weakness. Where President Bush has continually affirmed that the war on terrorism is not against Muslims, Osama bin Laden has defined the war along unmistakable ethnic and religious lines. His voice is louder than America’s voice in the Muslim world, and he has succeeded in winning the sympathy of many Muslims.

The United States has taken the lead in the war against Osama bin Laden’s terrorism, and we have the capability to defeat him. When isolated, the terrorists amount to no more than a radical fringe of particularly sophisticated bandits. But we cannot defeat terrorism if Osama bin Laden succeeds in polarizing Muslims against America. The war against terrorism is, in large part, a psychological war; therefore, winning the hearts and minds of the world’s Muslims is essential to the American war effort. Fortunately, within our diversity, we find a powerful weapon in the psychological fight: millions of Americans who are gifted with the right language, culture, and religion to appeal to the world’s Muslims on America’s behalf.

In building his terrorist organization, Osama bin Laden has proven to be an astute student of history and a master of propaganda. He appreciates the power of hate and has chosen the United States to be the scapegoat of his hate-driven campaign, much like the way Adolph Hitler once chose Europe’s Jews to focus his efforts. Terrorism represents a virulent form of destructive hate that is every bit as effective as Nazism in 1930s Germany. Like Hitler, Osama bin Laden has presented himself as an avenger of past wrongs, thus masking his murderous actions with pretences of a false victimization. Even as he defiles Islam, kills thousands of innocents, and foments a war that causes massive destruction among those he claims to represent, Osama bin Laden, by manipulating legitimate grievances, has successfully won the sympathy of many Muslims who would otherwise be in the best position to stop him. The unfortunate people who have chosen to support Osama bin Laden, such as the Taliban, are also victims of terrorism. In the unavoidable human cost of America’s battle against terrorism, the supporters of Osama bin Laden will pay the same penalty as the Nazi supporters in World War II.

Muslim Americans are in a unique position to aid the American war effort, both at home and abroad, while diminishing the overall casualties of the war. At home, many non-Muslim Americans lack an understanding of Islam and Islamic culture, which has allowed the fear generated by the terrorist attacks to have a deep impact on our country, particularly Muslim Americans. By engaging in the American war effort and educating non-Muslim Americans about their religion and culture, Muslim Americans can unify and strengthen the American people, while also negating the caustic fear that serves the terrorist enemy. As the face and voice of America abroad, Muslim Americans can effectively combat Osama bin Laden’s propaganda campaign in the Muslim world. By convincing the world’s Muslims to support America and not the terrorists, Muslim Americans can save many lives: those who do not support Osama bin Laden, after all, will not die on his behalf.

In our American diversity, we find our greatest advantage over the terrorists and our nation’s key to winning this war. All Americans share the same duty of service to our country. Muslim Americans, however, have a special opportunity to serve their country with a unique set of skills and abilities. With this war, Muslim Americans hold the power to change the course of American history, and in doing so, to join the annals of the greatest American heroes. Muslim Americans, in essence, have been given a rare chance to create a permanent niche in the hearts and minds of America.

Comments on Obama inaugural address

A post by Professor Nacos on her blog last month, Lebanon Election Outcome and Obama’s Public Diplomacy, reminded me of my responses to Professor Nacos' January post about President Obama's inauguration, The Promise of America's and Obama's Patchwork Heritage.

My comments sandwich a response by Professor Nacos:

The issue at stake is perception, not reality. Obama expressed the same message as Bush. If anything, Obama's expressions of Christianity, American primacy, and leadership with American ideals in his inaugural address were *more* aggressive than Bush, in effect out-Bushing Bush. There was quite a bit of 'either with us or against us' sentiment in it, just not as plainly spoken as his predecessor.

The Bush administration made a dedicated effort to make clear that the War on Terror is not a war on Islam. While the enemy has used an unambiguous radical religious construct to sell their war since before 9/11, and (continue to) commit atrocities and sabotage our peace-building efforts since 9/11, President Bush responded by promoting Islam as a peaceful religion that can co-exist with Western modernity. However, President Bush was an uncharismatic public spokesman in the face of media and self-serving politicians who undermined our war and peace-building missions.

In reality, the ideology underpinning our War on Terror has not been religious, but progressive liberalism, where Bush was the inheritor of Lincoln, Wilson, FDR, Truman and Kennedy (although one can argue that, while secular, the roots of progressive liberalism are Christian). Unless President Obama has been extremely duplicitious, he will continue Bush's progressive liberalism, which means the reality of how we conduct the war won't change. Nor will it calm our enemies and other leaders tangibly threatened by American primacy and the newest 'Washington agenda'. This is, after all, a competition with real stakes.

Potentially, perception will change due to the transfer of power from the uncharismatic Bush to the charismatic Obama. But will the media help Obama in the same places they undermined Bush? That remains to be seen. It also remains to be seen whether Obama, with or without media help, can make a difference in the regions where we are competing for the war and peace.

Maybe, if we Americans are truly deterministic agents, then in the bottom-line, it matters less what they think of the war; it only matters what we think of it. In that case, President Obama's value will not be changing the war itself or how it's perceived by our competitors, but changing how we collectively think of it.

Posted by: Eric January 24, 2009 at 09:44 AM

Ah, Eric. You and I must have listened to different speeches on inauguration day.
The "war on terrorism" a la ex-president Bush is over. One cannot fight a war against non-state actors, indeed, such a declaration alone elevates terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda to a level they do not deserve.
As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has repeatedly stated, military might will not defeat terrorism--what is needed is a mix of hard and soft power. Secretary of State Clinton called that recently smart power.

Posted by: Brigitte January 24, 2009 at 10:17 AM

Again, a perception problem. Those who believe the War on Terror is over with the change of administration have failed to grasp its continual evolution since 9/11. What Gates, Clinton and many others (including Bush) have said is perfectly compatible with Bush's, and now Obama's, evolving War on Terror.

We only have to read the on-going discussions about 4th or 5th generation warfare, based on events, to understand the notion of "war" as applied to the War on Terror is very different than the traditional state-vs-state (or 3rd generation) definition we grew up with. The traditional understanding of war doesn't fit the War on Terror, and therefore, has been a stumbling block for people who've persistently misunderstood this war.

The War on Terror is and has been full-spectrum, while peace-building is and has been a cornerstone of the war ... at the same time, war is and has been a cornerstone of the peace-building. I agree the war/peace should involve many more agencies than the military, but the military's dominant role has been less due to policy preference than reality. The State Department, for example, which is based upon government-2-government negotiation and nation-state dominance, has been ill-suited for the current war. (That said, the War on Terror has proven fluid in that regard, eg, State presence in Iraq, under Ambassador Crocker, has been restored to prominence concurrently with the increasing stability and reach of the Iraqi government. Using what we learned in Iraq, we can hope for similar progress by State with the Karzai government in Afghanistan.) As we've discussed before, until traditional soft power agencies are able to operate in failed state or even stateless non-permissive environments and adjust their capabilities to it, then by default, our military will be the main applied soft power *and* hard power agency. We shouldn't prefer a full-spectrum role for the military, and the military certainly does not, but that's been dictated by reality, not a dogmatic choice by the former President. Our alternative? We witnessed our alternative in Somalia and Rwanda.

The evolving War on Terror is anything but over, but perhaps, it has become unrecognizable to proponents of traditional war. If the war requires renaming for more people to understand its full-spectrum nature and the realities of the agencies involved, then maybe we should rename the War on Terror. I just don't know there is a better descriptive term for it. Until we invent a better term, I still prefer "war" just for the level of commitment implied by the term.

As far as Obama's inaugural address, the beauty of it is that it offered something for most everyone. And yes, in places, it out-Bushed Bush. Re-read Obama's speech then go back and re-read Bush's speeches. Then consider how much of the content is effectively the same. Consider these examples:

"Our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred."
-- Did critics once accuse Bush of a simplistic bipolar framing and lack of nuance in the War on Terror?

"But in the words of Scripture ... This is the source of our confidence -- the knowledge that God calls on us to shape an uncertain destiny."
-- !!! - as a non-religious American, I understand presidents routinely cite Christianity, notwithstanding ahistorical accusations of Bush, but Obama struck an eyebrow-raising fundamentalist, even evangelical, tone that I don't recall in the presidents of my lifetime.

"In reaffirming the greatness of our nation ... the risk-takers, the doers, the makers of things ... This is the journey we continue today. ... Those ideals still light the world"
-- Invocation of the vigorous, even expansionist, progressive liberalism that underpinned our westward expansion, post-Civil War Reconstruction, entry in the world wars (v Fascism), Cold War compare/contrast (v Communism), the pre-Bush accusation of the US as a meddling ideologue hyperpower, and the current War on Terror. Obama fairly well dispelled any doubt that he, even more than Bush, is a liberal idealist.

"... to all the other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where my father was born, know that America is a friend of each nation, and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity. And we are ready to lead once more."

"We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense. And for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken -- you cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you."

I can go on, Professor, but when I verge on quoting half or more of a speech, I may as well just refer you to the speech itself. Am I saying Obama is merely the logical continuation of Bush? In important ways, it appears that way so far; in other important ways, no, and I hope for the best in those areas, too. I agree with Obama that we do need to assess, innovate and re-invent ourselves so we can evolve for the 21st century, and not just rely on 20th century conventions. Under Bush, it appeared that the only significant areas of evolution were the military, our war/peace strategy, and possibly intelligence-gathering. It's up to Obama to build upon what Bush did right in those areas and be wary of the reactionaries who've opposed those changes, while also setting in motion changes in the important areas that Bush neglected to address.

I stand by what I said. The themes of Christianity, American primacy, and world leadership with American ideals in Obama's inaugural address out-Bushed Bush. I actually found it difficult to pull out a concise 'with us or against us' quote, because it was the basic premise of the foreign policy section of Obama's address. (It's a misperception that Bush preferred unilateralism, and we have hardly 'gone it alone' in any case; he was just unwilling to abandon the mission for want of sufficient multilateral consensus; even universal consensus, as we've learned to our frustration in Afghanistan, does not equate to sufficient multilateral commitment and investment.)

Obama's inaugural address was unreservedly liberal-hawkish. What stood out the most in the speech was that Obama was hardly circumspect about an aggressive transformative interventionist international role for America, what was called neo-conservative or liberal imperialism when pursued by the last administration. It appears President Obama, even more than his predecessor, desires that we change the world in our ideal image of ourselves. That's okay I guess, as long as folks, both the changers here and the changees abroad who were unwilling to change for ex-President Bush, are now willing to make the same change for a better American spokesman, the "patchwork" President Obama.

Posted by: Eric January 24, 2009 at 02:25 PM

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Also see Gripe: "expedience sake" and Closer reading of Nobel speech: Obama redefined "just war" and justified Iraq intervention.

Gripe: "expedience sake"

For a while, I've been peeved about something President Obama said in his inaugural address:

As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals. Our Founding Fathers -- (applause) -- our Founding Fathers, faced with perils that we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man -- a charter expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience sake. (Applause.)

The intelligence and security measures undertaken under President Clinton in the years leading up to 9/11 and then under President Bush in reaction to 9/11 were not due to "expedience sake". While it's proper to critically and continually review those measures, 'necessity's sake' would be the more appropriate characterization. As well, the choices can fairly be called a 'difficult balance', but they have not been "false". The new president's dismissive characterization of his predecessors' execution of their critical duties seems arrogant, naive about the threat, and dangerously disrespectful of the enemy. It's worrisome.

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Also see Comments on Obama inaugural address and Closer reading of Nobel speech: Obama redefined "just war" and justified Iraq intervention.

Comment on Israel-Hamas war

I left this comment on Professor Nacos' blog in response to Israeli-Palestinian Clash: Who is Winning the PR War?:

One of my favorite quotes about Operation Iraqi Freedom is relevant for Israel's current campaign:

"... war is undertaken at the risk of the national soul. The moral certainty that makes war possible is certain only to unleash moral havoc, and moral havoc becomes something the nation has to rise above. We can neither win a war nor save the national soul if all we seek is to remain unsullied—pristine. Anyway, we are well beyond that now. The question is not, and has never been, whether we can fight a war without perpetrating outrages of our own. The question is whether the rightness of the American cause is sufficient not only to justify war but to withstand war's inevitable outrages. The question is whether—if the cause is right—we are strong enough to make it remain right in the foggy moral battleground of war."
- Tom Junod

As we've learned - and needed to learn - in Iraq, for modern liberal Western nations, of which Israel is one, it's insufficient to defeat the enemy on the battlefield and declare victory. In modern liberal Western politics, and for the media that deliberately frames our politics, the perception (fair or not) of being the victimizer is politically debilitating and victims are granted political power. That's good and right in principle, but also exploitable by those who do not share our principles. Therefore, for the stronger side, when that side is a modern liberal Western nation, victory requires not only defeating the enemy, but establishing a tangible long-term better state in the defeated enemy's domain. The non-liberal 'weaker' enemy - whether Hamas or the Iraq insurgents - understands this as a vulnerability they do not share and the more they can promote suffering among the people, and use the media to blame their liberal enemy for the suffering, the stronger they are.

As President Bush's stubborness (which, hopefully, President-elect Obama will inherit) and the Petraeus-led counterinsurgency strategy also has taught us in Iraq, the modern-day guerilla strategy you discuss in this post can be defeated, but it requires more intimate engagement - not less - and a long and patient, intelligent, full-spectrum, and expensive commitment by the occupier to build the liberal peace. These peace-building efforts must endure even when the mission becomes protracted and ugly due to our own entering incompetencies and learning curve, the inevitable circumstances of change on this scale, and the sabotage of a ruthless calculating intelligent enemy. They must endure even when the mission becomes unpopular and misunderstood within the liberal societies of the occupier, and used cynically for political gain by competitive political entities within those societies.

How can Israel win this time? Move beyond 20th century thinking and learn from America's 21st century strategy in the War on Terror. Do more than win on the battlefield. Stay to work for liberal security. Israel must not be cowed by the media-driven protests within the modern liberal West that aid the non-liberal enemy and, therefore, perpetuate the suffering that empowers the enemy. Israel must first decisively defeat and disenfranchise the non-liberal enemy. Then, Israel must not settle for being a realist occupier for the sake of maintaining a security buffer for Israel proper; Israel must be a liberal occupier, as we've been in Iraq, and endure the costs in order to transform the region by building towards a modern liberal peace.

One can hope the media will choose to err on the side of the forces that work for long-term solution through liberal reform rather than continue to synchronize their efforts, deliberately or not, with the non-liberal enemy's open strategy of perpetuating a destructive status quo.

Glimpse inside President Bush's decision on the "Surge" or the real "3 am call"

To set the stage, first see 06OCT05 President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy and the 12JUL07 Press Conference by the President on the counterinsurgency "Surge".

Then, via the always excellent Small Wars Journal, see Troop ‘Surge’ Took Place Amid Doubt and Debate by NY Times reporter Michael Gordon. The article is a fascinating look inside the sharp debates, disagreements, and decision-making process that led to the present COIN strategy in Iraq.

In the same vein, also see Bush's Lonely Decision, the Wall Street Journal review of Bob Woodward's The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008. Excerpts from Woodward's book are serialized at the Washington Post: part 1, part 2, part 3. (h/t)

My biggest criticism of President Bush has been his reliance on delegating, which is not necessarily a poor leadership style, but in a war demanding evolutionary institutional changes, we've needed a President more like FDR who was more of a micro-manager. Excerpt from the Gordon article:

But Mr. Bush’s penchant to defer to commanders in the field and to a powerful defense secretary delayed the development of a new approach until conditions in Iraq, in the words of a November 2006 analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency, resembled anarchy and “civil war.”

I don't believe my criticism, albeit matching Michael Gordon's criticism, is right in this case, though. Primary benchmarks of the initial post-war plan were being met. Situation reports from commanders in Iraq were not providing a clear picture to the leadership in Washington of what was happening on the ground. Incremental adjustments that developed into the counterinsurgency "Surge" were being made under Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Until the need became obvious as Gordon points out, it was not obvious that a drastic change beyond the incremental adjustments was warranted. A timeframe of three years is reasonable in terms of allowing enough time to prove the success or failure of the initial post-war plan and drastically changing course with the COIN "Surge" when the initial post-war plan failed.

When the crisis point was reached, President Bush did take the necessary action. For the most part, Bush is made out in the Gordon article to be a competent, committed leader who made a tough choice from among a set of strongly held diverging 'expert' views.

President Bush is often maligned as a bumpkin whose strings are pulled by a neo-con cabal, a view reinforced by his less-than-stately public demeanor. And an argument can be made that Bush could, if not should, have made the call for the COIN "Surge" sooner had he been more of a micro-manager rather than a delegator.

However, the Gordon article and Woodward's book show President Bush chose a risky course of action under great pressure to do otherwise, with great deliberation, and so far at least, the course of action has been the correct one. In fact, the group that included GEN David Petraeus and advocated for the course of action that President Bush eventually chose — over the proposals of commanders in Iraq and top military and administration officials — does not seem like it was the most influential faction in the debate.

The Hillary Clinton presidential campaign featured an ad touting her as better qualified than Barack Obama to answer the "3 am call" and make a tough decision with far-reaching international implications. President Bush made his "3 am call" decision with the COIN "Surge".

How will Senator Obama or even Senator McCain fare when they face such an enormous decision without a clearly correct answer, when a decision must be made, when different factions are calling for radically different courses of action? Can either of them be as (eventually) decisive, committed to mission success, and deliberate as President Bush? As much as President Bush is degraded today by popular political culture, I would not be surprised if historians with access to now-classified records treat him much more kindly. Bush's decision for the counterinsurgency "Surge" is an exemplar of resolute principled American presidential leadership.

Add: George W. Bush is smarter than you and Bush ended financial crisis before Obama took office -- three important truths about 2008 by Bush senior economic advisor Keith Hennessey and Dubya and Me (backup) by Walt Harrington.

David Petraeus . . . my man

The always excellent Small Wars Journal posted a Times Online article, General David H Petraeus: The general's knowledge (archived), by Charles M Sennott, profiling General Petraeus, military commander of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

I already admired GEN Petraeus for the obvious reasons, but this quote from the article struck a chord:

“If we are going to fight future wars, they’re going to be very similar to Iraq,” he says, adding that this was why “we have to get it right in Iraq”.

I believe this deeply. With this quote alone, I feel as though GEN Petraeus represents me on the issue of Iraq better than any elected official. He gets it.

It seems obvious to me that our success or failure in Iraq will have far reaching implications. It will define and set the baseline. Operation Iraqi Freedom, as much as anything else, is a critical evolutionary learning curve for us in 4th Generation Warfare. Before OIF, even before 9/11, when I was a MI soldier, I realized we would have to confront our deeply entrenched phobias about guerilla war, moreso as it has evolved with globalization. I didn't invent the notion: over 40 years ago, President Kennedy announced that learning counterinsurgency was the American priority for the 20th Century. Unfortunately, we were hurt badly by the Vietnam War, which proved his point. Our defeat simultaneously provided a blueprint to the world for defeating us and made us phobic about engaging guerilla warfare. We are now struggling to catch up, evolutionarily speaking, in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I'm reading John Robb's Brave New War at the moment and Robb has only further reinforced my view that our Iraq mission has long-term consequences. Add: Along the same theme of the need to be ready to compete with other forms of martial competition, see Science of Resistance by Paul Tompkins and Robert R. Leonhard.