Professor Grygiel didn't respond to my e-mail, so I don't know whether he's read it.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Jakub Grygiel], [Civitas Institute]
date: May 22, 2026, 5:27 PM
subject: Response to Jakub Grygiel's sobering "The Iran War and the Coming Global Struggle" (Civitas Outlook, 23APR26)
To Jakub Grygiel and the Civitas Institute,
I clarify and relitigate the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ using the law and facts that define the Iraq issue.
I am writing to you to respond to the main policy point and secondary strategic point in Professor Grygiel's sobering 23APR26 Civitas Outlook article, The Iran War and the Coming Global Struggle.
Grygiel:
It is telling that many critics of the current war, especially in Europe and Asia, complain that the U.S. has become a force of chaos, rather than order. They assess this as a negative development for themselves and suggest it for the U.S. But such criticism misses the shift in the American security calculus because it views current events through the prism of unchallenged American global supremacy. Then, Washington could afford to provide order benefiting all in the hopeful expectation of a growing harmonization of interests among all powers. This has not happened. China is not a friend, Russia has not become a democracy, and Iran is not a contained and satisfied power — all the while the U.S. was providing global order, especially on the seas. To continue to provide order that benefits our rivals is not merely naive; it is outright damaging to U.S. interests. It should not be surprising, therefore, that Washington is willing to endure unprecedented instability in the Persian Gulf: the costs to us are smaller than those to others. The idea of a U.S.-led global order as a central tenet of American foreign policy, treating stability everywhere as equally valuable, is a thing of the past.
Regarding Professor Grygiel's main policy point, the basic reason for the paradigm shift from the post-Cold War 'Pax Americana' rules-based order is that the UNSCR 678 enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates was the baseline paradigm for "Washington could afford to provide order benefiting all in the hopeful expectation of a growing harmonization of interests among all powers". Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #americanprimacy section:
The Gulf War ceasefire terms were purpose-designed to resolve Saddam's manifold threat established with the Gulf War. The scope of the ceasefire terms meant that enforcing Iraq's mandated compliance resonated beyond the 4 corners of the Saddam problem or even the Iraq intervention itself. In 1991, at the dawn of the post-Cold War, the Gulf War ceasefire was invested with all the essential international norms, including strict aggression, disarmament, human rights, and terrorism-related mandates, and vital enforcement principles that were required to reify the aspirational "rules" of the post-Cold War world order.
Due to the historical context, threats and interests at stake, comprehensive spectrum of the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), model enforcement procedure, and US-led UN-based structure, the UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement was tantamount to the flagship and litmus test of the US-led post-Cold War liberal international order.
Due to the historical context, threats and interests at stake, comprehensive spectrum of the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), model enforcement procedure, and US-led UN-based structure, the UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement was tantamount to the flagship and litmus test of the US-led post-Cold War liberal international order.
Therefore, the basic cause of "The idea a U.S.-led global order as a central tenet of American foreign policy, treating stability everywhere as equally valuable, is a thing of the past" is the stigmatization of Operation Iraqi Freedom which ultimately enforced the Gulf War ceasefire mandates pursuant to UNSCR 678—in other words, the Iraq Syndrome. Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #americanprimacy section:
Stigmatizing right normalizes wrong in general. Stigmatizing an epochal paradigmatic right like the Iraq intervention fundamentally reshapes American culture, politics, policy, and leadership with metastatic premise. Clarifying and relitigating the Iraq issue means more than the 4 corners of the Saddam problem, President Bush's legacy, and Operation Iraqi Freedom itself. Since the 1990-2011 UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement and peace operations with Iraq activated all the elements of American leadership essential to compete for the dominance of pluralistic liberal world order in the geopolitical arena, the current prevailing revisionist narrative stigmatizing the Iraq intervention lays the foundation and sets the frame for a paradigm shift antithetical to American leadership of the free world.
The pivotal change that set the stage for "Russia’s war in Ukraine, China’s economic growth turning into military power, and Iran’s regional expansion fueled by nuclear ambitions" was President Obama's choice to make the Iraq Syndrome a guiding principle of American foreign policy. The reification of the Iraq Syndrome as an operative premise in American foreign policy started with President Obama's radical deviation with Iraq in contravention of President Eisenhower's cardinal precedent and the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement. The course change was further cemented by President Obama's 'lead from behind' approach to the Arab Spring, particularly with Syria, that undid the Bush Freedom Agenda and appeasement of Iran that undid the Clinton Iran-Iraq dual-containment framework. Even the Afghanistan "surge" was mortally undermined by the limits that President Obama imposed in accordance with the Iraq Syndrome. President Obama's promotion of the Iraq Syndrome from propaganda to guiding principle resulted in the retraction of American leadership of the free world and the power vacuum into which America's competitors advanced to inimically fill.
Notwithstanding their surface differences, President Biden and President Trump's continued obedience to the Iraq Syndrome has furthered the paradigm shift begun by President Obama.
For proponents of restoring "a U.S.-led global order as a central tenet of American foreign policy", the basic corrective step is curing the Iraq Syndrome at the premise level of our politics and policy, which begins by clarifying the Iraq issue and relitigating the prevailing yet demonstrably false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome. For example, excerpt from The apt UN-based international law solution for Iran is the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent addressing the international law aspect of the paradigm shift:
Today however, the Iraq Syndrome, e.g., the self-neutering "forever war" talking point that now predominates among both Republicans and Democrats, has stigmatized the Gulf War ceasefire formula and Saddam precedent with a prevailing yet demonstrably false narrative propagated by Saddam's accomplices in France, Russia, and China, which has effectively stripped the international rules-based order of the apt international law solution for the Iran problem. Disabling the Gulf War ceasefire formula has devolved that area to the pre-Gulf War Noriega precedent, which effectively restores the Noriega precedent as the principal way to deal with rogue actors that break the rules and pose a national security threat other than war. Consequently, President Trump has applied the Noriega precedent to the Venezuela and Iran problems.
. . .
The bottom-line need to restore the Gulf War ceasefire formula and Saddam precedent to solve rogue actors that break the rules and pose a national security threat other than war remains true. Therefore, the constructive response to anyone who criticizes the international law character of the the American and Israeli military action versus Iran is that if they are sincere in their concern, then it is incumbent on them to eradicate the Iraq Syndrome, uphold the Saddam precedent by clarifying the actual justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom, which in fact solved the festering Saddam problem pursuant to UNSCR 678 as purpose-designed, and restore the Gulf War ceasefire formula as the operative United Nations-based international law solution for threats other than war posed by rules-breaking rogue actors.
Anything short of making the public understand that President Bush and Prime Minister Blair properly upheld United Nations-based international law on behalf of the international rules-based order by enforcing the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) with Operation Iraqi Freedom pursuant to UNSCR 678 is tantamount to an implied admission that President Trump is justified—indeed, compelled—to apply the pre-Gulf War Noriega precedent to the Iran problem.
. . .
The bottom-line need to restore the Gulf War ceasefire formula and Saddam precedent to solve rogue actors that break the rules and pose a national security threat other than war remains true. Therefore, the constructive response to anyone who criticizes the international law character of the the American and Israeli military action versus Iran is that if they are sincere in their concern, then it is incumbent on them to eradicate the Iraq Syndrome, uphold the Saddam precedent by clarifying the actual justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom, which in fact solved the festering Saddam problem pursuant to UNSCR 678 as purpose-designed, and restore the Gulf War ceasefire formula as the operative United Nations-based international law solution for threats other than war posed by rules-breaking rogue actors.
Anything short of making the public understand that President Bush and Prime Minister Blair properly upheld United Nations-based international law on behalf of the international rules-based order by enforcing the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) with Operation Iraqi Freedom pursuant to UNSCR 678 is tantamount to an implied admission that President Trump is justified—indeed, compelled—to apply the pre-Gulf War Noriega precedent to the Iran problem.
Regarding Professor Grygiel's secondary strategic point, it has become more and more apparent that Operation Epic Fury is Operation Desert Fox redux.
Recalling Operation Desert Fox in terms of "The military operations against Iran are simply an attempt to eliminate, or at least to minimize for some time, the threat of the radical and potentially nuclear-armed regime in Tehran", Operation Epic Fury's purpose to "eliminate, or at least to minimize...the threat" is problematic because, like ODF for Iraq, we cannot go into Iran to conduct a reliable battle damage assessment. It is striking that the Trump administration's characterization of OEF's BDA for Iran is virtually the same as the Clinton administration's characterization of ODF's BDA for Iraq at the time. Yet later, Clinton officials admitted that they did not, and could not, know ODF's actual impact on Saddam's Iraq.
Notably, the Iraq Survey Group, which conducted the post-war investigation of Saddam's WMD, says little about ODF's impact on Iraq. Where ISG does evaluate the American military damage to Iraq's WMD capabilities prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the damage is from Operation Desert Storm because we (or technically, the UNSCR 687 inspections) were able to conduct a BDA in Iraq after ODS. ISG's implication is that ODF was not effective versus Saddam's Iraq. The fear is that OEF is similarly ineffective versus Iran. Of course, by the time of ODF's aerial bombing in December 1998, Iraq had applied eight years of intensive lessons on how to keep away the important stuff from American aerial targeting. Hopefully, unlike Saddam's Iraq, Iran's important stuff was caught unprepared and vulnerable to OEF's aerial bombing.
Recalling Operation Desert Fox in terms of "The radical regime in Tehran may survive as a diminished power...It may also collapse under the strain of the war and domestic pressures...Or it may turn into an unstable rump polity", we know that President Clinton's choice to self-consciously limit ODF to aerial bombing emboldened Saddam by demonstrating to him and other rogue actors the limit of US military enforcement. Saddam evaluated ODF as confirmation that the US was a paper tiger, which guided Saddam's heightened noncompliance from 1998 to 2003, which caused Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Iraqi regime change in 2003. The self-conscious limits on OEF appear to be affecting Iran's evaluation of US military enforcement in a similar way.
Saddam's direct reaction to Operation Desert Fox was nullifying the Gulf War ceasefire mandates in Iraqi law, accelerating the breakdown of the international sanctions and 'containment' in concert with Saddam's international accomplices (e.g., the Iraq Survey Group found "The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council"), and pushing up the reconstruction of Iraq's WMD program.
Operation Desert Fox did nothing at all to set back Saddam's terrorist threat, which preconfigured the Saddamist insurgency against post-Saddam Iraq. The Iraqi Perspectives Project, which conducted the post-war investigation of Saddam's terrorism, found the Saddamist terrorist threat was substantially deeper than the pre-war intelligence assessment. While ODF did not seek to decapitate Saddam's Iraq like OEF did to Iran, like OEF, ODF did target security infrastructure. However, like OEF, ODF was insufficient to boost internal opposition to an internal regime change due to missing the necessary ground element like the armed opposition on the ground that effectuated the regime change for President Obama's aerial bombing of Libya.
Hopefully, the strategic results of Operation Epic Fury turn out better than they were for Operation Desert Fox, but so far, OEF is looking markedly similar to its predecessor.
The gold standard for President Trump and Congress to work together constructively on the Iran problem is the close collaboration by Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush and Congress on Iraq. But that requires the President to first purge the Iraq Syndrome and its 'forever' or 'endless war' talking point. So far, however, rather than clarify the Iraq issue and relitigate the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative, the President has sought to work around Congress. We can only hope that President Trump's distinctive approach to the Iran problem while handicapped by the Iraq Syndrome will produce better results than the harmful results from President Obama's work on the Syria and Iran problems while handicapped by the Iraq Syndrome.
I invite your critical feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
Related: The apt UN-based international law solution for Iran is the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent, The apt Iraq comparison for the Iran intervention is the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, not Desert Storm, The Forward Party should reconceive the Iran issue with the premise that we were right on Iraq, which is the truth, and The Constitutional rule of law for war was skirted by President Clinton, reinforced by President Bush, and degraded by President Obama.
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