Sunday, February 22, 2015

New York Times writer posits "Thank you for your service" is offensive to veterans. I disagree.

Byron Wong at bigWOWO asks:
Hey [Eric LC],

I just saw this:

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/sunday-review/please-dont-thank-me-for-my-service.html?emc=edit_th_20150222&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=29649347

I'd be interested in your opinion. Could you blog about it? (I usually don't request this, but I think lots of people might also be interested.) All considered, I think the vets are right about those who don't serve--it's what you're supposedly supposed to say, without any kind of thought.
Byron,

Sure.

I was a soldier and, thus, I will always be a veteran. I have advocated for veterans in the civilian-military context. I have been thanked for my military service, so I have some insight on the topic. That being said, I qualify my reactions to Matt Richtel's article with I am not a 9/11-generation war veteran and even if I were, veterans are opinionated individuals with diverse takes on being thanked for their military service.

Reactions:

_Mr. Richtel's article would have been better rounded had he teamed with a thoughtful veteran, preferably a contemporary 9/11-generation war veteran, as a co-author.

Nonetheless, the perfect is the enemy of the good. I encourage people like Mr. Richtel to explore, however imperfectly, veterans issues from the civilian side of the civilian-military divide. His article implies that veterans prefer a social firewall to shut off acknowledgement and conversation from civilians who are not members of the American military fraternity and lack the basic framework to understand it. Perhaps some veterans feel like that. Not all do. I don't believe most veterans feel like that. I take a different tack. In college, creating a vital civilian-military cultural interface was a foundational reason for starting MilVets. Bridging the civilian-military divide has carried forward as a core element of MilVets' mission on campus and, for years, the group has been almost entirely 9/11-generation war veterans.

_The response from Tim O'Brien, author of The Things They Carried, highlights a key point that I feel strongly about, too: the politics of war matter to veterans.

We know when we volunteer that selfless service and sacrifice, potentially of our lives, are part of the deal. They're core elements of American military heritage. By oath, we trust up front that our nation's leaders will invest our lives in worthy causes. That doesn't mean, however, soldiers don't care about the politics of war. Of course they care; they live the wars and stake their lives in them. It mattered to me why my fellow American soldiers and I should potentially die defending Koreans from Koreans. The same question has been asked about the wisdom of Americans dying to defend Vietnamese from Vietnamese, Somalis from Somalis, Slavs from Slavs, Iraqis from Iraqis, Afghanis from Afghanis, and possibly someday, (Taiwanese) Chinese from (mainland) Chinese. The question really is one of fundamental premise: should America be a 'leader of the free world' at all that stakes the lives of America's sons and daughters for the sake of other peoples across distant shores.

Other than outliers like Ehren Watada, the politics of war take a backseat for soldiers while they're engrossed with the tasks, conditions, and standards of the mission at hand, and keeping their men, their buddies, and themselves sound. But the why and the outcome of the war matter very much to veterans when they reflect on their experiences, contextualize them in narrative form, and weigh the consequences for their own lives, their families, their comrades, their country, the people over there, and the world.

What categorically separates 'good' wars from 'bad' wars is the prevailing narrative of the why and outcome. While the wars viewed as honorable in the zeitgeist are just as harsh in their ground and personal effects as the wars viewed as dishonorable, the prevailing narrative sets the contextual frame that colors the social value of a veteran's military service. For that reason, it's critical for the sake of Iraq veterans to correct the political distortions of the law and policy, fact basis or justification — the why — of Operation Iraqi Freedom, more so since the long-term outcome of their mission has been thrown off track. Setting the record straight in the zeitgeist is most important for the young children of our KIA in Iraq who will only ever know their father or mother through the prism of the cultural legacy of the Iraq War.

_How have I personally felt when I've been thanked for my military service? A bit awkward.

The conventional responses to "Thank you", such as "No problem" or "You're welcome", don't squarely fit because overseas military service, generally speaking, is a national security action in the global context for the sake of the collective us. National security (i.e., national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests of the United States) is not the same thing as homeland security. Overseas military service is not a direct conveyance from American soldier to American (civilian) citizen, unlike say, a Coast Guard sailor or National Guard soldier who directly engages fellow Americans while serving on a search-and-rescue, peacekeeping, or disaster relief mission in the homeland. The good of my service in a national security mission in Korea to my fellow Americans was collective, indirect, and largely abstract.

As such, I would advise veterans who feel cynical like Hunter Garth to not interpret the statement, "Thank you for your service", from the viewpoint of their personal relationship with the thanker. Instead, they ought to adopt a more social view that a citizen on behalf of the nation is expressing civic appreciation to a soldier or veteran as a representative of the military's greater contribution to the collective us as the American nation.

The same civic concept underlies the "any soldier" letters from American schoolchildren that are distributed randomly to soldiers serving overseas. As a 20-something soldier in Korea, I felt awkward and vaguely objectified receiving a handwritten letter from a 4th grader in Ohio thanking me, too. The letter wasn't to me, though. It was to an American soldier serving over there and I was an American soldier serving over there.

I've summarized the abstract social value of military service and the civic appreciation thereof thus:
It truly is selfless service – a lot of love and pride goes into soldiering. It doesn’t matter why someone joins or where he came from, or how much he enjoys (or suffers) his duties. It doesn’t matter who’s making the tough decisions in the White House. Soldiers are part of a heritage that is older, deeper and more essential than the republic for which they sacrifice. Soldiers are of the people. They are the primal embodiment of the social contract we make with each other to be a civilization.

Now, and in all times, our soldiers, marines, sailors and airmen deserve the American people’s gratitude and understanding.
The summary follows from the way I counseled the new soldiers assigned to my care: You're a professional soldier of the United States Army now. Never forget that on your chest, you are telling the world at all times what you represent — your country, your Army, your family.

In my opinion, when a veteran is being thanked for his service by someone who has not served, likely will never serve, and doesn't know what it's like, the proffer of gratitude is not attuned to the veteran's individual service experience. But the expression is not meaningless. The veteran is being thanked by a fellow countryman less for his own sake than as an affirmation of something essential the veteran is part of that is bigger, deeper, and older than himself, that in fact is deeper and older than the American nation. He should accept it as a civic cultural ritual and not reject it as an unintended affront. The thank-you is not personal. It's for "any soldier" and the veteran represents "any soldier" who has served bearing his country, his Army, his family name over his heart.

Perhaps formulating a ritualistic response for veteran thankees would help alleviate the awkwardness of being thanked for our service. I suggest responding with "It was an honor", which deflects the individual aspect and focuses the exchange, instead, on the timeless collective aspect of military service.

Post-script:

To expand a bit on my post, "Thank you for your service" is viewed properly as a civic cultural ritual rather than a unique transaction between individuals. As with any ritual, though, "Thank you for your service" functions only when the meaning and context of the ritual are mutually understood and the underlying ethic is shared by its participants. As ritual, the key pieces currently missing are, one, a common cultural understanding of "Thank you for your service" as an affirmation of a fundamental social value rather than a comment on an individual experience and, two, a formulaic ritual response by the veteran thankee. I suggest the response, "It was an honor", to focus on the timeless collective aspect instead of the particular individual aspect of the veteran's military service.

As analogy, the ritual of the Eucharist is not a quick, thoughtless, throwaway substitute for the spectrum of Catholicism. Rather, the brief ritual is an entry point for the larger clockwork of believing and practicing the faith. "Thank you for your service", properly understood and practiced, should function similarly within a larger clockwork of (secular) civilian-military relations. When the context of the ritual of the Eucharist is subtracted, then the Communion bread becomes just a piece of wheat bread. Ritual context should be added to "Thank you for your service".

Thursday, February 12, 2015

Quick reaction to the proposed AUMF against ISIS

See Letter from the President -- Authorization for the Use of United States Armed Forces in connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, 11FEB15.

As previously discussed, the President already possesses the legal authority needed to conduct the anti-ISIS counter-terrorism campaign, which is not the same as a nation-v-nation war, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom. The President's counter-terrorism authority is rooted in Article II of the Constitution, not statutory authority, which has been affirmed by Congress since the Clinton administration. The proposed AUMF is for policy and political reasons, not for legal authority, although it may be legally useful for an anti-ISIS action on territory where the local nation opposes the action.

Of note, the proposed AUMF would repeal the 2002 AUMF, Public Law 107-243.

Repealing the 2002 AUMF would have limited impact from the standpoint of the mandate to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq" (P.L. 107-243) since it was oriented on the threat posed by Iraq when Iraq meant the noncompliant Saddam regime. There was closure on the 2002 AUMF in that respect since the threat posed by Saddam's regime has been resolved: The UN Security Council determined in 2010 that Iraq was largely in compliance with UNSCR 660-series mandates.

At the same time, repealing the 2002 AUMF would have limited impact from the standpoint of the mandate to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (P.L. 107-243) since its authority to enforce Iraq's compliance with UNSC resolutions is redundant.

If the 2002 AUMF is repealed, the 1991 AUMF (Public Law 102-1) and sections 1095 and 1096 of Public Law 102-190 (1991) are still in effect. As far as I know, the UN authorization that P.L. 102-1 is predicated on, UNSCR 678 (1990), remains active, which means the US continues to be authorized "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 678).

After the regime change of 2003, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338), which mandated the post-war peace operations, moved to the forefront, and since the end of 2008, the US-Iraq relationship has been guided by the 2008-2011 Status of Forces Agreement and the overarching guidelines of the long-term Strategic Framework Agreement. Notice that President Obama did not propose an end-date for the SFA nor whatever SOFA he adopted with Iraq in 2014. Iraq-specific Public Law 102-1, sections 1095 and 1096 of Public Law 102-190, Public Law 105-235 (1998), and Public Law 105-338, counter-terrorism statutes Public Law 104-132 (1996) and Public Law 107-40 (2001), and of course, Article II of the Constitution have not been repealed, either.

Keep in mind the UNSCR 660-series mandates are not lifted. With or without Saddam, Iraq remains obligated to keep compliant with "resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 678), which continue to be enforced under US law. The UNSCRs for Iraq contain the overarching mandate to "restore international peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 678) and an argument can be proffered that UNSCR 2170 (2014) activated the authority of the 1991 and 2002 AUMFs. Also note the counter-terrorism character in P.L. 107-243 and the standing counter-terrorism international mandate in UNSCR 1373 (2001).

There will be no repeat of Operation Iraqi Freedom because this time, the US is working with Iraq as an ally, not resolving a threat by Iraq as an enemy with noncompliant Saddam. President Obama's depiction of the mission for US forces in the anti-ISIS campaign seems similar to the mission envisioned had a residual US force stayed in 2011 to assist Iraqi forces. It's like Obama is taking a mulligan on the error of prematurely removing US peace-operation forces from Iraq. Of course, Iraq's condition now is very different than it was before Obama disengaged from Iraq. What would have been sufficient from a residual US force to protect Iraq then is likely no longer sufficient now.

Add: Legal analysis of the proposed AUMF at National Review and Lawfare blog. A balanced look at the conflicted nature of the proposed AUMF.

Add: S.J.Res.21 – Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against the Government of Syria to Respond to Use of Chemical Weapons, 06SEP13. Lawfare coverage.

Add: S.J.Res.10 – To repeal the authorizations for use of military force against Iraq, and for other purposes, 03MAR21. The obvious effect of the resolution would be removal of the standing Congressional authorization for the President to enforce UN resolutions on Iraq. Notably, the preamble of the resolution includes the implicit recognization that the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement is sufficient bilateral basis for the US forces deployed to Iraq contrary to President Obama's excuse for ending the OIF peace operations that Iraqi parliamentary approval was necessary.

Wednesday, February 11, 2015

An appeal to indict the Saddam regime for genocide (1997)

Note: The below text is copied from here. I post it with the qualifications that there seems to be no web presence for the "Kurdish Organisation for Human Rights – UK" nor have I found an official citation of this appeal in searchable United Nations on-line records. Nonetheless, whether or not it was a formally entered appeal with the UN, the content is a useful reference.

Also see Saddam Hussein Trial, Law Library of Congress, 03JUL07, Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988, US Senate, 09SEP88, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds, Human Rights Watch, July 1993, Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and Its Aftermath, Human Rights Watch, June 1992, and The Great Terror by Jeffrey Goldberg, The New Yorker, 25MAR02.



An Appeal to Indict the Iraqi Regime for Crimes of Genocide

AN APPEAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS TO INDICT THE HIGHER ECHELONS OF THE IRAQI REGIME FOR CRIMES OF GENOCIDE COMMITTED AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF IRAQI-KURDISTAN

His Excellency Mr. Kofi Annan, secretary-general of the United Nations, New York.

Members of the Security Council:
Ambassador Juan Somavia (Chile)
Ambassador Qin Huasun (China)
Ambassador Fernando Berrocal Soto (Costa Rica)
Ambassador Dr Nabil A. Elaraby (Egypt)
Ambassador Alain Dejammet (France)
Ambassador Alfredo Lopes Cabral (Guinea-Bissau)
Ambassador Hishashi Owada (Japan)
Ambassador Njuguna M. Maahugu (Kenya)
Ambassador Dr. Z. Bigniew M. Wlosowicz (Poland)
Ambassador Pedro Catarino (Portugal)
Ambassador Park Soo Gil (Republic of Korea)
Ambassador Sergey V. lavrov (Russia)
Ambassador Peter Osvaald (Sweden)
Ambassador Sir John Weston (United Kingdom)
Ambassador Bill Richardson (USA)


The Iraqi regime has perpetrated many crimes against the people of Iraqi Kurdistan, most of them are considered as crimes of genocide as defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9th December, 1948 which was approved by Iraq on 20th January, 1959. Some examples of the criminal acts committed by the Iraqi regime against the Kurdish people during the last three decades are the destruction of the Kurdish villages and the policy of ethnic cleansing, by the mass deportation of the Kurds and the settlement of Arab tribes in their place, public execution, mass murder, internment, the confiscation of property, torture, rape, large-scale disappearances, the systematic humiliation and demoralisation of individuals and groups of people and the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population.

This programme of destruction has been condemned by the international organisations concerned with human rights and especially those which have conducted research into the documents found in the Security Service and Intelligence departments in Kurdistan, after the uprising of March 1991. Several tons of these documents are in the library of the U.S. Congress in Washington.

The Security Council has already condemned the inhuman politics of the Iraqi regime in its Resolution No. 688 of 5th April 1991. The General Assembly of the U.N. has also passed many resolutions concerning the situation of human rights in Iraq, in particular Resolution No. 46/134, of 17th December 1991, Resolution No. 47/145 of 18th December 1992, Resolution No. 48/144 of 20th December 1993 and Resolution No. 49/203 of 23rd December 1994.

The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has also passed resolutions concerning the situation of human rights in Iraq:

1. E/CN. 1991/74, 6th March 1991.
2. E/CN. 1992/71, 5th March 1992.
3. E/CN. 1993/74. 10th March 1993.
4. E/CN. 4/1994/74, 9th March 1994.
5. E/CN. 4/1997/60, 9th March 1997.

The Sub-Commission for the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities also passed the following resolutions on the situation of human rights in Iraq:

1. E/CN. 4/1994/2, E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1993/520, 20th August 1994.
2. E/CN. 4/1995/2, E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1994/56, 25th August 1994.

Max van der Stoel, the special reporter for the Commission on Human Rights of the U.N. has submitted many reports which also condemn the Iraqi regime:

1. E/CN. 4/1992/31, 18th February 1992.
2. E/CN. 4/1993/45. 15th February 1993.
3. E/CN. 4/1994/58, 25th February 1994.
4. E/CN. 4/1995/56, 15th February 1995.
5. E/CN. 4/1997/57, 18th February 1997.

We can give here some examples of the criminal acts committed by the Iraqi regime which constitute genocide according to the international conventions:

A. The destruction of thousands of villages and small cities and the murder of their inhabitants.

The Iraqi regime began the destruction of the villages close to the Iranian border at the beginning of 1975, and followed this with the destruction of the villages near the Turkish border, and then those on the plains of Kurdistan which are far from the international border. The inhabitants of these villages and small towns were forced into concentration camps situated near the large cities or main roads. They were built especially for them and lacked even the barest necessities and facilities for basic living. These concentration camps were similar to those built by the Nazis during the Second World War which were administered by the Secret Services.

Those rural areas of Iraqi Kurdistan which were destroyed, represented more than 80% of the Kurdish agricultural land which supplied most of Iraq with food. The area was converted into a military zone "prohibited for security reasons". This operation was at its height during the years of the Anfal campaign. "Anfal" was the code-name given to the regime's policy of eliminating the Kurds and it was carried out in three stages during 1987 and 1988. The legal framework for the Anfal campaign was established in a decree, signed by Saddam Hussein, dated March 29th, 1987, in the name of the Revolutionary Command Council, which is the highest legislative and executive authority in Iraq and is composed of all the most powerful figures of the regime. This decree gave, to Ali Hassan Al-Majid, the cousin of the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, absolute power over all civilian, military and security institutions and the authority to use chemical weapons. The aim of the Anfal campaign was to force the inhabitants of most Kurdish villages in the Governorates of Kirkuk, Sulaimania, Arbil, Duhok and the Kurdish districts in the Governorate of Mosul and Dyala to leave their villages and surrender themselves to the military or Secret Service. Orders were given to clear the area completely. To this end, any person encountered by the forces was to be immediately executed and any who surrendered were to be handed over to the Security Services. Some of the villagers managed to escape to the borders, but most were obliged to surrender. They were later taken to the desert in the south of Iraq where they were killed by machine-gun and buried alive. The number killed in the three Anfal operations is put at 182,000 Kurds. In May 1991, when asked by a Kurdish delegate to the peace negations in Baghdad, Ali Hassan Al-Majid nervously said, " it couldn't have been more than 100,000"!

These Anfal operations and other previous operations from the mid- 1970s resulted in the destruction of 3,839 Kurdish villages, including many Assyrian christian villages. There were, in these destroyed villages, 1757 primary schools and 2457 mosques, many old monasteries and churches and 271 clinics. 219,828 Kurdish and Assyrian families were deported and, in rural Kurdish society, a "family" would include at least five people. The magnitude of this destruction clearly demonstrates the intention of the Iraqi regime to destroy totally the Kurdish entity.

(B) The policy of ethnic cleansing by the Arabization of some regions of Kurdistan.

The Iraqi regime began its policy of ethnic cleansing in the Governorate of Kirkuk when the Ba'athist regime came to power in February 1963. This policy began in the Kirkuk region because of its oil fields and rich farm lands. It became the policy of each succeeding government and has been extended to include the region of Kanakeen (in Dyala Governorate) and Makhmur (in Arbil Governorate) and the Kurdish districts (in Mosul Governorate). It was carried out in a two-fold process, each stage complementing the other.

In the first phase of this process the Kurds were forced to move out of these areas. The second phase was accomplished by bringing thousands of Arab families from central and southern Iraq and settling them in these areas. They were provided with housing and were employed in various installations or in the repressive government machine, such as the military, the intelligence, the security service, the Ba'ath party organisation and the "Popular Army", etc..

Here are some examples of the policy as implemented in the Kirkuk Governorate:

1. The destruction of 13 Kurdish villages near the city of Kirkuk in mid-1963, in particular those near the oil fields.

2. The expulsion of all the Kurds living in 34 Kurdish villages which were under the jurisdiction of the sub-district of Dubz — now Arabized to Al-Dibiss — and the resettling of those villages with Arab tribes.

3. Changing the name of the Kirkuk Governorate to the Arabic "Al- T'ameem" (meaning nationalisation), with the aim of obliterating the name it had held throughout a thousand years of history. At the same time the regime changed the names of the Kurdish quarters, streets and schools to Arabic names and forced the owners of commercial establishments to change the names to Arabic.

4. Between 1970 and 1990, 732 Kurdish villages with their 493 schools, 598 mosques and 40 clinics were destroyed in this Governorate. 37,726 Kurdish families were deported.

5. The city and the surrounding area was converted into a large military camp and fortification. Its historic castle was turned into a military fort.

6. A major step in the process of the Arabization of Kirkuk was the settling of tens of thousands of Arab families, in successive waves, with guaranteed housing and jobs. Parallel to this, the regime announced the grant of a monetary gift or bonus to any Kurd who would leave Kirkuk, in addition to securing housing for him in southern or central Iraq. During this time more than ten new quarters were built in the city for "new Arab settlers". Many new quarters with Arab names were built for these new settlers.

7. All low-ranking civil servants, including Kurdish elementary and secondary school teachers, as well as workers in various government departments and in the oil company facilities, were transferred to areas outside the Kirkuk Governorate and replaced with Arab civil servants and workers.

8. The Kurds were forbidden to sell their homes and properties except to Arabs and were prevented from buying homes and property under any circumstances. The city administration refused to grant any "building permit" or "permit to renovate" to Kurds even if their homes were badly in need of renovation, in order to force them to sell their homes or to abandon them and move out of the city. From the early eighties, this policy was applied to the Turkman minority also.

9. Four out of the seven districts of the Governorate of Kirkuk were detached from it and attached to the neighbouring Governorates, in order to make the Kurds a minority in the Kirkuk Governorate.

Today, tens of thousands of Kurdish families from Kirkuk live in tents and camps in the region controlled by the Kurds in extremely harsh conditions, resulting in the deaths of many, especially among the children and the elderly. For the most part, they depend for their survival on assistance from relief organisations and international aid.

This same policy of deportation continues to this day. In May and June 1997, more than 3000 Kurds were deported from the city of Kirkuk and its environs in preparation for a government census in October 1997. The names of most of these people are in our possession.

In other parts of Iraqi Kurdistan still under the control of the Iraqi regime, the same policy was enforced. Kurds in all these areas were forced to register themselves as Arabs, under the threat of expulsion from these areas if they failed to do so by the time of the Census.

The expelled Kurds wish to return to their homelands in their cities and villages under the protection of the United Nations.

C- The deportation of tens of thousands of Kurdish Shi'ite families to Iran.

In 1971 the regime designated many groups, mainly Shi'ite Kurds living in Baghdad and other cities in central Iraq, as Iranian and deported them to Iran. This operation increased during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980 to 1988. All their personal belongings were confiscated, including their Iraqi nationality papers and passports. Most of these people and many of their parents and grandparents were born in Iraq before the creation of the state of Iraq in 1921. Many of them had completed their national service in Iraq. According to figures supplied by the Red Cross, they numbered about 400,000. They were deported in a most inhuman way. Taken by the Security Services to the Iranian border, they were forced to walk many miles in the cold weather, without food, during the war between Iraq and Iran. Their journey took several days and some were killed in the crossfire between the warring factions or by land- mines. In addition to children and old people there were, among them, pregnant women and physically and mentally disabled people.

The Iraqi authorities incarcerated more than 4,000 young people from among these deportees and, to this day, their families have no knowledge of their whereabouts as the Iraqi authorities did not give their names to the Red Cross or to any other organisation. Their families desperately wish to know what has happened to their children.

Some of these deportees now live in Europe and elsewhere as refugees, but most remain in Iran, living in abject poverty and considered neither as refugees in Iran nor as Iranian but as "Iraqi"! These people also wish to return to the land of their birth and to be compensated for their loss.

D. The use of chemical weapons on the Kurdish city of Halabja.

On 17th March, 1988, the city of Halabja, originally with a population of 70,000, was bombarded with cyanide, mustard gas and nerve gas by Iraqi military aircraft. The result was the death of more than 5000 civilians, mostly women, children and the elderly. About 10,000 more were injured and the bombardment devastated the entire area. No life remained. This was the first time in history that a government had used chemical weapons against its own civilian citizens.

In reality, the city of Halabja was not the only place on which chemical weapons were used by the Iraqi regime. Before this incident, many beautiful Kurdish villages in the sub-district of Aghjalar in Kirkuk Governorate, in the sub-district of Karadagh in Sulaimania Governorate, the valley of Balissan in Arbil Governorate and other villages in Duhok Governorate were also attacked. But the attack on a large city such as Halabja, under the direct orders of Saddam Hussein and without condemnation by the international community, encouraged the further use of chemical weapons in the mid-1990s against the marsh Arabs of southern Iraq.

In this criminal way the regime continued to kill hundreds of Kurdish Peshmerga (fighters), on many occasions when there was a general amnesty in force and they had surrendered their weapons. Hundreds of other young Kurds were tortured to death or killed after appearing before a formal tribunal. Some of them were children under fifteen years of age. After the uprising of March 1991, many mass graves were discovered near the cities of Arbil and Sulaimania where the corpses of whole family groups, including children, were found.

We consider these crimes to be genocide, committed deliberately by the Iraqi regime throughout three decades, in an attempt to eliminate more than four million Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan.

It was not only the Kurds who suffered at the hands of the regime. A great many Iraqis were subjected to a campaign of torture and mass execution, especially following the uprising of March 1991 in the Shi'ite cities and marshes of southern Iraq. During the Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988, chemical weapons were used extensively against Iranian military targets, and Iranian cities were regularly bombarded with artillery, aircraft and ballistic missiles not aimed at specific military targets. Later, on August 2, 1990, the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait in direct violation of Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter. The regime's obvious intention was the destruction of the sovereignty of the Kuwaiti state.

The perpetrators of all these crimes must be punished by the international community as were those of Nazi Germany, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, etc..

We appeal to the Security Council to create an international tribunal, or to extend the competence of the existing War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague, to bring the "higher echelons" of the Iraqi regime to justice.

1. The National Union of Teachers in Kurdistan.
2. The Farmworkers Union of Kurdistan.
3. The Artists Union of Kurdistan.
4. The Photographers Union of Kurdistan.
5. The Union of Agricultural Workers of Kurdistan.
6. The General Workers Union of Kurdistan.
7. The Engineering Union of Kurdistan.
8. The Association of the Clergy in Kurdistan.
9. The Association of Lawyers in Kurdistan.
10. The Association of Economists in Kurdistan.
11. The Association of Technical Engineers.
12. The Students' Union of Kurdistan.
13. The Association of Sociologists in Kurdistan.
14. The Association of War Veterans.
15. The Association of Cultural Workers.
16. The Organisation for Child Welfare in Kurdistan.
17. The Organisation for Graduates in Law in Kurdistan.
18. The Union of Veterinary Surgeons.
19. The Union of Doctors of Medicine.
20. The Union of Chemists and Pharmacists.
21. The Centre for the Care and Protection of Orphans.
22. The Christian Centre of Kurdistan.
23. The Association of Retired Workers.
24. The Union of Geologists.
25. The Union of Nurses and Ancillary Staff.
26. The Civil Service Union.
27. The Union of Working Women.
28. The Union of `Women Social Democrats in Kurdistan.
29. The Women's' Union of Kurdistan.
30. The Kurdistan Islamic Sisters Union.
31. The Salah Hawramy's Cultural Centre in Kurdistan.
32. The Democratic Youth Union in Kurdistan.
33. The Kurdistan Socialist Democracy Student and Youth Union.
34. The Union of Students of Zahmatkeshan of Kurdistan.
35. The Union of Women of Zahmatkeshan of Kurdistan.
36. The Social and Cultural Association of the Governorate of Kirkuk.
37. Ezidi's Centre Abroad.
38. The Labour Party for Independent Kurdistan – European Section.
39. The Kurdish Human Rights Organisation – Sweden.
40. SKKMR – Sweden.
41. The Islamic Union of Kurdistan – British Section.
42. The Kurdish Information Centre – London.
43. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights`– New York.
44. The Kurdish Organisation for Human Rights – U.K.


Kurdish Organisation for Human Rights – UK
London, September 18, 1997



Related: #unscr688 section of "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts".

Sunday, July 27, 2014

Moral dilemma, Lone Survivor, Torture Report

Comment about the possible declassification of a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report on the use of torture in the War on Terror:

It’s a moral dilemma to be sure.

Last week, I watched the movie, Lone Survivor. It’s based on the account by former Navy SEAL Marcus Luttrell whose team, along with a Chinook crew and whole squad of SF operators, were killed in action.

Nineteen of the US military’s best men died because PO Luttrell’s commanding officer, LT Michael Murphy, decided to release 3 prisoners – 1 old man and 2 boys – rather than kill them outright or bind them, which the SEALs believed would likely result in their deaths (animal predators, weather).

LT Murphy made his decision in accordance with his morality, the rules of engagement, and laws of war. He also made this decision expecting that his erstwhile prisoners would inform the nearby Taliban forces of his SEAL team. These particular Taliban were known to be responsible for, and thus capable of, killing US Marines, which is a hard thing to do.

Nineteen of America’s best men, many of whom were husbands and fathers of young children, were killed because LT Murphy made an all-American moral decision, the kind we teach our soldiers to make with their dedicated ethical training from the earliest stage of their military indoctrination.

His only reprieve is that he didn’t survive long enough to see his close comrades in the rescue squad, whom he had called to save his team with his last act in life, also die as a result of his moral decision to spare the lives of the old man and 2 boys who would kill him and his men.

LT Murphy honored the highest traditions and values of the US military and was awarded the Medal of Honor, posthumously.

The moral dilemma of “enhanced interrogation” does not rise to killing old men and young boys who accidently stumble on a secret op. It’s usually not even torture by the standard of our enemy in the War on Terror.

But the other side of the moral dilemma of “enhanced interrogation” is even heavier than the life-or-death choice that faced LT Murphy and killed him.

Rather than LT Murphy’s own life, the lives of the three men in his command, and even the doomed rescue team he didn’t live to see, our interrogators are tasked with preventing the killing of 10s, 100s, 1000s, maybe even 10000s or more – depending on the kind of weapon the terrorists can obtain from terrorist supporters like Saddam – civilians, not just soldiers. Interrogators are charged with protecting the homeland itself.

When the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, I was disgusted, as was every other Army veteran I knew. But my reaction was tempered by the appreciation that the terrorists were assassinating and mass-murdering 10s and 100s of Iraqis at a time, almost every day, along with humanitarian aid workers and the coalition soldiers defending Iraq. Our interrogators at Abu Ghraib were wrong … but they were wrong while trying desperately to save American, coalition, aid workers, and most of all, Iraqi lives by stopping an enemy who was – and is – zealously committed to achieving social dominance through unrestrained terror-style murder and real torture.

Our morality – Michael Murphy’s morality – demands our judgement that certain acts are wrong and intolerable. Had I been in command, I’m certain I would have made the suicidal [and fratricidal] decision that LT Murphy made. I also would have penalized the interrogators and MPs at Abu Ghraib.

But know that that our morality, while we are competing with this enemy, comes with a very, very high price. At least consider the price when you judge.



Related: My first impression of the Abu Ghraib scandal and CIA Saved Lives.

Wednesday, June 11, 2014

The Fall of Mosul and legal authority for anti-ISIS strikes

The Wall Street Journal reports The Fall of Mosul.

I am angry, but there isn't more I can add to what I said to express my anger in January when Fallujah fell to the terrorists invading Iraq from the Syrian civil war:
The feared consequence of the Obama administration's contravening the Strategic Framework Agreement (2008) by disengaging from US-Iraqi affairs at a critical stage of Iraq's post-Surge development, abandonment of President Bush's Freedom Agenda, weakness in the Arab Spring, appeasement of Iran, and bungling of the SOFA negotiation causing our irresponsible exit from Iraq is becoming real. ...

[Read the rest of Infuriating.]
Columbia University subject matter experts from the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies explain ISIS. ISIS did not form as a direct consequence of Operation Iraqi Freedom. ISIS formed in the Syrian civil war which is part of the disintegration of the Arab Spring that started after President Bush left office. For the ISIS crisis, the decision for OIF is less relevant than President Obama's feckless approach to the Syrian civil war, the Arab Spring, and Iraq.

The terrorists did not start the Syrian civil war. The Syrian civil war started with the Assad regime's violent reprisals against the peaceful protests by moderate reformers in 2011. In fact, the Assad regime, with the backing of Russia and Iran, is responsible for much vaster harm than ISIS. The Assad regime and its allies appear to be using ISIS as leverage to neutralize the moderate opposition to the Assad regime.

The terrorists, which included the defeated remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq that reconstituted with ISIS, are opportunistic predators who have exploited the conflict. Terrorists routinely exploit conflicts and in the fecund conditions provided by the Syrian civil war, it's probable that absent AQI, other al Qaeda-related factions jockeying for dominance in the fecund conditions of the Syrian civil war — including AQI's pre-OIF elements under different banner in different configuration — would have developed like ISIS. In fact, AQI was not "created" by OIF. AQI came from pre-OIF al Qaeda elements and their pre-OIF allies from Saddam's regime who were supported by the Assad regime against OIF. Saddam's regime was not a secular bulwark, as it is often erroneously represented by OIF opponents. Saddam's terrorism included jihadists, including affiliates of al Qaeda, and he had undertaken the sectarian radicalization of Iraqi society since the Iran-Iraq War. The Saddam regime's terroristic rule in violation of UNSCR 688 was why the de-Ba'athication was considered necessary, per UNSCR 1483 and Public Law 105-338, by the Coalition Provisional Authority. (CPA senior advisers provide clarification on the de-Ba'athification here. Learn more about the CPA perspective here.)

Blaming OIF for current events in the Middle East relies on the fallacy of attenuated causation. When President Bush left office, the Arab Spring hadn't happened yet, while Iraq was stabilized, compliant, and progressing following the counterinsurgency "Surge" and Anbar Awakening. Operation Iraqi Freedom was not the disease. Until President Obama disengaged the peace operations, Operation Iraqi Freedom was working as the cure.

To wit, in May 2011 at the dawn of the Arab Spring, President Obama marked the historic opportunity for peace in the Middle East where Iraq's "promise of a multiethnic, multisectarian democracy ... is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress":
Indeed, one of the broader lessons to be drawn from this period is that sectarian divides need not lead to conflict. In Iraq, we see the promise of a multiethnic, multisectarian democracy. The Iraqi people have rejected the perils of political violence in favor of a democratic process, even as they’ve taken full responsibility for their own security. Of course, like all new democracies, they will face setbacks. But Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress. And as they do, we will be proud to stand with them as a steadfast partner.
President Obama inherited Iraq from President Bush as a firming strategic victory and keystone strategic partner growing at peace. To wit, statement on the US Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq website:
The Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Iraq (PDF version full text - 647 KB) guides our overall political, economic, cultural, and security ties with Iraq. This agreement is designed to help the Iraqi people stand on their own and reinforce Iraqi sovereignty, while protecting U.S. interests in the Middle East. The SFA normalizes the U.S.-Iraqi relationship with strong economic, diplomatic, cultural, and security cooperation and serves as the foundation for a long-term bilateral relationship based on mutual goals.
...
After a long and difficult conflict, we now have the opportunity to see Iraq emerge as a strategic partner in a tumultuous region. A sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq that can act as a force for moderation is profoundly in the national security interests of the United States and will ensure that Iraq can realize its full potential as a democratic society. Our civilian-led presence is helping us strengthen the strong strategic partnership that has developed up to this point.
The Iraq praised by President Obama and the US Embassy in Baghdad as an emerging "strategic partner" was the post-Saddam Iraq that had been developing with US intervention. But it required staying the course with Iraq and the Bush Freedom Agenda. In his benchmark May 2011 address, President Obama pledged US support for the Arab Spring. Middle East activists took the US president's pledge to heart to risk their lives, but Obama subsequently proudly reneged.

The proximate causes of the subsequent crisis in Iraq are, one, the construction of ISIS in Syria in the degeneration of the Arab Spring that combined with, two, the Iran encroachment upon the US-abandoned vulnerability of Iraq. Both conditions arose from post-Bush events that are related to fundamental errors made by President Obama, such as the 'lead from behind' approach to the Arab Spring, appeasement of Iran, and contravening the Strategic Framework Agreement with premature disengagement from Iraq, that sharply deviated from President Bush's course.

Iraq should have continued to progress with the careful aid of American leadership as a "strategic partner in a tumultuous region ... that can act as a force for moderation ... profoundly in the national security interests of the United States". Instead, what is happening to Iraq now is because Obama made the historic error of disengaging prematurely and leaving Iraq unprotected surrounded by danger instead of staying the course like President Eisenhower stayed the course with Korea. The necessary condition for securing and building the peace is security. Obama took away Iraq's security. Obama's foreign policy has created insecurity.

Related: Thoughts on the Syria dilemma.


The issue of the President's legal authority to deploy the military to Iraq under current circumstances, absent a new statutory authority, presents interesting legal questions.

President Clinton deployed the military to Iraq throughout his presidency with the statutory authority of P.L. 102-1 (1991). President Bush deployed the military to Iraq with the redundant statutory authority of P.L. 102-1 and P.L. 107-243 (2002). Because a "specific statutory authorization" is equivalent to a declaration of war under the War Powers Act, within the constitutional scope, there is no domestic legal controversy over the US military mission with Iraq from 1991 to 2011.

The failure to negotiate a new Status of Forces Agreement with Iraq that was effective past 2011 was cited as the main reason for the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. [Update: It's reported the US and Iraq agreed to a SOFA by executive agreement in June 2014, but I can't find an official announcement and text for it on-line. It seems to be a simple diplomatic assurance housed in the standing legal base of the Strategic Framework Agreement that was signed concurrently with the 2008-2011 SOFA.] However, did the departure of US forces from Iraq in 2011 coincide with an actual severing of all the relevant, or at least plausible, statutory authorities for deploying the military to Iraq? Or was some legal authority retained, perhaps applicable in the event of an emergency such as the current crisis, despite the physical removal of US forces from Iraq in 2011? I don't know; I hadn't thought about the post-OIF legality of deploying the military to Iraq without a new statutory authorization.

Note that the United States has a Strategic Framework Agreement with Iraq, which provides the overarching long-term conditions-based guidelines for the US-Iraq relationship. See the State Department press release, US Iraqi embassy statement, and a PDF of the agreement. Also see this CRS legal summary and CFR legal summary.

Add: September 2014 CRS review of the legal grounds for current military action against ISIS.

* The first question is whether Iraq-specific P.L. 102-1 and/or P.L. 107-243 are still live. Since they authorized the President to enforce the UNSC resolutions relevant to Iraq, a related question is whether the UNSC resolutions related to the security of Iraq are still live. For example, UNSC Res 1511 (2003) "authorizes a multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq". Update: The answer is that the 17NOV08 Status of Forces agreement between the US and Iraq terminatedsuperseded the authority of the older UNSC resolutions. [Update: On 2nd look, it doesn't appear that UNSCR 678 (1990) was terminated.] That means P.L. 102-1 is deadonly demoted law, since its authorization specified enforcement of UNSCR 678. However, I haven't come across that P.L. 102-1 and P.L. 107-243 have been repealed, so if the UNSC passes a new resolution for Iraq, the President should be authorized to enforce it under P.L. 107-243. Update2: UNSCR 2170 (15AUG14) appears to re-activate the P.L. 107-243 authorization to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq [and] ... acting pursuant to this joint resolution is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorist and terrorist organizations". Also note the standing counter-terrorism international mandate in UNSCR 1373 (28SEP01). At the same time, as corrected above, it appears P.L. 102-1 and UNSCR 678 remain active authority "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 678). In addition, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-338), which mandated the post-war peace operations, sections 1095 and 1096 of P.L. 102-190 (1991) that augmented P.L. 102-1, and P.L. 105-235 (1998) remain active Iraq-specific law.

* The second question is whether P.L. 107-40 (2001) or other counter-terror law cover the situation in Iraq "in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism" (P.L. 107-40), especially if a plausible 'organizational' link can be drawn between ISIS and al Qaeda. Furthermore, the standing policy since the Clinton administration has been "the President has authority under the Constitution [Article II] to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States" (P.L. 107-40). Congress has affirmed that the President's counter-terrorism authority derives directly from Article II of the Constitution rather than Congressional statutory authorization. The unsettled question, which was debated for OIF, has been the specific character of a threat that opens such authority. If President Obama can make the case that ISIS "threaten[s] the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States," this seems the most likely route for Obama to take military action without seeking additional authority from Congress. Update: The President's counter-terror authority is the strongest legal basis for countering ISIS as long as the counter-terrorism neither targets nor is opposed by the sovereign nations, Syria and Iraq. The State Department has designated ISIS as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). UNSCR 2170 states, "ISIL is a splinter group of Al-Qaida", which activates the specific statutory authorization of P.L. 107-40 (2001) on top of the stated premise of P.L. 107-40 that the President holds inherent counter-terror authority under Article II of the Constitution. UNSCR 2170 also appears to re-activate the specific statutory authorization of P.L. 107-243. In addition to P.L. 107-40 and P.L. 107-243, see section 324 of P.L. 104-132 (1996), which states, "the President should use all necessary means, including covert action and military force, to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy international infrastructure used by international terrorists, including overseas terrorist training facilities and safe havens", Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39 (1995), and Clinton's practical precedent for overseas military counter-terror action. War directed against a sovereign nation-state actor, such as the Taliban or Saddam, is a different issue than counter-terrorism directed against a non-state actor such as al Qaeda or ISIS in a foreign territory.

The third question is whether the US has an operative Congressionally approved multi- or bilateral security agreement (treaty) that covers Iraq. For example, President Clinton cited to the NATO treaty when he skipped Congress for the Balkans intervention. As far as I know, we only have the Strategic Framework Agreement with Iraq, which only states a commitment to "close cooperation" on defense and security issues. That does not by itself rise to a treaty. [Update: On 2nd thought, perhaps "close cooperation" is a term of art that does rise to a treaty.]

The fourth question is whether there is a statutory authority linked with a security agreement under international law. For example, President Obama claimed the 'Responsibility to Protect' justification was authorized by the general US agreement with the United Nations covenant when he skipped Congress for the Libya intervention. I thought R2P was a weak stand-alone legal basis in domestic and international law to deploy the military even before Obama severely stretched an already controversial novel application of R2P in the Libyan regime change. Nonetheless, it is a precedent.

The question of statutory authorization may be rendered moot if a US entity is attacked in Iraq. According to 50 USC 1541 (1973) of the War Powers Act, other than by Congressional declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, the military can also be deployed by the President "pursuant to ... a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces." For example, a legal basis for OIF was Iraq firing on the American aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone pursuant to UNSCR 688. When I served with 2ID in Korea, we sometimes would joke that our function was less to stop (really, delay) a north Korean attack than to serve as a tripwire for the insertion of US-led UN forces.

Thursday, May 1, 2014

Regarding pundits and David Brooks's "Saving the System"

In his April 28, 2014 article, Saving the System, New York Times columnist David Brooks laments the retreat of the aspirational, American-led pluralistic liberal world order. Brooks sees the current geopolitical situation much as I do: opportunistic power grabs across the board by rogue actors in competitive reaction to credibility squandered by the feckless leadership of the shrinking American hegemon. (Brooks doesn't assign blame, but I will: President Obama.)

What frustrates me about prominent pundits like Brooks is they talk about America's faltering will to lead the free world as though the state of the national character is something separate from themselves when, in fact, pundits like Brooks are instrumental in the competitive social politics that shape the national character, no more pivotally than when the popular narrative of the American-led Iraq compliance enforcement and peace-building mission was in the balance.

In August 2004, liberal Bush critic Tom Junod recognized the essential principles at stake in the Iraq intervention and described the pivotal importance of the prevailing narrative in "The Case for George W. Bush, i.e., what if he's right?":
... war is undertaken at the risk of the national soul. The moral certainty that makes war possible is certain only to unleash moral havoc, and moral havoc becomes something the nation has to rise above. We can neither win a war nor save the national soul if all we seek is to remain unsullied—pristine. Anyway, we are well beyond that now. The question is not, and has never been, whether we can fight a war without perpetrating outrages of our own. The question is whether the rightness of the American cause is sufficient not only to justify war but to withstand war's inevitable outrages. The question is whether—if the cause is right—we are strong enough to make it remain right in the foggy moral battleground of war.
Stigmatizing right normalizes wrong in general. Stigmatizing an epochal paradigmatic right like the Iraq intervention fundamentally reshapes American culture, politics, policy, and leadership with metastatic premise. The prevailing of the revisionist anti-liberal narrative against the Iraq mission is patient zero for the deficient American leadership in competition that's troubling Brooks. When pundits conceded the false narrative stigmatizing OIF, the will of the American people to effectually enforce liberal world order as the leader of the free world followed suit and fell.

The necessary foundation-fixing step for "saving the system" is prominent pundits like David Brooks correcting the popular narrative of the Iraq mission.

To wit, the 1990-2011 UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement and peace operations with Iraq were the defining American-led intervention of the post-Cold War and 9/11 era. President Bush's decision on the Saddam regime's harmfully belated "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) was substantively correct on the facts, justified on policy, and procedurally correct on law and precedent. Under President Bush, the Iraq intervention was essentially right on principle, by upholding the model "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), and in practice, by setting the competitive bar for real American leadership of the free world with ethical resolute adaptive leadership that stood fast versus the concerted political and practical attacks customized to the Vietnam War stigma.

But President Obama's subsequent radical deviation with Iraq was premised on the revisionist anti-OIF narrative.

In the broader politics, clarifying the Iraq issue with the upright corrective approach modeled at the OIF FAQ is necessary to assuredly promote humanitarian liberal policy, uphold the competitive proven-sufficient American leadership of the free world that manifested with Iraq, and hold to account the anti-liberal revisionists responsible for Obama's catastrophic course change. In contrast, the abased concessionary approach to the OIF stigma that's been adopted by acquiescent erstwhile (purported) OIF supporters has led — can only lead — to abject devaluation of humanitarian liberal policy, anti-competitive contraction and dilution of American leadership of the free world, and the concomitant encouragement and enabling of avid illiberal competitors.

The Iraq mission activated all the elements of American leadership essential for the pluralistic liberal world order to compete for dominance in the geopolitical arena. Therefore, the stigmatization of Operation Iraqi Freedom with false narrative has undermined the fundamental premises of the American-led pluralistic liberal world order. In its malignant cultural, political, policy effect, the path-shaping OIF stigma is the purposeful v2.0 strategic heir of the long debilitating Vietnam War stigma.

I started reading the comments to Brooks's column, but I had to stop after two because of course the NY Times' readers blame President Bush despite that Bush reacted to 9/11 and acted to resolve the Saddam problem properly, and moved to reinvigorate the Western coalition.

The blame for the weakened West is not with Bush. Rather, the blame properly lies with the betrayers who subverted American foreign affairs under Bush for partisan gain by adopting our competitors' propaganda with compounding harmful effects. Yet with their typical sociopathic gall, the betrayers responsible for sabotaging the national character instead blame the consequences of their malfeasance on President Bush, the same American leader who tried his best after 9/11 to rally the West for the contest. The Faustian reward for their treachery was winning political control of America. The damaging consequences, described by Brooks, of having the betrayers in charge of America have been predictable.

In the narrative contest for the zeitgeist, the truth is just a narrative that must be competed for like any other in the political arena. As a layman, I can help model the substantive piece in the narrative contest but not compete the political piece; for example. Subject knowledge is not the same thing as public expert authority, and both attributes are needed to effectually clarify the Iraq issue for the public against the revisionists and acquiescers. Therefore, pundits are needed to set the record straight.

Correcting the popular narrative of the Iraq mission is necessary to reestablish the sure American leadership of the free world under President Bush. Whereas the revisionist anti-OIF narrative, if allowed to stand, lays the foundation and sets the frame for a paradigm shift antithetical to American leadership of the free world. For public expert authorities who know the truth, their choice in the arena to correct or concede the OIF stigma is an ethical test with long pervasive consequences.



Related: Expanded list of responses to leaders, pundits, and other media.

Sunday, January 5, 2014

Infuriating

Headline from the Sydney Morning Herald: Al-Qaeda claims key Iraqi city of Fallujah.

Excerpt:
ISIS fighters have steadily asserted their control over the province's desert regions for months, buoyed by their consolidation of control over territory just across the border in Syria. They are more disciplined and better armed than the tribal fighters drawn into the fray over the past week, and the Iraqi security forces lack the equipment and technology that enabled US troops to suppress the al-Qaeda challenge.

Al-Qaeda's ascendant influence in Syria has given the militants control over the desert territories spanning both sides of the Iraqi-Syrian border, enabling them to readily transfer weapons and fighters between the arenas.
The feared consequence of the Obama administration's contravening the Strategic Framework Agreement (2008) by disengaging from US-Iraqi affairs at a critical stage of Iraq's post-Surge development, abandonment of President Bush's Freedom Agenda, weakness in the Arab Spring, appeasement of Iran, and bungling of the SOFA negotiation causing our irresponsible exit from Iraq is becoming real.

The enemy defeated by the counterinsurgency "Surge" in Iraq and greatly reduced by the US-led post-9/11 counter-terrorism campaign has exploited the collapse of the Arab Spring, especially the Syrian civil war (apparently with the collusion of the Assad regime and its allies), in the gaps left by President Obama's diminishment of American leadership in the region.

Like our post-WW2 regional partners in Asia and Europe where US soldiers still serve, post-Surge+Awakening Iraq with American partnership should have been the keystone for regional reform.

To wit, in May 2011, at the dawn of the Arab Spring, President Obama marked the historic opportunity to lead the peace in the Middle East where "Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress":
Indeed, one of the broader lessons to be drawn from this period is that sectarian divides need not lead to conflict. In Iraq, we see the promise of a multiethnic, multisectarian democracy. The Iraqi people have rejected the perils of political violence in favor of a democratic process, even as they’ve taken full responsibility for their own security. Of course, like all new democracies, they will face setbacks. But Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress. And as they do, we will be proud to stand with them as a steadfast partner.
The Arab Spring should have been the decisive point where the resolute principled strong-horse American leadership that manifested with Iraq the model and the Freedom Agenda seized the historical moment.

In the benchmark May 2011 address, President Obama pledged US support which Arab Spring activists took to heart to risk their lives, but Obama subsequently proudly reneged.

President Obama should have stayed the course he inherited and built upon the hard-won foundational progress that was achieved under President Bush just as President Eisenhower stayed the course he inherited from Presidents Roosevelt and Truman to build US-led liberal international order.

Instead, the inhumane squandering of the hard-won, promisingly progressing, but still vulnerable gains that President Obama inherited from the Bush administration and the fecklessness of the Obama administration's foreign affairs at a critical turning point in world affairs have brought on a predictable, evitable disaster.

Moved by 9/11, President Bush wore the mantle of American leadership of the free world and set us on a paradigmatically humanitarian liberal course to compete for the shape of our children's world. America's self-labeled liberals should have stood strong with President Bush. Instead, the President was vilified and America's paradigmatic humanitarian liberal leadership with Iraq was stigmatized by then-Senator Obama and his cohort for acting to resolve the festering problem of Saddam's noncompliant, threatening, tyrannical, radicalized sectarian, rearming, terrorist regime.

Because of their critical betrayal of America the leader of the free world, we have moved a long, long way from President Kennedy's oath (1961), "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty," President Clinton's counsel (1998, about Iraq) that “In the century we're leaving, America has often made the difference between chaos and community; fear and hope. Now, in a new century, we'll have a remarkable opportunity to shape a future more peaceful than the past -- but only if we stand strong against the enemies of peace," and President Bush's pledge (2001), "As long as the United States of America is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this will be an age of liberty, here and across the world."

In July 2003, former President Clinton urged:
I would say the most important thing is we should focus on what's the best way to build Iraq as a democracy? . . . We should be pulling for America on this. We should be pulling for the people of Iraq.
Instead, the Democrats chose to sacrifice America's liberal leadership heritage and life-or-death responsibility to the people of Iraq for partisan gain. From Robert Gates, former defense secretary, offers harsh critique of Obama’s leadership in ‘Duty’, by Bob Woodward, in the Washington Post:
Gates offers a catalogue of various meetings, based in part on notes that he and his aides made at the time, including an exchange between Obama and then-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton that he calls “remarkable.”

He writes: “Hillary told the president that her opposition to the [2007] surge in Iraq had been political because she was facing him in the Iowa primary. . . . The president conceded vaguely that opposition to the Iraq surge had been political. To hear the two of them making these admissions, and in front of me, was as surprising as it was dismaying.”
On these admissions alone of their rank self-interest and parochial partisanship trumping the grave stakes in Iraq, Secretary Clinton and President Obama should be pilloried and disqualified from Commander in Chief.

More from Secretary Gates's book vis-à-vis Ann Althouse:
The difficulty of extending the surge to September 2007 (when Petraeus would submit his report on progress), much less to the spring of 2008, was underscored by the rhetoric coming from both Republicans and Democrats in Congress. The frequently used line “We support the troops” coupled with “We totally disagree with their mission” cut no ice with people in uniform. Our kids on the front lines were savvy; they would ask me why the politicians didn’t understand that, in the eyes of the troops, support for them and support for their mission were tied together. But the comments that most angered me were those full of defeatism— sending the message to the troops that they couldn’t win and, by implication, were putting their lives on the line for nothing. The worst of these comments came in mid-April from the Senate majority leader, Harry Reid, who said in a press conference, “This war is lost” and “The surge is not accomplishing anything.” I was furious and shared privately with some of my staff a quote from Abraham Lincoln I had written down long before: “Congressmen who willfully take actions during wartime that damage morale and undermine the military are saboteurs and should be arrested, exiled, or hanged.” Needless to say, I never hinted at any such feelings publicly, but I had them nonetheless.
President Bush handed to President Obama a history-changing winning hand in Iraq — earned with dear cost by our soldiers and allies including Iraqis — and a progressing liberal strategy to win the War on Terror. President Obama threw them away. Bush honored the commitment of his predecessors to American leadership of the free world. Obama has dishonored it and them — and us — and opened the way for the illiberal enemy.

President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and their cohort's rank betrayal of America the leader of the free world and US-led liberal international order is enough to push this Generation-X JFK liberal to give up in disgust.



Code of Conduct:
I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard my country and our way of life.
Soldier's Creed:
I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.
Civilization oriented by a robust, sure American liberal exceptionalism, made real to me by my service in Korea, was for me synonymous with the "American way of life".

As I walked the city while the sun set on 9/11, I anticipated the anti-liberal flood in the coming contest and determined to fight it as a college activist. I'm the boy who stuck his finger into a trickling leak to try saving his hometown. My civil-military advocacy at Columbia succeeded, but I didn't make the larger social-political cultural difference that was most important for America's competitive will. The anti-liberal tsunami broke through and washed over and around the crumbling dike/levee I meant to guard, undeterred by the few sandbags I managed to pile. Worse, the anti-liberal flood burst from inside my hometown, from American leaders, as well as from outside, from America's competitors.

Failure teaches. SU4A touched the surface of the problem, but didn't dig deep enough. It's time to fall back to the redoubt and rethink the situation. What I thought we needed on 9/11 is insufficient.



Also see The Fall of Mosul and legal authority for anti-ISIS strikes, 10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts, and Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ.

Friday, September 6, 2013

The Constitutional rule of law for war was skirted by President Clinton, reinforced by President Bush, and degraded by President Obama

PREFACE: This post is a sequel to Thoughts on the Syria Dilemma, where I responded to Byron Wong of bigWOWO's question, "I was just dropping in to check if you had an opinion on Syria." In the discussion that ensued at Byron's blog post, I expounded that President Bush's conscientious approach as Commander in Chief after 9/11 reinforced the Constitutional rule of law for war by reintegrating the legislative-executive process that President Clinton often skirted as Commander in Chief. However, the Democrats' false narrative of the Iraq intervention and President Obama's sloppy regressive approach as Commander in Chief have degraded the Constitutional rule of law for war that had been upgraded by President Bush.



Selected from the discussion thread at bigWOWO:

Byron: “I don’t know if “rule of law” really applies to war in general.”

It does apply to US military action, but not in the way that a lot of people have been led to believe by the false narrative that was promulgated against the Iraq mission and President Bush.

I was surprised by Kaufman’s analysis, too. I had assumed there was a stronger statutory and policy basis in place for President Obama’s proposed action. It is normal for the US to act to enforce an “international norm”, but it’s also normal for the US to develop a legal-rational foundation for that action. Obama simply neglected to build the legal-rational foundation to act on Syria. I’ll talk more about that below.

Your presumption is correct that the US President is not restrained on a short leash as Commander in Chief. It’s a short list, of course, but President Clinton is the exemplar of a post-Cold War US President who deployed the US military in a piecemeal, ad hoc, creatively (Russians say il-) legal manner. Clinton was my CinC and I can expound on why his deployments were unpopular within the military, but suffice to say that the changing character of world affairs since the Cold War compelled Presidential deployment of the US military to become more fluid.

Before 9/11, Bush intended to rein in the mission creep he inherited from Clinton. Reducing the global US military footprint was corporate-trained, famously clinical Secretary Rumsfeld’s primary project. But 9/11 upended Bush’s initial agenda and altered his worldview. Most notably, 9/11 replaced Bush’s pre-9/11 IR realist assessment that the Iraq problem was ‘contained’ with Clinton’s liberal assessment that the situation with Saddam was a “clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere.”

Bush’s clearest repudiation of his pre-9/11 IR realist worldview also affirmed his post-9/11 liberal worldview: “For decades, free nations tolerated oppression in the Middle East for the sake of stability. In practice, this approach brought little stability, and much oppression. So I have changed this policy.”

Which brings me to the point of the Kaufman citation.

Although Bush came around to Clinton’s liberal worldview after 9/11 and built upon what Clinton did right, such as Clinton’s Iraq and counter-terror policies, Bush also tried to redress Clinton’s two most criticized faults as Commander-in-Chief. One Clinton fault was deploying the military for justifiable reasons, at least from a liberal point of view, but with politically based limits that curtailed their real effectiveness. In contrast, after 9/11, Bush attempted to rationally match means to achieve the ends of American liberal foreign policy.

More relevant to this discussion, the other Clinton fault was Clinton’s legal creativity in stretching the Presidential authority to deploy the US military. Clinton’s ad hoc approach to foreign affairs can be justified by the seismic shift in the world that was happening rapidly on his watch; Clinton was reacting, and he ultimately proved unable or incapable of moving American leadership ahead of evolving world affairs. The hope of the ‘Washington Consensus’ that excited liberals around the world at the end of the Cold War was largely eroded during the Clinton presidency. The global questioning of the US ‘hyperpower’ didn’t start with Bush after 9/11; it started with Clinton.

In contrast, Bush, perhaps due to his business and governing background, was conscientious about the process of the chief executive working with the ‘Board’, whether that be a corporate board or government legislature. What struck me most about Bush after 9/11 was that he sought Congressional and UN certifications even when he could have – and I argue should have – simply relied on Clinton’s precedents. Moreover, with the Iraq intervention, the new certifications sought by Bush did not substantially change the policy, US statutes, and UNSC resolutions on Iraq that were already operative via Clinton.

Was Bush simply a more ethically conscientious President than Clinton? Yes, but I think the answer is also pragmatic.

Clinton treated the legislative-executive process as a necessary hindrance to his authority as Commander-in-Chief. He was right; it is, by checks-and-balances design. In contrast, Bush moved to reaffirm the legislative-executive process in his authority as Commander-in-Chief. After 9/11, Bush understood that the global confrontation that was heralded on 9/11 started long before 9/11 and would last long past 9/11. He understood that Clinton’s ad hoc method of deploying the US military, while it worked in the near term, was a politically unhealthy way for the government of a liberal democratic nation to conduct a long, full-spectrum struggle. So, although Bush could have – and I argue should have – relied on Clinton’s precedents, Bush tried to reboot the system after Clinton’s ad hoc approach by reintegrating the legislative-executive process in Bush’s authority as Commander-in-Chief.

It’s sad and unfortunate that rather than work with Bush to prepare the US government for a long-term leadership challenge, the Democrats decided to prioritize their immediate parochial partisan interests, instead.

To clarify, the UN has zero sovereign authority over any US military deployment. Every US military deployment can only be authorized under US sovereign authority. As any libertarian can explain, no international norm nor even agreement contains the higher authority either to compel the US to deploy our military or to stand down our military. Whatever enforcement power exists in international law is based on the participation of sovereign national authorities, most notably to this point, the US.

However, the US has been the hegemon of a particularly styled group of independent nations – the ‘free world’ – and that carries with it leadership responsibilities, if not compulsive duties. While international law has no power over the US in and of itself, the soft, fuzzy, and gray area of international law provides us an organizing framework for international relations with the attendant leverages.

Wrapping up this comment regarding Kaufman’s analysis and Obama’s proposed action, the key is that a US military action must be based on a legal-rational foundation with US sovereign authority in order to be legal. While the original Constitutional concept of a Congressional ‘declaration of war’ became impractical sometime in the 19th century as the US evolved as a permanent global presence, Congress has adapted by providing certifications that generally empower, within limits, the US President to take military action without impractical legislative micromanagement, adjusted by various War Powers Acts. Since WW2, beginning with President Truman in Korea, US Presidents have at times deployed the US military ahead of Congressional certification as a practical matter and then returned to Congress as soon as practical for the normal legislative-executive certification process. But those deployments always took place with existing legal-rational chained links to US sovereign authority, such as Congressionally certified SEATO treaty, NATO treaty, UN covenant. Even Clinton’s Balkans deployment that set a very controversial precedent by bypassing Congress and the UNSC was legally, if creatively, tethered to Congressional prior approval by the NATO treaty.

As with other of Bush’s hard-won gains as Commander-in-Chief, Obama has undone Bush’s reintegration of the legislative-executive process and, instead, returned to Clinton’s ad hoc approach.

The practical advantage of Clinton’s ad hoc approach is more flexibility to act free of legislative interference. The practical disadvantage of Clinton’s ad hoc approach is less ability to order an effective action should the needs of the mission exceed the resources available to the vested authority of the US President. Indeed, Clinton acted freely but often ineffectively as Commander-in-Chief, whereas Congress often interfered with Bush’s foreign affairs to detrimental effect, but also provided the resources when the needs of the mission exceeded the resources available to the US President. Obama has followed Clinton’s lead by acting more freely but also more ineffectively compared to Bush.

Clinton operated on the outer limit of Presidential authority and we became accustomed to it. However, Kaufman’s analysis shows that when Obama failed to acquire the partnership of NATO, UN, or another chained link to prior Congressional approval, Obama’s initial impulse to order an attack on Syria failed to meet the minimum threshold of US sovereign authority.

The head-shaking aspect of Obama’s political mess on Syria is it was an easily avoidable mistake. Obama has talked about the Syria problem for long enough. At the same time he was talking about it, he simply needed to lay a normal legal-rational foundation to act. He neglected to do so. Separate from the wisdom of a US military action that knowingly assists al Qaeda, Obama’s belated decision to go to Congress for certification should provide the missing legal-rational link.

I won’t ever say my fellow Columbia alumnus is stupid. The President is not stupid. He’s just not as conscientious in his duties as Bush. But Obama did make an obvious, stupid, unnecessary, humiliating mistake on the world’s center stage that has real consequences. Congress now is compelled to help Obama try to clean up the mess he made for us. I believe Obama’s reliance on charismatic authority (I recommend you view the link I provided) caused him to blur in his mind even Clinton’s creative stretching of Presidential military authority.

The false narrative of the Iraq mission and slander of President Bush has metastasized from a sociopathic partisan grab at domestic political power into principles that are actually guiding – and harming – our foreign affairs. In order to restore rational decision-making to our liberal American foreign policy, the first necessary step for conscientious liberals is a mea culpa in which we admit openly that Bush was right. Without that baseline admission and cognitive reset by liberals, we’ll keep going the wrong way and not understand why. ...

Add: I don’t believe Senator McCain realizes that President Obama neglected to lay a basic legal-rational foundation for US military action on Syria. Other than Jean Kaufman, it doesn’t seem like anyone else has caught the oversight, either. It’ll be made a moot point if and when Congress certifies. But if Congress doesn’t certify, Obama fails to acquire any other chained link to prior Congressional approval, and the President attacks Syria only on the isolated basis of his own authority, it will be an unConstitutional action. Perhaps no legal action will ever be brought against Obama for it, but I guess some anti-American lawfare activist somewhere would catch it. ...

---------------

Byron,

I am serious about the comparison.

To repeat, the point I’m making is that Clinton set a practical precedent for Commander-in-Chief that reduced the legislative-executive process in the Presidential military authority.

In addition, because Clinton had already laid an operative legal-rational foundation with his counter-terror and Iraq policy, it was not actually necessary for Bush to engage the legislative-executive process – at all – to respond to 9/11 or on Iraq. For updates to Clinton’s legal-rational foundation, Bush simply could have used the executive administrative process.

In other words, before Bush went to Congress, military action was already certified by US sovereign authority. Bush and Clinton were authorized to put boots on the ground in Afghanistan years before 9/11. Clinton established the preemption doctrine that Bush was later attacked on. In fact, Clinton had bombed Afghanistan, which means, as was the case for Iraq, Clinton had already laid the foundation and set the stage for ground invasion.

In the wake of 9/11 with great pressure to respond quickly and decisively, it would have been justified, easier, and even sensible for a military operation, for Bush to adopt Clinton’s ad hoc approach as Commander-in-Chief. Unlike Obama’s proposed attack on Syria, the foundation was already properly laid to attack Afghanistan.

Would anyone have seriously protested if Bush had used Clinton’s established, quicker ad hoc approach to respond to 9/11? If so, they would have had no legal leg to stand on. And, as you point out, there was no political need to go to Congress. Congress would have backed Bush and opened the purse to attack al Qaeda and their Taliban hosts, regardless.

Yet Bush didn’t take the quicker, easier, and – I argue – more sensible ad hoc approach that Clinton had set up. Instead, Bush scrupulously reintegrated the legislative-executive process in his authority as Commander-in-Chief. It wasn’t necessary. It was a reset of Presidential approach.

One could say Bush’s sense of ethics as President was naïve, and one would have been proven right in so saying, but Bush also understood that ad hoc efficiency in the short run breaks down in the long run as a governing approach in a legal-rational system . . . as Obama is finding out with his Syria mess.

My point is that Obama had a choice of legislative-executive approaches as Commander-in-Chief: the pre-9/11 ad hoc approach that Bush inherited from Clinton and the post-9/11 reintegrated approach that Obama inherited from Bush. Obama opted for Clinton’s easier ad hoc approach despite that 9/11 had rendered the Clinton doctrine (as distinct from his policies) obsolete.

This isn’t a novel concept for political scientists, by the way. Again, I recommend you view the link I provided on Weber’s charismatic authority type, which describes Obama.

The legality of Obama’s proposed action on Syria is more than a serious question, it’s a consequential question. The mistake you’re making, Byron, is conflating the general prohibition on NBC use with the legal-rational procedure to act to enforce it. A law without an actionable law enforcement procedure is just an opinion. You’re a parent and an executive with management responsibility, both professionally and with activist organizations, right? If so, then you understand the concept. Normally, the two go hand in hand; Obama’s failure to lay a proper legal-rational foundation is abnormal. The point of Kaufman’s analysis doesn’t show that NBC use is not prohibited, but rather that Obama made the incredible error of moving on the world’s center stage to act *with military action* to enforce the prohibition while lacking a sufficient legal-rational foundation to act.

Obama didn’t just let other nations off the hook on Syria; he neglected to nail up the enforcement hook to begin with, which has made it easy for the international community to decline the President’s invitation to help attack Syria. In contrast, the enforcement hook on Saddam had been nailed up by Bush Senior and upgraded by Clinton continually since 1990-1991.

Especially with the practical considerations that Assad has an effective web of sponsors, Obama is proposing a course with Syria that knowingly and obviously strengthens the position of Islamic terrorists – as though Obama’s post-9/11 historical conclusion is that our limited aid in the 1980s to the Mujahedeen fighting the Soviets didn’t go nearly far enough –[,] and Obama lacks a Bush-level preparation to mitigate the potential consequences, he needed to have his legal-rational Ps and Qs in impeccable order from the beginning.

He didn’t. Now Obama is sloppily backtracking, trying to fill in the legal-rational gap after already making a mess of it on the world stage, and begging Congress to clean it up for him.

I agree with you that the world retreating from Obama’s red line on Syrian NBC use is a failure of principle. But it’s also a failure of American leadership. The independent, self-interested nations of the ‘free world’ have always relied on America, specifically the US President, leading strong from the front for their solidarity. From the start, the international community as an effective enforcement entity has always been an illusion kept alive by American leadership, from the moment that Truman sent Task Force Smith into Korea on a suicide mission to validate the UN.

The anti-Bush notion that America could, instead, follow the international community or ‘lead from behind’ was always a lie but it was a tolerable lie as long as it was limited to domestic partisan politics. But Obama’s actual incorporation of the lie as a guiding principle in our foreign affairs has caused an anomic breakdown of the international community.

Byron, consider the Presidency as a hereditary course rather than unrelated episodes. Yes, Bush did face different conditions with the 9/11 attacks than Obama is facing with his Syria mess. That’s ordinary – Eisenhower faced different conditions than Truman. Yet Eisenhower didn’t need to refight WW2 or the Korean War because he built on the gains of his predecessors and adapted the Presidential course he inherited from Truman at the dawn of the Cold War.

Bush conscientiously laid a foundation for effective American leadership after 9/11. If Obama and the Democrats had properly supported Bush in solidarity, today’s breakdown of American leadership would have been prevented. But if the Democrats had supported Bush, they risked not winning the White House and Congressional seats, which they needed to advance their domestic agenda. That was the trade-off.

President Obama is dealing with the consequences of the Democrats poisoning the well of American government against his predecessor. Even so, when Obama assumed office, he held the power to clean the well of American government that he had helped poison. If President Obama had simply claimed solidarity with President Bush at the start of his Presidency, adapted Bush’s course, and built on Bush’s gains – especially since Obama retained Bush’s liberal foreign policy goals – American leadership would be healthy now. ...

---------------

Regarding your point on the economy, I’m a poli sci guy, not a finance guy nor an economist, and the issue is tangential to the Syria intervention discussion. But it seems to me as a layman that the cause of the stunning and sudden economic collapse – ie, the cascade effect of risky loans insured by federal law then bundled as financial products that exponentially multiplied the effect of an otherwise ordinary real-estate downturn – didn’t originate with the Bush administration and had inputs from both sides. My understanding is that during the Clinton administration the Democrats warped the mortgage market by encouraging and insuring loans to high-risk borrowers while the Republicans advocated for looser market controls, although there was bipartisan cooperation on both factors. The financial market adapted to the high-risk loans and the course of the economic collapse was thus set. In the short term, the freer financial flows artificially boosted the economy during the Clinton administration. But, in the long term, we paid the price for the fundamental flaws in the financial model that had facilitated impressive short-term growth in the Clinton years, and the problem became manifest as the shock at the tail end of the Bush administration. If I recall correctly, Bush responded with stimulus packages that presaged Obama’s stimulus packages. The Clinton through pre-collapse Bush economy was raised on a bubble and should not be viewed as a success model. The larger, more complicated challenge we face is correcting the fundaments of our economy, whether by centralized organization or a Smithian market correction that is swept clean of warping effects like government-insured high-risk loans. But I’m just a poli sci guy, so what do I know. You’re finance, right? Did I get the basics right, at least?

I repeat the point that Obama should have adapted Bush’s course and built on Bush’s gains as Commander-in-Chief just as Eisenhower did with Truman. Recall that Truman left office as one of the most unpopular Presidents in American history and Ike actually campaigned on the platform he would end the Korean War. Yet Ike didn’t pull out of Korea nor Asia nor Europe at a point where our Cold War foreign policy was only taking shape but had not yet been set in stone, very similar to the 9/11-era conditions inherited by Obama. The difference is Ike had a serious long view of the liberal American role in the dawning Cold War just as Bush had a serious long view of the liberal American role after 9/11. Unlike Bush, it doesn’t appear that Obama is serious about long-term liberal American leadership in the world.

Clinton explains the greater American leadership context for taking military action against Saddam:
In the century we’re leaving, America has often made the difference between chaos and community; fear and hope. Now, in a new century, we’ll have a remarkable opportunity to shape a future more peaceful than the past — but only if we stand strong against the enemies of peace.
As you know, the only alternatives to decisively confronting Saddam was an indefinite ad hoc crumbling, provocative, and harmful status quo that had no solution in its concept, or freeing a noncompliant Saddam. You know that the US and UN had no burden of proof on Iraq’s WMD and the entire burden of proof was on Saddam. You know Saddam was both established and presumed guilty on WMD as the basis for the Gulf War ceasefire and UNSC resolutions enforced by Bush Senior, Clinton, and Bush. You know that, by procedure, our intelligence on Iraq’s WMD could not trigger military enforcement and only Saddam’s failure to comply with the weapons, humanitarian, and the other operative UNSC resolutions could trigger military enforcement. You know the same standard for compliance triggered Clinton’s Op Desert Fox and Bush’s Op Iraqi Freedom. You also know the false notion that Saddam was innocent on WMD (which he wasn’t) ran counter to the foundational premises, the course, and history of the Iraq mission that Bush inherited from Clinton.

You know all of this. Why do you insist on pretending you don’t?

Put yourself in Bush’s shoes and make your choice:

If you believed Saddam had rehabilitated his regime in secret, on his own, and was actually innocent (which he wasn’t), then you advocated for freeing a noncompliant Saddam from the ‘containment’ *despite* that he had again failed a “last chance” opportunity granted by a US President to meet his burden of proof on WMD, and setting aside the weapons resolutions, Saddam had made no move to resolve the UN’s operative humanitarian and terrorism prohibitions on Iraq. Correct?

Or, you advocated, instead, for indefinitely maintaining the ad hoc crumbling, provocative, and harmful status quo with Iraq with no solution *despite* your belief that Saddam was innocent on WMD. Is that correct?

Byron, it’s not your fault the Democrats duped you with a false narrative that caused your misunderstanding of the Iraq mission. You’re not the only American who the Democrats bamboozled. But your misunderstanding doesn’t change the Iraq problem that Bush inherited as President, the price and danger of the status quo with Iraq, nor the procedure to solve the Iraq problem that Clinton had developed and passed on to Bush.

As far as the relationship between the Iraq problem and 9/11, it’s not a main part of my explanation of the Iraq mission since the Iraq problem was fully mature before 9/11. But Clinton did explain the relationship best. ...

The link between 9/11 and Iraq is not a major part of my take on the issue because the Iraq problem, including Saddam’s guilt on terrorism, and procedures to resolve the problem were mature by the close of the Clinton administration, before 9/11. President Bush’s implementation of the preemptive doctrine in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks was an extension of President Clinton’s preemptive doctrine in response to the escalating Islamic terrorist campaign that culminated in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Bush administration did not claim Saddam was behind the 9/11 attacks. However, the 9/11 attacks did significantly boost the urgency and political will to resolve the Iraq problem expeditiously. President Clinton explained the link between 9/11 and Iraq:
Noting that Bush had to be "reeling" in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, Clinton said Bush's first priority was to keep al Qaeda and other terrorist networks from obtaining "chemical and biological weapons or small amounts of fissile material."
"That's why I supported the Iraq thing. There was a lot of stuff unaccounted for," Clinton said in reference to Iraq and the fact that U.N. weapons inspectors left the country in 1998.
"So I thought the president had an absolute responsibility to go to the U.N. and say, 'Look, guys, after 9/11, you have got to demand that Saddam Hussein lets us finish the inspection process.' You couldn't responsibly ignore [the possibility that] a tyrant had these stocks," Clinton said.

---------------

As far as my opinion on the legality of Obama bombing Syria without Congressional approval, I’ll restate. For the President to order military action outside of a threat to the US, which can include US holdings outside the homeland – eg, an attack on a US embassy or a US flagged cargo ship – there needs to be a link to US sovereign authority via Congressional certification.

Since the US became a permanent global presence, the original legislative-executive process of Congress declaring war has become impractical. Thus, we’ve resorted to chained links to US sovereign authority and general authorizations for the US President to deploy the military, with Congress retaining various controls and limits.

The US military can be and has been used to enforce international norms. But there still needs to be a link, however Clintonian-creatively stretched, to Congressional certification.

The basic difference between the Syria and Iraq problems, other than the thick stack of Congressional certifications that Bush inherited from Clinton and Bush Senior, is that Iraq threatened regional allies and US interests. Therefore, underlying the equally thick stack of international norms enforced in Iraq by Bush and the humanitarian scope of our post-war mission in Iraq was a foundation of traditional US security interests.

(Interesting Clinton trick: Clinton made sure to include Saddam’s firing on US aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone as a trigger for military enforcement. Presumably, if Saddam had proven compliance on the weapons resolutions, which of course he didn’t, the no-fly zone would still need to be maintained because it was enforcing the humanitarian resolutions, not the weapons resolutions. And, of course, Saddam considered the no-fly zone to be an illegal infringement of Iraq’s sovereignty. In other words, Clinton had set up a wide range of triggers so that once a US President decided to give Saddam his next “last chance” to comply, the US was going to invade Iraq one way or the other short of Saddam totally changing his regime. Clinton had shaped the Iraq problem as Saddam’s regime itself, so that Iraq’s behavior – ie, across-the-board compliance – was the central issue, not Iraq’s demonstrable possession of WMD. The Democrats knew this, yet misrepresented the Iraq problem anyway.)

The Syria problem – as large, horrifying, and crying out for effective humanitarian intervention as it is – is an internal conflict, and that changes the calculus by stripping away the usual Congressional certifications contained in traditional US security interests. Therefore, another Congressional certification needs to be found for Obama to order a military strike if Congress fails to approve his proposal. According to Kaufman’s analysis, no such certification exists in the international ‘laws’ related to NBC use and current Congressional statements on the Syria conflict.

The only Congressional certification I can think to apply is the 2001 AUMF if Obama can draw a cognizable link between Syria’s NBC use and terrorism. Although Assad is fighting terrorists, he is also a sponsor of terrorism and is being aided by a terrorist sponsor with its cadre of terrorist groups. Therefore, although the alleged NBC use at bar was not a terrorist act, it’s plausible Obama can make a Clintonian-creative legal argument that stretches the authority of the 2001 AUMF to military action against Syria. To that end, Obama did include a terrorism element in his recent public argument for military action against Syria.

Of course, Senator McCain may know an applicable Congressional certification that Kaufman doesn’t know. ...

---------------

My last, thematic thought for today on your blog related to the Syria dilemma:

Byron, as a liberal, as long as you block yourself from understanding everything that Bush did right after 9/11 as a liberal American President, you will block yourself from understanding everything that Obama has done wrong by the liberal standard.

You’re fighting it because it challenges your basic political worldview, but you need to accept that the Democrats lied to you. The Democrats have been corrupted; they’re not genuine liberals anymore. You have kids. ... If you want your kids to grow up to inherit a liberal world, you need to let go of your partisan mental blocks and figure out who is genuinely and effectively fighting for the liberal world you want for them. Until you do, we’ll keep going the wrong way and you won’t understand why. ...

---------------

Byron,

Except you were wrong and Bush was right by the liberal standard, most of all with the Iraq mission correctly understood. The liberal foreign policy choices you say you support are effective by that standard. As long as you refuse to admit your mistake and accept Bush was right, your deviation from Bush will continue to sabotage your advocacy of liberal foreign policy.

Stipulated about our recent economic history, although I don't recall that Bush's statement about maintaining general economic activity was a radical call to action that fomented an extreme nation-wide spike of loan-shark credit and mindless wanton spending that toppled our economy. We weren't coming off the Great Depression on 9/11; our current consumer and debt culture started in the 80s and escalated in the 90s. If there is a latter-day root cause, it was the bipartisan market-warping promotion of unaffordable home ownership, not eating out and shopping at Walmart.

Be that as it may, the economy didn't compel Obama to order our troops home from Iraq (until he bungled the SOFA negotiation) nor stop him from plussing up in Afghanistan. The economy didn't make Obama shut down Gitmo, stop him from dramatically increasing drone assassinations or bombing Libya on the pretense of R2P until regime change, and it's not stopping Obama from trying to bomb Syria. Obama is still spending mountains of tax dollars as Commander-in-Chief. Which means the Presidential practical areas of (military affairs) foreign policy and domestic economy are still distinct at this point of American history, at least outside of partisan conflations made for parochial political purposes.

Again, I'm not talking about episodic partisan climate as far as Bush's legislative-executive approach as Commander-in-Chief after 9/11. He set a baseline for how to do the CinC job in the 9/11 era. Although Clinton's pre-9/11 ad hoc approach would have been easier, quicker, and - I argue - more sensible for a President at war, Bush understood that reintegrating the legislative-executive process as CinC was a healthier approach for a legal-rational system for the long difficult challenge we entered on 9/11.

In other words, Bush did the heavy lifting in setting up a healthier legislative-executive SOP for Obama. Obama simply had to claim his solidarity with Bush and follow Bush's lead. Instead, he set back Bush's progress by opting for Clinton's pre-9/11 ad hoc approach. Obama's choice makes sense for a Weberian charismatic authority type.

The type of liberal foreign policy you've advocated on your blog falls within the liberal interventionist or liberal internationalist or neo-liberal or neo-conservative school. I'm disappointed that you stubbornly cling to the Democrats' false narrative on Iraq even though it undermines the liberal foreign policy you advocate.

Our intervention in Iraq enforced all the international norms you believe in. After 11 years of Saddam refusing to comply with the Gulf War ceasefire and UNSC resolutions, the exhaustion of every measure short of our last credible military threat to compel Saddam's compliance, Bush acted decisively to bring Iraq into compliance in order to restore credibility to the enforcement of international norms for the 9/11 era. It was up to Saddam to dispel the credible military threat simply by complying to standard, which he should have done immediately in 1991, let alone 2002-2003.

However, at the same time that Bush was trying to fix the international enforcement of international norms, the Democrats were doing their best to break it in order to gain an upper hand in domestic politics. When the Democrats - full of passionate intensity - lied to you, America, and the world about our Iraq mission, they also undermined the enforcement of all the international norms and humanitarian peace-building objectives that were intrinsic to the Iraq mission.

You blame partisan politics for Obama's difficulty over his Syria proposal. In fact, Obama's difficulty is a direct consequence of the long-term damage caused by the Democrats' propaganda against the Iraq mission to the political process and public perception necessary for the enforcement of international norms.

Excerpt from 10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts:
I also said this to Professor Nacos:

What's called neo-conservatism is just the progressive (interventionalist) liberalism of Wilson, FDR, and Truman, renamed. The bashing of neo-conservatism by self-described Western liberals, therefore, has led to the frustrating, self-defeating spectacle of influential people speaking liberal platitudes but quixotically opposing our definitively liberal strategy in the War on Terror. The effect of these liberals' tragic hypocrisy has been the degradation of the Western liberalizing influence on the illiberal regions of the world.

By the same token, an equally damaging effect of the attacks by self-described liberals on our liberal strategy has been the degradation within Western societies of the domestic understanding and support we need to adequately sustain the war/peace-building strategy endorsed by Presidents Bush and Obama. Therefore, a critical task of President Obama is to fix the deep damage done to his and Bush's foreign policy goals by Senator/Candidate Obama and other Bush critics.



Related comments from a CNN discussion thread, not the bigWOWO discussion thread:

The following exchange from other users was removed by moderation. That's odd, there's nothing inflammatory in it, and it's more thoughtful than 99.7% of the usual internet spew.

"The plan for Syria's chemical weapons can be a success - if 'success' is defined correctly. With Iraq, President Bush faithfully and successfully followed the procedure to resolve the Iraq problem that he inherited from President Clinton. What did that include? Regime change mandate. A credible military threat that was the next step up from Op Desert Fox’s penultimate bombing – ie, ground invasion. A very high and strict standard of proof for Saddam to meet regarding Iraq's "unaccounted for" proscribed weapons that had been elevated during the Cllinton administration in response to Saddam’s belligerence, resistance, and exposed evasions. A broad spectrum of requirements for Iraq under the UNSC resolutions, covering issues such as Iraq's humanitarian and terrorism problems, that extended beyond proscribed weapons. So how can President Obama succeed with Syria where Presidents Bush Senior, Clinton, and Bush ‘failed’ with Iraq? (… said for sake of argument. We actually succeeded resolving the Iraq problem under Bush by achieving every requirement set forth by Clinton - ie, Iraq in compliance, Iraq no longer a threat, and regime change.) Simple – by making Syria’s test easier and more limited than Iraq’s test. Lower the proof standard. Narrow the requirements for Syria, eg, studiously ignore the humanitarian and terrorism problems with Syria that were bases for strict requirements for Iraq. Avoid placing too heavy a proof burden and presumption of guilt on Syria. Essentially, Obama can succeed with Syria's chemical weapons by adopting the position of Saddam’s defenders in 2002-2003, which I guess Obama has done by ceding the lead on Syria to Russia.

AcidRed

Eric

an hour ago

If you can't dazzle 'em with brilliance, baffle 'em with BS? Must have been Clinton's fault, right?
Reply

Eric

AcidRed

37 minutes ag

The Iraq problem? Clearly, that was Saddam's fault, not the fault of any American President. Saddam could and should have complied with the Gulf War ceasefire and UNSC resolutions in 1991 - before Clinton was elected President - let alone fail repeatedly during the Clinton administration, thus compelling a stricter standard of proof, and then fail again to meet Iraq's burden of proof in 2002-2003. Saddam's behavior compelled Clinton to classify the situation with Iraq "a clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere" and to establish US policy on Iraq that "The hard fact is that so long as Saddam remains in power, he threatens the well-being of his people, the peace of his region, the security of the world. The best way to end that threat once and for all is with the new Iraqi government, a government ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its people."

It can certainly be argued that since Clinton set the bar for resolving the Iraq problem that Bush followed faithfully, then Clinton should have resolved the Iraq problem on his watch rather than kick the can. But to Clinton's credit (not "fault"), he established the laws, policy, precedent, and procedure necessary for his successor to resolve the Iraq problem. The Iraq problem was made by Saddam. But to resolve the Iraq problem, Bush followed the prescription made by Clinton.



Related thought from my 05JUL13 thoughts of the day:

Related to "Defining the problem frames the solution", one of my basic leadership principles, the ends do justify the means. Saying the ends don't justify the means is as silly as saying that how you play the game matters more than winning or losing. Means should be rationally matched to the ends. However, in a multi-dimensional competitive arena, there are simultaneous different ends. They may conflict. The means that are necessary to achieve one end may undermine another end. For example, in a rules-bound arena, cheating may garner near-term victories that are necessary, but also cause long-term defeat when the cheating is uncovered and punished. It comes down to smart rational trade-offs and making mitigations and compensations. Ethics must be weighed rationally as a factor of varying weight depending on the contours of the competition. In the ultimate judgement, the concrete gains from victory are what count, but the competitor must be clear about his ends and the definition of victory in order to choose his means rationally. Thought inspired by this documentary on the Soviet defeat of the Japanese in Manchuria.



Related: Apply the Saddam precedent to "finish the job and free Iran" (Lisa Daftari), Correct the Iraq War "story" to constructively "shape American foreign policy for years to come" (Jonah Goldberg), Answer and solutions for Mark Hertling's "Tell Me How the Iran War Ends: What are we fighting for?", Cure the Iraq Syndrome to win America back from postliberals and leftists (Thomas Howes), The facts show Edward Feser was right on Iraq in the first place and changed his mind based on misinformation, Jakub Grygiel's "The Iran War and the Coming Global Struggle" comes of the Iraq Syndrome, The apt UN-based international law solution for Iran is the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent (Richard Epstein, John Yoo), The apt Iraq comparison for the Iran intervention is the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, not Desert Storm (Jonathan Allen), and The Forward Party should reconceive the Iran issue with the premise that we were right on Iraq, which is the truth.