Professor Feser didn't respond to my e-mail, so I don't know whether he's read it.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Edward Feser]
date: May 29, 2026, 10:00 PM
subject: The facts show you were right on Iraq in the first place and you changed your mind based on misinformation
Professor Feser,
I clarify and relitigate the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ using the law and facts that define the Iraq issue.
I am writing to you to clarify the Iraq issue in your 03MAR26 tweet explaining why you changed your mind on Iraq, 21APR26 tweet referencing Cardinal Ratzinger on Iraq, and your 11MAR26 Public Discourse article, America’s Conflict in Iran Is Not a Just War.
Clarifying the Iraq issue to you and the public is important. Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #americanprimacy section:
Stigmatizing right normalizes wrong in general. Stigmatizing an epochal paradigmatic right like the Iraq intervention fundamentally reshapes American culture, politics, policy, and leadership with metastatic premise. Clarifying and relitigating the Iraq issue means more than the 4 corners of the Saddam problem, President Bush's legacy, and Operation Iraqi Freedom itself. Since the 1990-2011 UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement and peace operations with Iraq activated all the elements of American leadership essential to compete for the dominance of pluralistic liberal world order in the geopolitical arena, the current prevailing revisionist narrative stigmatizing the Iraq intervention lays the foundation and sets the frame for a paradigm shift antithetical to American leadership of the free world.
The facts show you were right to support Operation Iraqi Freedom in the first place. You changed your mind based on misinformation. As you point out, the Iraq Syndrome is the context for the Iran issue, and the Iraq Syndrome "was one of the major factors behind the rise of Donald Trump". The Iraq Syndrome is based on a demonstrably false narrative. President Trump and his followers paved his way to the presidency by demeaning and discrediting the centrist Republican leadership with the same misinformation that changed your mind on Iraq.
Feser:
The strongest case for it (and the reason I supported it at first) rested on two main considerations: punishing Saddam's government for violating the terms of the first Iraq war's ceasefire vis-a-vis WMD; and freeing the Iraqi people from the terror of his murderous government. But the war failed on both counts, insofar as there were no WMD, and the civilian death toll that resulted from the war was horrific, an absolutely unacceptable price to pay.
See the OIF FAQ answer to "Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq".
Your assertion that "there were no WMD" in terms of "violating the terms of the first Iraq war's ceasefire vis-a-vis WMD" is incorrect. In fact, the UNMOVIC and Iraq Survey Group findings and Operation Avarice are rife with UNSCR 687 WMD violations.
By procedure, the UNMOVIC confirmation of Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) per the UNSCR 687 WMD disarmament mandates was the principal casus belli in President Bush's determination to use force per Public Laws 102-1, 102-190, and 107-243 pursuant to UNSCR 678 in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441).
Subsequently, the Iraq Survey Group corroborated UNMOVIC, "ISG judges that Iraq failed to comply with UNSCRs", and confirmed "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" and that the Saddam regime possessed an active WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687. From David Kay's report to Congress, 28JAN04:
In my judgment, based on the work that has been done to this point of the Iraq Survey Group, and in fact, that I reported to you in October, Iraq was in clear violation of the terms of [U.N.] Resolution 1441.
Resolution 1441 required that Iraq report all of its activities -- one last chance to come clean about what it had.
We have discovered hundreds of cases, based on both documents, physical evidence and the testimony of Iraqis, of activities that were prohibited under the initial U.N. Resolution 687 and that should have been reported under 1441, with Iraqi testimony that not only did they not tell the U.N. about this, they were instructed not to do it and they hid material.
Resolution 1441 required that Iraq report all of its activities -- one last chance to come clean about what it had.
We have discovered hundreds of cases, based on both documents, physical evidence and the testimony of Iraqis, of activities that were prohibited under the initial U.N. Resolution 687 and that should have been reported under 1441, with Iraqi testimony that not only did they not tell the U.N. about this, they were instructed not to do it and they hid material.
In its assessment of Saddam's WMD program, the evidence found by the Iraq Survey Group constituted a floor only as the Iraqi "denial and deception operations" (ISG) that undermined the UNSCR 687 inspections continued to also undermine the ISG investigation. Iraqi counterintelligence got rid of evidence with a practically free hand during the inspections, invasion, and occupation, even during the ISG investigation. Consequently, the Iraq Survey Group largely characterized missing evidence as unaccounted for, "unresolvable ambiguity" (Kay), not "there were no WMD". From David Kay's report to Congress, 28JAN04:
I regret to say that I think at the end of the work of the [Iraq Survey Group] there's still going to be an unresolvable ambiguity about what happened.
A lot of that traces to the failure on April 9 to establish immediately physical security in Iraq -- the unparalleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program and their other programs as well, a lot of which was what we simply called Ali Baba looting. "It had been the regime's. The regime is gone. I'm going to go take the gold toilet fixtures and everything else imaginable."
I've seen looting around the world and thought I knew the best looters in the world. The Iraqis excel at that.
The result is -- document destruction -- we're really not going to be able to prove beyond a truth the negatives and some of the positive conclusions that we're going to come to. There will be always unresolved ambiguity here.
A lot of that traces to the failure on April 9 to establish immediately physical security in Iraq -- the unparalleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program and their other programs as well, a lot of which was what we simply called Ali Baba looting. "It had been the regime's. The regime is gone. I'm going to go take the gold toilet fixtures and everything else imaginable."
I've seen looting around the world and thought I knew the best looters in the world. The Iraqis excel at that.
The result is -- document destruction -- we're really not going to be able to prove beyond a truth the negatives and some of the positive conclusions that we're going to come to. There will be always unresolved ambiguity here.
A reasonable assumption is that Iraqi counterintelligence prioritized higher value evidence than the proscribed items and activity that were left behind for ISG to find. A reasonable inference from the "unparalleled" (Kay) mass of evidence lost to the Iraqi "denial and deception operations" (ISG), taken together with the still large amount of evidence that ISG found, is that the Saddam regime possessed a vaster WMD program than we can know.
In short, you were right to support Operation Iraqi Freedom due to the Saddam regime's UNSCR 687 WMD violations.
Your opinion that "the civilian death toll that resulted from the war was horrific, an absolutely unacceptable price to pay" is an immoral position since "the civilian death toll" before, during, and after Operation Iraqi Freedom was primarily caused by "the terror of his [Saddam's] murderous government".
Iraq's Gulf War ceasefire obligations included the UNSCR 688 humanitarian mandates, per which Operation Iraqi Freedom defended the Iraqi people in accordance with American and international law.
Unfortunately, rather than choose peace with the regime change, Saddam and his army of terrorists converted "the terror of his murderous government" to the Saddamist insurgency that attacked the Iraqi people like Saddam ruled Iraq. Early on, the Saddamists' zeal and world-leading expertise at wrecking Iraq and terrorizing and mass-murdering Iraqis outmatched the US military's ability to defend the Iraqi people from Saddamists. The contemporary peace operations with Kosovo and Afghanistan simply could not adequately prepare American soldiers for Saddamists. The problem was made harder by the severe pre-war underestimation of Saddam's terrorism which led to the early misdiagnosis of the Saddamist insurgency as a reaction by normal Iraqis to occupation or de-Baathification. But the OIF peace operations adjusted to the competition relatively soon. Ultimately, the US military proved to be the only entity in the world willing and able to stop the Saddamist abuse of the Iraqi people in either their regime, AQI, or ISIS forms.
Since UNSCR 660, the majority of Iraqi "civilian death toll" was consequent to President HW Bush prematurely removing US boots on the ground from Iraq in 1991 and President Obama prematurely removing US boots on the ground from Iraq in 2011, which should be "an absolutely unacceptable price to pay" for (twice!) abandoning the Iraqi people to the Saddamists. From 2003 to 2011, the United States did not abandon the Iraqi people to the Saddamists.
In short, you were right to support Operation Iraqi Freedom due to the Saddam regime's UNSCR 687 terrorism and UNSCR 688 human rights violations.
Feser:
Cardinal Ratzinger on the Iraq war: “The concept of a ‘preventive war’ does not appear in the Catechism of the Catholic Church… It was right to resist the war and its threats of destruction. It should never be the responsibility of just one nation to make decisions for the world… Given the new weapons that make possible destructions that go beyond the combatant groups, today we should be asking ourselves if it is still licit to admit the very existence of a ‘just war.’” https://fff.org/2008/04/17/pope-benedict-bushs-war-iraq/
Cardinal Ratzinger misconceived Operation Iraqi Freedom as a "preventive war". The controlling law and policy on Iraq plainly show OIF was an international law enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates pursuant to UNSCR 678. The partial truth in Cardinal Ratzinger's view is that the Gulf War ceasefire obligated Iraq to "condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism" (UNSCR 687), which the Saddam regime extremely violated, and counterterrorism is intrinsically preventive.
Cardinal Ratzinger undermined international law by favoring the nations, led by France, Russia, and China, found to be complicit with the Saddam regime's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441)—"The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council" (ISG)—instead of the nations, led by the United States and United Kingdom, that faithfully enforced the Gulf War ceasefire mandates pursuant to UNSCR 678.
Interestingly, Cardinal Ratzinger's premise for questioning "the very existence of a 'just war'"—"Given the new weapons that make possible destructions that go beyond the combatant groups"—is also John Yoo's premise for revising the 'imminent' standard for anticipatory self-defense.
Feser:
But that these considerations are not by themselves sufficient to justify going to war should be obvious enough from the example of the Iraq war, which is now widely acknowledged to have been a disastrous mistake.
Operation Iraqi Freedom was not a "disastrous mistake". The basic flaw of your argument is that its keystone premise, "the Iraq war...is now widely acknowledged to have been a disastrous mistake", is based on a false narrative.
Properly understood, Operation Iraqi Freedom is not a cautionary example. Rather, OIF was correctly decided and its conduct was competitively corrective. President Bush's determination for OIF demonstrably was correct on law and fact. OIF was a war of necessity according to Richard Haass's taxonomy. And OIF was a vital corrective for effectual American leadership of the free world.
Feser:
Saddam Hussein’s fall was also cheered, but its sequel was not a happy one for the Iraqi people, who suffered between 100,000 and 200,000 civilian casualties (or even more, according to some estimates).
... Hence, suppose that, in removing an oppressive government that killed tens of thousands of protesters, U.S. military action were to plunge Iran into anarchy or civil war that resulted in hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths (which, again, is what happened in Iraq after Saddam was deposed). It would be quite absurd to pretend that the Iranian people would, in such a scenario, have been liberated.
... Hence, suppose that, in removing an oppressive government that killed tens of thousands of protesters, U.S. military action were to plunge Iran into anarchy or civil war that resulted in hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths (which, again, is what happened in Iraq after Saddam was deposed). It would be quite absurd to pretend that the Iranian people would, in such a scenario, have been liberated.
The sequel to "Saddam Hussein's fall" was that Saddam and his terrorists converted their sectarian, terrorist, genocidal rule of Iraq to their sectarian, terrorist, genocidal insurgency against Iraq.
Operation Iraqi Freedom did not plunge Iraq into anarchy or civil war. Nor was the Saddam regime the antidote for anarchy and civil war. Rather, the Saddam regime created the corrupted Iraqi society that hindered the mandated rehabilitation of Iraq and produced the terrorists that manufactured chaos and faked a civil war. If Iraq was in anarchy and a real civil war, then there would not have been a Sahwa "awakening", and the counterinsurgency "surge" would not have turned the tide with such celerity.
Excerpt from Criticism of Hal Brands's commentary on Iraq in Hand-Off: "Reassessing Bush's Legacy: What the Transition Memoranda Do (and Don't) Reveal":
Brands:
The facts show the Bush administration was correct that Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom were both necessary "to keep America safe from catastrophic terrorism". The assertion that "The Iraq War was massively counterproductive from a counterterrorism perspective, because it reenergized a battered jihadist movement and unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East" is akin to blaming the medical team treating a cancer for causing the cancer.
OIF did not cause the "jihadist movement and unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East"; the Saddam regime did. The regime change exposed that Saddam's Iraq had festered over the twelve years that the UNSCR 678 enforcers vainly hoped Saddam would choose to comply with the Gulf War ceasefire mandates. Since 1991, Saddam's terrorism and corruption of Iraqi society became "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, 18MAR04) than the international community knew, which caused the mandated rehabilitation of Iraq to be harder than initially planned for.
To clarify the cause of the "unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East", see From Militant Secularism to Islamism: The Iraqi Ba’th Regime 1968-2003 by Amatzia Baram and The Islamic State Was Coming Without the Invasion of Iraq by Kyle Orton.
Kyle Orton: "To put it simply, the Saddam regime’s reputation for keeping a lid on religious militancy and sectarianism is exactly wrong; by commission and omission it brought both things to levels Iraq has scarcely ever known in its history."
To clarify the cause of the "jihadist movement", see Saddam: What We Now Know by Iraqi Perspectives Project co-author Jim Lacey. Excerpt:
The assertion that "it reenergized a battered jihadist movement" implies the false premise that the "jihadist movement" that attacked Iraq was primarily "reenergized" al Qaeda members "battered" in Afghanistan. Actually, the AQI/ISIS "jihadist movement" is primarily Saddamist terrorists and their "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with the al Qaeda network from before OIF. Excerpt from American Enterprise Institute panel discussion, "The Iraq War Series: The Conduct of the War":
Based on the Saddamist terrorists' insurgency and the post-war investigations of Saddam's UNSCR 687 terrorism and UNSCR 688 human rights violations, Operation Iraqi Freedom was necessary for the War on Terror. More than that, the facts show the Iraq regime change should have happened years earlier than the Afghanistan regime change to prevent the Saddam regime from fueling the dramatic growth of both the al Qaeda and Saddamist terrorist threats with the Iraqi state-level investment in "seeking and developing supporters from the same demographic pool" (IPP) that "increased the aggregate terror threat" (IPP).
The Bush administration always viewed the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of a larger struggle to keep America safe from catastrophic terrorism.
... The Iraq War was massively counterproductive from a counterterrorism perspective, because it reenergized a battered jihadist movement and unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East.
... The Iraq War was massively counterproductive from a counterterrorism perspective, because it reenergized a battered jihadist movement and unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East.
The facts show the Bush administration was correct that Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom were both necessary "to keep America safe from catastrophic terrorism". The assertion that "The Iraq War was massively counterproductive from a counterterrorism perspective, because it reenergized a battered jihadist movement and unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East" is akin to blaming the medical team treating a cancer for causing the cancer.
OIF did not cause the "jihadist movement and unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East"; the Saddam regime did. The regime change exposed that Saddam's Iraq had festered over the twelve years that the UNSCR 678 enforcers vainly hoped Saddam would choose to comply with the Gulf War ceasefire mandates. Since 1991, Saddam's terrorism and corruption of Iraqi society became "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, 18MAR04) than the international community knew, which caused the mandated rehabilitation of Iraq to be harder than initially planned for.
To clarify the cause of the "unleashed sectarian forces that polarized the Middle East", see From Militant Secularism to Islamism: The Iraqi Ba’th Regime 1968-2003 by Amatzia Baram and The Islamic State Was Coming Without the Invasion of Iraq by Kyle Orton.
Kyle Orton: "To put it simply, the Saddam regime’s reputation for keeping a lid on religious militancy and sectarianism is exactly wrong; by commission and omission it brought both things to levels Iraq has scarcely ever known in its history."
To clarify the cause of the "jihadist movement", see Saddam: What We Now Know by Iraqi Perspectives Project co-author Jim Lacey. Excerpt:
... All of this is just the tip of the iceberg of available evidence demonstrating that Saddam posed a dangerous [terrorism and WMD] threat to America. There are other reports providing specific information on dozens of terrorist attacks, as well as details of how Iraq helped plan and execute many of them. Moreover, there is also proof of Saddam’s support of Islamic groups that were part of the al-Qaeda network. A good analogy for the links between Saddam and bin Laden is the Cali and Medellín drug cartels. Both drug cartels (actually loose collections of families and criminal gangs) were serious national-security concerns to the United States. The two cartels competed for a share of the illegal drug market. However, neither cartel was reluctant to cooperate with the other when it came to the pursuit of a common objective — expanding and facilitating their illicit trade. The well-publicized and violent rise of the Medellín cartel temporarily obscured and overshadowed the rise of, and threat posed by, the Cali cartel, in the same way that 9/11 camouflaged the terror threat posed by Saddam. In reality Saddam and bin Laden were operating parallel terror networks aimed at the United States. Bin Laden just has the distinction of having made the first horrendous attack.
Given the evidence, it appears that we removed Saddam’s regime not a moment too soon.
Given the evidence, it appears that we removed Saddam’s regime not a moment too soon.
The assertion that "it reenergized a battered jihadist movement" implies the false premise that the "jihadist movement" that attacked Iraq was primarily "reenergized" al Qaeda members "battered" in Afghanistan. Actually, the AQI/ISIS "jihadist movement" is primarily Saddamist terrorists and their "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with the al Qaeda network from before OIF. Excerpt from American Enterprise Institute panel discussion, "The Iraq War Series: The Conduct of the War":
Jack Keane:
The fact of the matter is, we were dealing with an enemy force that Saddam Hussein had before the invasion, that planned to do what he was doing. And we were conducting likely the most formidable insurgency the West has ever encountered.
Why am I saying that? Human capital is usually an issue for insurgents. Sometimes they get it outside. But human capital, they had somewhere in the neighborhood, if you add up the Fedayeen, the Ba’ath Party militia, special Republican Guard, excuse me, and [inaudible 01:10:58] intelligence service, the numbers 130,000. I’m not suggesting that we’re all involved. But I’m suggesting to you that was a good place to start. Remember, this is Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-based insurgency to start with. He had an unlimited amount of money, billions and billions of dollars. Normally, in the typical Mao based insurgency, they’re starving for what? For capital. They had an unlimited amount of money. They had unlimited amount of arms and ammunition. ... And what else did they have? Well, hell, they ran the country for 35 years, and they wanted to take it back.
The fact of the matter is, we were dealing with an enemy force that Saddam Hussein had before the invasion, that planned to do what he was doing. And we were conducting likely the most formidable insurgency the West has ever encountered.
Why am I saying that? Human capital is usually an issue for insurgents. Sometimes they get it outside. But human capital, they had somewhere in the neighborhood, if you add up the Fedayeen, the Ba’ath Party militia, special Republican Guard, excuse me, and [inaudible 01:10:58] intelligence service, the numbers 130,000. I’m not suggesting that we’re all involved. But I’m suggesting to you that was a good place to start. Remember, this is Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-based insurgency to start with. He had an unlimited amount of money, billions and billions of dollars. Normally, in the typical Mao based insurgency, they’re starving for what? For capital. They had an unlimited amount of money. They had unlimited amount of arms and ammunition. ... And what else did they have? Well, hell, they ran the country for 35 years, and they wanted to take it back.
Based on the Saddamist terrorists' insurgency and the post-war investigations of Saddam's UNSCR 687 terrorism and UNSCR 688 human rights violations, Operation Iraqi Freedom was necessary for the War on Terror. More than that, the facts show the Iraq regime change should have happened years earlier than the Afghanistan regime change to prevent the Saddam regime from fueling the dramatic growth of both the al Qaeda and Saddamist terrorist threats with the Iraqi state-level investment in "seeking and developing supporters from the same demographic pool" (IPP) that "increased the aggregate terror threat" (IPP).
Operation Iraqi Freedom liberated Iraq from the Saddam regime in 2003, but the Iraqi regime change was only the first step needed to solve the Saddam problem. It took longer to diagnose the "sequel" Saddamist insurgency, develop counterinsurgency, and defeat the Saddamist insurgency.
Feser:
The war also cost the U.S. dearly in blood and treasure.
The heightened cost of Operation Iraqi Freedom is a consequence of the Gulf War ceasefire enforcers allowing the noncompliant Saddam problem to fester for twelve years despite that from the start, President HW Bush, President Clinton, and Congress diagnosed that Iraqi regime change was needed to solve the Saddam problem. Saddam used the extra time in power to make his terrorism and human rights abuses "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, 18MAR04) than we knew, which preconfigured the Saddamist insurgency and created the corrupted condition of Iraqi society that drove up the cost of rehabilitating Iraq.
Excerpt from Review of Linda Robinson's "The Long Shadow of the Iraq War: Lessons and Legacies Twenty Years Later":
Robinson:
Worrying about "the perfect storm that could ensue" when confronting a growing problem is a normal and useful exercise. But sooner or later, action towards solving that problem must happen. The solution needs to start somewhere. From there, setbacks and adjustments are normal. Otherwise, the problem will keep worsening, and what could have solved the problem yesterday won't be enough today and will be less adequate tomorrow. That's how an initial post-war plan that likely would have worked for an early-1990s, or even mid-1990s, Iraq proved insufficient in 2003. That's how the Powell Doctrine becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy.
As far as "the massive years-long reconstruction project that would be required to restore stability", that's not new for the American leader of the free world. There's a reason US forces have been stationed in Germany, Japan, and Korea since World War Two. The United States has understood that securing the long-term peace is necessary to win the short-term war, hence the Gulf War ceasefire.
The references at "perfect storm" and "years-long reconstruction project" help illustrate that the noncompliant-Saddam problem was growing worse. Concomitantly, the cost and difficulty of the "reconstruction project" with post-Saddam Iraq was growing as long as the noncompliant-Saddam problem was allowed to fester.
So while Ms. Robinson is correct that in 2003 the Iraqi regime change was costly and difficult, at the same time, nation-building post-Saddam Iraq was as cheap and easy as it ever was going to be moving forward. It would have been cheaper and easier in 1991 when the Powell Doctrine held back President HW Bush as the Iraqis who answered his call to revolt were slaughtered. Or in 1998 when Congress made Iraqi regime change the law to join the executive policy, but then ODF confirmed to Saddam that America was a paper tiger.
President HW Bush, President Clinton, and Congress all held up Iraqi regime change as the solution to the noncompliant-Saddam problem. Yet they kicked the can down the road as the problem festered until some successor was compelled to fix it. That successor turned out to be President Bush.
Senior regional experts warned of the perfect storm [PDF] that could ensue if Saddam were toppled, and of the massive years-long reconstruction project that would be required to restore stability.
Worrying about "the perfect storm that could ensue" when confronting a growing problem is a normal and useful exercise. But sooner or later, action towards solving that problem must happen. The solution needs to start somewhere. From there, setbacks and adjustments are normal. Otherwise, the problem will keep worsening, and what could have solved the problem yesterday won't be enough today and will be less adequate tomorrow. That's how an initial post-war plan that likely would have worked for an early-1990s, or even mid-1990s, Iraq proved insufficient in 2003. That's how the Powell Doctrine becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy.
As far as "the massive years-long reconstruction project that would be required to restore stability", that's not new for the American leader of the free world. There's a reason US forces have been stationed in Germany, Japan, and Korea since World War Two. The United States has understood that securing the long-term peace is necessary to win the short-term war, hence the Gulf War ceasefire.
The references at "perfect storm" and "years-long reconstruction project" help illustrate that the noncompliant-Saddam problem was growing worse. Concomitantly, the cost and difficulty of the "reconstruction project" with post-Saddam Iraq was growing as long as the noncompliant-Saddam problem was allowed to fester.
So while Ms. Robinson is correct that in 2003 the Iraqi regime change was costly and difficult, at the same time, nation-building post-Saddam Iraq was as cheap and easy as it ever was going to be moving forward. It would have been cheaper and easier in 1991 when the Powell Doctrine held back President HW Bush as the Iraqis who answered his call to revolt were slaughtered. Or in 1998 when Congress made Iraqi regime change the law to join the executive policy, but then ODF confirmed to Saddam that America was a paper tiger.
President HW Bush, President Clinton, and Congress all held up Iraqi regime change as the solution to the noncompliant-Saddam problem. Yet they kicked the can down the road as the problem festered until some successor was compelled to fix it. That successor turned out to be President Bush.
The lesson from the cost of Operation Iraqi Freedom for the Iran problem is that the President and Congress should resolve the analogous Iran problem as soon as possible and not allow it fester, the American mistake that drove up the cost of solving the Saddam problem.
Feser:
Anger over its failure was one of the major factors behind the rise of Donald Trump, who promised not to lead the country into another such war.
See the OIF FAQ epilogue answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory".
Operation Iraqi Freedom was not a failure. OIF was a strategic victory under President Bush. The "failure" was President Obama's strategic blunder of prematurely ending the OIF peace operations. President Obama's irresponsible exit from Iraq has resulted in cascading harms.
Excerpt from Criticism of Hal Brands's commentary on Iraq in Hand-Off: "Reassessing Bush's Legacy: What the Transition Memoranda Do (and Don't) Reveal":
Brands:
President Obama, May 19, 2011:
Professor Brands's criticism is misplaced when applied to President Bush on Iraq "through late 2006". The criticism is correctly applied to President Obama on Iraq from 2011 to 2014.
Blame for "the collapse of Iraqi stability that unleashed so many of the wider strategic consequences that persisted for years thereafter—indeed, in many cases those consequences could not be undone even when Iraq was temporarily stabilized a few years later" could apply to President Bush if President Obama had stayed the course with Iraq. But the blame cannot apply to President Bush because of Obama's radical deviation with Iraq. Professor Brands's criticism of Bush has the "America First" logic of blaming Presidents Roosevelt and Truman for the Soviet invasion that followed if President Eisenhower had withdrawn US forces from Europe like President Obama withdrew US forces from Iraq.
The Saddamist insurgency "battered" by OIF "reenergized" as ISIS in the Syria safe "space", where President Obama declined to intervene, and then went back to attacking "fragile and reversible" (McGurk) Iraq. Except now Iraq was stripped of the necessary American protection by Obama. Notably, when Iraq invoked the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement in their frantic calls for help, President Obama waited "to stand with them as a steadfast partner" until after the "collapse of Iraqi stability that unleashed so many of the wider strategic consequences that persisted for years thereafter—indeed, in many cases those consequences could not be undone even when Iraq was temporarily stabilized a few years later".
To help recall how President Obama replaced "Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress" in May 2011 with "the collapse of Iraqi stability that unleashed so many of the wider strategic consequences that persisted for years thereafter—indeed, in many cases those consequences could not be undone even when Iraq was temporarily stabilized a few years later", see Why Obama’s Foreign Policy Process is Broken by David Francis and Obama’s Syria achievement by Fred Hiatt.
Here, though, the president's consistent failure, though late 2006, to adjust course, to resolve crippling dysfunction, or even to fully acknowledge how badly things were going should continue to be judged harshly, not least because it was the collapse of Iraqi stability that unleashed so many of the wider strategic consequences that persisted for years thereafter—indeed, in many cases those consequences could not be undone even when Iraq was temporarily stabilized a few years later.
President Obama, May 19, 2011:
Indeed, one of the broader lessons to be drawn from this period is that sectarian divides need not lead to conflict. In Iraq, we see the promise of a multiethnic, multisectarian democracy. The Iraqi people have rejected the perils of political violence in favor of a democratic process, even as they’ve taken full responsibility for their own security. Of course, like all new democracies, they will face setbacks. But Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress. And as they do, we will be proud to stand with them as a steadfast partner.
Professor Brands's criticism is misplaced when applied to President Bush on Iraq "through late 2006". The criticism is correctly applied to President Obama on Iraq from 2011 to 2014.
Blame for "the collapse of Iraqi stability that unleashed so many of the wider strategic consequences that persisted for years thereafter—indeed, in many cases those consequences could not be undone even when Iraq was temporarily stabilized a few years later" could apply to President Bush if President Obama had stayed the course with Iraq. But the blame cannot apply to President Bush because of Obama's radical deviation with Iraq. Professor Brands's criticism of Bush has the "America First" logic of blaming Presidents Roosevelt and Truman for the Soviet invasion that followed if President Eisenhower had withdrawn US forces from Europe like President Obama withdrew US forces from Iraq.
The Saddamist insurgency "battered" by OIF "reenergized" as ISIS in the Syria safe "space", where President Obama declined to intervene, and then went back to attacking "fragile and reversible" (McGurk) Iraq. Except now Iraq was stripped of the necessary American protection by Obama. Notably, when Iraq invoked the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement in their frantic calls for help, President Obama waited "to stand with them as a steadfast partner" until after the "collapse of Iraqi stability that unleashed so many of the wider strategic consequences that persisted for years thereafter—indeed, in many cases those consequences could not be undone even when Iraq was temporarily stabilized a few years later".
To help recall how President Obama replaced "Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress" in May 2011 with "the collapse of Iraqi stability that unleashed so many of the wider strategic consequences that persisted for years thereafter—indeed, in many cases those consequences could not be undone even when Iraq was temporarily stabilized a few years later", see Why Obama’s Foreign Policy Process is Broken by David Francis and Obama’s Syria achievement by Fred Hiatt.
Feser:
Anger over its failure was one of the major factors behind the rise of Donald Trump, who promised not to lead the country into another such war.
See my 24APR15 advice, How Republicans should talk about the Iraq issue, and 23OCT19 Recommendation: How Republicans should talk about the Iraq issue vis-à-vis Trump. Excerpt from my 24APR15 advice:
With few exceptions, prominent Republicans have adopted the tack of demurring to 're-litigate' the Iraq issue. This is a mistake. Their reticence is interpreted as implicit acknowledgement that the decision for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was wrong, thus invalidating the grounds for the Iraq intervention and dismissing its hard-won successes (such as the Counterinsurgency "Surge"), mitigating or altogether absolving President Obama of his missteps, and validating the guilty characterization of President Bush and the Republican Party with the blame for current events.
Moreover, the view that OIF was wrong is the basic justification for President Obama's policy choices with Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and others.
I can recommend a more constructive strategy for Republicans than the counter-productive demurral to 're-litigate' the Iraq issue: re-litigate it from the ground up to set the record straight.
Do not concede the opposition's misrepresentation of the reasons for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Conceding it sets you up for failure from the word go by boxing you into the frame of a strategically false narrative.
Break that box, instead. Constructive talk about the Iraq intervention requires a reset of the frame with wholesale correction of the popular misconceptions about the grounds — the 'why' — of the mission.
Use this explanation of the law and policy, fact basis for Operation Iraqi Freedom: https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/.
...
Once you have corrected the popular misconceptions about OIF, then — and only then — will you be able to talk about the Iraq issue in a constructive way that realigns the leadership course of our nation and properly honors our men and women and our partners who have served selflessly in Iraq for the right reasons.
At the same time, setting the record straight in the zeitgeist and resetting the frame of the national discussion on the Iraq intervention can focus an inquisitorial spotlight on those parties that have corrupted American leadership by misrepresenting the Iraq intervention. They have caused the harmful consequences of American leadership failure and dishonored our Iraq veterans by denigrating their mission with a false narrative.
In short, stop weakly shying away from the controversy. Vigorously re-litigate the Iraq issue with the basic truth of the matter. Flip the Iraq issue in the zeitgeist. Let the American people know that at the decision point in March 2003, President Bush made the right — the harder right — leadership decision and the Iraq intervention was an honorable, justified mission that was succeeding when President Bush left office in January 2009.
Moreover, the view that OIF was wrong is the basic justification for President Obama's policy choices with Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and others.
I can recommend a more constructive strategy for Republicans than the counter-productive demurral to 're-litigate' the Iraq issue: re-litigate it from the ground up to set the record straight.
Do not concede the opposition's misrepresentation of the reasons for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Conceding it sets you up for failure from the word go by boxing you into the frame of a strategically false narrative.
Break that box, instead. Constructive talk about the Iraq intervention requires a reset of the frame with wholesale correction of the popular misconceptions about the grounds — the 'why' — of the mission.
Use this explanation of the law and policy, fact basis for Operation Iraqi Freedom: https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/.
...
Once you have corrected the popular misconceptions about OIF, then — and only then — will you be able to talk about the Iraq issue in a constructive way that realigns the leadership course of our nation and properly honors our men and women and our partners who have served selflessly in Iraq for the right reasons.
At the same time, setting the record straight in the zeitgeist and resetting the frame of the national discussion on the Iraq intervention can focus an inquisitorial spotlight on those parties that have corrupted American leadership by misrepresenting the Iraq intervention. They have caused the harmful consequences of American leadership failure and dishonored our Iraq veterans by denigrating their mission with a false narrative.
In short, stop weakly shying away from the controversy. Vigorously re-litigate the Iraq issue with the basic truth of the matter. Flip the Iraq issue in the zeitgeist. Let the American people know that at the decision point in March 2003, President Bush made the right — the harder right — leadership decision and the Iraq intervention was an honorable, justified mission that was succeeding when President Bush left office in January 2009.
The centrist Republican leadership should have applied my advice a decade ago. You should apply my advice today.
Feser:
And unlike the Iraq war, Trump’s Iran war is being fought without a clear plan or congressional approval.
As you imply, the key for President Trump and Congress to get right on "Trump's Iran war" is to make it 'like the Iraq war'. The President and Congress should apply the Saddam precedent to the Iran problem because Congress provided Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush with sufficient means to solve the Saddam problem, and President Bush acted sufficiently to finally solve the festering Saddam problem with Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, a constructive legislative-executive process for the Iran problem requires purging the Iraq Syndrome and its self-neutering 'forever' or 'endless war' talking point at the premise level of our politics and policy. It requires the President and Congress to work together on Iran from the operative premise that America got it right on Iraq.
As I explained to Richard Epstein and John Yoo, The apt UN-based international law solution for Iran is the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent. In terms of the rules and standards needed to solve the Iran problem, the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) for aggression (UNSCR 949), weapons of mass destruction and conventional armament (UNSCR 687), terrorism (UNSCR 687), and repression (UNSCR 688) that solved the Saddam regime's manifold threat is the proper match for Iran's analogous manifold threat.
Set aside the international perspective on the (un)likelihood right now of the UN Security Council duplicating UNSCR 678 and the Gulf War ceasefire mandates for the Iran problem. From the domestic perspective, the US law and policy pursuant to UNSCR 678 that successfully solved the analogous Saddam problem are the proper precedent to develop "a clear plan" and "congressional approval" for the Iran problem. Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush and Congress's work together on the Saddam problem is the gold standard for President Trump and Congress to work together constructively on the Iran problem. Excerpt from The Forward Party should reconceive the Iran issue with the premise that we were right on Iraq, which is the truth:
At the dawn of the post-Cold War era, the American-led enforcement of UNSCR 678 was purposely designed as the baseline paradigm for the rules-based post-Cold War liberal international order, particularly to resolve rogue actors like Iran and Saddam's Iraq by upholding the aspirational rules of the reorganized international community. Iraq's mandated compliance with the comprehensive Gulf War ceasefire mandates was the primary test case for "pax Americana". With that essential evaluation of the Iraq intervention in mind, the HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations and Congress conscientiously worked together to enforce UNSCR 678 and related UN resolutions per Public Law 102-190 and related US law. The Iraq intervention set the gold standard for "a president who leads, a Congress that does its job, and a political system that rewards courage instead of silence" and "decisions about war would be debated openly and decided collectively by the representatives of the American people".
However, as the degenerative Iraq Syndrome has pervaded our politics and policy, among its harmful effects, "Presidents of both parties have increasingly used military force without clear authorization from Congress. Meanwhile, Congress has too often avoided the responsibility the Constitution assigns to it." President Trump's Constitutionally messy use of force with Iran follows the precedent of President Obama's Constitutionally messy use of force with Libya. Both messy actions follow the Iraq Syndrome. In order to correct course, to apply a computer analogy, the American 'system' needs to 'revert' to a 'previous restore point' from a healthy 'state' prior to the Iraq Syndrome: On the Iran issue, the Forward Party should hold the President and Congress accountable to the gold standard of Iraq.
However, as the degenerative Iraq Syndrome has pervaded our politics and policy, among its harmful effects, "Presidents of both parties have increasingly used military force without clear authorization from Congress. Meanwhile, Congress has too often avoided the responsibility the Constitution assigns to it." President Trump's Constitutionally messy use of force with Iran follows the precedent of President Obama's Constitutionally messy use of force with Libya. Both messy actions follow the Iraq Syndrome. In order to correct course, to apply a computer analogy, the American 'system' needs to 'revert' to a 'previous restore point' from a healthy 'state' prior to the Iraq Syndrome: On the Iran issue, the Forward Party should hold the President and Congress accountable to the gold standard of Iraq.
Professor Feser, the facts show you were right to support Operation Iraqi Freedom in the first place. It is essential and urgent that you clarify OIF's actual justification first to yourself and then to the public in order to revive the resolute, principled, competitive, essential American leadership of the free world that crystallized with OIF in the crucible of Iraq—not only for the Iran problem.
I invite your critical feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
P.S. If you are an ethical centrist who is concerned about the horseshoe theory come to life in American politics, then consider this excerpt from The Forward Party should reconceive the Iran issue with the premise that we were right on Iraq, which is the truth:
Political strategy point: Consider the instrumental role of the Iraq Syndrome in marginalizing the Republicans' and Democrats' ethical centrists (I have in mind Liz Cheney and the late Joe Lieberman) and replacing them with the "ideological extremes" and "“red versus blue” narrative" that now dominate both parties. The Iraq Syndrome discredited the moderate 'establishment' leaders on both sides of the aisle to enable the rise to power of President Obama, President Trump, and their polarizing factions.
Yet, while the Iraq Syndrome has been a successful strategy for the partisans, it is also a potential pivotal vulnerability for them, as yet unexploited, since the Iraq Syndrome is based on a demonstrably false narrative. To exploit the vulnerability, the Forward Party should vigorously relitigate the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative to discredit the partisans, and hold them to account for the essential damage caused by the Iraq Syndrome. And you should clarify the Iraq issue to restore the ethical centrists who were right on Iraq in the first place.
Yet, while the Iraq Syndrome has been a successful strategy for the partisans, it is also a potential pivotal vulnerability for them, as yet unexploited, since the Iraq Syndrome is based on a demonstrably false narrative. To exploit the vulnerability, the Forward Party should vigorously relitigate the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative to discredit the partisans, and hold them to account for the essential damage caused by the Iraq Syndrome. And you should clarify the Iraq issue to restore the ethical centrists who were right on Iraq in the first place.
No comments:
Post a Comment