Dr. Howes didn't respond to my e-mail, so I don't know whether he's read it.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Thomas Howes]; [Civitas Institute]; [The Vital Center]; [James Madison Society]
date: Jun 5, 2026, 3:16 PM
subject: Cure the Iraq Syndrome to win America back from postliberals and leftists
To Thomas Howes and the Civitas Institute,
I clarify and relitigate the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ using the law and facts that define the Iraq issue.
I am writing to you to criticize the Iraq Syndrome, explicit and implicit, in Dr. Howes's 22APR26 response to Edward Feser's 21APR26 tweet referencing Cardinal Ratzinger on Iraq, 03APR26 Civitas Outlook article, The Iran War and the Future of the American Right, and 22APR26 Civitas Outlook article, Postliberalism’s Hungary Gambit Failed.
The Iraq Syndrome is currently predominant yet based on a demonstrably false narrative. Whereas Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrably was correct on law and fact. The case against Saddam is substantiated. Curing the Iraq Syndrome by clarifying that America rightly solved the Saddam problem is the key to orient the President, Congress, the public, and the international community constructively to solve the analogous Iran problem.
Howes:
I was opposed to the Iraq War in 2003, though I was more confident than my knowledge of the facts warranted. I still think it was the wrong decision, though.
The Iraq Syndrome is the keystone premise of Edward Feser's view that America’s Conflict in Iran Is Not a Just War. Dr. Howes's response should have corrected Professor Feser and pointed out that Cardinal Ratzinger's view on Operation Iraqi Freedom undermined international law and misconceived OIF as a "preventive war". Excerpt from The facts show Edward Feser was right on Iraq in the first place and changed his mind based on misinformation:
Feser:
Cardinal Ratzinger misconceived Operation Iraqi Freedom as a "preventive war". The controlling law and policy on Iraq plainly show OIF was an international law enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates pursuant to UNSCR 678. The partial truth in Cardinal Ratzinger's view is that the Gulf War ceasefire obligated Iraq to "condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism" (UNSCR 687), which the Saddam regime extremely violated, and counterterrorism is intrinsically preventive.
Cardinal Ratzinger undermined international law by favoring the nations, led by France, Russia, and China, found to be complicit with the Saddam regime's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441)—"The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council" (ISG)—instead of the nations, led by the United States and United Kingdom, that faithfully enforced the Gulf War ceasefire mandates pursuant to UNSCR 678.
Cardinal Ratzinger on the Iraq war: “The concept of a ‘preventive war’ does not appear in the Catechism of the Catholic Church… It was right to resist the war and its threats of destruction. It should never be the responsibility of just one nation to make decisions for the world… Given the new weapons that make possible destructions that go beyond the combatant groups, today we should be asking ourselves if it is still licit to admit the very existence of a ‘just war.’” https://fff.org/2008/04/17/pope-benedict-bushs-war-iraq/
Cardinal Ratzinger misconceived Operation Iraqi Freedom as a "preventive war". The controlling law and policy on Iraq plainly show OIF was an international law enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates pursuant to UNSCR 678. The partial truth in Cardinal Ratzinger's view is that the Gulf War ceasefire obligated Iraq to "condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism" (UNSCR 687), which the Saddam regime extremely violated, and counterterrorism is intrinsically preventive.
Cardinal Ratzinger undermined international law by favoring the nations, led by France, Russia, and China, found to be complicit with the Saddam regime's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441)—"The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council" (ISG)—instead of the nations, led by the United States and United Kingdom, that faithfully enforced the Gulf War ceasefire mandates pursuant to UNSCR 678.
But instead of correcting Professor Feser and Cardinal Ratzinger, Dr. Howes exacerbated the Iraq Syndrome by responding, "I was opposed to the Iraq War in 2003, though I was more confident than my knowledge of the facts warranted. I still think it was the wrong decision, though."
Dr. Howes's view on Iraq is vague but looks like Hal Brands's view on Iraq, "It is still possible, of course, to understand all of those factors and conclude...that the invasion was nonetheless, on balance, a mistake." Therefore, I recommend my corrective Criticism of Hal Brands's commentary on Iraq in Hand-Off: "Reassessing Bush's Legacy: What the Transition Memoranda Do (and Don't) Reveal".
If Dr. Howes's reasoning for "it was the wrong decision" differs from Professor Brands's reasoning for "the invasion was nonetheless, on balance, a mistake", we can critically examine Dr. Howes's reasoning as well.
Howes:
Postliberals are a minority in American politics, but they punch well above their weight. They are well organized, operate in lockstep, and are loyal to one another—they behave in many ways like the leftists who for decades carried out a strategy of a “long march through the institutions.” ... The more transparent their unpopular project, the less successful it will be.
A pivotal way that postliberals "behave in many ways like the leftists" is that both rely on the Iraq Syndrome. Both polarizing factions "operate in lockstep" by propagating the same false narrative of the Iraq intervention to demean and discredit the "conscientious Republicans and Democrats" in the center, such as the late Vice President Cheney and late Senator Lieberman, who conscientiously enforced the paradigmatic Gulf War ceasefire mandates. The Iraq Syndrome is the horseshoe theory come to life in American politics.
Therefore, a pivotal way to make the postliberal and leftist "unpopular project...more transparent" and "less successful" is to relitigate the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative to expose the postliberal and leftist project as an historic fraud. By the same token, clarifying Operation Iraqi Freedom's actual justification would show the public that the "conscientious Republicans and Democrats" in the center who supported the Iraq intervention were right on Iraq in the first place.
Howes:
For at least the last decade, isolationist messaging has dominated the GOP. John McCain and John Bolton were frequently dismissed by the populist base as neocons for suggesting we should bomb Iran. As recently as the 2024 primaries, Nikki Haley was labeled by her opponents as a warmonger for foreign policy proposals that look rather tame compared to the reality of Trump’s second term.
"For at least the last decade, isolationist messaging has dominated the GOP" implicitly refers to the Iraq Syndrome and its 'forever war' or "endless war" talking point, e.g., Senator Murkowski's statement on the Iran conflict.
To fix the situation, see my 24APR15 advice to the GOP, How Republicans should talk about the Iraq issue, and 23OCT19 Recommendation: How Republicans should talk about the Iraq issue vis-à-vis Trump. Excerpt from my 24APR15 advice:
With few exceptions, prominent Republicans have adopted the tack of demurring to 're-litigate' the Iraq issue. This is a mistake. Their reticence is interpreted as implicit acknowledgement that the decision for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was wrong, thus invalidating the grounds for the Iraq intervention and dismissing its hard-won successes (such as the Counterinsurgency "Surge"), mitigating or altogether absolving President Obama of his missteps, and validating the guilty characterization of President Bush and the Republican Party with the blame for current events.
Moreover, the view that OIF was wrong is the basic justification for President Obama's policy choices with Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and others.
I can recommend a more constructive strategy for Republicans than the counter-productive demurral to 're-litigate' the Iraq issue: re-litigate it from the ground up to set the record straight.
Do not concede the opposition's misrepresentation of the reasons for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Conceding it sets you up for failure from the word go by boxing you into the frame of a strategically false narrative.
Break that box, instead. Constructive talk about the Iraq intervention requires a reset of the frame with wholesale correction of the popular misconceptions about the grounds — the 'why' — of the mission.
Use this explanation of the law and policy, fact basis for Operation Iraqi Freedom: https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/.
. . .
Once you have corrected the popular misconceptions about OIF, then — and only then — will you be able to talk about the Iraq issue in a constructive way that realigns the leadership course of our nation and properly honors our men and women and our partners who have served selflessly in Iraq for the right reasons.
At the same time, setting the record straight in the zeitgeist and resetting the frame of the national discussion on the Iraq intervention can focus an inquisitorial spotlight on those parties that have corrupted American leadership by misrepresenting the Iraq intervention. They have caused the harmful consequences of American leadership failure and dishonored our Iraq veterans by denigrating their mission with a false narrative.
In short, stop weakly shying away from the controversy. Vigorously re-litigate the Iraq issue with the basic truth of the matter. Flip the Iraq issue in the zeitgeist. Let the American people know that at the decision point in March 2003, President Bush made the right — the harder right — leadership decision and the Iraq intervention was an honorable, justified mission that was succeeding when President Bush left office in January 2009.
Moreover, the view that OIF was wrong is the basic justification for President Obama's policy choices with Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and others.
I can recommend a more constructive strategy for Republicans than the counter-productive demurral to 're-litigate' the Iraq issue: re-litigate it from the ground up to set the record straight.
Do not concede the opposition's misrepresentation of the reasons for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Conceding it sets you up for failure from the word go by boxing you into the frame of a strategically false narrative.
Break that box, instead. Constructive talk about the Iraq intervention requires a reset of the frame with wholesale correction of the popular misconceptions about the grounds — the 'why' — of the mission.
Use this explanation of the law and policy, fact basis for Operation Iraqi Freedom: https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/.
. . .
Once you have corrected the popular misconceptions about OIF, then — and only then — will you be able to talk about the Iraq issue in a constructive way that realigns the leadership course of our nation and properly honors our men and women and our partners who have served selflessly in Iraq for the right reasons.
At the same time, setting the record straight in the zeitgeist and resetting the frame of the national discussion on the Iraq intervention can focus an inquisitorial spotlight on those parties that have corrupted American leadership by misrepresenting the Iraq intervention. They have caused the harmful consequences of American leadership failure and dishonored our Iraq veterans by denigrating their mission with a false narrative.
In short, stop weakly shying away from the controversy. Vigorously re-litigate the Iraq issue with the basic truth of the matter. Flip the Iraq issue in the zeitgeist. Let the American people know that at the decision point in March 2003, President Bush made the right — the harder right — leadership decision and the Iraq intervention was an honorable, justified mission that was succeeding when President Bush left office in January 2009.
The centrist Republican leadership should have applied my 24APR15 advice "for at least the last decade". Dr. Howes and the Civitas Institute should apply my advice today.
Howes:
Those of us who believe in America, those of us who believe in its Constitution, those of us who believe in a rule of law, cannot help but fear the direction of national politics in recent years. In a two-party system, we need both parties to respect these ideals because each will be in charge roughly half the time. The trends are, nonetheless, troubling.
. . .
The two major parties will remain, and so will much of their electorates. Conscientious Republicans and Democrats can get more like-minded people to show up to primaries, and that will make a difference, but in general elections, they will still have to work with coalitions of people who do not share their ideals. Since conscientious conservatives are unlikely to find a purist solution to this predicament, the only viable path is incremental improvement. Trump’s base moving away from the new right and toward voices that are more supportive of the American experiment is a positive development. That helps America, and given America’s disproportionate influence, it also helps the world.
. . .
The two major parties will remain, and so will much of their electorates. Conscientious Republicans and Democrats can get more like-minded people to show up to primaries, and that will make a difference, but in general elections, they will still have to work with coalitions of people who do not share their ideals. Since conscientious conservatives are unlikely to find a purist solution to this predicament, the only viable path is incremental improvement. Trump’s base moving away from the new right and toward voices that are more supportive of the American experiment is a positive development. That helps America, and given America’s disproportionate influence, it also helps the world.
Dr. Howes shares this purpose with the Forward Party. See my recommendation to the Forward Party, The Forward Party should reconceive the Iran issue with the premise that we were right on Iraq, which is the truth. Excerpt:
The "partisan battles" over Iran reinforce that the pervasive Iraq Syndrome, such as the misguiding "forever war" talking point, has become the operative political and policy context for today's Republicans and Democrats. As such, it is essential for the Forward Party's mission and your challenge to "the two major parties" that you establish the operative context that Operation Iraqi Freedom was justified and a war of necessity according to Richard Haass's taxonomy. Which is the demonstrable truth. In contrast, the Iraq Syndrome is based on a demonstrably false narrative.
The Iraq Syndrome is degenerative and toxic for the Forward Party's advocacy of "America can maintain a strong national defense and be a force for good in the world while honoring constitutional balance. A presidency that respects the law, matched with a Congress willing to act as a co-equal branch of government, strengthens our country, protects our troops, and upholds the rule of law that defines us as a nation." Whereas the 1990 to 2011 Iraq intervention, including OIF, embodies the elements of the Forward Party's platform.
At the dawn of the post-Cold War era, the American-led enforcement of UNSCR 678 was purposely designed as the baseline paradigm for the rules-based post-Cold War liberal international order, particularly to resolve rogue actors like Iran and Saddam's Iraq by upholding the aspirational rules of the reorganized international community. Iraq's mandated compliance with the comprehensive Gulf War ceasefire mandates was the primary test case for "pax Americana". With that essential evaluation of the Iraq intervention in mind, the HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations and Congress conscientiously worked together to enforce UNSCR 678 and related UN resolutions per Public Law 102-190 and related US law. The Iraq intervention set the gold standard for "a president who leads, a Congress that does its job, and a political system that rewards courage instead of silence" and "decisions about war would be debated openly and decided collectively by the representatives of the American people".
However, as the degenerative Iraq Syndrome has pervaded our politics and policy, among its harmful effects, "Presidents of both parties have increasingly used military force without clear authorization from Congress. Meanwhile, Congress has too often avoided the responsibility the Constitution assigns to it." President Trump's Constitutionally messy use of force with Iran follows the precedent of President Obama's Constitutionally messy use of force with Libya. Both messy actions follow the Iraq Syndrome. In order to correct course, to apply a computer analogy, the American 'system' needs to 'revert' to a 'previous restore point' from a healthy 'state' prior to the Iraq Syndrome: On the Iran issue, the Forward Party should hold the President and Congress accountable to the gold standard of Iraq.
The Iraq Syndrome is degenerative and toxic for the Forward Party's advocacy of "America can maintain a strong national defense and be a force for good in the world while honoring constitutional balance. A presidency that respects the law, matched with a Congress willing to act as a co-equal branch of government, strengthens our country, protects our troops, and upholds the rule of law that defines us as a nation." Whereas the 1990 to 2011 Iraq intervention, including OIF, embodies the elements of the Forward Party's platform.
At the dawn of the post-Cold War era, the American-led enforcement of UNSCR 678 was purposely designed as the baseline paradigm for the rules-based post-Cold War liberal international order, particularly to resolve rogue actors like Iran and Saddam's Iraq by upholding the aspirational rules of the reorganized international community. Iraq's mandated compliance with the comprehensive Gulf War ceasefire mandates was the primary test case for "pax Americana". With that essential evaluation of the Iraq intervention in mind, the HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations and Congress conscientiously worked together to enforce UNSCR 678 and related UN resolutions per Public Law 102-190 and related US law. The Iraq intervention set the gold standard for "a president who leads, a Congress that does its job, and a political system that rewards courage instead of silence" and "decisions about war would be debated openly and decided collectively by the representatives of the American people".
However, as the degenerative Iraq Syndrome has pervaded our politics and policy, among its harmful effects, "Presidents of both parties have increasingly used military force without clear authorization from Congress. Meanwhile, Congress has too often avoided the responsibility the Constitution assigns to it." President Trump's Constitutionally messy use of force with Iran follows the precedent of President Obama's Constitutionally messy use of force with Libya. Both messy actions follow the Iraq Syndrome. In order to correct course, to apply a computer analogy, the American 'system' needs to 'revert' to a 'previous restore point' from a healthy 'state' prior to the Iraq Syndrome: On the Iran issue, the Forward Party should hold the President and Congress accountable to the gold standard of Iraq.
The American-led enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates set the gold standard for bipartisan collaboration, Constitutional rule of law for war, and American leadership of the free world. All three aspects of the "American experiment" are undermined by the Iraq Syndrome. Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #americanprimacy section:
Stigmatizing right normalizes wrong in general. Stigmatizing an epochal paradigmatic right like the Iraq intervention fundamentally reshapes American culture, politics, policy, and leadership with metastatic premise. Clarifying and relitigating the Iraq issue means more than the 4 corners of the Saddam problem, President Bush's legacy, and Operation Iraqi Freedom itself. Since the 1990-2011 UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement and peace operations with Iraq activated all the elements of American leadership essential to compete for the dominance of pluralistic liberal world order in the geopolitical arena, the current prevailing revisionist narrative stigmatizing the Iraq intervention lays the foundation and sets the frame for a paradigm shift antithetical to American leadership of the free world.
"America’s disproportionate influence" would also help the world by restoring the international law solution for rogue actors that pose a threat other than war, i.e., the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent. See The apt UN-based international law solution for Iran is the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent.
Holding Saddam's accomplices led by France, Russia, and China to account for their complicity in Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441), i.e., casus belli, would also help the world by discouraging Saddam's accomplices from encouraging and enabling other rogue actors like Iran.
Howes:
Recent events reveal that Trump’s base is not as isolationist as many perceived. There were signs even before the Iran War, where a healthy percentage of Republicans favored aid for Ukraine and sanctions on Russia, and showed no real support for the U.S.’s withdrawal from world affairs.
The problem with "a healthy percentage of Republicans...showed no real support for the U.S.’s withdrawal from world affairs" is that the Iraq Syndrome's self-neutering 'forever war' or "endless war" talking point continues to predominate among Republicans, which makes for a self-defeating contradiction.
For example, as I explain in Jakub Grygiel's "The Iran War and the Coming Global Struggle" comes of the Iraq Syndrome, it has become apparent that Operation Epic Fury is Operation Desert Fox redux. It is not surprising that Iran's reaction to the self-conscious limits of OEF induced by the Iraq Syndrome has been markedly similar to Saddam's reaction to the self-conscious limits of ODF induced by the Vietnam Syndrome.
Operation Desert Fox is a cautionary example of the limits of air power when it is not combined with an effective ground element. ODF failed to weaken and coerce the Saddam regime in the ways that mattered for the UNSCR 678 enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates, which is relevant to the Iran issue given that President Trump clearly, and rightly, wants to reinvent the Gulf War ceasefire's rules and standards for the analogous Iran problem.
President Trump's difficult ceasefire negotiation with Iran highlights further disadvantages of Operation Epic Fury compared to President Clinton's Operation Desert Fox.
One, for the Saddam problem, the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) for weapons of mass destruction and conventional disarmament (UNSCR 687), terrorism (UNSCR 687), human rights (UNSCR 688), and aggression (UNSCR 949) was well established preceding Operation Desert Fox. The strategically* ineffective, even counterproductive, ODF was not the coercive basis of the ceasefire conditions for Iraq.
(* While not strategically effective, Operation Desert Fox was legally effective in finishing the set of law, policy, and precedent that set the stage for Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) and Operation Iraqi Freedom pursuant to UNSCR 678.)
In contrast, President Trump did not inherit sufficient rules and standards to solve the Iran problem like President Clinton inherited to solve the Saddam problem. Rather, Operation Epic Fury is President Trump's coercive basis for negotiating sufficient ceasefire conditions for Iran. The problem is that Iran is reacting to OEF like Saddam reacted to ODF.
President Trump wants to reinvent the Gulf War ceasefire mandates for Iran, yet establishing the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) depended on Operation Desert Storm's coercive leverage, i.e., US boots on the ground pressing into Iraq itself. And of course, the UNSCR 678 enforcers finally brought Iraq into its mandated compliance with Operation Iraqi Freedom, which again required US boots on the ground within Iraq, capturing the flag in Baghdad and then beating the preconfigured Saddamist insurgency. When the Saddam precedent is properly understood, the establishment of the sufficient Gulf War ceasefire mandates with the coercive leverage of US ground forces, the twelve-year failure of air power alone to compel Iraq's mandated compliance, Saddam's response to ODF with the heightened noncompliance that compelled OIF, and the belated achievement of Iraq's mandated compliance with US ground forces prove the political and practical necessity of an effective ground element.
Specific to the Iran issue, the requirement of an effective ground element was a key lesson (re)learned from finally solving the festering Saddam problem that should have been an automatic premise in managing the analogous Iran problem. However, the misguiding Iraq Syndrome has buried the constructive lessons of Iraq.
Two, for the Saddam problem, Congress provided sufficient support to the HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations for the military enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates with multiple resolutions urging the President to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235), including redundant authorizations to use military force.
In contrast, the 'forever war' or "endless war" talking point that currently predominates among Democrats and Republicans has limited Congress's support for managing the Iran problem to less than the Congressional support that was necessary to resolve the analogous Saddam problem. It is not surprising then that President Trump has opted to work around Congress rather than work with a Congress that is corrupted by the Iraq Syndrome, albeit the President's own choices on Iran have been undermined by the Iraq Syndrome.
Nonetheless, Congress is not wrong to call on the President to work with Congress on the Iran problem. The Iran problem will last beyond the Trump administration like the Saddam problem lasted beyond the HW Bush administration. Rather than work around Congress, President Trump and Congress should lay a lasting law and policy foundation to deal with the Iran problem like the legal foundation that President HW Bush and Congress established for the Saddam problem, which was necessary and sufficient for the American leader of the free world to eventually resolve the Saddam problem two administrations later. But reprising Congress's sufficient support on Iraq for Iran requires curing the Iraq Syndrome and clarifying the actual justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom at the premise level of our politics and policy. Excerpt from The facts show Edward Feser was right on Iraq in the first place and changed his mind based on misinformation:
Feser:
As you imply, the key for President Trump and Congress to get right on "Trump's Iran war" is to make it 'like the Iraq war'. The President and Congress should apply the Saddam precedent to the Iran problem because Congress provided Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush with sufficient means to solve the Saddam problem, and President Bush acted sufficiently to finally solve the festering Saddam problem with Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, a constructive legislative-executive process for the Iran problem requires purging the Iraq Syndrome and its self-neutering 'forever' or 'endless war' talking point at the premise level of our politics and policy. It requires the President and Congress to work together on Iran from the operative premise that America got it right on Iraq.
. . .
Set aside the international perspective on the (un)likelihood right now of the UN Security Council duplicating UNSCR 678 and the Gulf War ceasefire mandates for the Iran problem. From the domestic perspective, the US law and policy pursuant to UNSCR 678 that successfully solved the analogous Saddam problem are the proper precedent to develop "a clear plan" and "congressional approval" for the Iran problem. Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush and Congress's work together on the Saddam problem is the gold standard for President Trump and Congress to work together constructively on the Iran problem.
And unlike the Iraq war, Trump’s Iran war is being fought without a clear plan or congressional approval.
As you imply, the key for President Trump and Congress to get right on "Trump's Iran war" is to make it 'like the Iraq war'. The President and Congress should apply the Saddam precedent to the Iran problem because Congress provided Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush with sufficient means to solve the Saddam problem, and President Bush acted sufficiently to finally solve the festering Saddam problem with Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, a constructive legislative-executive process for the Iran problem requires purging the Iraq Syndrome and its self-neutering 'forever' or 'endless war' talking point at the premise level of our politics and policy. It requires the President and Congress to work together on Iran from the operative premise that America got it right on Iraq.
. . .
Set aside the international perspective on the (un)likelihood right now of the UN Security Council duplicating UNSCR 678 and the Gulf War ceasefire mandates for the Iran problem. From the domestic perspective, the US law and policy pursuant to UNSCR 678 that successfully solved the analogous Saddam problem are the proper precedent to develop "a clear plan" and "congressional approval" for the Iran problem. Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush and Congress's work together on the Saddam problem is the gold standard for President Trump and Congress to work together constructively on the Iran problem.
As the situation stands, President Trump limiting US military coercive leverage to an Operation Desert Fox redux in obedience to the Iraq Syndrome is not much better than President Obama's JCPOA in obedience to the Iraq Syndrome.
To fix the situation, Republicans who "showed no real support for the U.S.’s withdrawal from world affairs" need to solve their self-defeating contradiction and cure the Iraq Syndrome by embracing Operation Iraqi Freedom to apply the constructive lessons of Iraq. For example, excerpt from Review of Linda Robinson's "The Long Shadow of the Iraq War: Lessons and Legacies Twenty Years Later":
Robinson:
"Adopt the Powell Doctrine" is exactly the wrong lesson from Iraq. The Powell Doctrine positively influenced Saddam's choice to breach the Gulf War ceasefire, thus causing the Gulf War to resume. Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #postwar section:
It doesn't make sense that "Congress should ... apply these guidelines" given that the Powell Doctrine undermined Congress's mandates on Iraq. The 22MAR00 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing on Iraq shows that by March 2000, Congress understood the UN sanctions and UN inspections had failed, the 'containment' was not real, the problem was growing worse, and the UNSCR 678 enforcement had reached the line of Iraqi regime change codified in Public Law 105-338, albeit many (not all) US officials still balked at crossing the line with force. Excerpt:
The Powell Doctrine was one of the reasons for the "fundamental mistake that everybody underestimated when George [HW] Bush stopped us going into Baghdad" (Biden).
Iraq shows us that the self-limiting formula of the Powell Doctrine undermines our ability to deter adversaries, match capability to need, and solve problems in the global arena. The United States should not handicap itself as a competitor with the inherent incompetence and vulnerability of the Powell Doctrine. The constructive lesson of Iraq is that the American leader of the free world should seek practical and political mastery of all relevant forms of competition, including counterinsurgency, in order to competently and confidently champion our interests across the spectrum of the global arena, and deter or counteract our adversaries who might otherwise exploit the Powell Doctrine to advance inimical interests and deter the US.
If the executive branch cannot apply these [Powell Doctrine] guidelines, Congress should.
Lesson: Adopt the Powell Doctrine ...
Lesson: Adopt the Powell Doctrine ...
"Adopt the Powell Doctrine" is exactly the wrong lesson from Iraq. The Powell Doctrine positively influenced Saddam's choice to breach the Gulf War ceasefire, thus causing the Gulf War to resume. Excerpt from the OIF FAQ retrospective #postwar section:
The Army's shortcomings in the immediate post-war were due to an institutional mindset deeply rooted in the fall-out of the Vietnam War, exemplified by the Powell Doctrine, that was averse to nation-building occupation. The resulting Pentagon culture was critically misaligned with White House policy on Iraq where the Gulf War ceasefire, evinced by the breadth of the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) that was enforced under US law and President HW Bush's path-setting policy decisions at the outset, effectively required Iraqi regime change — with or without Saddam staying in power. Yet Saddam felt uncompelled to comply as mandated with the Gulf War ceasefire because he interpreted from his 1991 Operation Desert Storm and 1998 Operation Desert Fox experiences that the US was bluffing. Due to the self-imposed limitations typified by the Powell Doctrine, Saddam believed the US was unwilling to enforce the terms of ceasefire with a credible threat of regime change, thus the chief enforcer of the Gulf War ceasefire could be defeated.
In effect, the Powell Doctrine represented an obvious design flaw in American leadership that provided a foundational building block for Saddam, his allies, and other like-minded actors to develop a template for effectively rendering American-led international enforcement obsolete.
Implicating the Powell Doctrine, GEN Petraeus again: “If we are going to fight future wars, they’re going to be very similar to Iraq,” he says, adding that this was why “we have to get it right in Iraq”.
In effect, the Powell Doctrine represented an obvious design flaw in American leadership that provided a foundational building block for Saddam, his allies, and other like-minded actors to develop a template for effectively rendering American-led international enforcement obsolete.
Implicating the Powell Doctrine, GEN Petraeus again: “If we are going to fight future wars, they’re going to be very similar to Iraq,” he says, adding that this was why “we have to get it right in Iraq”.
It doesn't make sense that "Congress should ... apply these guidelines" given that the Powell Doctrine undermined Congress's mandates on Iraq. The 22MAR00 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing on Iraq shows that by March 2000, Congress understood the UN sanctions and UN inspections had failed, the 'containment' was not real, the problem was growing worse, and the UNSCR 678 enforcement had reached the line of Iraqi regime change codified in Public Law 105-338, albeit many (not all) US officials still balked at crossing the line with force. Excerpt:
Senator Biden. I do not disagree with anything any of you said except none of you have a damn solution. You do not have any idea of what you are talking as to what to do from here. You are right in the criticism. I think the criticism is dead right. We made a fundamental mistake that everybody underestimated when George Bush stopped us going into Baghdad. One of the things no one figured was that it would be read as a conclusion that possession of or the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons would hold off the giant. And that is the reason why he did not occupy Baghdad is because we had these weapons, thereby emboldening them to hang onto them closer. So, a fundamental mistake. It is easy to Monday morning quarterback now and say it, but a fundamental mistake made. And we continue to make mistakes as we go along.
The Powell Doctrine was one of the reasons for the "fundamental mistake that everybody underestimated when George [HW] Bush stopped us going into Baghdad" (Biden).
Iraq shows us that the self-limiting formula of the Powell Doctrine undermines our ability to deter adversaries, match capability to need, and solve problems in the global arena. The United States should not handicap itself as a competitor with the inherent incompetence and vulnerability of the Powell Doctrine. The constructive lesson of Iraq is that the American leader of the free world should seek practical and political mastery of all relevant forms of competition, including counterinsurgency, in order to competently and confidently champion our interests across the spectrum of the global arena, and deter or counteract our adversaries who might otherwise exploit the Powell Doctrine to advance inimical interests and deter the US.
Howes:
Supporters of Trump’s decision to go to war with the Iranian regime argue that the bombing of Iranian military targets has weakened the Iranian regime and its ability to harm the US and its allies. This war could end a despotic, apocalyptic-minded, America-hating regime. But what the war has also imposed is the unintended diminishment of the new right’s influence in the Republican Party. Politics in America is never settled, and the shape and depth of the conservative movement, and its influence on the GOP, is no exception. The future, as some have said, takes a long time to happen. But we know that its political destination is anything but determined.
The Iraq Syndrome preceded presidential candidate Trump. The Iraq Syndrome was instrumental in the diminishment of the centrist Republican leadership that paved the way for "the new right’s influence in the Republican Party" and President Trump's ascension to the presidency. By the same token, the Iraq Syndrome was instrumental in the left's diminishment of the centrist Democratic leadership that paved the way for President Obama's ascension to the presidency.
If President Trump's efforts to solve the Iran problem, already handicapped by the Iraq Syndrome, are dissatisfactory to the public, then the Iraq Syndrome, the keystone premise of "the new right’s influence in the Republican Party", will live on and even grow stronger.
Until Dr. Howes cures the Iraq Syndrome by relitigating the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative to the public and clarifying the actual justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom at the premise level of our politics and policy, his project to win American society back from the postliberal and leftist factions will be set up for failure.
As Dr. Howes says, "The future, as some have said, takes a long time to happen." As some have also said, first things first. To lay the foundation for a better "political destination", Dr. Howes needs to clarify the Iraq issue to himself and the public and understand that America was right on Iraq.
Dr. Howes and the Civitas Institute, I invite your critical feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
Related:
No comments:
Post a Comment