Ms. Daftari didn't respond to my e-mail, so I don't know whether she's read it.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Lisa Daftari]; [New York Post], [California Post]
date: Jul 28, 2026, 3:50 PM
subject: Apply the Saddam precedent to "finish the job and free Iran"
To Lisa Daftari and the New York Post [and California Post],
I clarify and relitigate the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ using the law and facts that define the Iraq issue.
I am writing to you with criticism and recommendations in response to Ms. Daftari's 24JUL26 New York Post [and California Post] article, Iranian-Americans to Trump: Finish the job and free Iran, the replies to her 24JUL26 tweet of the article, and her 21JUL26 tweet that "the worst thing we can do is leave a wounded regime".
Right now, it is premature for Ms. Daftari to say "thank you, Mr. President" since Operation Epic Fury has not shown that President Trump matches President Bush's wisdom and resolve that "finish[ed] the job" with Operation Iraqi Freedom.
At the same time, Ms. Daftari is right to warn us that "the worst thing we can do is leave a wounded regime". If President Trump does not "finish the job" with either an Iranian regime change or a sufficient revision of the Iran regime, then the Iranian people will suffer. Knowing what we know now about Saddam's "wounded regime" following Operation Desert Storm, we can predict that Iran's "wounded regime" is a greater danger to the Iranian people, Iran's targets in the region, and the international community, which gives urgency to Ms. Daftari's appeal to President Trump to "finish the job and free Iran".
Following Operation Desert Storm, Saddam's "wounded regime" adapted. The ways that the Saddam regime adapted provide us a predictive reference for Iran's "wounded regime" as a rogue state in the same area with a similar mentality and similar tools facing similar circumstances. Saddam's post-ODS adaptations included the prioritization and expansion of Saddam's "regional and global terrorism" (Iraqi Perspectives Project). Excerpt from the Iraqi Perspectives Project post-war investigation of Saddam's terrorism:
In the years between the two Gulf Wars, UN sanctions reduced Saddam's ability to shape regional and world events, steadily draining his military, economic, and military powers. The rise of Islamist fundamentalism in the region gave Saddam the opportunity to make terrorism, one of the few tools remaining in Saddam's "coercion" toolbox, not only cost effective but a formal instrument of state power. Saddam nurtured this capability with an infrastructure supporting (1) his own particular brand of state terrorism against internal and external threats, (2) the state sponsorship of suicide operations, and (3) organizational relationships and "outreach programs" for terrorist groups. Evidence that was uncovered and analyzed attests to the existence of a terrorist capability and a willingness to use it until the day Saddam was forced to flee Baghdad by Coalition forces.
The threat of Iran's terrorism is bad now. We know from the Saddam precedent that Iran's terrorism can get a lot worse. The expansion of Saddam's terrorism included "the predominant targets of Iraqi state terror operations were Iraqi citizens, both inside and outside of Iraq" (IPP). As IPP co-author Jim Lacey concluded, "Given the evidence, it appears that we removed Saddam’s regime not a moment too soon."
The United Nations post-war investigation of Saddam's human rights violations found that the Saddam regime's "systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror" (UN Commission on Human Rights, 19APR02)—already assessed as genocidal—were actually "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, 18MAR04) than the outside world thought in the years that followed President HW Bush's failure to "finish the job" with Operation Desert Storm.
The threat of Iran's human rights violations is bad now. We know from the Saddam precedent that Iran's human rights violations can get a lot worse.
We know now that at the start of OIF we substantially underestimated Saddam's rule by "widespread terror" (UNCHR) and the expansion of Saddam's "regional and global terrorism" (IPP), which included "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with the al Qaeda network. Our pre-OIF underestimation of the Saddam regime as a world-leading terrorist organization exposed the OIF peace operations as Saddam's terrorism was smoothly converted to the Saddamist terrorist insurgency that caught our "boots on the ground" by surprise and viciously attacked the nation-builders (soldiers, diplomats, aid workers) and, more so, the Iraqi people until the OIF counterinsurgency adjustment matured with the "surge".
Thus, the urgent lesson of Saddam is that if President Trump's attempt to solve the Iran problem falls short today like President HW Bush's attempt to solve the Saddam problem fell short in 1991, then we should expect that the already suffering Iranian people will suffer "far worse" at the hands of Iran's "wounded regime". We should also expect an Iranian "wounded regime" left in power will adapt in ways, such as "from 1991 through 2003, the Saddam regime regarded inspiring, sponsoring, directing, and executing acts of terrorism as an element of state power" (IPP), that will make the Iran problem increasingly dangerous and more costly and difficult to solve the longer that we allow the Iran problem to fester.
For the sake of the Iranian people, region, and international community, Ms. Daftari should rigorously hold President Trump's leadership on Iran accountable to the proven contemporary standard of President Bush's sufficient leadership on Iraq, so that President Trump does not kick the can down the road with Iran like President HW Bush did with Iraq, and instead solves the Iran problem with either an Iranian regime change like President Bush achieved with Iraq, or a sufficient revision of the Iran regime like the United Nations tried and failed to achieve with Iraq between 1991 and 2003.
For that purpose, Ms. Daftari's statement in her 24JUL26 article that "We watched George W. Bush call Iran part of an axis of evil and then hand the regime a $700 billion gift by removing Saddam from its western flank" is counterproductive for her advocacy in three ways:
First, Ms. Daftari's statement undermines her advocacy by rejecting the precedential resolution of the Saddam problem with Operation Iraqi Freedom. OIF's primary mandate was to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (Public Law 107-243) and "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235) under the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). The Gulf War ceasefire mandates were purpose-designed to fulfill the "need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687) with Iraq's mandated compliance on weapons of mass destruction and conventional disarmament (UNSCRs 687 and 707, etc.), aggression (UNSCR 949), terrorism (UNSCR 687), and human rights (UNSCR 688).
The Saddam regime's unresolved Gulf War-established threat was diagnosed by Iraq's measurable compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire mandates, and it is confirmed that the Saddam regime was in "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire across the board (including WMD) at Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). It is also confirmed that Saddam "never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" (Iraq Survey Group). Operation Iraqi Freedom was correctly decided on law and fact and a war of necessity according to Richard Haass's taxonomy.
In substantive terms, the rules and standards of the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) were categorical and sufficient to address the Saddam regime's manifold threat, which makes them an apt match for the Iran regime's analogous manifold threat,—which makes the OIF resolution of the Saddam problem the apt precedent for solving the analogous Iran problem. In contrast to the Gulf War ceasefire mandates, however, neither President Obama's joint comprehensive plan of action nor President Trump's memorandum of understanding categorically and sufficiently addresses the Iran regime's manifold threat. Moreover, Vice President Vance, President Trump's lead negotiator with Iran, sounded like a JCPOA-era Obama negotiator in his 15JUL26 interview with Joe Rogan, which should concern Ms. Daftari. It behooves Ms. Daftari to rigorously uphold the Saddam precedent and apply the Gulf War ceasefire formula to sufficiently fill the gaps and raise the standard of President Trump's ceasefire negotiation with Iran.
In strategic terms, Operation Iraqi Freedom achieved its primary mandate of enforcing Iraq's mandated compliance. (Note that OIF's actual 'mission accomplished' was officially determined in December 2010. The slandered "Mission Accomplished" banner in May 2003 addressed the USS Abraham Lincoln's specific mission in support of the invasion, not OIF overall.)
Rather than reject OIF, Ms. Daftari needs to uphold the Saddam precedent as the necessary premise to make her advocacy substantively sufficient because the Gulf War ceasefire formula categorically and sufficiently addressed the Saddam regime's manifold threat, which is essential for her cause since the Iran regime's manifold threat is analogous to the Saddam regime's manifold threat. She also needs to uphold Operation Iraqi Freedom as the necessary premise to make her advocacy strategically sufficient to "finish the job and free Iran". There is no alternative matching precedent in contemporary law and policy. If Ms. Daftari continues to reject Operation Iraqi Freedom, not uphold the Saddam precedent, and not apply the Gulf War ceasefire formula and enforcement to the analogous Iran problem, then she will continue to undermine her advocacy.
Second, the replies to Ms. Daftari's 24JUL26 tweet of her article are a reminder that the main obstacle to her cause is the Iraq Syndrome, usually represented by the "forever wars" talking point that currently predominates the political frame. Her advocacy is an implicit request for President Trump to approach the Iran problem like President Bush approached the Saddam problem at Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). Yet her statement that Operation Iraqi Freedom was a "gift" to Iran upholds the Iraq Syndrome axiom that OIF was a strategic blunder, which makes her request for America to approach Iran like we approached Iraq unreasonable in the current predominant political frame. (In actuality, Operation Iraqi Freedom was a strategic victory under President Bush. The strategic blunder that enabled Iran was President Obama prematurely ending OIF in obedience to the Iraq Syndrome—more on that below.)
Ms. Daftari's 21JUL26 tweet further triggers the Iraq Syndrome by recommending substantially the same coercive actions that we applied to Saddam's Iraq over the decade-plus Gulf War ceasefire enforcement that preceded Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). See the OIF FAQ answer to "Why did Bush leave the ‘containment’ (status quo)" and OIF FAQ answer to "Why did resolution of the Saddam problem require a threat of regime change". The parallel is unavoidable for Ms. Daftari's advocacy since the Saddam problem and Iran problem are analogous, which is why her rejection of OIF undermines her advocacy. To empower her advocacy, she needs to purge the degenerative Iraq Syndrome and its misguiding "forever wars" talking point from the predominant political frame, and replace them with the operative premise that America got it right on Iraq until President Obama's radical deviation. The fundamental political correction begins with relitigating the Iraq Syndrome's demonstrably false narrative to the public.
Third, Ms. Daftari's statement overlooks that Operation Iraqi Freedom comprises the necessary precedent for the core human rights element of her cause. President Bush actually approached the Iraqi people and the Iraqi human rights issue in the way she says President Trump is approaching but he is not (or no longer) actually approaching the Iranian people and the Iranian human rights issue.
Daftari:
President Trump said he would come to their rescue, and he did. ... Presidents before him did not have the vision, or the will, to see the Iranian people themselves as America’s most important ally on the ground.
It has been a while since Trump administration statements, including the memorandum of understanding, characterized Iranian human rights as a core element of President Trump's solution for the Iran problem.
For Iraq, the human rights element was codified in UNSCR 688 of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates, reiterated in Congressional resolutions and HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush administration policy, and a practical component of the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement from the beginning per Public Law 102-190, then joined by Public Law 105-338, pursuant to UNSCR 678. The United States held Iraq accountable to the UNSCR 688 "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), which the Saddam regime extremely violated for casus belli. Operation Iraqi Freedom pursued Iraqi human rights as mandated by US law and policy.
If Iranian human rights stay a core element of Ms. Daftari's advocacy despite President Trump's apparent marginalization of the issue, then it behooves her to hold up the human rights element of the Iraq intervention as the standard and precedent to prioritize and assess the human rights aspect of the Iran intervention. Right now, Ms. Daftari's rejection of OIF and pretense that President Trump is pursuing Iranian human rights in a way that he is not (or no longer) actually doing are not helping the human rights element of her cause.
Regarding "what we are witnessing, finally, is an American president who has looked the Islamic Republic in the eye and refused to blink", the problem is not whether President Trump "refused to blink" at Iran. The problem is that President Trump "hit them" with a strategy for coercive leverage that has been predictably insufficient. President Trump's air-limited Operation Epic Fury has essentially been President Clinton's Operation Desert Fox redux, and predictably, Iran has reacted to OEF like Saddam reacted to ODF. Refusing to blink with an insufficient coercive strategy for a rogue state of Saddam's Iraq or Iran's caliber is hardly better than blinking. To "hit them" effectively, the Trump administration needs to eradicate the Iraq Syndrome "forever wars" handicap and then adjust Operation Epic Fury sufficiently like the Bush administration successfully adjusted Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Excerpt from Jakub Grygiel's "The Iran War and the Coming Global Struggle" comes of the Iraq Syndrome:
Regarding Professor Grygiel's secondary strategic point, it has become more and more apparent that Operation Epic Fury is Operation Desert Fox redux.
Recalling Operation Desert Fox in terms of "The military operations against Iran are simply an attempt to eliminate, or at least to minimize for some time, the threat of the radical and potentially nuclear-armed regime in Tehran", Operation Epic Fury's purpose to "eliminate, or at least to minimize...the threat" is problematic because, like ODF for Iraq, we cannot go into Iran to conduct a reliable battle damage assessment. It is striking that the Trump administration's characterization of OEF's BDA for Iran is virtually the same as the Clinton administration's characterization of ODF's BDA for Iraq at the time. Yet later, Clinton officials admitted that they did not, and could not, know ODF's actual impact on Saddam's Iraq.
Notably, the Iraq Survey Group, which conducted the post-war investigation of Saddam's WMD, says little about ODF's impact on Iraq. Where ISG does evaluate the American military damage to Iraq's WMD capabilities prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the damage is from Operation Desert Storm because we (or technically, the UNSCR 687 inspections) were able to conduct a BDA in Iraq after ODS. ISG's implication is that ODF was not effective versus Saddam's Iraq. The fear is that OEF is similarly ineffective versus Iran. Of course, by the time of ODF's aerial bombing in December 1998, Iraq had applied eight years of intensive lessons on how to keep away the important stuff from American aerial targeting. Hopefully, unlike Saddam's Iraq, Iran's important stuff was caught unprepared and vulnerable to OEF's aerial bombing.
Recalling Operation Desert Fox in terms of "The radical regime in Tehran may survive as a diminished power...It may also collapse under the strain of the war and domestic pressures...Or it may turn into an unstable rump polity", we know that President Clinton's choice to self-consciously limit ODF to aerial bombing emboldened Saddam by demonstrating to him and other rogue actors the limit of US military enforcement. Saddam evaluated ODF as confirmation that the US was a paper tiger, which guided Saddam's heightened noncompliance from 1998 to 2003, which caused Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Iraqi regime change in 2003. The self-conscious limits on OEF appear to be affecting Iran's evaluation of US military enforcement in a similar way.
Saddam's direct reaction to Operation Desert Fox was nullifying the Gulf War ceasefire mandates in Iraqi law, accelerating the breakdown of the international sanctions and 'containment' in concert with Saddam's international accomplices (e.g., the Iraq Survey Group found "The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council"), and pushing up the reconstruction of Iraq's WMD program.
Operation Desert Fox did nothing at all to set back Saddam's terrorist threat, which preconfigured the Saddamist insurgency against post-Saddam Iraq. The Iraqi Perspectives Project, which conducted the post-war investigation of Saddam's terrorism, found the Saddamist terrorist threat was substantially deeper than the pre-war intelligence assessment. While ODF did not seek to decapitate Saddam's Iraq like OEF did to Iran, like OEF, ODF did target security infrastructure. However, like OEF, ODF was insufficient to boost internal opposition to an internal regime change due to missing the necessary ground element like the armed opposition on the ground that effectuated the regime change for President Obama's aerial bombing of Libya.
Hopefully, the strategic results of Operation Epic Fury turn out better than they were for Operation Desert Fox, but so far, OEF is looking markedly similar to its predecessor.
Recalling Operation Desert Fox in terms of "The military operations against Iran are simply an attempt to eliminate, or at least to minimize for some time, the threat of the radical and potentially nuclear-armed regime in Tehran", Operation Epic Fury's purpose to "eliminate, or at least to minimize...the threat" is problematic because, like ODF for Iraq, we cannot go into Iran to conduct a reliable battle damage assessment. It is striking that the Trump administration's characterization of OEF's BDA for Iran is virtually the same as the Clinton administration's characterization of ODF's BDA for Iraq at the time. Yet later, Clinton officials admitted that they did not, and could not, know ODF's actual impact on Saddam's Iraq.
Notably, the Iraq Survey Group, which conducted the post-war investigation of Saddam's WMD, says little about ODF's impact on Iraq. Where ISG does evaluate the American military damage to Iraq's WMD capabilities prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the damage is from Operation Desert Storm because we (or technically, the UNSCR 687 inspections) were able to conduct a BDA in Iraq after ODS. ISG's implication is that ODF was not effective versus Saddam's Iraq. The fear is that OEF is similarly ineffective versus Iran. Of course, by the time of ODF's aerial bombing in December 1998, Iraq had applied eight years of intensive lessons on how to keep away the important stuff from American aerial targeting. Hopefully, unlike Saddam's Iraq, Iran's important stuff was caught unprepared and vulnerable to OEF's aerial bombing.
Recalling Operation Desert Fox in terms of "The radical regime in Tehran may survive as a diminished power...It may also collapse under the strain of the war and domestic pressures...Or it may turn into an unstable rump polity", we know that President Clinton's choice to self-consciously limit ODF to aerial bombing emboldened Saddam by demonstrating to him and other rogue actors the limit of US military enforcement. Saddam evaluated ODF as confirmation that the US was a paper tiger, which guided Saddam's heightened noncompliance from 1998 to 2003, which caused Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Iraqi regime change in 2003. The self-conscious limits on OEF appear to be affecting Iran's evaluation of US military enforcement in a similar way.
Saddam's direct reaction to Operation Desert Fox was nullifying the Gulf War ceasefire mandates in Iraqi law, accelerating the breakdown of the international sanctions and 'containment' in concert with Saddam's international accomplices (e.g., the Iraq Survey Group found "The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council"), and pushing up the reconstruction of Iraq's WMD program.
Operation Desert Fox did nothing at all to set back Saddam's terrorist threat, which preconfigured the Saddamist insurgency against post-Saddam Iraq. The Iraqi Perspectives Project, which conducted the post-war investigation of Saddam's terrorism, found the Saddamist terrorist threat was substantially deeper than the pre-war intelligence assessment. While ODF did not seek to decapitate Saddam's Iraq like OEF did to Iran, like OEF, ODF did target security infrastructure. However, like OEF, ODF was insufficient to boost internal opposition to an internal regime change due to missing the necessary ground element like the armed opposition on the ground that effectuated the regime change for President Obama's aerial bombing of Libya.
Hopefully, the strategic results of Operation Epic Fury turn out better than they were for Operation Desert Fox, but so far, OEF is looking markedly similar to its predecessor.
Finally, Ms. Daftari is wrong to conflate the Iran-Iraq policy of President Clinton and President Bush with the radically deviant Iran-Iraq policy of President Obama and President Biden. "Removing Saddam from its western flank" was not a "gift" to Iran. The critical opportunities opened by Operation Iraqi Freedom included improvement of the Clinton dual containment of Iran. America's actual "gift" to Iran was President Obama's radical deviation that prematurely ended OIF, thereby wasting the opportunity to improve the Clinton dual containment and enabling Iran's regional break-out.
Excerpt from Correct the Iraq War "story" to constructively "shape American foreign policy for years to come":
For the Iran problem, Mr. Goldberg, the American Enterprise Institute, and The Dispatch should clarify to the public that Operation Iraqi Freedom set up a stronger Clinton dual containment of Iran, but the opportunity was lost by President Obama's radical deviation. In other words, "opponents of “forever wars” on the left and right" like Senator Paul are actually to blame for the Iran problem since they wasted the solution that was earned by OIF and the Freedom Agenda under President Bush. Excerpt from Criticism of Hal Brands's commentary on Iraq in Hand-Off: "Reassessing Bush's Legacy: What the Transition Memoranda Do (and Don't) Reveal":
Brands:
The assertion that "In dealing with Iran, the mishandled occupation of Iraq was a strategic millstone for Washington" only makes sense up to the point of the Iraq "surge". A key component of the Iraq "surge" was the Iraq government satisfactorily dealing with the secondary Iran-driven insurgency that complemented the primary Saddamist insurgency. When that happened, the Iraq "surge" beat both the Saddamist insurgency and Iran.
As Peter Rodman explains, Operation Iraqi Freedom set up a better stable and ethical path to deal with Iran that relied on three prongs: stabilize Iraq as an American ally, increase sanctions pressure, and support civil reform in Iran. The three prongs were well within reach for President Obama when he entered office. Instead, as Michael Doran explains, President Obama did the opposite of all three.
Worse, President Obama's premature exit from Iraq in 2011, belated return to Iraq in 2014 only after Iraq was ravaged by the Saddamists and rendered vulnerable to Iran, circumscription of the 2014 return to counterterrorism without restoring the nation-building mission, and retraction of American leadership in the Syria crisis specifically and the Arab Spring generally were a stack of gift invitations that Iran accepted to take over the vital gap in Iraq that President Obama left behind. Iran's "regional tumult", which was hitherto contained, broke out from there.
In dealing with Iran, moreover, the mishandled occupation of Iraq was a strategic millstone for Washington. "If the Bush administration's careful coalition-building and restraint of the nuclear front hemmed Iraq in," writes one administration official, "the international disunity and regional tumult that followed the initial US success in Iraq and Afghanistan produced the opposite."
The assertion that "In dealing with Iran, the mishandled occupation of Iraq was a strategic millstone for Washington" only makes sense up to the point of the Iraq "surge". A key component of the Iraq "surge" was the Iraq government satisfactorily dealing with the secondary Iran-driven insurgency that complemented the primary Saddamist insurgency. When that happened, the Iraq "surge" beat both the Saddamist insurgency and Iran.
As Peter Rodman explains, Operation Iraqi Freedom set up a better stable and ethical path to deal with Iran that relied on three prongs: stabilize Iraq as an American ally, increase sanctions pressure, and support civil reform in Iran. The three prongs were well within reach for President Obama when he entered office. Instead, as Michael Doran explains, President Obama did the opposite of all three.
Worse, President Obama's premature exit from Iraq in 2011, belated return to Iraq in 2014 only after Iraq was ravaged by the Saddamists and rendered vulnerable to Iran, circumscription of the 2014 return to counterterrorism without restoring the nation-building mission, and retraction of American leadership in the Syria crisis specifically and the Arab Spring generally were a stack of gift invitations that Iran accepted to take over the vital gap in Iraq that President Obama left behind. Iran's "regional tumult", which was hitherto contained, broke out from there.
In summary, Ms. Daftari is right to warn us that "the worst thing we can do is leave a wounded regime". Knowing what we know now about Saddam's "wounded regime", we can predict that Iran's "wounded regime" is a greater danger to the Iranian people, region, and international community, which gives urgency to Ms. Daftari's appeal to President Trump to "finish the job and free Iran" with either an Iranian regime change or a sufficient revision of the Iran regime. To do so, the categorical and sufficient rules and standards of the Gulf War ceasefire formula need to be applied to Iran, and President Trump's leadership on Iran needs to match the proven standard of President Bush's sufficient leadership on Iraq. That necessitates displacing the degenerative Iraq Syndrome and its misguiding "forever wars" talking point with the operative premise that America got it right on Iraq until President Obama's radical deviation. Whereas Ms. Daftari's current rejection of Operation Iraqi Freedom is counterproductive for her advocacy.
Ms. Daftari, your cause is important. To help you apply the Saddam precedent to "finish the job and free Iran" in addition to this e-mail, here are the latest OIF FAQ posts on President Trump's attempt to solve the Iran problem, which is analogous to the Saddam problem. This list is in reverse chronological order:
...
I invite your critical feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
Related: Correct the Iraq War "story" to constructively "shape American foreign policy for years to come" (Jonah Goldberg), Answer and solutions for Mark Hertling's "Tell Me How the Iran War Ends: What are we fighting for?", Cure the Iraq Syndrome to win America back from postliberals and leftists (Thomas Howes), The facts show Edward Feser was right on Iraq in the first place and changed his mind based on misinformation, Jakub Grygiel's "The Iran War and the Coming Global Struggle" comes of the Iraq Syndrome, The apt UN-based international law solution for Iran is the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent (Richard Epstein, John Yoo), The apt Iraq comparison for the Iran intervention is the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, not Desert Storm (Jonathan Allen), The Forward Party should reconceive the Iran issue with the premise that we were right on Iraq, which is the truth, and The Constitutional rule of law for war was skirted by President Clinton, reinforced by President Bush, and degraded by President Obama.
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