Monday, July 20, 2026

Correct the Iraq War "story" to constructively "shape American foreign policy for years to come"

PREFACE: Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief and co-founder of The Dispatch and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Goldberg's conclusion, "Some story [of the war] will prevail, and that story — accurate or not — will shape American foreign policy for years to come," in his 15JUL26 The Dispatch and American Enterprise Institute article, "How Will We Remember the Iran War?" and "The Iran War Could Shape American Policy for Decades", states an essential reason for the OIF FAQ mission to clarify the Iraq issue to the public versus the specious and misguiding Iraq Syndrome. However, Mr. Goldberg misdirects his thesis to the Iran War while conspicuously ignoring the Iraq War despite that President Trump's flawed strategy to solve the Iran problem and the opposition to the Iran War in Congress are both derivative of the Iraq Syndrome. I recommended to Mr. Goldberg to relitigate the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative for the necessary premise to correct course on Iran and constructively "shape American foreign policy for years to come".

Mr. Goldberg didn't respond to my e-mail, so I don't know whether he's read it.



from: [Eric LC]
to: [Jonah Goldberg]; [Alexander Hibbs], [Joseph Kosten], [Gary Schmitt]
date: Jul 20, 2026, 7:31 AM
subject: Correct the Iraq War "story" to constructively "shape American foreign policy for years to come"

To Jonah Goldberg, the American Enterprise Institute, and The Dispatch,

I clarify and relitigate the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ using the law and facts that define the Iraq issue.

I am writing to you in response to Mr. Goldberg's 15JUL26 American Enterprise Institute article, The Iran War Could Shape American Policy for Decades, also titled How Will We Remember the Iran War? We don’t know yet how it will end, but the story is often more lasting than the facts at The Dispatch.

The article concludes with its thesis, "Some story will prevail, and that story — accurate or not — will shape American foreign policy for years to come." I agree with the concept of Mr. Goldberg's thesis. Therein lies the solution to the problem: Correct the prevailing story to constructively shape American foreign policy for years to come. The question is, which war story is the fundamental one to correct?

The answer is not President Trump's war with Iran, which is a downstream effect of President Obama's radical deviation with Iraq. The focal premise of Mr. Goldberg's thesis, that the "war with Iran" is the "this war" from which "Some story will prevail, and that story — accurate or not — will shape American foreign policy for years to come," is a misdirection.

The right answer is that the prevailing story of Operation Iraqi Freedom—not Operation Epic Fury—has been shaping American foreign policy, including Iran policy, since the Obama administration and "will shape American foreign policy for years to come". For the solution to work it is necessary to repair Mr. Goldberg's focal misdirection so the public can focus on the real problem: that the demonstrably false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome has been the prevailing story destructively shaping American foreign policy for years. President Obama and President Trump's flawed strategies to solve the Iran problem are both derivative of the Iraq Syndrome and its "forever wars" talking point, as is the opposition to the Iran War in Congress.

For example, I disagree that President Trump "has been improvising ever since...Trump realized his little war in Iran wasn’t going to repeat the “success” of his little war in Venezuela". The "improvising" characterization implies a strategic freedom that Operation Epic Fury has not shown. Rather, since "hostilities resumed", OEF has continued to obey the Iraq Syndrome's regression to our strategic mistakes with Saddam's Iraq after Operation Desert Storm and before Operation Iraqi Freedom, particularly Operation Desert Fox. The Iran problem is analogous to the Saddam problem, and we embargoed, sanctioned, and bombed Iraq between ODS and OIF, too. Throughout that interval, the Saddam problem festered until the strategic correction of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Operation Epic Fury has essentially been Operation Desert Fox redux, and predictably, Iran has reacted so far to OEF like Saddam reacted to ODF, which is to say, emboldened, belligerent, and aggressive. See Jakub Grygiel's "The Iran War and the Coming Global Struggle" comes of the Iraq Syndrome and Cure the Iraq Syndrome to win America back from postliberals and leftists for more detailed OEF:ODF comparison.

The article refers to "opponents of “forever wars” on the left and right", which implies Mr. Goldberg does know the fundamental value of the Iraq Syndrome. Yet he pointedly does not mention the Iraq War despite the direct influence of the Iraq Syndrome on the Iran War and the politics around it. Conspicuously instead, Mr. Goldberg cites esoteric narratives of the American founding, the Civil War, the SAVE Act, and the New Deal to argue "Politics is about many things, but whether you call it “spin,” “framing” or “narrative competition,” storytelling is never far from the heart of it" and "Very often the story is more lastingly important than the facts".

Mr. Goldberg's focal misdirection is corroborated by his empty retort to Rand Paul's 19JUN26 forever wars tweet and "his stupid word gymnastics" in the ensuing discussion, which were an obvious evasion of the common knowledge that the "forever wars" talking point is based on the Iraq Syndrome.

Willful ignorance will not make the Iraq Syndrome go away. The degenerative Iraq Syndrome has staying power as the strategic heir to the debilitating Vietnam Syndrome. Ignoring the Iraq Syndrome only enables its malignancy to grow worse and eventually fatal. Here is an example of how Mr. Goldberg should have answered Senator Paul:

The trick in @RandPaul's "They've been wrong every time" has been 1 spreading false narrative, 2 curtailing the US forces needed to secure long-term peace like we have with Germany, Japan & Korea since WW2, 3 blaming the resulting harm on "forever wars".
[See] https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2014/05/operation-iraqi-freedom-faq.html#blunderorvictory

The solution to the problem lies in the concept of Mr. Goldberg's thesis: For the prevailing story of the Iraq War which "will shape American foreign policy for years to come" to be made constructive, the public needs to understand that America got it right on Iraq until President Obama's radical deviation. That sets a clear reference point to identify where American leadership of the free world was last on the right track, where we went off track, and how to get us back on track. To achieve that end, the false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome needs to be relitigated, and the actual law and fact justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom needs to be clarified to the public. Prevailing the correct narrative of the Iraq War is the necessary premise to purge the Iraq Syndrome from our politics and policy, discredit the "opponents of “forever wars” on the left and right" who depend on the specious Iraq Syndrome, and restore the principal status of the principled centrists among Democrats and Republicans who supported OIF, which in turn are necessary conditions for the President and Congress to correct course on Iran.

For the Iran problem, Mr. Goldberg, the American Enterprise Institute, and The Dispatch should clarify to the public that Operation Iraqi Freedom set up a stronger Clinton dual containment of Iran, but the opportunity was lost by President Obama's radical deviation. In other words, "opponents of “forever wars” on the left and right" like Senator Paul are actually to blame for the Iran problem since they wasted the solution that was earned by OIF and the Freedom Agenda under President Bush. Excerpt from Criticism of Hal Brands's commentary on Iraq in Hand-Off: "Reassessing Bush's Legacy: What the Transition Memoranda Do (and Don't) Reveal":

Brands:
In dealing with Iran, moreover, the mishandled occupation of Iraq was a strategic millstone for Washington. "If the Bush administration's careful coalition-building and restraint of the nuclear front hemmed Iraq in," writes one administration official, "the international disunity and regional tumult that followed the initial US success in Iraq and Afghanistan produced the opposite."

The assertion that "In dealing with Iran, the mishandled occupation of Iraq was a strategic millstone for Washington" only makes sense up to the point of the Iraq "surge". A key component of the Iraq "surge" was the Iraq government satisfactorily dealing with the secondary Iran-driven insurgency that complemented the primary Saddamist insurgency. When that happened, the Iraq "surge" beat both the Saddamist insurgency and Iran.

As Peter Rodman explains, Operation Iraqi Freedom set up a better stable and ethical path to deal with Iran that relied on three prongs: stabilize Iraq as an American ally, increase sanctions pressure, and support civil reform in Iran. The three prongs were well within reach for President Obama when he entered office. Instead, as Michael Doran explains, President Obama did the opposite of all three.

Worse, President Obama's premature exit from Iraq in 2011, belated return to Iraq in 2014 only after Iraq was ravaged by the Saddamists and rendered vulnerable to Iran, circumscription of the 2014 return to counterterrorism without restoring the nation-building mission, and retraction of American leadership in the Syria crisis specifically and the Arab Spring generally were a stack of gift invitations that Iran accepted to take over the vital gap in Iraq that President Obama left behind. Iran's "regional tumult", which was hitherto contained, broke out from there.

For American foreign policy overall, the American leadership characteristics that Mr. Goldberg advocates, such as "sticktoitiveness", are embodied by Operation Iraqi Freedom. From the paradigmatic Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) on weapons of mass destruction and conventional disarmament (UNSCRs 687 and 707, etc.), aggression (UNSCR 949), terrorism (UNSCR 687), and human rights (UNSCR 688), which was sufficient to solve Saddam's manifold threat and should be applied as such to Iran's analogous manifold threat, to the United States' faithful enforcement of Iraq's mandated compliance to resolution pursuant to UNSCR 678, to the Presidents' and Congress's conscientious cooperation on the UNSCR 678 enforcement, to the Iraq "surge's" invaluable contemporary case study of the resolute leadership, resilient mission, and adaptation to setbacks needed to succeed in real competition, Operation Iraqi Freedom is properly understood as the gold standard for the principled, real competitive American leadership of the free world needed for the analogous Iran problem specifically and American foreign policy overall.

But unlocking the constructive lessons of Iraq requires displacing the false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome as the keystone premise of American foreign policy with the true story that Operation Iraqi Freedom was correctly decided on law and fact, a war of necessity according to Richard Haass's taxonomy, and a vital strategic corrective for 'pax Americana' liberal international order.

This essential corrective task to constructively "shape American foreign policy for years to come" requires the public expert authority of Mr. Goldberg, the American Enterprise Institute, and The Dispatch to compete for the truth of the Iraq War in the narrative contest for the zeitgeist. Note however public expert authority is only the political capability needed to compete effectively in the social arena. For the substantive element of the corrective task, Mr. Goldberg and company must become individually well-versed in the primary law and fact sources that define the Iraq issue. Due to the 'expert consensus' obfuscating the Iraq issue, they cannot defer to authoritative expert commentary as usual. Instead, while employing higher primary source authority to realign the Iraq issue with the operative law and facts that define it, they must incisively criticize expert authorities who may be preeminent, colleagues, or even friends wherever they have propagated the false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome. See, for example, my above-quoted corrective criticism of Hal Brands and my Critical notes on the UK Iraq Inquiry Chilcot report. For more examples, take your pick.

Lindsey Graham to his credit before he passed away strived to retain a level of American leadership of the free world with President Trump. However, Senator Graham's fundamental failure was neglecting to purge the Iraq Syndrome from our politics and establish the policy premise that America was right on Iraq. You need to do better than Senator Graham did.

To help you fight for American leadership of the free world better, here are the latest OIF FAQ posts on the Iraq Syndrome and President Trump's attempt to solve the Iran problem, which is analogous to the Saddam problem. This list is in reverse chronological order:
...

I invite your critical feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.



Related: Answer and solutions for Mark Hertling's "Tell Me How the Iran War Ends: What are we fighting for?", Cure the Iraq Syndrome to win America back from postliberals and leftists (Thomas Howes), The facts show Edward Feser was right on Iraq in the first place and changed his mind based on misinformation, Jakub Grygiel's "The Iran War and the Coming Global Struggle" comes of the Iraq Syndrome, The apt UN-based international law solution for Iran is the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent (Richard Epstein, John Yoo), The apt Iraq comparison for the Iran intervention is the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, not Desert Storm (Jonathan Allen), The Forward Party should reconceive the Iran issue with the premise that we were right on Iraq, which is the truth, and The Constitutional rule of law for war was skirted by President Clinton, reinforced by President Bush, and degraded by President Obama.

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