Tuesday, November 8, 2016

Comments critical of presidential candidates Trump, Clinton, and McMullin's positions on OIF

Comment criticizing Donald Trump's position on OIF:

"Trump is a sissy who thinks Bush's war in Iraq was a mistake."

The essential defect of Trump's view that "Bush's war in Iraq was a mistake" is not that it's "sissy", but rather that his view is based on legal and factual error — which bears on assessing his judgement as a candidate for Commander in Chief.

The premise of Trump's position is that Iraq was exculpated on the WMD issue, but that premise is demonstrably false.

According to the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) and fact record for the Gulf War ceasefire (UNSCR 687) disarmament process, Iraq's guilt of proscribed armament was established. To cure its guilt of proscribed armament, Iraq was required to meet its burden [to prove disarmament] with the [declare/yield/eliminate-under-international-supervision] procedure outlined in UNSCR 687.

From the outset of the Gulf War ceasefire, Saddam refused to comply and disarm as mandated and as he agreed to do in order to suspend the Gulf War short of regime change.

Accordingly, in 2002, the UN Security Council decided "to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions", "Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991)", and "to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" (UNSCR 1441).

Concurrently, Congress instructed the President "to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (P.L. 107-243).

Yet in his "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), Saddam opted again not to disarm as mandated. Instead, on March 7, 2003, UNMOVIC reported to the UN Security Council, "about 100 unresolved disarmament issues ... Little of the detail in these declarations, such as production quantities, dates of events and unilateral destruction activities, can be confirmed. Such information is critical to an assessment of the status of disarmament. Furthermore, in some instances, UNMOVIC has information that conflicts with the information in the declaration."

In other words, after 12 years, including 4 months of inspections in his "final opportunity to comply", Saddam had failed to comply with even the basic step of the ceasefire disarmament process, a total verified declaration that accounted for Iraq's entire WMD program, which Iraq had been mandated to provide within 15 days — in April 1991.

The post hoc Iraq Survey Group corroborated UNMOVIC and further substantiated President Bush's decision for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): "ISG judges that Iraq failed to comply with UNSCRs" — "[In addition to preserved capability,] we have clear evidence of his [Saddam's] intent to resume WMD" — "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions...[o]utward acts of compliance belied a covert desire to resume WMD activities" — "it has become evident to ISG that [Iraqi] officials were involved in concealment and deception activities"[ — "From 1999 until he was deposed in April 2003, Saddam’s conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs steadily grew in scale, variety, and efficiency"].

The truth is at the decision point for OIF, Iraq had not disarmed as mandated. Saddam was in fact rearming in violation of UNSCR 687 and evidentially in material breach across the board of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates, including and especially the (WMD) disarmament mandates of UNSCR 687, terrorism mandates of UNSCR 687, and humanitarian mandates of UNSCR 688.

Contrary to Trump's position that "Bush's war in Iraq was a mistake", the President's decision for OIF was correct on the law and facts.

See the explanation of the law and policy, fact basis — the why — of the decision for OIF, which includes the answers to "Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq?" & "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom legal?".

[P.S. Trump's assertion that Saddam was an effective counter-terrorist is diametrically wrong. In fact, Saddam was a world-leading vector of terrorism: "Saddam’s use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime" (IPP). Saddam also ruled Iraq with "widespread terror" (UNCHR).]



Comment criticizing Hillary Clinton's latter 'evolved' position on her vote for the 2002 AUMF and the decision for OIF. An upgraded version of the comment:

“She only makes admissions against interest when there is no alternative to acknowledging the truth in a controversy. Clinton’s history of changing positions and spinning facts is now legendary.”

[A] prime example of Mrs. Clinton’s penchant for brazen spin is her ‘evolving’ position regarding her Senate vote for the 2002 AUMF (Public Law 107-243) in response to partisan pressure.

Clinton’s latter position is that she voted for the 2002 AUMF as Senator to provide the President the necessary leverage for “coercive diplomacy” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with the UN inspections, which is partially correct.

However, as her latter position ‘evolved’ under partisan pressure, Clinton subsequently misrepresented the operative enforcement procedure that defined the decision for Operation Iraqi Freedom in order to disclaim her Senate vote with accusation that the decision for OIF abused the 2002 AUMF.

That accusation [by Clinton] is incorrect on the law and facts. The evidence shows that the decision for OIF hewed to Congressional instruction in the 2002 AUMF.

[The nub of Clinton's accusation is the charge that Bush curtailed the UN inspections, but she's incorrect; UNMOVIC discharged its mandate from UNSCR 1441. See the answer to "Did Bush allow enough time for the inspections?"]

The essential defect of Clinton’s latter position is she mischaracterized the operative historical context for the UNSCR 1441 inspections, the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) that was enforced under the 2002 AUMF, the Congressional instruction to “ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq” (P.L. 107-243), the UNMOVIC findings in the UNSCR 1441 inspections, the UN Security Council consideration of the UNMOVIC findings, and the standard for the determination to use force in section 3(b) of the 2002 AUMF by which President Bush determined to use force with OIF.

[Section 3(b) in Public Law 107-243:

SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.
... (b) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION.—In connection with the exercise of the authority granted in subsection (a) to use force the President shall, prior to such exercise or as soon thereafter as may be feasible, but no later than 48 hours after exercising such authority, make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that—
(1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone either (A) will not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq or (B) is not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq; and
(2) acting pursuant to this joint resolution is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorist and terrorist organizations ...]

While mischaracterizing the UNMOVIC [Clusters document] findings [of "about 100 unresolved disarmament issues"] that confirmed “Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687” (UNSCR 1441), which were the principal trigger for OIF, Clinton ignores the various other fact findings that also confirmed Saddam was in material breach of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates enforced under the 2002 AUMF.

For example, the Iraq Survey Group reported, “ISG judges that Iraq failed to comply with UNSCRs”[, "In addition to preserved capability, we have clear evidence of his [Saddam's] intent to resume WMD",] and “the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions” in breach of UNSCR 687 etc., the Iraqi Perspectives Project reported, “evidence shows that Saddam’s use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime” in breach of UNSCR 687, and the UN Commission on Human Rights reported, “systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq” in breach of UNSCR 688.

In addition, Clinton’s later claim that her Senate vote for the 2002 AUMF opposed Iraqi regime change elides section 4 of the 2002 AUMF, which invoked section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 and “expected” regime change would result from Saddam’s “final opportunity to comply” (UNSCR 1441).

To properly assess Clinton’s latter ‘evolved’ position on her Senate vote for the 2002 AUMF and the decision for OIF, see the explanation of the law and policy, fact basis of the decision for OIF. The scope of Clinton’s misrepresentations are wide enough that I can only recommend reviewing all the answers in the explanation for a sufficient understanding of the 2002 AUMF and the decision for OIF to judge her.

The sad, tragic aspect of Clinton’s spin is that she made the correct decision in her Senate vote for the 2002 AUMF based on the standing law, policy, and precedent that had matured under her husband’s frustrated efforts to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates. Given her proximity to President Clinton’s administration-long struggle with the Saddam problem, Senator Clinton likely understood the gravity of Saddam’s “clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere” (President Clinton) at least as much as, and likely better than, President Bush.

Rather than ‘evolve’ her position on her Senate vote for the 2002 AUMF when her choice was correct in the first place, America, our allies, including and especially Iraq, and she herself would have been better served if she had instead set the record straight on the why of the Iraq intervention and stood up for her right decision and the justified mission.

[P.S. A post expressing my anger at Secretary Clinton and President Obama's fundamental betrayal of American leadership of the free world with their political partisan-based sabotage of the Iraq intervention. Secretary Clinton also reneged on her promises to the Iraqi people to uphold the Strategic Framework Agreement.]



Comment criticizing Evan McMullin's position on OIF:

In the context of a permanent competitive movement, I remain interested in the McMullin campaign’s progress.

But.

In terms of his 2016 presidential candidacy, Evan McMullin disqualified himself from my vote by failing the same litmus test that disqualified Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton.

McMullin’s chief calling card within his overall branding as a principled conservative departing from a Trump-corrupted GOP is his center-right Republican national security platform and background, including “House GOP policy director”.

Therefore, McMullin’s position on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is particularly dismaying as both a poor reflection of his judgement and as a window to the evident misunderstanding of OIF’s grounds in GOP inner circles.

Excerpt from McMullin’s speech on national security at Georgetown University (21SEP16) –
https://www.evanmcmullin.com/honoring_our_founding_principles_promotes_america_s_national_security:
Now, I am going to say something that many may find surprising. As an intelligence officer who saw it firsthand, I believe the invasion of Iraq was misguided – a tragic and expensive mistake. More than four thousand Americans lost their lives in an effort that will end up costing the American taxpayer over 2 trillion dollars. The justification for the war was Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, which were not found, and his suspected terrorist connections.

In our haste and fear we launched a war in which American forces fought with valor and courage, but it was driven by misjudgment on the front end and a lack of clear objectives once it began.
Again, keep in mind that McMullin’s lead credentials are his national security platform and background.

Yet contrary to McMullin’s characterization of President Bush’s decision as a “misguided…mistake”, the “justification” for enforcement with Iraq was plainly stated through 3 consecutive administrations as Iraq’s mandated compliance with the UNSCR 660 series.

The OIF decision was substantively and procedurally correct. The US case versus Saddam is in fact substantiated. Saddam was evidentially in categorical breach of the Gulf War ceasefire in his “final opportunity to comply” (UNSCR 1441).

Contra McMullin, Saddam’s UNSCR 687 breach regarding WMD was established by UNSCOM, decided by UNSC, confirmed by UNMOVIC at the decision point for OIF, and corroborated post hoc by ISG: “ISG judges that Iraq failed to comply with UNSCRs … the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions”.

Contra McMullin, Saddam’s pre-OIF “suspected” terrorism in fact underestimated Saddam’s terrorism. Saddam’s UNSCR 687 breach regarding terrorism was confirmed by the IPP findings on Saddam’s “regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations” that included “considerable operational overlap” with the al Qaeda network.

The OIF decision was not made in “haste” (McMullin), but rather at the conclusion of a decade-plus process that exhausted the alternatives until it finally reached the red line of Saddam’s “final opportunity to comply” (UNSCR 1441) in 2002-2003.

Whatever subjective opinion McMullin holds of the 3-administration US policy of strictly enforcing Iraq’s full compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire mandates, [there was no "misjudgment on the front end".] President Bush’s decision for OIF objectively was correct on the facts according to the operative enforcement procedure for the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441).

McMullin should be the one presidential candidate who upholds the ‘Why We Fight’ of OIF because every national security principle he purports to champion manifested with the US-led 1990-2011 UNSCR 660-series enforcement, most of all with OIF and its peace operations.

Yet it’s plain McMullin is unfamiliar with the decade-plus controlling law, policy, and precedent of the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement and, in the operative context, the determinative facts that triggered enforcement with OIF.

McMullin omits mention altogether of the cornerstone UNSCR 688 humanitarian mandates and thus overlooks Saddam’s “systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror” (UNCHR) in OIF’s justification.

Consistent with his omission of UNSCR 688, McMullin’s criticism of a “lack of clear objectives once it began” exposes his ignorance of the law-and-policy framework that defined the OIF peace operations (eg, section 4 of the 2002 AUMF, section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, statement of the Atlantic Summit, UNSCR 1483, etc) which included the basic UNSCR 660-series compliance process, which the recent “House GOP policy director” is apparently unaware of.

Simply in terms of political strategy, McMullin repeats the mortal strategic error committed by Jeb Bush responding to the Megyn Kelly, May 2015 “knowing what we know now” hypothetical on Iraq, which discredited GOP leadership on national security and set the stage for Trump. Worse, he doubles down on JEB’s disqualifying mistake.

McMullin seems unconscious that disclaiming the Iraq intervention and stipulating the (demonstrably) false narrative of OIF disqualifies the very center-right national security principles he purports to champion. The OIF stigma, based on the false narrative that McMullin stipulated, has been the keystone premise of President Obama’s radical deviation of US foreign policy that has undermined American leadership of the free world.

McMullin’s fundamental misconception of OIF is mystifying. The law and policy, fact basis of the Iraq intervention’s justification is not complicated. The US led the enforcement of Iraq’s mandated compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire as headline news for over a decade while it progressed to its coda with OIF. President Bush’s decision is a straightforward fact pattern that’s easily understood from a readily accessible, plainly stated law, policy, precedent, fact record.

Yet the one 2016 presidential candidate who cla[i]ms to champion all the principles embodied by the Iraq intervention and therefore should grasp the ‘Why We Fight’ of Iraq, plainly does not know. McMullin’s failure on the OIF litmus test is disqualifying for a prospective Commander in Chief.

I hope Team McMullin is sincere about and successful establishing a permanent GOP-independent real competitive conservative movement. But as for Evan McMullin, he disappointed me.



PREFACE: Rick Wilson is a longtime Republican political consultant who was the main strategist for the McMullin presidential campaign.

from: [Eric LC]
to: [Rick Wilson]
date: Oct 23, 2019, 1:47 PM
subject: Recommendation: How Republicans should talk about the Iraq issue vis-à-vis Trump

Mr. Wilson,

I use the primary source authorities, i.e., the set of controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts that define OIF's justification, at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ to clarify the Iraq issue and correct for the prevalent conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.

With that, I am writing you regarding this statement in your 20OCT19 New York Daily News article, DEFDON 1: Trump has more reason than ever for genuine alarm:
In 2006, George W. Bush’s conduct of the war in Iraq cost the GOP, bigly.

You are correct that in the politics, Republicans by and large have failed to uphold the vital American leadership of the free world that manifested under President Bush with Iraq. The GOP failure has been inexplicable given that the President's determination on Iraq was demonstrably correct: the case against Saddam is substantiated: The OIF decision was substantively correct on the facts, procedurally correct on law and precedent, and justified on the policy.

The GOP failure to defend the Iraq intervention in the politics was exploited by the insurgent Obama and Trump campaigns to discredit their normal opponents and give rise to their presidencies. Excerpt from my clarification to Allan Lichtman regarding Trump on Bush and WMD in The Case for Impeachment (2017):
Indeed, President Trump's charge against President Bush is false: according to the operative law and facts that define the Iraq issue, by which a hypothetical impeachment would have been litigated, President Bush's decision on Iraq was in fact correct. Though written prior to the 2016 presidential race, the OIF FAQ answer to "Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq" directly addresses Trump's assertion, "He [President Bush] got us into the war [OIF] with lies!". In addition, during the 2016 presidential race, I correct[ive]ly criticized then-Candidate Trump's misrepresentation of the Iraq issue.
Per your point, my counsel to the GOP in 2015, How Republicans should talk about the Iraq issue, is just as apt today — especially for Republicans who dissent from President Trump. Excerpt:
With few exceptions, prominent Republicans have adopted the tack of demurring to 're-litigate' the Iraq issue. This is a mistake. Their reticence is interpreted as implicit acknowledgement that the decision for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was wrong, thus invalidating the grounds for the Iraq intervention and dismissing its hard-won successes (such as the Counterinsurgency "Surge"), mitigating or altogether absolving President Obama of his missteps, and validating the guilty characterization of President Bush and the Republican Party with the blame for current events.

Moreover, the view that OIF was wrong is the basic justification for President Obama's policy choices with Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and others.

I can recommend a more constructive strategy for Republicans than the counter-productive demurral to 're-litigate' the Iraq issue: re-litigate it from the ground up to set the record straight.
Further, President Bush's resolute adaptive ethical leadership with Iraq was a critical corrective for American international leadership. The standard of preemptive perfection asserted by Bush's critics is neither a usual nor reasonable standard for competition. Rather, the pattern of setback and adjustment that characterized the ups and downs of Operation Iraqi Freedom is typical for real competition, including world-changing contests of war and peace. OIF provided a critical corrective where America and its allies committed the degree of resolute perseverance and responsive adjustment that is necessary to effectually enforce essential international norms for the sake of US national security where they are urgently needed in the world versus the worst illiberal malfeasors. In particular, the counterinsurgency "Surge" passed the competitive test for effectual leadership of the free world. President Bush raised the competitive bar for upholding liberal world order with Iraq, and it is essential for proponents of genuine American leadership of the free world to uphold that bar.



Related: Recommendation to Hillary Clinton on how to talk about her Iraq vote, How Republicans should talk about the Iraq issue, Rebuke of Jordan Chandler Hirsch's "Freedom from Iraq: How the GOP Can End the War over the War", Correcting Mario Loyola: UNSCR 1441 did place the burden of proof on Iraq, and Decision Points suggests President Bush has not read key fact findings on Iraq carefully.

Thursday, September 22, 2016

Augmenting William Inboden's critique of J.E. Smith's Bush biography regarding Iraq

PREFACE: William Inboden is the Executive Director and William Powers, Jr. Chair, Clements Center for National Security, and Associate Professor of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs. I responded to his 15AUG16 Foreign Policy article, It’s Impossible to Count the Things Wrong With the Negligent, Spurious, Distorted New Biography of George W. Bush. Professor Inboden didn't respond to my e-mail, so I don't know whether he's read it.



from: [Eric LC]
to: [William Inboden]
date: Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 8:21 AM
subject: Augmenting your Foreign Policy critique of J.E. Smith's Bush biography re Iraq

Professor Inboden,

I appreciate your article, "It’s Impossible to Count the Things Wrong With the Negligent, Spurious, Distorted New Biography of George W. Bush", at http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/15/its-impossible-to-count-the-things-wrong-with-the-negligent-spurious-distorted-new-biography-of-george-w-bush/. President Bush is a decent man and, at an inflection point in American history, he was a dutiful President.

Your notice, "Smith devotes more attention to this [Iraq War] than any other topic in the book", prompted this e-mail. I can augment your defense of President Bush in relation to the Iraq War from my study of the law, policy, precedent, and facts of President Bush's decision for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

I recommend my explanation of OIF's legal-factual basis at http://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2014/05/operation-iraqi-freedom-faq.html. It synthesizes the situation, controlling law, policy, and precedent that defined the operative enforcement procedure for the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) and, in the operative context, the determinative fact findings of the Saddam regime's breach of the Gulf War ceasefire that triggered enforcement with OIF.

I excerpted Iraq-related passages from your article and interjected comments and references.

Inboden:
Moreover, in Smith’s account, this alleged presidential application of biblical prophecies to Iraq had a tremendous consequence in that it caused Chirac to decide to oppose the war: “Bush’s religious certitude and his invocation of Gog and Magog scuttled the possibility of French support for military action” (339)

_French opposition to the US-led military enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire started, at the latest, in August 1996 with Operation Desert Strike. The French (and other nation[s']al) opposition that President Bush faced over Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2002-2003 was carried forward from the same French (and other nation[s']al) opposition that President Clinton faced over Operation Desert Fox in 1998.

Excerpt from Iraq Survey Group report:
Iraq pursued its related goals of ending UN sanctions and the UN OFF program by enlisting the help of three permanent UNSC members: Russia, France and China. ... Saddam expressed confidence that France and Russia would support Iraq’s efforts to further erode the UN sanctions Regime.
... In May 2002, IIS correspondence addressed to Saddam stated that a MFA (quite possibly an IIS officer under diplomatic cover) met with French parliamentarian to discuss Iraq-Franco relations. The French politician assured the Iraqi that France would use its veto in the UNSC against any American decision to attack Iraq, according to the IIS memo.

New York Times: U.N. Rebuffs U.S. on Threat to Iraq if It Breaks Pact, 03MAR98:
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/03/world/un-rebuffs-us-on-threat-to-iraq-if-it-breaks-pact.html
Los Angeles Times: Allies Sit on Sidelines for Desert Fox, 18DEC98:
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/dec/18/news/mn-55387
New York Times: To Paris, U.S. Looks Like a 'Hyperpower', 05FEB99:
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/05/news/05iht-france.t_0.html


Inboden:
After denying Bush any credit for protecting the nation against further attacks, Smith goes further and blames Bush for any terrorist threats that the nation does face. As he puts it, “the threat of terrorism that confronts the United States is in many respects a direct result of Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003.” But Smith just states this as an article of faith, and offers no evidence for such an overwrought assertion. In fact, as every serious counterterrorism expert knows, the jihadist threat existed well before the Iraq invasion, and has continued and metastasized through to today in many ways that have nothing to do with the Iraq war. Instead of Smith’s reckless calumny, a more scrupulous and nuanced assessment of the Iraq War’s effect on jihadism would find a complex relationship wherein the American troop presence and chaos in Iraq certainly inspired and attracted a large number of new jihadists, but also had a “flypaper” effect, which, when combined with lethal advances in American intelligence and counterterrorism operations, led to the near decimation of al Qaeda in Iraq by 2009. Meanwhile, other al Qaeda franchises and other jihadist groups have proliferated over the last 15 years in places like Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Pakistan, Algeria, and Nigeria, and their growth in numbers and in hostility to the United States has had almost nothing to do with the Iraq War.

_Knowing what we know now about Saddam's terrorism, it seems less the case that OIF "inspired and attracted a large number of new jihadists" than Saddam's terrorism and its network of "regional and global terrorism" (IPP) were converted to the insurgency. Saddam was a world-leading vector of terrorism: "Saddam’s use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime" (IPP). Saddam also ruled Iraq with "widespread terror" (UNCHR). A chief reason the US was caught off guard by the insurgency appears to be that Saddam's terrorism was significantly underestimated by US analysts before OIF, although it was recognized enough to constitute a lead element of the OIF casus belli[.],

US Joint Forces Command Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, November 2007:
http://fas.org/irp/eprint/iraqi/
Kyle Orton: The Islamic State Was Coming Without the Invasion of Iraq, 12DEC15:
https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2015/12/12/the-islamic-state-was-coming-without-the-invasion-of-iraq/


Inboden:
The Patriot Act sends Smith into a frenzy of righteous indignation. Yet once again, his treatment of it demonstrates his familiar problems with facts and historical perspective. He denounces the act as “a direct assault on the civil liberties Americans enjoy” and calls it potentially “the most ill-conceived piece of domestic legislation since the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.”

_It's not directly Iraq-related, but I'll point out that the Patriot Act's content was recycled from the Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995 and Antiterrorism Amendments Act of 1995 requested by President Clinton. P.L. 104-132, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, contained a watered-down version of the 1995 acts.

Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, 10FEB95:
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-104s390is/pdf/BILLS-104s390is.pdf
Antiterrorism Amendments Act of 1995, 15MAY95:
https://www.congress.gov/104/bills/hr1635/BILLS-104hr1635ih.pdf
Public Law 104-132, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 24APR96 (see sections 301 and 324):
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-104publ132/html/PLAW-104publ132.htm


Inboden:
Then there is the Iraq War. Smith devotes more attention to this than any other topic in the book. And yet, because he relies almost exclusively on secondary sources and has failed to do any meaningful original research, his account sheds virtually no new insight on any aspect of the war — such as the Bush administration’s changed risk calculus in the post-September 11 environment, Bush’s own deliberations and decision-making, the inter-agency divisions and disputes that hindered post-war planning, the intelligence challenge posed by a dictator who wanted the world to believe that he possessed weapons of mass destruction when in fact he did not ...

_President Clinton marked Saddam's distinctive combined WMD-and-terrorism threat. Prevention of terrorist acquisition of WMD from rogue state actors, especially Saddam, was Clinton policy; President Bush carried forward the standing policy, heightened by the 9/11 attacks. Iraq's proscribed armament was more than a belief; it was established fact in the UNSCR 687 disarmament process. There was no "intelligence challenge" in terms of the operative enforcement procedure because enforcement of UNSCR 687 [etc.] et al was compliance based. The burden of proof was on Iraq to cure its established and presumed guilt of UNSCR 687-proscribed armament by proving the mandated disarmament. Iraq's threat was gauged by Saddam's compliance and disarmament. If Saddam was noncompliant and not disarmed according to UNSCR 687, then Saddam continued to be an armed threat. Saddam's breach of UNSCR 687 regarding WMD was [established by UNSCOM, ]decided by UNSC, confirmed by UNMOVIC, and corroborated by ISG. The UNMOVIC and ISG findings are rife with disarmament violations. Saddam did not disarm as mandated and was rearming in breach of UNSCR 687. Saddam's WMD program, as proscribed by UNSCR 687, was active.

President Clinton address to Joint Chiefs of Staff and Pentagon staff, 17FEB98:
http://clinton6.nara.gov/1998/02/1998-02-17-president-remarks-on-iraq-to-pentagon-personnel.html
Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39, 21JUN95:
http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/_previous/Documents/2010%20FOIA/Presidential%20Directives/PDD-39.pdf
UNMOVIC Clusters document: Unresolved Disarmament Issues Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes 6 March 2003:
http://www.un.org/depts/unmovic/new/documents/cluster_document.pdf
Iraq Survey Group: DCI Special Advisor Report on Iraq's WMD (Duelfer report), 30SEP04:
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/


Inboden:
For example, he returns again and again to the assertion that it was not until over a month after the original Iraq invasion that Bush summarily invented the goal of establishing a democracy in Iraq, in his “Mission Accomplished” remarks aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln on May 1, 2003. Smith accuses Bush of using the speech to “unilaterally changing the plan” to replace the Saddam Hussein dictatorship with a democracy, and claims this is the first time that Bush ever announced the strategic objective of a democratic Iraq. Which would be a significant violation of the commander-in-chief’s responsibility — if it were true. But what Smith fails to mention is that Bush had declared the goal of leaving behind a democratic government in Iraq months earlier, before the invasion. For example, in his speech to the American Enterprise Institute in February 2003, Bush laid out an extensive case for why the removal of the Hussein regime would best be followed by a democratic government accountable to its people: “The nation of Iraq–with its proud heritage, abundant resources and skilled and educated people–is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom.”

_The "democracy" goal of the Iraq intervention was rooted in UNSCR 688 (5 April 1991) and concurrently established as US policy under President HW Bush, carried forward without break, and progressed in law and policy under Presidents Clinton and Bush. Consistent with the standing law and policy of the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, the "democracy" goal was a constant element in Bush's major speeches on Iraq leading up to OIF and carried forward in the 2002 AUMF. The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 is cited and nation-building "efforts" are "expected" in section 4 of P.L. 107-243.

Excerpt from President Bush's remarks at the UN General Assembly, 12SEP02:
If all these steps [to make Iraq compliant with UN mandates] are taken, it will signal a new openness and accountability in Iraq. And it could open the prospect of the United Nations helping to build a government that represents all Iraqis -- a government based on respect for human rights, economic liberty, and internationally supervised elections.
... The United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people; they've suffered too long in silent captivity. Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause, and a great strategic goal. The people of Iraq deserve it; the security of all nations requires it. Free societies do not intimidate through cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world with mass murder. The United States supports political and economic liberty in a unified Iraq.

President HW Bush Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance With United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 19JAN93:
http://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/5191
[Secretary of State Albright speech on President Clinton’s 2nd term policy on Iraq, 26MAR97:
https://web.archive.org/web/20140701184550/http://fas.org/news/iraq/1997/03/bmd970327b.htm]
Joint statement by VP Al Gore and leaders of the Iraqi National Congress, 26JUN00:
http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/06/2000-06-26-joint-statement-by-vp-and-leaders-of-iraqi-national-congress.html
Bush White House: Statement of the Atlantic Summit: A Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People, 16MAR03:
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030316-1.html


Inboden:
Smith’s lack of research and original insights into the war do not prevent him from making it the centerpiece of his evaluation of Bush, or from declaring in the final sentence of his book that Bush’s “decision to invade Iraq is easily the worst foreign policy decision ever made by an American president.”

_Setting aside Professor Smith's subjective opinion of Bush's decision, the US case versus Saddam is substantiated. President Bush's decision for OIF objectively was correct on the law and facts.

In my [OIF FAQ] explanation, see the FAQ answers to "Why did Bush leave the ‘containment’ (status quo)?", "Did Iraq failing its compliance test justify the regime change?", and "Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq?".


Inboden:
Nor does he even begin to offer a net assessment of the successes and failures, and benefits and costs, of the war. The costs and failures are well known and grim, including the over 4,000 American troops killed in action and thousands more physically maimed, the tens of thousands of Iraqi civilian deaths ... But the war’s successes and benefits need to be accounted for as well, including the removal from power of a genocidal dictator who had already destabilized the region for over two decades (having invaded two of his neighboring countries, threatened to invade a third, and attacked a fourth), Muammar al Qaddafi’s voluntary relinquishment of his weapons of mass destruction stockpile in Libya, and the fact that upon leaving office in January 2009, Bush left to his successor an Iraq that was relatively stable and peaceful, with a reasonably functioning elected government, and with al Qaeda in Iraq almost completely defeated.

_According to the UN Security Council official assessment of Iraq's progress in December 2010, the US peace operations with Iraq were succeeding before President Obama disengaged the OIF peace operations.

Security Council Takes Action to End Iraq Sanctions, Terminate Oil-For-Food Programme as Members Recognize ‘Major Changes’ Since 1990, 15DEC10:
http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc10118.doc.htm
In my [OIF FAQ] explanation, see the FAQ answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory?".


Inboden:
... the damage to American credibility, the incitement of more terrorists, and the further destabilization of the region.

_The "damage to American credibility" is mainly a product of the disinformation promulgated by actors, including UNSC permanent members, who opposed American leadership and/or were complicit with Saddam's breach of the Gulf War ceasefire. The corrupted political state of the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement was carried forward from Operation Desert Fox in 1998 to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2002-2003. Fixing the "damage to American credibility" begins with clarifying that OIF's basis was humane, legal, and justified, and discrediting the prevailing yet false narrative of OIF. Again, it's not clear to what degree OIF "incite[d]...more terrorists" and to what degree the insurgency was converted product of Saddam's terrorism, if they can be distinguished (in other words, Saddam's terrorism was growth-oriented regardless of OIF). The notion that OIF "further destabiliz[ed]...the region" seems like a conflation of OIF and the subsequent [degeneration of the] Arab Spring. In fact, before President Obama disengaged the OIF peace operations and led from behind with the Arab Spring, he characterized post-Surge Iraq as a potential healing influence for the region: "Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress".

Politico: The Iran Deal’s Fatal Flaw by Charles Duelfer, 02APR15:
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/04/iran-deal-kerry-flawed-negotiations-close-116623_full.html#.V-OhedQrKrd
President Obama Remarks on the Middle East and North Africa, 19MAY11:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa

The references in this e-mail, except the [19MAY11] Obama speech, also can be found listed and linked at http://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2004/10/perspective-on-operation-iraqi-freedom.html.

Objection to Paul Miller's characterization of OIF as an "outlier" in American Power and Liberal Order

PREFACE: Paul Miller is the associate director of the Clements Center for National Security at The University of Texas at Austin. I responded to the excerpt from his book, American Power and Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy. He also wrote the 06MAR17 War on the Rocks article, Reassessing Obama’s Legacy of Restraint. Professor Miller didn't respond to my e-mail, so I don't know whether he's read it.



from: [Eric LC]
to: [Paul Miller]
date: Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 12:20 AM
subject: re American Power and Liberal Order: Operation Iraqi Freedom was an inflection point, not an outlier

Professor Miller,

I read with much agreement the excerpt from your book, "American Power and Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy", at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-power-liberal-order-17715?page=show. I support your advocacy of American leadership of the free world. The need for it is critical.

I agree that the stigmatization of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is the chief obstacle to your thesis. However, I disagree with your attempt to skirt the OIF stigma: "advocates of restraint sometimes overgeneralize from Iraq as if it were the paradigmatic case of the United States’ role in the world. But Iraq was a single outlier, not a representative sample of U.S. foreign policy".

Skirting the OIF stigma invites skepticism of your thesis because your premise is obviously wrong. The Iraq intervention was paradigmatic. The 1990-2011 US-led enforcement of Iraq's compliance with the UNSCR 660 series set the foundation and over its progressed course, which culminated with OIF, defined American leadership following the Cold War. While OIF was not a "representative sample" in terms of usual routine, it was not an "outlier" but rather an inflection point. A rough analogy for OIF's significance to US foreign policy is the Korean War.

The intervention to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L. 105-235) manifested the principles of American leadership of the free world that you advocate. US efforts in Iraq did not fail before President Obama disengaged the OIF peace operations. According to the UN Security Council official assessment of Iraq's progress in December 2010, the US peace operations with Iraq were succeeding. See http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc10118.doc.htm (UNSC, 15DEC10).

President Bush upheld paradigmatic American leadership of the free world with Iraq. President Obama's disengagement of the OIF peace operations was a deviation from American leadership of the free world.

Rather than skirt the OIF stigma, to clear the obstacle, I recommend that you de-stigmatize the Iraq intervention by setting the record straight on the law and policy, fact basis — the why — of Operation Iraqi Freedom. For that purpose, I suggest you review my explanation of OIF's legal-factual basis at http://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2014/05/operation-iraqi-freedom-faq.html. It's essentially a cheat sheet synthesizing the situation, controlling law, policy, and precedent that defined the operative enforcement procedure for the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) and, in the operative context, the determinative fact findings of the Saddam regime's breach of the Gulf War ceasefire that triggered enforcement with OIF. The US case versus Saddam is in fact substantiated; on the law and facts, President Bush's decision for OIF demonstrably was correct.

Again, I support your advocacy of American leadership of the free world, Professor. I hope my feedback will help strengthen your position.



PREFACE: This direct message to Paul Miller responds to his 06MAR17 War on the Rocks article, Reassessing Obama’s Legacy of Restraint. Professor Miller didn't respond to my DM, so I don't know whether he's read it.

Perfectly planned victory is not the norm in US military history. We've usually succeeded — imperfectly — in contests of war and peace with perseverance and adaptation to the competition, which was the norm carried forward to the OIF peace operations when the enemy defeated the post-war Plan A. President Bush and the US demonstrably were right on Iraq. The "mistake" was President Obama's radical deviation contravening the Strategic Framework Agreement.

The 1990-2011 US-led enforcement of Iraq's mandated compliance with the UNSCR 660 series, especially UNSCRs 687, 688, 949, 1441, and 1483, was the defining international enforcement of the post-Cold War. Thus, your current tack to counter Obama and Rhodes' "misleading narrative" is self-defeating because their methodological assessment of the Iraq intervention is correct insofar OIF did manifest the paradigm of US-led enforcement of the liberal international order that you advocate. As such, stigmatizing OIF effectively disqualifies the [US-enforced liberal policy] paradigm you advocate. The prevalent view in the politics — contrary to the controlling law, policy, precedent, and determinative facts of the Iraq issue — that Bush's decision on Iraq was a "mistake", which you (emphatically!) concede, effectively discredits the [US-enforced liberal policy] paradigm you advocate. For your advocacy to succeed requires establishing in the politics that Bush and the US (and Blair and the UK) were right on Iraq in the first place. Whereas your concession that OIF was a "mistake" is tantamount to surrendering your case. Your argument in the War on the Rocks article, while impressive, was wholly contained within the frame disqualifying the [US-enforced liberal policy] paradigm you advocate. All you did was scuff at Obama and Rhodes while admitting their keystone premise is essentially correct. Effective advocacy of the [US-enforced liberal policy] paradigm requires you to repair the foundation of the politics, by reframing the path-setting Iraq issue, by replacing the current keystone premise that OIF was a "mistake" with the [US-enforced liberal policy] paradigm-essential premise that objectively, Bush's decision on Iraq was substantively correct on the facts, procedurally correct on the law, and justified on the policy. That basic step isn't a cure-all, of course. Setting the record straight on the Iraq issue only sets the stage so you can begin to effectively argue your case in the people's court. Once you've flipped the table on the Iraq issue, you'll have set in place the keystone premise for the frame needed to re-credit and re-qualify US-led enforcement of the liberal international order. By the same token, setting the record straight on the Iraq issue arms you to discredit anyone who has endorsed the blatantly revisionist anti-OIF keystone premise of the Obama/Rhodes "misleading narrative" that has undermined US-led enforcement of the liberal international order.

Once again, to relitigate the Iraq issue effectively with the bedrock law, policy, precedent, and facts of the OIF decision, see http://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/.

7 Mar 2017

Sunday, September 4, 2016

Comments on Stephen Knott's "When Everyone Agreed About Iraq"

PREFACE: Stephen Knott is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the United States Naval War College and the author of Rush to Judgment: George W. Bush, the War on Terror, and His Critics. I critiqued his 15MAR13 Wall Street Journal article, When Everyone Agreed About Iraq. Professor Knott's e-mail in the exchange is omitted.



from: [Eric LC]
to: [Stephen Knott]
date: Sun, Sep 4, 2016 at 5:24 AM
[addenda date: Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 1:20 AM]
subject: ... your 2013 WSJ article

Professor Knott,
...
Rather than write a quasi-thesis on your WSJ article, I'll interject comments and references from my table of sources at http://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2004/10/perspective-on-operation-iraqi-freedom.html. My theory is a recipe-like format is more useful for your work. If you prefer a woven narrative, I cover the same ground in my OIF FAQ explanation, 10th anniversary of OIF survey, and other OIF-related posts.

Comments on When Everyone Agreed About Iraq
For years before the war, a bipartisan consensus thought Saddam possessed WMD.
By Stephen F. Knott, March 15, 2013, Wall Street Journal

Knott:
At 5:34 a.m. on March 20, 2003, American, British and other allied forces invaded Iraq. One of the most divisive conflicts in the nation's history would soon be labeled "Bush's War."

_Operation Iraqi Freedom was at least as much President HW Bush and President Clinton's war as it was "Bush's War". OIF was the coda of the US-led enforcement of Iraq's compliance with the UNSCR 660 series, including the Gulf War ceasefire, that began in 1990-1991. At the conclusion of the decade-plus of Iraq's noncompliance, Operation Iraqi Freedom, the ultimate enforcement step for Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), progressed from the penultimate enforcement step, Operation Desert Fox, that had enforced Clinton's judgement, "Iraq has abused its final chance".

President HW Bush address to the nation on the suspension of Allied offensive combat operations in the Persian Gulf, 27FEB91:
https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2746
President Clinton statement regarding UNSCR 1205, 05NOV98:
http://clinton6.nara.gov/1998/11/1998-11-05-statement-by-the-president-on-iraq.html
President Clinton announcement of Operation Desert Fox, 16DEC98:
http://clinton6.nara.gov/1998/12/1998-12-16-president-statement-on-iraq-air-strike.html
New York Times: With Little Notice, U.S. Planes Have Been Striking Iraq All Year, 13AUG99:
http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/081399iraq-conflict.html


Knott:
The overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime became official U.S. policy in 1998, when President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act—a bill passed 360-38 by the House of Representatives and by unanimous consent in the Senate. The law called for training and equipping Iraqi dissidents to overthrow Saddam and suggested that the United Nations establish a war-crimes tribunal for the dictator and his lieutenants.
The legislation was partly the result of frustration over the undeclared and relatively unheralded "No-Fly Zone War" that had been waged since 1991. Saddam's military repeatedly fired on U.S. and allied aircraft that were attempting to prevent his regime from destroying Iraqi opposition forces in northern and southern Iraq. According to former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Hugh Shelton, in 1997 a key member of President Bill Clinton's cabinet (thought by most observers to have been Secretary of State Madeleine Albright) asked Gen. Shelton whether he could arrange for a U.S. aircraft to fly slowly and low enough that it would be shot down, thereby paving the way for an American effort to topple Saddam. Kenneth Pollack, a member of Mr. Clinton's National Security Council staff, would later write in 2002 that it was a question of "not whether but when" the U.S. would invade Iraq. He wrote that the threat presented by Saddam was "no less pressing than those we faced in 1941."

_Iraqi regime change as the solution for Saddam's failure to comply as mandated by the Gulf War ceasefire was implicit and covert policy under HW Bush and progressed to explicit law and policy under Clinton.

[President HW Bush remarks on assistance for Iraqi refugees and a news conference, 16APR91:
http://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2882]
National Security Advisor Scowcroft response to Congressman Murtha's letter on Iraq, 14NOV91:
https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/persian-gulf/41-CO072-287965ss-365241/41-co072-302096-2.pdf
President HW Bush letter to Congress reporting on Iraq's compliance with UNSCRs, 19JAN93:
http://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/5191
[Los Angeles Times: Hussein Torpedoed CIA Plot Against Him, Officials Say, 08SEP96:
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-09-08/news/mn-41835_1_king-hussein]
Secretary of State Albright policy speech on Iraq, 26MAR97:
http://fas.org/news/iraq/1997/03/bmd970327b.htm
Joint statement by Vice President Gore and leaders of the Iraqi National Congress, 26JUN00:
http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/06/2000-06-26-joint-statement-by-vp-and-leaders-of-iraqi-national-congress.html


Knott:
Radicalized by the events of 9/11, George W. Bush gradually concluded that a regime that had used chemical weapons against its own people and poison gas against Iran, invaded Iran and Kuwait, harbored some of the world's most notorious terrorists, made lucrative payments to the families of suicide bombers, fired on American aircraft almost daily, and defied years of U.N. resolutions regarding weapons of mass destruction was a problem.

_Before the 9/11 attacks, Bush officials were deeply concerned that the 'containment' of Iraq was broken and that a noncompliant, unreconstructed Saddam was "out of the box" (Rumsfeld). President Bush entered office with President Clinton's assessment, "Iraqi actions pose a continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States". 9/11 pushed Bush's Gulf War ceasefire enforcement with a heightened threat consideration of Saddam's distinctive WMD-and-terrorism threat, which was marked by Clinton, that raised the urgency to expeditiously resolve the Saddam problem with the "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) required to satisfy "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687).

President Clinton address to Joint Chiefs of Staff and Pentagon staff, 17FEB98:
http://clinton6.nara.gov/1998/02/1998-02-17-president-remarks-on-iraq-to-pentagon-personnel.html
President Clinton letter to Congress on the continuing national emergency with Iraq, 28JUL00:
http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/07/2000-07-28-letter-from-the-president-on-the-iraqi-emergency.html
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld working paper regarding Iraq, 27JUL01:
https://web.archive.org/web/20120912105032/http://waranddecision.com/docLib/20080403_RumsfeldmemoIraq.pdf
President Bush remarks to the United Nations General Assembly, 12SEP02:
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html


Knott:
The former chief U.N. weapons inspector, an Australian named Richard Butler, testified in July 2002 that "it is essential to recognize that the claim made by Saddam's representatives, that Iraq has no WMD, is false."
In the U.S., there was a bipartisan consensus that Saddam possessed and continued to develop WMD. Former Vice President Al Gore noted in September 2002 that Saddam had "stored secret supplies of biological and chemical weapons throughout his country." Then-Sen. Hillary Clinton observed that Saddam hoped to increase his supply of chemical and biological weapons and to "develop nuclear weapons." Then-Sen. John Kerry claimed that "a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his [Saddam's] hands is a real and grave threat to our security."
Even those opposed to using force against Iraq acknowledged that, as then-Sen. Edward Kennedy put it, "we have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing" WMD. When it came time to vote on the authorization for the use of force against Iraq, 81 Democrats in the House voted yes, joined by 29 Democrats in the Senate, including the party's 2004 standard bearers, John Kerry and John Edwards, plus Majority Leader Tom Daschle, Sen. Joe Biden, Mrs. Clinton, and Sens. Harry Reid, Tom Harkin, Chris Dodd and Jay Rockefeller. The latter, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, claimed that Saddam would "likely have nuclear weapons within the next five years."

_Saddam's guilt of UNSCR 687-proscribed armament was a "bipartisan consensus" (Knott) because Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) were basic established fact in the UNSCR 687 disarmament process.

[On top of the basic established fact of Saddam's UNSCR 687-proscribed armament, which was presumed until Iraq proved it disarmed as mandated, the pre-OIF "bipartisan consensus" was informed by the indicators — corroborated by the Iraq Survey Group — of Iraq "rebuilding his [Saddam's] military-industrial complex", "increasing its access to dual-use items and materials", "creating numerous military research and development projects", and running "procurement programs supporting Iraq’s WMD programs" (ISG), and most compellingly, the UNSCR 1441 inspection findings of "about 100 unresolved disarmament issues" (UNMOVIC), which provided the basis for key assessments. In other words, while the panned intelligence estimates were predictively imprecise, the "bipartisan consensus" was nonetheless based on sound data of Saddam's confirmed "material breach" (UNSCR 1441).]

In terms of enforcement, Saddam's WMD was not an intelligence issue because there was no burden on the enforcers of the Gulf War ceasefire to prove Iraq was armed as estimated. It was a compliance issue because the "onus [was] clearly on Iraq" (UNMOVIC) to prove Saddam disarmed as mandated. Upon the established fact of Iraq's proscribed armament, the only legally prescribed and practical way to know Saddam disarmed was Iraq proving he was compliant with UNSCR 687. The UNMOVIC Clusters document finding of "about 100 unresolved disarmament issues" confirmed "Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687" (UNSCR 1441) and thus retained "the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security" (UNSCR 1441). While the pre-war intelligence estimates were additionally cited by Bush officials, the basis for enforcement of the UNSCR 660 series, including with OIF, was always Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441).

UNMOVIC Clusters document (“Unresolved Disarmament Issues Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes 6 March 2003″):
http://www.un.org/depts/unmovic/new/documents/cluster_document.pdf — note the "A Historical Account of Iraq's Proscribed Weapons Programmes" section.
IAEA Iraq Nuclear Verification Office's Iraq Nuclear File: Key Findings:
https://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Invo/factsheet.html
Secretary of State Powell presentation to the U.N. Security Council, 05FEB03:
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html
President Bush report to Congress on the determination and legal authority for Operation Iraqi Freedom, 18MAR03:
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-108hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-108hdoc50.pdf


Knott:
Support for the war extended far beyond Capitol Hill. In March 2003, a Pew Research Center poll indicated that 72% of the American public supported President Bush's decision to use force.

_The public support at the time for President Bush's decision to use force is less compelling than whether Bush's OIF decision accorded with the controlling law, policy, and precedent that defined the operative enforcement procedure for the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) and, in the operative context, the determinative fact findings of Iraq's (non)compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire mandates. The answer is yes, it did. President Bush's decision to use force demonstrably was correct on the law and facts, which is more compelling than the public support it had at the time.

My OIF FAQ explanation synthesizes the situation, law, policy, precedent, and facts of the OIF decision:
http://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2014/05/operation-iraqi-freedom-faq.html


Knott:
If Mr. Bush "lied," as the common accusation has it, then so did many prominent Democrats—and so did the French, whose foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, claimed in February 2003 that "regarding the chemical domain, we have evidence of [Iraq's] capacity to produce VX and yperite [mustard gas]; in the biological domain, the evidence suggests the possible possession of significant stocks of anthrax and botulism toxin." Germany's intelligence chief August Hanning noted in March 2002 that "it is our estimate that Iraq will have an atomic bomb in three years."

_They didn't lie. Again, the burden was on Iraq to prove Saddam was disarmed as mandated, and there was no burden on the US and UN to prove Iraq was armed as estimated. That being said, the UNMOVIC and the post-war Iraq Survey Group findings variously support Mr. de Villepin's statement about Iraq's "capacity to produce" CW and "possible possession" of BW.

[Regarding Saddam's "capacity to produce" CW and BW, ISG found "clear evidence of his [Saddam's] intent to resume WMD", a covert active Iraqi Intelligence Service biological and chemical "network of laboratories could have provided an ideal, compartmented platform from which to continue CW agent R&D or small-scale production efforts", a large IIS "covert procurement program", and substantial readily convertible "dual-use" production capability in which "it would have been possible for Iraq to assemble a CW production plant ... Iraq had improvised and jury-rigged equipment in the past" and "the equipment used for their [BW agent simulants] manufacture can also be quickly converted to make BW agent". The clandestine IIS role in Iraq's WMD-related violations is significant because Saddam's CW and BW programs started in the IIS. The IIS is also the Saddam regime arm that managed Saddam's terrorism, which included "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with the al Qaeda network.

Regarding Saddam's "possible possession" of BW stocks, neither UNMOVIC nor ISG cleared Saddam. UNMOVIC: "With respect to stockpiles of bulk agent stated to have been destroyed, there is evidence to suggest that these was [sic] not destroyed as declared by Iraq." ISG found that the evidence needed to make a determination was missing: "ISG cannot determine the fate of Iraq’s stocks of bulk BW agents [nor] ... The fate of a portion of Iraq’s BW agent seed-stocks."]

The nuclear-related IAEA findings in the UNSCR 1441 inspections were less alarming than the UNMOVIC findings. However, Iraq wasn't fully compliant with the UNSCR 687 nuclear mandates, either, and ISG corroborated that there were indicators of proscribed nuclear activity. While Mr. Hanning's pre-war estimate of the maturity of Iraq's nuclear program was off the mark, the confirmed indicators of proscribed nuclear activity validate Bush's push to restore the UNSCR 687 IAEA inspections forthwith.

DCI Special Advisor Report on Iraq's WMD (Iraq Survey Group), 30SEP04:
a. Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap5.html
b. Biological Warfare: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap6.html — note the "Unresolved Issues" section.
Update report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Security Council pursuant to resolution 1441 (2002), 27JAN03:
https://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Invo/reports/s_2003_95.pdf
[10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts:] "A false premise asserted by OIF opponents is the casus belli for OIF was based on a claim that Saddam possessed nuclear weapons":
http://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#nuclear


Knott:
According to interrogations conducted after the invasion, Saddam's own generals believed that he had WMD and expected him to use these weapons as the invasion force neared Baghdad.
The war in Iraq was authorized by a bipartisan congressional coalition, supported by prominent media voices and backed by the public. Yet on its 10th anniversary Americans will be told of the Bush administration's duplicity in leading us into the conflict. Many members of the bipartisan coalition that committed the U.S. to invade Iraq 10 years ago have long since washed their hands of their share of responsibility.
We owe it to history—and, more important, to all those who died—to recognize that this wasn't Bush's war, it was America's war.
Mr. Knott, a professor of national security affairs at the United States Naval War College, is the author of "Rush to Judgment: George W. Bush, the War on Terror, and His Critics" (University Press of Kansas, 2012).

_In fact, nearly all the Bush case versus Saddam is substantiated. President Bush's decision for Operation Iraqi Freedom was correct on the law and facts. We owe it to history to set the record straight on the law and policy, fact basis — the why — of OIF.

More current, the stigmatization of OIF has been the cornerstone premise for President Obama['s] choices with Iraq, Libya, Syria, Iran, and other foreign affairs. The prevailing yet demonstrably false narrative that has stigmatized the Iraq intervention has effectively discredited the vital American leadership of the free world. Re-normalizing American leadership of the free world requires de-stigmatizing OIF, and the basic step of de-stigmatizing OIF is setting the record straight on the why of OIF at the premise level of our political discourse. History will follow suit.

For those who died in the line of duty and for their loved ones who are inundated by dis[mis]information, we owe them the confirmation that their mission was moral, strategic, lawful, justified, and manifested the principles of American leadership of the free world. In short, we owe them the knowledge that their mission was honorable.

---------------

from: [Eric LC]
to: [Stephen Knott]
date: Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 11:22 AM
subject: Re: ... your 2013 WSJ article

Professor Knott,

Thank you. I hope the information will be put to use. Responding within the scope of your 2013 WSJ article, I gave you a lot of it — enough to re-lay the foundation of the issue in the discourse — but my response wasn't altogether comprehensive.

For example, whereas the Gulf War ceasefire compliance basis is key to properly understand President Bush's decision for OIF, I left out that contrary to their disinformative partisan rhetoric on the issue, Obama officials plainly understood the compliance basis of the Iraq intervention.

Vice President Biden statement on behalf of the UNSC, Security Council Takes Action to End Iraq Sanctions, Terminate Oil-For-Food Programme as Members Recognize ‘Major Changes’ Since 1990, 15DEC10:
http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc10118.doc.htm

For 2nd example, I didn't unpack Secretary of State Powell's panned 05FEB03 UN Security Council presentation to show that contrary to the prevailing narrative, the main points of Powell's speech are in fact validated nearly across the board:
http://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2016/05/powell-unsc.html

In your words, "We owe it to history—and, more important, to all those who died" to set the record straight on the Iraq intervention. And, what's past is prologue. Re-litigating the narrative of the epochal Iraq intervention versus active disinformation reinforcement such as Professor Smith's biography [of President Bush*] and the Bush on Trial play is critical to insert keystone premise in the discourse that's needed to correct the currently misguided course of American leadership in the world...if it's not too late already for us to right our course.

With respect to you[r WSJ article], President Bush's OIF decision was more justified than a publicly supported bipartisan consensus. With respect to Judith Miller, Professor Inboden, et al, it was not a mistake excused by the pre-war intelligence estimates. Rather, knowing what we know now according to the situation, law, policy, precedent, and fact record of the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, President Bush's decision for Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrably was correct.

[* See Augmenting William Inboden's critique of J.E. Smith's Bush biography regarding Iraq.]

Tuesday, May 24, 2016

Regarding Secretary of State Powell's speech at the UN Security Council on February 5, 2003

PREFACE: I unpacked Secretary of State Powell's speech at the UN Security Council on February 5, 2003. For links to the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement law, policy, and fact findings referred to below, see the OIF FAQ further reading section. For exposition with samples and links, go here for the casus belli, here for UNSCOM/UNMOVIC and IAEA's fact record, here for the Iraq Survey Group's ex post investigation, here for the Iraqi Perspectives Project's terrorism findings, and here for the Saddam regime's human rights violations. Appended: #morell, #haass. Comment:

The thing about Secretary of State Powell’s presentation to the UN Security Council on February 5, 2003 is that while some of its pre-war intelligence-based details that were predictively imprecise have been severely panned in the politics, on the fact record – knowing what we know now – Powell’s presentation actually holds up very well. On the main points of his case presentation against Saddam, Powell was correct nearly across the board.

Of foundational importance, Powell correctly reiterated the burden of proof and standard of compliance with the UNSCR 1441 inspections, and that enforcement would be triggered by Saddam’s failure to comply and disarmed as mandated.

UNMOVIC confirmed and ISG [Iraq Survey Group] corroborated Powell’s view that Iraq did not comply and disarm as mandated by UNSCRs 687 and 1441.

ISG confirmed Powell’s view that Saddam was in fact covertly reconstituting Iraq’s WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687.

ISG confirmed Powell’s view regarding “denial and deception operations” and “concealment and destruction efforts” (ISG) and “many of these [WMD-related] sites were…sanitized by the Regime” (ISG).

ISG confirmed Powell’s view that Saddam had no intention to comply with the UN mandates.

UNMOVIC confirmed Powell’s view that Iraq did not turn over the information required to establish the total verified declaration that accounted for Iraq’s entire WMD-related program, including for anthrax and other BW.

Albeit not the “mobile production facilities used to make biological agents” (Powell) that Powell depicted, ISG confirmed a covert IIS chemical and biological lab network along with CW- and BW-convertible capability.

For example, ISG: “The UN deemed Iraq’s accounting of its production and use of BW agent simulants … to be inadequate. … the equipment used for their manufacture can also be quickly converted to make BW agent.”

UNMOVIC, ISG historical accounts confirm Powell’s context setting of Iraq’s proscribed activity “when UNSCOM was in country and inspecting”. Again, Iraq’s ceasefire-proscribed WMD was established fact on which the burden of proof was on Saddam to disarm as mandated.

Powell’s statement, “There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more” is panned because ISG didn’t find them. [Note: "them" refers to BW stocks; UNMOVIC and ISG confirmed Iraq's dual-use biological production capability.] But in fact, Iraq failed to account for its BW program as mandated. Then ISG could not answer for the fate of Iraq’s missing BW agents, stocks, and equipment due to Iraq’s “denial and deception operations” and “concealment and destruction efforts” (ISG).

UNMOVIC confirmed Powell’s view that Iraq failed to account for its CW stores: “These quantities of chemical weapons are now unaccounted for.” The historical account also confirm Powell’s context setting of Saddam’s track record of “denial and deception operations” (ISG) on CW.

ISG confirmed Powell’s view that “Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry”. ISG found a plethora of convertible dual-use items and activity.

ISG confirmed Powell’s view that “Iraq procures needed items from around the world using an extensive clandestine network”. ISG: “The IIS ran a large covert procurement program”.

ISG confirmed, “Early on, Saddam sought to foster the impression with his generals that Iraq could resist a Coalition ground attack using WMD.”

ISG confirmed that the covert undeclared IIS labs experimented on humans.

IAEA and ISG confirmed Powell’s context setting on Iraq’s track record of nuclear ambitions. ISG confirmed Saddam was revitalizing Iraq’s nuclear program and the indicators of proscribed nuclear-related activity, especially related to possible centrifuge activity, and that the aluminum tubes were properly flagged for possible nuclear application. The only part of Powell’s nuclear presentation that falls down in hindsight is the extent to which Iraq sought fissile material.

ISG confirmed Powell’s view on Iraq’s ceasefire-proscribed missile development.

On terrorism, Powell does speak at length with inordinate focus on Zarqawi.

[Update: Analysis of the Zarqawi issue is included in this exceptionally detailed write-up of the Saddam-al Qaeda relationship. Basically, the Bush administration was again substantively correct on the issue, if not predictively precise in the details.]

However, the Iraqi Perspectives Project [IPP] confirmed Powell’s main point that “Iraq and terrorism go back decades” and validated Powell’s warning about “the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the Al Qaida terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder”.

IPP also confirmed the “regional and global” (IPP) scope of Saddam’s terrorism.

While Powell emphasized the Saddam-AQ link with inordinate focus on Zarqawi, he did not define Saddam’s terrorism exclusively with the Saddam-AQ link:
And the record of Saddam Hussein’s cooperation with other Islamist terrorist organizations is clear … Terrorism has been a tool used by Saddam for decades. Saddam was a supporter of terrorism long before these terrorist networks had a name. And this support continues. The nexus of poisons and terror is new. The nexus of Iraq and terror is old. The combination is lethal.
Various human rights organizations (I refer mainly to the UN Commission on Human Rights due to their regular reference to UNSCR 688) confirmed Powell’s view of Saddam’s humanitarian violations.

ISG confirmed Powell’s view of Saddam’s WMD intent. ISG: “we have clear evidence of his intent to resume WMD as soon as sanctions were lifted … the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions. Outward acts of compliance belied a covert desire to resume WMD activities.”

Finally, Powell was correct that “We wrote 1441 to give Iraq one last chance” and “Iraq is not so far taking that one last chance.”



PREFACE: Michael Morell was Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and served as President George W. Bush’s intelligence briefer. Morell apologized to Colin Powell during the promotional tour for Morell's book, The Great War of Our Time: The CIA’s Fight Against Terrorism from AL QA’IDA to ISIS.

from: [Eric LC]
to: [Michael Morell]
date: Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 9:00 AM
subject: Your apology to Secretary Powell re his 05FEB03 UNSC speech was unnecessary and misleading

Mr. Morell,

I recently came across your May 2015 apology to Secretary Powell regarding his 05FEB03 speech at the UN Security Council: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/michael-morell-apologizes-colin-powell-about-cia-pre-iraq-war-wmd-evidence/.

Your apology to Secretary Powell was unnecessary and misleading.

I unpack Powell's UNSC speech here — https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2016/05/powell-unsc.html — with reference to the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), the decade+ established fact of the Saddam regime's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441), the UNMOVIC findings per UNSCR 1441 pursuant to UNSCR 687 that confirmed Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) to trigger President Bush's determination to use force per Public Law 107-243, the ex post Iraq Survey Group findings that corroborated Saddam's "material breach", and the Iraqi Perspectives Project findings on Saddam's "regional and global terrorism" that included "considerable operational overlap" with al Qaeda and also breached UNSCR 687.

Your apology is unnecessary because knowing what we know now, Powell’s UNSC speech holds up very well. The main points of his case presentation against Saddam are substantiated nearly across the board. The only major part of Powell’s presentation that falls down in hindsight is the extent to which the Saddam regime sought fissile material.

Your apology is misleading because it obfuscates that the principal theme of Powell's UNSC speech was the reiteration that the casus belli was Saddam's evidential noncompliance with the terms of ceasefire in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) — not the pre-war intelligence estimates. At the same time, Powell's characterization of Saddam's UNSCR 687 WMD violations was based mainly on the established fact record of the UNSCOM, IAEA, and UNMOVIC inspections, rather than independent intelligence analysis as such. (Recall that intelligence efforts to assess Saddam's WMD thwarted by Iraq's ceasefire-breaching "denial and deception operations" (ISG) compelled you to rely on the UN inspections.)

Per ISG's findings, the pre-war intelligence estimates were predictively imprecise. However, the inapposite and distorted emphasis on the pre-war intelligence estimates in the politics has obfuscated that Powell's substantive points regarding Saddam's noncompliance with UNSCRs 687 and 688 are nearly all validated. Per UNMOVIC and ISG's findings, although the pre-war estimates were predictively imprecise, the intelligence correctly indicated the Saddam regime was noncompliant with the UNSCR 687 mandates and engaged in proscribed armament and terrorist activity. For example, although the intelligence-estimated mobile bio weapons labs famously were not found by ISG, on the substantive point per UNSCR 687, ISG did find a covert IIS chemical and biological laboratory network together with a readily convertible BW simulant production capability.

During your book's promotional tour, you should have clarified that the President's decision for enforcement with Iraq pivoted on whether Saddam met Iraq's burden to prove the mandated "full and immediate compliance" (UNSCR 1441) with the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), there was no burden on the US to prove the predictive precision of your pre-war intelligence estimates, and Saddam's categorical "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire is confirmed.

Moreover, ISG's non-findings of WMD, usually portrayed as unequivocal in the politics, are in fact heavily qualified in the Duelfer report. In many instances where ISG cited lack of evidence, it meant the evidence needed for a definite determination is missing or lost, not that absence of evidence is evidence of absence. The ISG report, which corroborated Saddam's UNSCR 687 WMD breach and is rife with UNSCR 687 disarmament violations, in effect comprises a floor only, not a complete account.

On the law and facts, President Bush's decision for Operation Iraqi Freedom was correct. The case against Saddam is substantiated. I hew to the controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts to clarify the Iraq issue here: https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/.

I recommend that you review my post unpacking Powell's UNSC speech, revisit his speech and check my assessment for yourself, and then when you realize your error, publicly clarify the Iraq issue and retract your apology. There was no need for your apology because on 05FEB03 at the UNSC, Secretary Powell was right on Iraq.



PREFACE: Richard Haass is president of the Council on Foreign Relations. Colin Powell passed away on 18OCT21.

from: [Eric LC]
to: [Richard Haass]
date: Nov 8, 2021, 3:13 AM
subject: Actually, Colin Powell's 05FEB03 UNSC speech is nearly all validated

Dr. Haass,

I clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ by organizing the primary source authorities, i.e., the set of controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts that define OIF's justification, to lay a proper foundation and correct for the prevalent conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.

I am writing you to clarify the Iraq issue in your 21OCT21 post, Colin Powell's American Life.

Haass:
What most of the critics miss is that Powell went to great lengths to establish the truth, and that what he said was what he thought to be true. One can be wrong without malign intent.

To genuinely honor Colin Powell's legacy, you should clarify that he was fundamentally right on Iraq in the first place and "most of the critics" have been wrong all along.

For example, see the relatable OIF FAQ Critique of Matt Latimer's "The Don Rumsfeld the Obituaries Won’t Write About".


Haass:
The biggest blemish on his record was his appearance as secretary of state before the United Nations Security Council in February 2003 to make the case for military intervention in Iraq.

Secretary of State Powell's 05FEB03 presentation to the UN Security Council should not be a blemish on his record. Knowing what we know now, the speech holds up well. The main points are substantiated nearly across the board. See OIF FAQ post Regarding Secretary of State Powell's speech at the UN Security Council on February 5, 2003 where I unpack Secretary Powell's speech.

Note, when I say "substantiated", I don't necessarily mean the intelligence-estimated details were proven to be predictively precise, but rather that the substantive element in the point was validated.

For example, the Iraq Survey Group did not find “mobile production facilities used to make biological agents” (Powell). Instead, ISG reported "secret biological work in the small IIS [Iraqi intelligence service] laboratories discovered by ISG" and “The UN deemed Iraq’s accounting of its production and use of BW [biological weapon] agent simulants—specifically Bacillus subtilis, Bacillus lichenformis, Bacillus megaterium and Bacillus thuringiensis to be inadequate … the equipment used for their manufacture can also be quickly converted to make BW agent.”

Moreover, many of Secretary Powell's points were not based on intelligence estimate but only reiterated the operative enforcement procedure and the fact record established by UNSCOM/UNMOVIC and IAEA in the decade-plus course of the UNSCR 687 disarmament process.


Haass:
As we now know, what Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, was hiding from international inspectors was not weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but the fact that he had none.

Incorrect. While Saddam was bluffing, which by itself violated UNSCRs 687 and 1441 for casus belli, Saddam wasn't only bluffing. As David Kay reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 28, 2004:
Iraq was in clear violation of the terms of [U.N.] Resolution 1441. Resolution 1441 required that Iraq report all of its activities -- one last chance to come clean about what it had. We have discovered hundreds of cases, based on both documents, physical evidence and the testimony of Iraqis, of activities that were prohibited under the initial U.N. Resolution 687 and that should have been reported under 1441, with Iraqi testimony that not only did they not tell the U.N. about this, they were instructed not to do it and they hid material.
We know "From 1999 until he was deposed in April 2003, Saddam’s conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs steadily grew in scale, variety, and efficiency" (ISG) with illicit funds from the Oil For Food scandal. We know Iraq was reconstituting a broad array of conventional arms, military infrastructure, and nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile research, development, and production capabilities with the "large covert procurement program" (ISG) under cover of "denial and deception operations" (ISG).

But we can't know the extent that Saddam's proscribed weapons programs were retained and reconstituted because Iraq effectively rid evidence with extensive "concealment and destruction efforts" (ISG).

Again, David Kay, 28JAN04:
I regret to say that I think at the end of the work of the [Iraq Survey Group] there's still going to be an unresolvable ambiguity about what happened ... [due to] the unparalleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program and their other programs as well, a lot of which was what we simply called Ali Baba looting.
While we speculate on the true extent of Iraq's UNSCR 687 violations, we can assume that the many UNSCR 687 violations ISG did find were only what was left over after Iraqi counterintelligence rid presumably higher-value evidence.


Haass:
We know now the statement was in part inaccurate, owing to what is known as “confirmation bias.” Assuming that Saddam Hussein possessed WMD, intelligence analysts and policymakers tended to devote the most attention to information that appeared to confirm their premise and discount information that did not.

To clarify, the "confirmation bias" was actually Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) probationary status with the established fact of Saddam's WMD, Iraq's established dual-use WMD method, and Iraq's evidential failure to disarm as mandated -- e.g., "With respect to stockpiles of bulk agent stated to have been destroyed, there is evidence to suggest that these was [sic] not destroyed as declared by Iraq" (UNMOVIC) -- through its "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) with the ceasefire terms.

The logic of the "confirmation bias" charge is akin to if the 9/11 hijackers had escaped death on 9/11 and then reiterated the established 'dual use' pattern that preceded 9/11 -- e.g., entering the US, flying lessons, packing utility blades in carry-on bags, etc. -- yet alternative nonthreatening explanations were prioritized and red-line threat analysis was deemed "overstated" until the unreconstructed recidivists again drew their 'dual use' knives in flight.

Suffice to say, the operative context of the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) and the law, policy, and precedent that enforced Iraq's mandated compliance did not work that way.


Haass:
Moreover, it would be misreading history to hold Powell responsible for the costly, ill-advised war that followed. Alone among George W. Bush’s senior advisers, he did not push for it ...

President Bush, Secretary Powell, and the rest of "George W. Bush’s senior advisers" weren't responsible for the war: Saddam was. It was always Saddam's choice -- whether in 1990-1991, 1997-1998, or 2002-2003 -- to comply with the UNSCR 660 series in order to forestall war or to violate the US-enforced UN mandates in order to instigate war. Saddam ultimately chose to violate the UNSCR 660 series through Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441).

However "ill-advised" you opine it was, the regime change demonstrably was necessary to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235) and "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (P.L. 107-243).

Before Bush was President, Saddam had exhausted the UNSCR 678 non-military and lesser military enforcement measures. By Operation Desert Fox at the eight-year point, President Clinton and Congress had already concluded regime change was the only realistic way to bring Iraq into its mandated compliance. In fact, the UNSCR 1441 "final opportunity to comply" was the second final chance given to Saddam after Clinton pronounced "Iraq has abused its final chance" with ODF.

Iraq Survey Group:
Trade fostered under the OFF [Oil For Food] program starting in 1997 allowed Saddam to pursue numerous illicit revenue earning schemes, which began generating significant amounts of cash outside of the auspices of the UN ... After 1996, the state of the Iraqi economy no longer threatened Saddam’s hold on power in Iraq, and economic recovery underpinned a more confident Regime posture ... By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their international support ... As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation.
Saddam's victory over the sanctions meant the diplomatic coercive alternative to military enforcement was neutralized. It also meant the pre-9/11 status quo with Iraq, the chiefly sanctions-based post-ODF ad hoc 'containment', was no longer a viable alternative, if it ever worked at all.

After Saddam failed his "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) with UNMOVIC, the Iraq Survey Group confirmed "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" and "In addition to preserved capability, we have clear evidence of his [Saddam's] intent to resume WMD". Along with the UNSCR 687 disarmament violations found by ISG, Saddam's UNSCR 687 terrorism violations and UNSCR 688 human rights violations were found to be "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq) than we knew before OIF.

Jim Lacey, who headed the postwar Iraqi Perspectives Project investigation of Saddam's terrorism, concluded, "Given the evidence, it appears that we removed Saddam’s regime not a moment too soon."

With the post-ODF ad hoc 'containment' broken, President Bush's determination for OIF was the only real choice once Saddam chose to breach Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). The real alternative to OIF was compromising the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) to wind down the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement and accommodate the practically uncontained, categorically noncompliant, unreconstructed Saddam regime, which was not a choice allowed by the controlling law and policy on Iraq.


Haass:
... as subsequent events showed, Bush was prepared to go to war without much international support.

Actually, the preceding event of Operation Desert Fox prepared President Bush "to go to war without much international support" because President Clinton faced the same opposition to the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement. By 1998, "The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council" (ISG). Unfortunately, despite the intensive diplomacy by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair to convince their fellow UNSC members to uphold international law pursuant the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441), Saddam's accomplices instead chose to continue their complicity with Saddam's [Iraq's] "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441), which informed Saddam's choice to breach Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) and thereby resume the Gulf War.


Haass:
At the end of the day, Powell’s efforts at the UN are not central to understanding why and how the United States went to war.

Actually, Secretary Powell's 05FEB03 speech to the UN Security Council is a serviceable explanation of the compliance-based case against Saddam.

Clarifying the Iraq issue for the public by laying a proper foundation with the controlling law, policy, precedent, and determinative facts that define OIF's justification is "central to understanding why and how the United States went to war". The OIF FAQ synthesis of the mission's primary sources is designed for that purpose.

I hope you and the Council on Foreign Relations will set the record straight and genuinely honor Colin Powell's legacy.

If you have questions about my work, please ask.