Friday, March 1, 2019

Critical responses to James Fallows, Allan Lichtman, Philip Bobbitt, and Steven A. Cook

PREFACE: Scroll down or click on #fallows for my critical review of James Fallows's November 2002 The Atlantic article, "The Fifty-First State?", and October 2004 The Atlantic article, "Bush's Lost Year"; #lichtman for my clarification to Allan Lichtman regarding Trump on Bush and WMD in The Case for Impeachment (2017); #bobbitt for my correction of Philip Bobbitt's "principal motive" for Operation Iraqi Freedom in The Garments of Court and Palace: Machiavelli and the World that He Made (2013); and #cook for my critical response to Steven A. Cook's 17FEB19 Foreign Policy article, "All This Should Remind You of the Run-Up to the Iraq War". Their e-mails in our respective exchanges are omitted.



from: [Eric LC]
to: [James Fallows]
date: Mar 1, 2019, 12:22 PM
subject: Re: New Cheney biopic Vice is a gift opportunity to clarify the Iraq issue for the public

Mr. Fallows,

My appreciation for your lifetime of reporting on US military power and policy and civil-military relations is why I am appealing to you to set the record straight contra Vice et al. But again, expert stature does not take precedence over bedrock law and fact.

I review your articles below [per the dictate in my Critical responses to leaders and pundits preface]. To round out the diagnosis, I shared this excerpt (without your e-mail address) with national security analyst Brian Dunn, who blogs at The Dignified Rant with a strategy orientation, for his critical input:
I have a different view of the matter: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/10/bushs-lost-year/303507/
... I just believe it was an enormous strategic error (as I argued at the time: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/11/the-fifty-first-state/302612/ )

Brian posted his review at "Victory, Indeed":http://thedignifiedrant.blogspot.com/2019/02/victory-indeed.html. His e-mail address is on the left-side menu bar under the ad. Excerpt:
I did look at the two articles Fallows cites to justify his current view.

The first was published in the November issue of The Atlantic. Despite being cited as an example of why the war was a big error, it was actually just a collection of people discussing all the ways things could go horribly wrong. If you throw up enough potential problems it sounds bad. But that pre-war laundry list is not an argument for error.
...
The second article, in October 2004, focuses on comparing the reality of Iraq to the fantasy world of all the other problems America would have solved without being involved in Iraq:
...
Again, it is way too early to base your 2019 judgment of an enormous strategic error on 2002 and 2004 speculation and results! Look at Europe in November 1946 if you want to see why you need time to judge a victory or defeat. In my lifetime I've gone from seeing the Korean War as a draw to seeing it as a victory because as time passed South Korea moved from an autocracy to a democratic and prosperous state.
...
It was certainly morally just for America to get rid of an evil and murderous dictator. But America also won the Iraq War on the results.

--Iraq no longer is run by a minority Sunni Arab faction for the narrow benefit of that faction while impoverishing, terrorizing, and killing its own people (including most Sunni Arabs). Iraq is now dominated by the Shia majority in an imperfect democracy that needs our help to develop rule of law. But at least imperfect ballots rather than lethal bullets are settling the question of who runs Iraq.

--Iraq no longer uses, produces, or seeks weapons of mass destruction.

--Iraq no longer a major threat to its own Kurds, where once Saddam gassed them on a large scale.

--Iraq is no longer a threat to neighbors as it was under Saddam to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and even Iran. While Iran under the mullahs was and is no friend of America, the war with Iran in the 1980s raised tensions in a vital part of the world that could have interrupted the world's oil supplies. And Saddam's power bent Jordan to be a client of Iraq in many ways. All that is negated.

--Iraq no longer supports terrorism in the region, and is in fact an ally who has killed far more jihadis than many of our most capable NATO allies. Somehow that obvious sign of victory is overlooked all too easily.

Iraq is not perfect. Far from it. But it is far better than it was under Saddam. America--and the region--is far better off because of our much-maligned victory over Saddam and the jihadis and Iranian who waged war against America in Iraq after Saddam was chased from his palaces.
My review:

Your articles confirmed the implication of the inherently incompatible view that President Bush's decision on Iraq was simultaneously correct on the controlling law and policy and an "enormous error" on subordinate strategy: that is, the articles show your conception of the Iraq issue is basically flawed.

Your opportunity cost argument stitches together a basket of speculative swatches, including significantly for its keystone representation of the Iraq issue. On the merits, a patchwork of speculation — however esteemed its sources — is neither equivalent to nor interchangeable with the interlocked primary sources that define the Iraq issue. Given its core role in your argument, your telling of the President's decision is remarkably devoid of the operative context, i.e., the controlling law, policy, and precedent that defined the operative enforcement procedure for the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) and the fact findings of Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) that determined enforcement with OIF.

Moreover, where you do foray from conjecture onto legal-factual ground, you misinform your readers. For example, your assertion, "Iraq has been bottled up, by international sanctions, for more than ten years", is incorrect. For clarification about the sanctions, see the OIF FAQ answer to "Why did Bush leave the ‘containment’ (status quo)"; excerpt:
A prevalent assumption in the politics is the ISG finding, "In addition to preserved capability, we have clear evidence of his intent to resume WMD as soon as sanctions were lifted," means Saddam had not undertaken to resume WMD because the UNSC had not yet officially lifted the UNSCR 660-series sanctions. However, ISG reported Saddam's position on the sanctions was "We have said with certainty that the embargo will not be lifted by a Security Council resolution, but will corrode by itself." ISG findings confirm Saddam’s "end-run strategy" was to lift the sanctions by undermining them for "the de facto elimination of sanctions" rather than to lift the sanctions by UNSC decree through compliance with "the formal and open Security Council process". From Saddam's perspective, he was lifting the sanctions long before the 2002-2003 "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441):
By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their international support. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of 1999.
... As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation. [ISG]
In fact, by the time of President Bush's September 2002 speech to the UN General Assembly, Iraq had undertaken conventional and WMD-related armament activity in violation of UNSCR 687 for years. Reconstitution of Saddam's WMD program was underway. The Regime Finance and Procurement section of the Iraq Survey Group Duelfer report details the Saddam regime's nearly completed defeat of the sanctions and 'containment' that was averted with OIF.
With your misrepresentation of the Iraq issue, your argument confronts a pliably murky straw man in place of the otherwise well-defined Iraq issue. As such, on the merits, your argument is mooted by your miss of the actual justification of the Iraq intervention. But in the politics, the forceful obfuscation by a public expert authority of your estimable stature has helped normalize the otherwise blatantly false anti-OIF narrative, such as Vice's reiterated propaganda, with compounding harmful consequences. Note, for example, Hassan Hassan's criticism of Western "leftists or anti-imperialists" for "fighting the Iraq war through Syria" and thus enabling the humanitarian toll in Syria caused by the Assad regime and its allies, especially Iran and Russia.

You said, "I have come to mine [my conclusions] with great care, and it's not because I have missed or overlooked the kinds of points you're making." That implies you've deliberately misinformed your readers. I hope that's not the case. Instead, I'll grant you the benefit of the doubt that you've merely been a victim of, as Secretary Rumsfeld famously explained, "But there are also unknown unknowns — the ones we don't know we don't know."

You can remedy the damage you've helped cause. For that purpose, you more than most — multiplied by the American public in your reach — would benefit from the OIF FAQ clarification; excerpt:
...

As always, if you have questions about my work (or Brian's work), please ask.

---------------

from: [Eric LC]
to: [James Fallows]
date: Mar 9, 2019, 1:42 PM
subject: Re: New Cheney biopic Vice is a gift opportunity to clarify the Iraq issue for the public

Mr. Fallows,

...
Tip: Given that you cite President Clinton to contextually frame your argument, it should help you — as it critically helped me — to learn that Clinton, whose entire presidency was preoccupied by the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement, is the best source for understanding President Bush's decision on Iraq. In that regard, you said, "I will ask you to recognize the possibility that people can come to conclusions different from your own, based on reasoning as strong as you believe your own to be." Indeed, some areas of the broader discourse on Iraq are necessarily more subjective; but OIF's law and policy, fact basis is not one of those areas. The primary source authorities of the Iraq intervention are exceptionally straightforward, thorough, and plain — incontrovertible — and make for a simple clear assessment of whether a representation of the Iraq issue credibly accords with or else misinforms contra the operative law and facts. Much credit for that constant clarity goes to President Clinton. As Saddam exhausted the lesser ceasefire enforcement measures during his tenure, the Yale JD president worked with Congress with evident foresight to meticulously refine the case against Saddam and reinforce the enforcement procedure, which Clinton's Harvard MBA successor carried forward to capacitate Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441).
... The OIF FAQ includes numerous Clinton Iraq citations in the same vein since the Clinton-to-Bush continuity in the US-led Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement is a main theme.
...

[Note: The #clinton section of Perspective on Operation Iraqi Freedom provides a comprehensive listing of Clinton Iraq citations.]

---------------

from: [Eric LC]
to: [James Fallows]
date: Mar 11, 2019, 4:36 PM
subject: Re: New Cheney biopic Vice is a gift opportunity to clarify the Iraq issue for the public

Mr. Fallows,

You're welcome, but to be accurate, they're critical reviews of your view per your articles, per your request. The purpose of critically reviewing your articles is to help you clarify the Iraq issue for the public — which starts with correcting the seminal faults of your own work.

Note, again, laying a proper foundation with the operative law and facts doesn't necessarily mean discarding all your speculative analysis. Rather, it means re-sorting and valuating your content in the operative context.

Your articles surprised me. The deferential assumption due to your stature and experience is that you have working if not proficient knowledge of the controlling law, policy, precedent and determinative facts for President Bush's decision on Iraq. After all, the US-mandated enforcement of the UN-mandated Gulf War ceasefire threat-resolution measures versus Saddam's intransigence had progressed to coda over a decade of headline news by the time Bush became president. Plus, you repeatedly (if vaguely) insisted to me that you know them. Thus, I was curious to learn the presumably extraordinarily sophisticated reasoning for a view that's contradictory on its face.

I learned from your articles instead that your reasoning is simple: it follows a fundamental flaw, omission of OIF's law and policy, fact basis. To my surprise, your articles evidence you do not know the actual justification of the Iraq intervention despite your stature and experience and insistence you know it. Your view per your articles is akin to missing, overlooking, or worse, obfuscating the basic malady and prescription in order to creatively reproach a critical medical procedure.

My review singled out the linchpin assertion, "Iraq has been bottled up, by international sanctions, for more than ten years", for correction with that fault in mind. These additional Iraq Survey Group and Iraqi Perspectives Project findings, also borrowed from the OIF FAQ answer to "Why did Bush leave the ‘containment’ (status quo)", further elaborate the correction:
...

Your misrepresentation of the Iraq issue has helped cause much damage, but you can fix it.

---------------

from: [Eric LC]
to: [James Fallows]
date: Mar 12, 2019, 3:32 PM
subject: Re: New Cheney biopic Vice is a gift opportunity to clarify the Iraq issue for the public

Mr. Fallows,

On the merits, a synthesis of the primary source authorities manifestly outweighs an omission of the primary source authorities and the conjectural straw man planted in their stead.

The OIF FAQ is purpose-designed to lay a proper foundation with the operative law and facts, and correct the conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue, which means it's a purpose-designed tool for you to reexamine your premises.

Again, you're welcome to critically review the OIF FAQ:https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/ to substantiate your disagreement as we've critiqued your articles. I look forward to your feedback.



from: [Eric LC]
to: [Allan Lichtman]
date: Mar 9, 2019, 12:09 PM
subject: Regarding Trump on Bush and WMD in The Case for Impeachment

Professor Lichtman,

I use the primary source authorities — i.e., the controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts — to clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ.

From that perspective, I am writing you in response to this excerpt from pages 87-88 of The Case for Impeachment in Chapter 5, "Lies, Lies, and More Lies":
Some believe that George W. Bush should have suffered impeachment for pushing America into war through falsehoods about the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. One Bush critic said, "For the war! He lied! He got us into the war with lies!" He was surprised that Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi didn't look to impeach Bush and get him out office. "Which personally I think would have been a wonderful thing." That critic was none other other than Donald J. Trump.1
Despite condemning Bush's lies, Donald Trump has his own history of lying as an ingrained way of life.

Indeed, President Trump's charge against President Bush is false: according to the operative law and facts that define the Iraq issue, by which a hypothetical impeachment would have been litigated, President Bush's decision on Iraq was in fact correct. Though written prior to the 2016 presidential race, the OIF FAQ answer to "Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq" directly addresses Trump's assertion, "He [President Bush] got us into the war [OIF] with lies!". In addition, during the 2016 presidential race, I correct[ive]ly criticized then-Candidate Trump's misrepresentation of the Iraq issue.

To clarify, the "threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq" was established per UNSCR 687 at the outset of the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement and carried forward from the HW Bush and Clinton administrations' enforcement with Iraq. An American president upholding his duty could not arbitrarily decide Iraq's WMD threat per UNSCR 687 was resolved short of the mandated proof from Iraq. Iraq's WMD threat was established and presumed until Iraq met its burden of proof that it complied and disarmed in accordance with the UNSCR 687 "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441).

By procedure, the enforcement with OIF was triggered when Hans Blix and UNMOVIC reported Iraq again did not disarm per UNSCR 687, which meant Iraq remained in "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the ceasefire in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). This excerpt is from the #casusbelli section of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts":
At the decision point for OIF, the Saddam regime was evidentially in material breach across the board of the Gulf War ceasefire terms. The principal cause for OIF was Iraq's failure to comply and disarm as mandated with the UNSCR 1441 inspections. In Saddam's "final opportunity to comply" with "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations" (UNSCR 1441), Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire WMD mandates was established by UNSCOM, decided by the UN Security Council, confirmed by UNMOVIC to trigger the decision for OIF, and corroborated post hoc by the Iraq Survey Group.
...
For a succinct explanation of the legal basis for the military enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire, see President Clinton's letter to Congress outlining the legal authority for Operation Desert Fox. See President Bush's letter to Congress summarizing his determination and the legal authority for Operation Iraqi Freedom for a longer explanation.
Clarification in the public discourse of the Iraq intervention's actual justification would supplement your argument.



from: [Eric LC]
to: [Philip Bobbitt]
date: Feb 22, 2019, 4:08 PM
subject: The "principal motive" for OIF in your 2013 Machiavelli book

Professor Bobbitt,

Your 2013 book, The Garments of Court and Palace[:] Machiavelli and the World that He Made, states in note 30 for chapter 8 on page 235:
It's open to doubt whether the principal motive of the Bush administration in 2003, when it organized the invasion of Iraq, was to create a democratic regime to replace the autocracy of Saddam Hussein. But once American forces occupied Iraq, it was inconceivable that the old regime would be replaced with anything other than a democracy. And so, as the war began to proceed in earnest — despite American claims of victory — the war aim of a peaceful and benign democratic state took shape.

There's no doubt about the Bush administration's motive for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The US law and policy and UN resolutions that define OIF plainly show that the mission's purpose was to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (Public Law 107-243) and "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235) per the Gulf War ceasefire terms purpose-designed to resolve Iraq's Gulf War-established threat.

To that end, by the time President Clinton handed off the UNSCR 660-series compliance enforcement to President Bush, credible threat of regime change was established as necessary to compel Saddam's mandated cooperation. If Saddam failed to comply volitionally, regime change was established in the law and policy as the necessary measure to bring Iraq into its mandated compliance.

The premise that Iraqi regime change would "create a democratic regime to replace the autocracy of Saddam Hussein" was established in the operative set of law, policy, and precedent inherited by President Bush.

I clarify this question and other aspects of the Iraq issue at my Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ. In particular, I suggest the OIF FAQ answers to "Why did resolution of the Saddam problem require a threat of regime change", "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom about WMD or democracy", and "Was the invasion of Iraq perceived to be a nation-building effort".

The OIF FAQ clarifies the Iraq issue by synthesizing the primary source authorities that define President Bush's decision on Iraq. As such, I encourage you also to share the OIF FAQ with the New Hampshire state representatives who in 2008 sought to "force" Congress to impeach President Bush over the OIF decision.

---------------

from: [Eric LC]
to: [Philip Bobbitt]
date: Feb 23, 2019, 12:31 PM
subject: Re: The "principal motive" for OIF in your 2013 Machiavelli book

Professor Bobbitt,

Indeed, reminiscent of the Japanese regime change with or without Hirohito, the US-led ceasefire enforcers would have accepted (and long held out for) compliant Saddam as 1st preference. A compliant insurrectionist Iraqi leadership was 2nd preference. Unfortunately, Saddam refused the 1st and disallowed the 2nd in his distinctive manner. The Iraq Survey Group confirmed Saddam "never intended" to comply as mandated..

The three OIF FAQ answers I suggested below address the issue with apt citations. Particular to your objection, see the OIF FAQ answer to "Was the invasion of Iraq perceived to be a nation-building effort":https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/#nation-building. In fact, PL 107-243 contained a democracy component by extension — recall that the 2002 AUMF was not novel but rather carried forward, summarized, and updated the operative set of law, policy, and precedent that was finished with Operation Desert Fox under President Clinton.

[Section 4 of Public Law 107-243 "expected those actions described in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–338)". Section 7 of Public Law 105-338 ("SEC. 7. ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQ UPON REPLACEMENT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME") instructed, "the United States should support Iraq’s transition to democracy by providing immediate and substantial humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, by providing democracy transition assistance to Iraqi parties and movements with democratic goals", no matter the agency by which the Saddam regime was replaced, whether by insurrectionist Iraqi leadership or invasive regime change.]

The UNSCRs (1483, 1511, etc) for the OIF peace operations were detailed. However, you're correct that preceding OIF, the UN mandates were not (and could not be) detailed about regime change like the attendant US law and policy. That being said, preceding OIF, there was a general (nominally anyway) normative UN standard for occupations that the US strove to uphold. See the "Foundational legal documents for the 2003-2011 peace operations in post-Saddam Iraq" section at https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2013/03/10-year-anniversary-start-Operation-Iraqi-Freedom-thoughts.html#law for a linked listing of topical UN and US references.



from: [Eric LC]
to: [Steven A. Cook]
date: Feb 28, 2019, 6:28 PM
subject: Critical response to "All This Should Remind You of the Run-Up to the Iraq War"

Dr. Cook,

I am writing you in response to your 17FEB19 article in Foreign Policy, "All This Should Remind You of the Run-Up to the Iraq War":https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/17/all-this-should-remind-you-of-the-run-up-to-the-iraq-war/, in particular your references to the Iraq intervention.

Steven A. Cook:
No one has made a reference to smoking guns and mushroom clouds ...

To clarify the reference, see the #nuclear section of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts" post; excerpt:
In the operative UNSCR 687 disarmament context with the established fact of "Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme" (IAEA), that there were indicators of proscribed nuclear activity by Iraq is true.
...
Nonetheless, while reasonably concerned about the indicators of proscribed nuclear activity by Iraq, President Bush did not claim Saddam possessed nuclear weapons. His caution on October 7, 2002, "Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud," is often mischaracterized as a claim by Bush that Saddam possessed nuclear weapons. Yet in the same remarks, Bush stated, "Many people have asked how close Saddam Hussein is to developing a nuclear weapon. Well, we don't know exactly, and that's the problem." Understood in context, "we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud" helped explain that the intelligence and Iraq's continued violation of the UNSCR 687 WMD and terrorism mandates — the "clear evidence of peril" — compelled resolution of Iraq's mandated compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire terms, notwithstanding the President's acknowledgement that the intelligence was not "smoking gun" "final proof" that Saddam possessed nuclear weapons. In fact, the caution of a potential "mushroom cloud" was stated not as knowledge of Iraqi nuclear weapons but rather to stress that Saddam's outstanding WMD and terrorist threat per UNSCR 687 plus the intelligence gave weight to the call for UN and IAEA inspectors to return to Iraq forthwith in order to verify Iraq was compliant with the range of UNSCR 687 disarmament mandates, not limited to the nuclear disarmament mandates. To wit, the "mushroom cloud" image was prefaced with "Our enemies would be no less willing, in fact, they would be eager, to use biological or chemical, or a nuclear weapon." By "confront it now" in the same remarks, President Bush meant expeditiously bring Iraq into compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire terms, including the nuclear disarmament mandates.
Steven A. Cook:
... but how far off are we when the most senior U.S. officials have essentially declared their Iranian counterparts to be little more than a murderous gang hellbent on dominating the region? This was the same message that the George W. Bush administration stressed over and over again about Saddam Hussein and Iraq.

Highlighting Saddam's record of aggression simply reiterated the long established grounds of the Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement purposed to fulfill "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687).

To wit, this excerpt is from the Iraq Survey Group report:
Saddam’s rationale for the possession of WMD derived from a need for survival and domination. This included a mixture of individual, ethnic, and nationalistic pride as well as national security concerns particularly regarding Iran. Saddam wanted personal greatness, a powerful Iraq that could project influence on the world stage, and a succession that guaranteed both. ... WMD was one of the means to these interrelated ends.
To wit, this excerpt is from UNSCR 949 (1994):
Recalling that Iraq's acceptance of resolution 687 (1991) adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations forms the basis of the cease- fire,
Noting past Iraqi threats and instances of actual use of force against its neighbours,
Recognizing that any hostile or provocative action directed against its neighbours by the Government of Iraq constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,
... Determined to prevent Iraq from resorting to threats and intimidation of its neighbours and the United Nations,
Underlining that it will consider Iraq fully responsible for the serious consequences of any failure to fulfil the demands in the present resolution,
...
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
... 3.Demands that Iraq not again utilize its military or any other forces in a hostile or provocative manner to threaten either its neighbours or United Nations operations in Iraq;
... 5.Demands that Iraq cooperate fully with the United Nations Special Commission;

To wit, this excerpt is from the OIF FAQ answer to "Why not free a noncompliant Saddam":
On August 2, 1999, in his last comprehensive update on Iraq's compliance to Congress per Public Law (P.L.) 102-1 (1991), President Clinton was plainly opposed to freeing a noncompliant Saddam:
We are convinced that as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, he will continue to threaten the well-being of his people, the peace of the region, and vital U.S. interests. We will continue to contain these threats, but over the long term, the best way to address them is by encouraging the establishment of a new government in Baghdad.
...
The human rights situation in Iraq continues to fall far short of international norms, in violation of Resolution 688. That resolution explicitly notes that the consequences of the regime's repression of its own people constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region.
...
Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security. I remain determined to see Iraq fully comply with all of its obligations under Security Council resolutions. The United States looks forward to the day when Iraq rejoins the family of nations as a responsible and law-abiding member.
...
As such, the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) for the Gulf War ceasefire was purposefully designed with a spectrum of essential international norms to resolve the manifold threat of Iraq established with the Gulf War:
Reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait,
... Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of its prior use of chemical weapons and affirming that grave consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons,
... Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq,
Concerned by the reports in the hands of Member States that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons programme contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968,
... Deploring threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to make use of terrorism against targets outside Iraq and the taking of hostages by Iraq,
Taking note with grave concern of the reports of the Secretary-General of 20 March 1991 and 28 March 1991, and conscious of the necessity to meet urgently the humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq,
Bearing in mind its objective of restoring international peace and security in the area as set out in recent resolutions of the Security Council,
Conscious of the need to take the following measures acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
...
34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area. [UNSCR 687]
The politics have obfuscated that demonstration of Saddam's WMD was not the essential issue of the Gulf War ceasefire. The essential issue of the Gulf War ceasefire was the reconstruction of the "Government of Iraq" to satisfy "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687). The essential threat posed by the "Government of Iraq" was the unreconstructed nature of the Saddam regime, rather than Iraq's armament. The mandated disarmament of Iraq's WMD program was only a measurable symptom, albeit Iraq's WMD breach was an especially dangerous symptom. The essential purpose of enforcing Iraq's compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire measures, including the WMD disarmament mandates, was to assess whether the nature of the "Government of Iraq" had been reconstructed "to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions" (UNSCR 687).
Steven A. Cook:
Pence could have spared himself the trip to Poland and sent Donald Rumsfeld in his stead to reprieve his infamous criticism of the Germans and French as “old Europe,”...

The "infamous criticism" of Germany and France constitutes delicate diplomacy given that the two European leaders were implicated in the Oil For Food scandal and complicit with Saddam breaking the UNSCR 687 arms embargo, and thus they shared Saddam's culpability for the casus belli, i.e., Iraq's ceasefire breach.

Steven A. Cook:
... though, having learned their lesson in Iraq, the former defense secretary would now have to include the British.

The British can't be included with the Germans and French because unlike Germany and France, the UK was not complicit with Iraq's ceasefire breach. Rather, the UK together with the US responsibly enforced Iraq's mandated compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire terms.

Regarding the US-UK partnership with Iraq, see my Critical response to John Rentoul's "Chilcot Report: Politicians" and my Rebuttal of Prime Minister Brown's memoir argument against Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Steven A. Cook:
Most ominously, there is a lot of whispering in Washington that the Trump administration is ignoring the professionals within U.S. intelligence community, Defense Department, and other foreign-policy bureaucracies who have judged Iran to be in compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

To be sure, the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) was more stringent than the JCPOA. Iraq's noncompliance with the UNSCR 687 WMD mandates was assessed, confirmed, and corroborated by the U.S. intelligence community, Defense Department, other foreign-policy bureaucracies, the UN Security Council, UNSCOM, UNMOVIC, and the Iraq Survey Group.

To wit, this excerpt is from the #casusbelli section of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts" post:
At the decision point for OIF, the Saddam regime was evidentially in material breach across the board of the Gulf War ceasefire terms. The principal cause for OIF was Iraq's failure to comply and disarm as mandated with the UNSCR 1441 inspections. In Saddam's "final opportunity to comply" with "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations" (UNSCR 1441), Iraq's "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire WMD mandates was established by UNSCOM, decided by the UN Security Council, confirmed by UNMOVIC to trigger the decision for OIF, and corroborated post hoc by the Iraq Survey Group.
Steven A. Cook:
they [the Iranians] have taken advantage of the strategic blunders of others—the United States in Iraq

Yes, President Obama's radical course deviation with Iraq was a strategic blunder. See the OIF FAQ answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory", and the sources and commentary at An irresponsible exit from Iraq; excerpt:
In January 2009, President Bush handed President Obama a hard-won turnaround success in strategically critical Iraq to build upon. The US was fulfilling the principal objective of bringing Iraq into compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions stemming from UNSCR 660 (1990). Looking ahead from the COIN "Surge", post-Saddam Iraq was clearly headed the way of Germany, Japan, and South Korea as a key regional strategic partnership. In May 2011, at the dawn of the Arab Spring, Obama described the historic opportunity for peace in the Middle East where "Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress".

Concurrently, OIF had set up a better stable and ethical path to deal with Iran that relied on 3 prongs: stabilize Iraq as an American ally, increase sanctions pressure, and support civil reform in Iran. President Obama, instead, did the opposite of all three.
Steven A. Cook:
The one big difference between 2019 and 2002 is the determination among Democrats not to make the same mistakes they made 17 years ago when they allowed the Bush administration to frame the terms of the debate that paved the way for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Actually, the "terms of the debate ... 17 years ago" were established by President Clinton, who is a Democrat, and faithfully carried forward by President Bush. As Clinton 2nd-term Secretary of State Albright put it in her 2003 memoir, "As I listened to his words [Bush regarding Iraq], I had to nod in agreement. It was, after all, similar to speeches I had made time and again during my years as UN ambassador and Secretary of State."

See the clarification of the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ. A main theme of the OIF FAQ is the Clinton-to-Bush continuity of the US policy on Iraq.

Steven A. Cook:
Democrats in particular are not going to support another preventive war in the Middle East.

To be clear, the actual character of the Iraq intervention was the compliance enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates which represented the range of essential international norms. The casus belli was Iraq's "material breach" [(UNSCR 1441)] of the Gulf War ceasefire. Because the Gulf War ceasefire terms were threat-resolution measures, defense was an inherent characteristic of the enforcement. Iraq's unresolved threat was measured by Iraq's noncompliance with the ceasefire terms, and Iraq's noncompliance was categorical. Note, Saddam's categorical breach of the ceasefire included the UNSCR 687 terrorism mandates, and counter-terrorism is intrinsically preventive.

I hope this is helpful. If you have questions, please ask.



Related: Regarding pundits and David Brooks's "Saving the System".

Thursday, January 31, 2019

Critical response to The U.S. Army in the Iraq War study (2019)

PREFACE: I responded to The U.S. Army in the Iraq War study, which was ordered in 2013 by then-Chief of Staff of the Army General (Ret.) Ray Odierno and published on 17JAN19 by the Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press. See The U.S. Army in the Iraq War: Volume 1 and executive summary covering 2003-2006, and Volume 2 and executive summary covering 2007-2011. From the SSI faculty and staff directory, Dr. Wilson is "Isaiah Wilson, III – Director of SSI & USAWC Press", Dr. Metz is "Steven K. Metz – Director of Research", and Dr. Bolan is "Christopher J. Bolan – Professor of Middle East Security Studies". Dr. Metz's e-mail in the exchange is omitted.

My response to study co-author Frank Sobchak regarding his 08MAR19 Defense One article, "The US Army Is Trying to Bury the Lessons of the Iraq War", is additionally included.



from: [Eric LC]
to: [Strategic Studies Institute Webmaster], [Christopher Bolan], [Steven Metz]
cc: [U.S. Army War College Public Affairs Office]
date: Jan 31, 2019, 6:28 PM
subject: To Director, Strategic Studies Institute: Critical response to The U.S. Army in the Iraq War study

Dr. Wilson, Dr. Metz, Dr. Bolan, and Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College [Press],

I use the primary source authorities — i.e., the controlling law, policy, and precedent, and determinative facts — that define the Iraq issue to clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ. With that, I am writing you in response to The U.S. Army in the Iraq War study (OIF study) published on 17JAN19 per the invitation, "Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College [Press]".

I was moved to respond in particular by this statement from "Conclusion: Lessons of the Iraq War" in Volume 2:
The Iraq War has the potential to be one of the most consequential conflicts in American history. It shattered a long-standing political tradition against preemptive wars. John Quincy Adams’s presumption that America should not go “abroad searching for monsters to destroy” was erased, at least temporarily. In the conflict’s immediate aftermath, the pendulum of American politics swung to the opposite pole with deep skepticism about foreign interventions.

That speaks to the essential purpose of my work on the Iraq issue. This excerpt is combined from the preface to the OIF FAQ's titular post and my explication of the preeminent need to set the record straight and embrace the Iraq intervention:
My take in the debate over Operation Iraqi Freedom is the mission cannot be judged properly until the misconceptions about its law and policy, fact basis are corrected. Because the Iraq intervention is epochal, the prevalent misrepresentation of the grounds for OIF, such as "invading Iraq was based on cooked up intelligence", has corrupted American politics and undermined our national interests. Competitors like Russia understand stigmatizing OIF discredits the fundamental principles of American leadership in the paradigmatic mission, which subverts the premise of American leadership of the free world. Therefore, although President Obama withdrew the US-led peace operations from Iraq in 2011, setting the record straight remains vital because judgement of OIF in the zeitgeist continues to bear underlying influence on American affairs.
. . .
Rather than build on the hard-earned lessons of Iraq to reset the baseline for effectual American leadership of the free world, OIF stigma has driven American politics towards a weak-willed American leadership that invites the competition to exploit a gaping self-imposed strategic vulnerability.

The keystone premise needed to revitalize US-led enforcement of liberal world order is a competitive embrace of the Iraq intervention by policy makers, like US leaders built on the Korea intervention to suit America for the global contest. Repudiation of the Iraq intervention undermines effectual American leadership of the free world and devalues the essential international norms the US enforced with Iraq, which encourages and enables the advance of avid illiberal competitors.
...
But if US policy is to enforce the liberal international order, then the Iraq intervention, like the Korea intervention, sets the bar for effectual American leadership of the free world. Properly matching US strategy to US policy requires the political embrace of the Iraq intervention in order to constructively apply the essential lessons of Iraq, like US leaders applied the lessons of Korea.
While I am conversant with the strategic aspect, my work on the Iraq issue focuses on clarifying the mission's law and policy, fact basis — i.e., the why of OIF — per its relevance in the political aspect. A principal reason for the "problems that stemmed from assuming the coalition’s contributing nations held a common understanding of and commitment to the strategic objective[ — t]hey did not" is that the global politics were flooded with the same zealous misinformation and mischaracterization that pervasively undermined the Iraq mission and caused the alliance-fraying "British Government and public’s deeply negative view of the Iraq War" and the "deep skepticism about foreign interventions" in American politics. Now as then, clarifying the Iraq issue at the premise level of the politics is critical to lay the foundation necessary for sufficient strategic and policy solutions to take root.

To that end, basic law-and-policy errors that have impaired the public discourse have pervaded even the OIF study. Notably, it mischaracterizes the casus belli as Iraq's demonstrated WMD and criticizes OIF as a "preemptive war". In fact, the casus belli was Iraq's confirmed "material breach" (UNSCR 1441) of the Gulf War ceasefire. The Iraq intervention was primarily an international (law) compliance enforcement in the same genus as but at a higher level than the Balkans intervention, albeit remedying Iraq's standing Gulf War-established manifold threat was intrinsic in the prescriptive-cum-diagnostic Gulf War ceasefire terms that Saddam categorically breached in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) to trigger OIF.

Casus belli is a legal derivation and is identified as such with the operative set of law, policy, precedent, and facts. I guess the shortfall of primary sources cited in the OIF study from a legal perspective is to blame for the elision of the fundamental compliance enforcement context. The mischaracterization of OIF's casus belli is a foundational error by the OIF study. Fortunately, the error is readily corrected using the bedrock law, policy, precedent, and facts that define the Iraq issue.

To clarify, the US-mandated enforcement procedure for the UN-mandated "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) plainly shows the casus belli was Iraq's "material breach" of the Gulf War ceasefire in its "final opportunity to comply" with "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 1441). Unfortunately, in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply", Saddam again chose war via noncompliance with Iraq's UNSCR 660-series obligations over peace via compliance as mandated.

Contra the OIF study, neither the 75th Field Artillery Brigade's Exploitation Task Force nor the Iraq Survey Group needed to demonstrate Saddam's WMD "to verify the casus belli of the Iraq invasion". Hans Blix and UNMOVIC principally verified OIF's casus belli with the 06MAR03 confirmation of Iraq's noncompliance with the UNSCR 687 WMD mandates. Nonetheless, ISG and other ex post investigations did additionally corroborate the casus belli, e.g., "ISG judges that Iraq failed to comply with UNSCRs", while confirming that strident opponents of OIF including Security Council members France and Russia were complicit with Saddam.

The OIF study is also remiss in misrepresenting the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement. This excerpt is taken from the addenda to the #postwar section of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts" post:
My criticisms are the Army study overall is short of primary sources, Volume 1 mischaracterizes the casus belli as Iraq's demonstrated WMD stockpiles (the casus belli was Iraq's confirmed ceasefire breach), Volume 2 mischaracterizes OIF as a preemptive war (OIF was primarily a compliance enforcement), the Volume-2 executive summary wholly omits reference to the overarching conditions-based Strategic Framework Agreement, and the study report itself only briefly cites the "broader SFA" and incorrectly implies the SFA does not cover security. In fact, the SFA was the fail-safe. While the short-term 2008-2011 Status of Forces Agreement is predominantly cited, the long-term conditions-based SFA is why there was a follow-on SOFA negotiation under President Obama rather than a set-in-stone exit, why the 2011 withdrawal was "unexpected" in spite of the 2008-2011 SOFA, why Obama promised (though then reneged) a compensatory civilian presence, and why the US military subsequently effected a conspicuously simple return to Iraq.
Preemptive perfection is of course welcome, but that's not typical for any kind of real competition, whereas the setbacks and adjustments described by the OIF study conform to a normal competitive pattern. History shows us that US military successes have typically followed costly adjustments to often-devastating setbacks, e.g., the battles of New York, First Manassas, Kasserine Pass, and Chosin Reservoir. Comparatively, the shortcomings and learning curve in the analogous Korea intervention were far worse and harsher, respectively, than the shortcomings and learning curve in the Iraq intervention. Unfortunately however, President Obama did not constructively follow President Bush at the dawn of the 9/11 era like President Eisenhower followed President Truman at the dawn of the Cold War era. President Obama's radical course deviation with Iraq was not normal, and I disagree with the OIF study's misrepresentation of the SFA that enables the conflation of the presidents' disparate policies.

I hope this is helpful. If you have questions about my work on the Iraq issue, please ask.

---------------

from: [Eric LC]
to: [Steven Metz]
cc: [Isaiah Wilson, III], [Christopher Bolan]
date: Feb 1, 2019, 1:14 PM
subject: Re: [Non-DoD Source] To Director, Strategic Studies Institute: Critical response to The U.S. Army in the Iraq War study

Dr. Metz,

Thank you for the response. I understand the purpose of the OIF study. Nevertheless, as the narrative structure of the OIF study itself demonstrates, the aspects are interdependent; operations serve strategy serves policy. Operations are understood in the operative context of strategy, which in turn is understood in the operative context of the controlling law, policy, and precedent.

Moreover, the disclaimer up front states, "Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not ... misrepresent official U.S. policy." Yet among its basic law-and-policy errors, the OIF study misrepresents a foundational element of the official U.S. policy on Iraq:
The focus on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the casus belli for war would require additional forces to secure Saddam Hussein’s suspected WMD sites ... (Volume 1, p. 55);
CENTCOM and CFLCC did not assign an organization to secure Iraq’s presumed WMD until 3 months before the invasion, even though the Iraqis’ alleged nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons stockpiles were the U.S. casus belli (Volume 1, p. 60);
On June 22, the ISG formally took charge of the WMD mission, and the 75th Field Artillery Brigade redeployed in frustration, bringing an unceremonious end to the unit’s abortive mission to verify the casus belli of the Iraq invasion (Volume 1, p. 139);
Even the effort to locate the Iraqi regime’s WMD, the very casus belli for the U.S.-led coalition, was treated almost as an afterthought, tasked to a U.S. Army organization that was unequipped to accomplish the mission and had to be replaced by the hastily formed, ad hoc Iraq Survey Group (Volume 1, p. 248).

This excerpt is from the introduction of the OIF FAQ answer to "Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq":
[T]he prevalent myth that Operation Iraqi Freedom was based on a lie relies on a false premise that shifted the burden of proof from Iraq proving it had disarmed in compliance with the UNSC resolutions to the US proving Iraqi possession matched the pre-war intelligence estimates.

In fact, the US as the chief enforcer of the UNSCR 660-series resolutions held no burden of proof in the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement. From the outset of the Gulf War ceasefire, Saddam as the probationary party held the entire burden to prove Iraq was compliant with the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) that was necessary to satisfy "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions [and] ... to secure peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 687). The question of "Where is Iraq's WMD?" was never for the US and UN to answer; it was always a question Saddam was required to answer according to UNSCR 687 (1991) to prove Iraq had disarmed.

Neither demonstration of Iraqi possession nor the intelligence was an element of the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, which pivoted solely on whether Iraq proved compliance with the UNSC resolutions. The law and policy of the Gulf War ceasefire plainly show its enforcement was compliance-based and "the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441). The pre-war intelligence was not the governing standard of Iraqi compliance and thus, no matter its predictive precision, did not and could not trigger OIF. By procedure, only Iraq’s noncompliance with its ceasefire obligations could trigger enforcement, and only the "full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions" (UNSCR 1441) could switch off the enforcement.
The basic law-and-policy errors in the OIF study aren't a difference of opinion. They misrepresent official U.S. policy in the face of incontrovertible plain official US law, policy, and precedent.

Those errors have (had) political implications that redound on the OIF study's purpose. The OIF study rightfully advocates for the primary preservation and constructive application of OIF's hard-earned lessons. As do I. But as the debilitating Vietnam War stigma demonstrates, the OIF study's purpose can only be fulfilled if the political conditions are conducive. As I said, clarifying the Iraq issue at the premise level of the politics is critical to lay the foundation necessary for sufficient strategic and policy solutions to take root.

[The OIF FAQ post functions as a cheat sheet as well as a study guide by synthesizing the primary source authorities into a coherent, assimilable narrative to help readers learn the why of the Iraq intervention for themselves. I understand though that once they know what to look for, SSI-AWC scholars likely prefer diving directly into the source material.

Again, I hope this helps to set the record straight, and if you have questions about my work on the Iraq issue, please ask.]



PREFACE: Frank Sobchak is a PhD candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who co-authored “The U.S. Army in the Iraq War,” the U.S. government’s longest and most detailed study of the Iraq conflict. (source)

from: [Eric LC]
to: [Frank Sobchak]
date: Mar 19, 2019, 1:10 PM
subject: To advocate OIF's lessons, first clarify OIF's justification and exit

Colonel Sobchak,

I use the primary source authorities — i.e., the controlling law, policy, and precedent and determinative facts — to clarify the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ. With that, I am writing you in response to your 08MAR19 article, "The US Army Is Trying to Bury the Lessons of the Iraq War":https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/03/us-army-trying-bury-lessons-iraq-war/155403/, with recommendations.

As I expound here, I squarely agree with you on the vital importance of upholding the hard-earned lessons of the Iraq intervention, which are analogous to the essential lessons of the Korea intervention that set the baseline for American leadership in the Cold War. The primary challenge for your advocacy is political: counteract the stigmatization of Operation Iraqi Freedom and constructively reframe the Iraq issue versus competitors who use the policy-shaping OIF stigma to empower inimical agenda.

My first recommendation is to reach out to Nadim Shehadi, who was the director of The Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University until August 2018. Nadim is like-minded, but he'll need your convincing to rejoin the cause because he's discouraged.

My second recommendation is to use the OIF FAQ to clarify OIF's actual justification in the politics. The OIF FAQ is purpose-designed to lay a proper foundation with the operative law and facts. It synthesizes OIF's primary source authorities to correct the conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.

At the same time, critically highlight President Obama's radical course deviation with Iraq, and demarcate the constructive progress with counterinsurgency versus the degeneration that resulted from Obama's premature reduction, then withdrawal of OIF's peace operations. For reference, see the sources and commentary at An [i]rresponsible exit from Iraq.

It's necessary to clarify OIF's actual justification on the front end, or else the prevalent obfuscation of the Iraq issue enables the quarantine of OIF's essential lessons as aberrant fruit of an outlier, mistake, or conspiracy that's best forsworn. And, it's necessary to hold President Obama's choices to account on the back end, or else the elision of Obama's radical course deviation with Iraq enables the harm that resulted from the premature reduction, then withdrawal of OIF's peace operations to be ascribed to the failure of COIN as a disproof of concept.

On the other hand, if you do not zealously compete in the politics to lay a proper foundation and clarify the Iraq issue on either end framing the lessons of Iraq, then your advocacy will fail.

Note per above that The U.S. Army in the Iraq War study presently undercuts your advocacy with its basic law-and-policy errors regarding President Bush and President Obama's respective decisions on Iraq.

I hope this is helpful. If you have questions about my work, please ask.

Tuesday, January 22, 2019

Criticism and suggestions regarding the "Iraq Syndrome" in Cathy Young's "Confessions of a Libertarian Neocon"

PREFACE: Cathy Young is a Newsday columnist, an Arc Digital associate editor, a Reason contributing editor, and tweets at @CathyYoung63. I responded to her discussion of the "Iraq Syndrome" in her 26DEC18 Arc Digital article, "Confessions of a Libertarian Neocon". Ms. Young's e-mail in the exchange is omitted.



from: [Eric LC]
to: [Cathy Young]
date: Jan 22, 2019, 6:15 PM
subject: Regarding the "Iraq Syndrome" at "Confessions of a Libertarian Neocon"

Ms. Young,

I'd like to share some reactions to the "Iraq Syndrome" in your 26DEC18 article, "Confessions of a Libertarian Neocon":https://arcdigital.media/confessions-of-a-libertarian-neocon-e10042d21369.

My equivalent term for "Iraq Syndrome" is OIF stigma, which I regularly discuss with reference to Vietnam War stigma; for example.

First, regarding "Moreover, American opinion is still fairly divided about the war in Iraq; the public consensus is far less skewed against the war than the pundit consensus seems to be. In a Pew poll earlier this year, 48 percent said going to war was the wrong decision, while 43 percent said it was right."

Criticism: Citing to poll numbers in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, either at the time or current, is a nothing defense — a non-rebuttal. To be sure, you're not alone in using the argument. For example, Pete Hegseth and Stephen Knott are guilty of making it their lead argument. Worse than providing no substantive defense of the OIF decision, when it's used sans operative context, the 'public support' argument serves OIF opponents by, one, working hand-in-hand with the "false pretenses" assertion ('It was only supported because Bush lied') and, two, validating the justification for President Obama's exit from Iraq ('The public supported leaving Iraq').

The proper argument on both points is the substantive merits: uphold the OIF decision on the merits and criticize Obama's 2011 exit from Iraq on the merits. Incontrovertible plain law and facts make for a far stronger argument than poll numbers; objectively, the case against Saddam is substantiated. Fact pattern-type analysis that hews to the operative law, policy, precedent, and facts that define the Iraq issue shows that President Bush's decision on Iraq was substantively correct on the facts, procedurally correct on law and precedent, and justified on the policy. For example, see my law-and-fact clarification of the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ, which is oriented on the main points of the prevailing anti-OIF narrative.

Second, regarding "Who’s to say that Saddam Hussein would not have started another regional war, leading to his downfall and to an Iraqi civil war with even more casualties? There is an odd U.S.-centrism in the assumption that without our involvement, the Middle East after 2001 would have seen no wars, no revolutions, and no other catastrophes."

Suggestion: Clarify that Saddam's threat was not limited to Iraq's military and, at the point of Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) in 2002-2003, the Saddam problem was neither stable nor contained (in either sense). Critically, the operative context of the question, "Who's to say Saddam Hussein would not have started another regional war", was the burden on Iraq to prove it cured Saddam's standing Gulf War-established manifold threat in accordance with the comprehensive prescriptive-cum-diagnostic Gulf War ceasefire terms.

Any counterfactual that follows the premise of the US and UK backing down when Saddam chose to call the Gulf War ceasefire enforcers' bluff by breaching his "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) needs to factor that Saddam's leading "regional and global terrorism" (Iraqi Perspectives Project), which included "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with al Qaeda, and his radically sectarian rule by "widespread terror" (UNCHR) were actually "far worse" (UNCHR) than we knew before OIF. Coupled with those ceasefire breaches, Saddam was in fact reconstituting Iraq's WMD and conventional armament in violation of UNSCR 687.

Recall that the Iraq Survey Group's post-war findings corroborated UNMOVIC's confirmation of Iraq's ceasefire breach (ie, casus belli) and confirmed Saddam "never intended" to comply as mandated. At the same time, the ISG report is heavily qualified as a survey of Saddam's WMD due to Iraq's rigorous counter-intelligence, which included systematic ridding of evidence even during the post-war ISG investigation. Which is to say, the ISG's findings comprise a floor only, not a complete account of Saddam's WMD. We know Saddam had not disarmed as mandated per UNSCR 687, and we know Saddam was reconstituting his conventional arms and WMD program in breach of UNSCR 687, but we don't know the extent that Saddam had preserved and reconstituted his WMD program. Also recall in light of Saddam's principal terrorist threat and his "sanitized" secret IIS labs that terrorism and military-based standards for WMD threat are different.

In any case, knowing what we know now, we can be sure Saddam had broken 'containment' and was past red line and worsening in every ceasefire-mandated facet. So, what if Saddam was in power for the Arab Spring? Given the extreme harm that Saddam's allies have caused in the Arab Spring by merely copying Saddam's tactics and re-purposing Saddam's terrorists, one shudders to imagine how a Saddam in power — noncompliant, ambitious, unreconstructed, and triumphantly strengthened for years past a hypothetical American and British capitulation to his categorical ceasefire breach — might have opportunistically engaged the Arab Spring.

Third, regarding "I warned against assuming easy success and wrote that visions of a liberated and reconstructed Iraq as a model of freedom and prosperity in the region was “just the kind of noble dream that has a way of turning to a nightmare.”"

Suggestion: To establish the proper law-and-policy context for the nation-building mission, I suggest the OIF FAQ answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom about WMD or democracy". The OIF regime change was principally a Gulf War ceasefire compliance enforcement measure.

As I like to say, building a nation to secure the peace does not happen faster [or with less trial and error] than raising a child. The Iraq mission was evidently succeeding before President Obama's course change prematurely withdrew the necessary peace operations with Iraq. To help you address the events that have followed Obama's radical deviation, I suggest the OIF FAQ answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory" and the #bushwaswinning section of my "10 year anniversary of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom: thoughts"; excerpt:
With American leadership tempered by the crucible of Iraq, the next step of winning the War on Terror was building peace in the Middle East based on new norms. How? Carry forward the Bush Freedom Agenda and continue the steadfast American partnership developing the emerging pluralistic, liberalizing post-Saddam Iraq as the keystone building block.

While the Arab Spring happened during the Obama administration, the Bush Freedom Agenda had positioned America to boost liberal reform in the Middle East. Concurrently, OIF had set up a better stable and ethical path to deal with Iran that relied on 3 prongs: stabilize Iraq as an American ally, increase sanctions pressure, and support civil reform in Iran. President Obama, instead, did the opposite of all three.

In his benchmark May 2011 address, Obama pledged "steadfast" support for progressing Iraq and the Arab Spring. Middle East activists took the US president's pledge to heart to risk their lives, but Obama subsequently proudly reneged. In the singular window to make a historic difference, in the moment America held — as President Clinton had envisioned — "a remarkable opportunity to shape a future more peaceful than the past", President Obama astonishingly, instead, appeased Iran, disengaged the vital peace operations with Iraq, dropped the Bush Freedom Agenda, and opted to 'lead from behind' with predictable and evitable tragic consequences.
The key corrective premises that must be impressed on the politics, including upon your colleagues at Reason, is that the American and British decision on Iraq was demonstrably, objectively correct in the first place, the Iraq mission was evidently succeeding before Prime Minister Brown and President Obama's radical deviation, and the subsequent harms followed their course change. Fixing the foundation and frame of the Iraq issue in the politics would lift up your "neocon" advocacy and discredit your opposition. I hope this is helpful.



Related: Regarding pundits and David Brooks's "Saving the System".

Saturday, January 12, 2019

New Cheney biopic Vice is a gift opportunity to clarify the Iraq issue for the public

Appeal to OIF supporters and other humanitarian liberal policy advocates:

Vice, the new biopic about Vice President Cheney by Adam McKay, features the false narrative stigmatizing the Iraq intervention, which makes the film a precious gift opportunity for you (and other like-minded persons) to clarify the Iraq issue for the public. For that purpose, the Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ is ready to help you as a cheat sheet and study guide for the Iraq issue. I show my work, cite my sources, and remind that I'm not the authority: the sources are the authority. If you have questions about my work, ask.

Objectively on the law and facts, the American and British decision on Iraq was correct; the case against Saddam is substantiated. But if you feel that upholding the women and men, including President Bush and VP Cheney, who conscientiously rose to their duty with the vital ethical, principled, resolute, adaptive leadership that manifested with Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) isn't good enough reason for zealous advocacy, then consider that OIF stigma is the purposeful v2.0 strategic heir of Vietnam War stigma as the keystone premise in the politics subverting American leadership of the free world. Like the Vietnam War stigma, the OIF stigma won't go away until you've corrected it and discredited its proponents in the politics.

By refreshing the false narrative stigmatizing the Iraq intervention, McKay is practically inviting you (and other like-minded persons) to counteract the OIF stigma for our children's sake as an earlier generation should have counteracted the Vietnam War stigma for our sake. Your competitive advantage is the basic narrative of the OIF stigma is brazenly false and thus readily corrected by properly fixing the discourse with the incontrovertible plain law, policy, precedent, and facts that define the Iraq issue. On the other hand, if the Vice propaganda is conceded, then the metastatic OIF stigma will grow deeper.

From my Critical responses to leaders and pundits (note the apt preface), I suggest the Rebuttal of Prime Minister Brown's memoir argument against Operation Iraqi Freedom to prep your mindset to exploit Vice — with the understanding that setting the record straight will demand more than that from my work and your expertise.

Please share this appeal with like-minded family, friends, and colleagues, most importantly those with the means to compete in the politics. Adam McKay's gift opportunity to clarify the Iraq issue for the public will be viable for only so long.



#platner-cheney

PREFACE: Graham Platner is an Iraq veteran and 2026 Democratic candidate for US senator from Maine. Alex Nitzberg is a writer for Fox News Digital. Patrick Ward is a Fox News Channel White House Producer who contributed to Mr. Nitzberg's article.

from: [Eric LC]
to: [Alex Nitzberg], [Patrick Ward]
date: Nov 9, 2025, 1:27 AM
subject: Regarding Platner, Cheney, and Iraq

Mr. Nitzberg and Mr. Ward,

I clarify and relitigate the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ using the law and facts that define the Iraq issue.

I am writing to you in response to your 06NOV25 Fox News article, Iraq War vet running for US Senate says he won’t mourn Dick Cheney, Platner claimed Cheney 'wasted' American and Iraqi lives for 'nothing'.

I hope you share this message with Graham Platner and let your readers know, too.

Mr. Platner is incorrect that "the only legacy that we have to remember is that he [Vice President Cheney] wasted thousands of young American lives, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives, and trillions of dollars for absolutely nothing".

Vice President Cheney did his duty properly on Iraq. The vice president was right—the United States was right—on Iraq. On law and fact, President Bush's determination for OIF pursuant to UNSCR 678 was correct: the case against Saddam is substantiated. Doing his duty in turn, Mr. Platner's mission as an American soldier in Iraq was justified, honorable, and necessary. Or said another way, OIF demonstrably was a "war of necessity" according to Council on Foreign Relations president emeritus Richard Haass's famous taxonomy.

The Iraqi Perspectives Project did the post-war investigation of the Saddam regime's UNSCR 687 terrorism violation. IPP co-author James Lacey: "Given the evidence, it appears that we removed Saddam’s regime not a moment too soon." Because Mr. Platner and his fellow soldiers did their duty in Iraq, we were able to find out the noncompliant-Saddam problem was actually "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, 18MAR04) than we thought, and act to solve it.

Knowing what we know now, the Iraqi regime change was not only necessary, it needed to happen years earlier to save the "thousands of young American lives, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives" (Platner) that fell victim to the army of terrorists, including the al Qaeda network, that was bred by the Saddam regime in breach of the Gulf War ceasefire, i.e., casus belli, during the twelve year span between Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. And yes, the Iraq Survey Group confirmed that the Saddam regime did have an active WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687, which was also casus belli.

OIF did not cost "trillions of dollars" unless creative accounting is applied. See the OIF FAQ answer "Did Operation Iraqi Freedom really cost X trillions of dollars".

As for Senator Collins's support for Public Law 107-243, which Mr. Platner reviles as an element of his senate campaign, it should be clarified that the 2002 authorization for use of military force mainly restated and updated the standing law and policy on Iraq that had developed since 1990-1991. In and of itself, the authorization of the 2002 AUMF pursuant to UNSCR 678 was redundant with the 1991 AUMF pursuant to UNSCR 678, Public Law 102-1 per Public Law 102-190, which was restated in Public Law 107-243.

Why did Congress support the President on Iraq so readily in 2002? Because the Bush administration's case against Saddam in 2002 reiterated Congress's own case against Saddam from 2000.

In 1998, after seven years of Saddam's continual intransigent noncompliance with Iraq's Gulf War ceasefire obligations, Congress officially reached the line of Iraqi regime change with Public Laws 105-235 and 105-338. Both laws were restated in Public Law 107-243. The change that pushed Congress across the line of Iraqi regime change in 2002 that Congress had already reached in 1998 was the heightened threat value of the Saddam regime's UNSCR 687 terrorism violation following the 9/11 attacks. Rightly so: As IPP discovered, and our soldiers and the Iraqi people suffered, the Saddamist terrorist threat, which included "considerable operational overlap" (IPP) with al Qaeda, had grown far worse than we knew during the twelve years that the noncompliant-Saddam problem was allowed to fester.

Senator Collins did her duty properly on Iraq. As did Vice President Cheney and President Bush. As did Mr. Platner in Iraq. You should let him know that. The American people should know that.

Suggested reading to clarify the Iraq issue: my critique of the UK Iraq Inquiry Chilcot report at https://operationiraqifreedomfaq.blogspot.com/2025/01/critical-notes-on-uk-iraq-inquiry-chilcot-report.html.


#wurmser-cheney

PREFACE: David Wurmser served as senior advisor to Vice President Cheney on the Middle East and authored Tyranny’s Ally: America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein.

from: [Eric LC]
to: [David Wurmser]
date: Jan 7, 2026, 11:08 PM
subject: Show Vice President Cheney was right on Iraq

Dr. Wurmser,

I clarify and relitigate the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ using the law and facts that define the Iraq issue.

I am writing to you in reaction to your Wikipedia biography, your 28DEC25 X post, and your 04NOV25 The Editors article, The Dick Cheney I Knew, juxtaposed with the 06NOV25 Fox News article, Iraq War vet running for US Senate says he won’t mourn Dick Cheney, Platner claimed Cheney 'wasted' American and Iraqi lives for 'nothing'.

To effectively rehabilitate Vice President Cheney's legacy in relation to Iraq, it is not enough to recount that in "2004-2006", "He spent most of his days in this period collecting whatever information he could about the war, the well-being and morale of our soldiers, and in trying to help them from Washington achieve victory" and "he more than any other U.S. official never gave up on our effort, on our forces still fighting on the ground there, or on the effort for which thousands of soldiers were wounded or died".

To make a difference, you need to make the public understand the fundamental premise that before Vice President Cheney pursued "the well-being and morale of our soldiers", President Bush was justified in ordering them to invade and occupy Iraq in the first place. For that purpose, the law and facts that define the justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom plainly show that President Bush's determination on Iraq was correct: the case against Saddam is substantiated.

The law and facts that define the Iraq issue also show that your assertion that "no victory in Iraq was either possible or even definable without a clear national strategy" is incorrect. Since 1991, the HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations and Congress, with the United Nations, defined "victory in Iraq" as Iraq's compliance with its international obligations under the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) pursuant to UNSCR 678. On December 15, 2010, the United Nations declared victory in Iraq.

What does clarifying OIF's justification to the public look like?

Take, for example, the money quote in your Wikipedia biography:

Maloof and Wurmser gave their findings to the Bush administration, which used them to claim that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and ties to terrorism. Neither claim has shown to be true, per the Senate Report on Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq.

Your Wikipedia biography's assertion that "Neither claim has shown to be true" is incorrect on both counts.

First, regarding the "claim that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction", that was not a "claim". The burden was on Iraq to prove it disarmed per UNSCR 687, not on the UNSCR 678 enforcers to prove a "claim" of Saddam's WMD. In the operative context of the Gulf War ceasefire-mandated disarmament, the operative premise "that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction" was presumed per UNSCR 687 and established fact by UNSCOM and IAEA until Iraq proved it disarmed in accordance with UNSCR 687. The UNMOVIC Clusters document found that Iraq did not disarm per UNSCR 687 with "about 100 unresolved disarmament issues" (UNMOVIC), which retained the operative premise "that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction" in violation of UNSCR 687. By procedure, the UNMOVIC confirmation of Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) established casus belli pursuant to UNSCR 678.

Second, the post-war Iraq Survey Group findings, the ostensible fact basis of the July 9, 2004 "Senate Report on Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq", are rife with UNSCR 687 WMD violations. ISG findings do show that the pre-war intelligence estimates were predictively imprecise. At the same time, ISG findings also show that Iraq possessed a reconstituting WMD program in violation of UNSCR 687 with at least covert ready capability and ready capacity to scale up. The WMD evidence found by ISG constitutes a floor only, not a complete account of Saddam's WMD, due to "the unparalleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program" (David Kay, 28JAN04). Taken together, the large amount of WMD evidence found by ISG and the "unparalleled" (Kay) mass of evidence that was denied to ISG by the systematic Iraqi "denial and deception operations" (ISG) that "sanitized" (ISG) the evidence strongly suggest the Saddam regime had a vaster WMD program than we can know.

Third, regarding the "claim that Saddam Hussein had...ties to terrorism", the post-war Iraqi Perspectives Project findings are rife with UNSCR 687 terrorism violations. IPP's "evidence shows that Saddam's use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime" and "links the regime of Saddam Hussein to regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations" (IPP). Regarding the relationship between the Saddam regime and al Qaeda, IPP found that "In reality Saddam and bin Laden were operating parallel terror networks aimed at the United States" (Jim Lacey, 14SEP11), and the two primary terrorist "cartels" shared "indirect cooperation" with "considerable operational overlap" (IPP).

Of note, the Iraqi Perspectives Project findings were presented in November 2007, which means the "Senate Report on Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq", which was presented in July 2004, could not have "shown" whether the "claim that Saddam Hussein had...ties to terrorism" was true or not.

Clarifying OIF's justification to the public also means correcting the misconceptions in your 28DEC25 X post.

First, you could not be the "nefarious architect of the Iraq war" unless you were one of the HW Bush officials, other nations officials, or United Nations officials in 1990-1991 who crafted the Gulf War ceasefire mandates and their enforcement pursuant to UNSCR 678. In terms of OIF's casus belli, I assume you did not convince Saddam to breach the Gulf War ceasefire in Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) either as an Iraqi official or an official of one of the nations, led by France, Russia, and China, that were complicit in Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441).

Second, whether or not "Israel quite strongly and vociferously opposed the Iraq war" is irrelevant to the Gulf War ceasefire compliance-based casus belli. The actual relevance of Israel to OIF's justification is Saddam's primary "connections to Palestinian terror organizations" (IPP) such as Hamas that threatened Israel, which violated paragraph 32 of UNSCR 687 and UNSCR 949 for casus belli. IPP confirmed Saddam's terrorist threat to Israel among Saddam's terrorist threat to all of his "perceived enemies or US allies in the region" (IPP).

Third, setting aside the feasibility of your "wholly Iraqi and Hashemite-based strategy" to resolve the Saddam problem, you were incorrect when you "quite strongly disagreed with the idea that we had an obligation to rebuild Iraq were we to invade". It was standing law and policy by the time Bush and Cheney came into office. To clarify, see the OIF FAQ answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom about WMD or democracy" and the OIF FAQ answer to "Was the invasion of Iraq perceived to be a nation-building effort".

The key to understanding the US "obligation to rebuild Iraq" is understanding that deposing Saddam was not the purpose of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Iraq regime change was the means to begin pursuing OIF's purpose: The US law and policy and UNSC resolutions that define the Iraq mission plainly show that the purpose of OIF was "to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235) once the Saddam regime failed its "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), which was expected after twelve years of Iraqi intransigence and inevitable since "the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions" (ISG). Facilitating the process "to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235), including the UNSCR 688 humanitarian mandate per Public Law 105-338, necessitated "the US-run, big-war concept".

This is the key to setting the record straight on the actual why, or justification, of Operation Iraqi Freedom:

Wurmser (28DEC25):
I hope this then encourages those who honestly want to examine the war to go back and do grounded research into what happened, based on actual sources (and I pray de-classified archives soonest), so we can stop having to suffer uninformed, invented urban myths and conspiracy theories and instead discuss on solid foundations the deliberations of what led to the war.

The way to establish the "solid foundations the deliberations of what led to the war" is to realign the Iraq issue with the "actual" primary sources of Operation Iraqi Freedom, i.e., the controlling law, policy, precedent, and determinative facts that define OIF's justification. OIF's primary sources are straightforward, thorough, plain, and readily accessible—immutable and incontrovertible. They are the bedrock of the Iraq issue that definitively answer the why of the Iraq intervention. And unlike the prayed for "de-classified archives", OIF's primary sources are readily available on the internet right now.

At the OIF FAQ, I show my work and cite the sources to model the corrective dialectic. When "de-classified archives" do become available, they are properly evaluated in the operative context of a properly laid foundation with OIF's "actual" primary sources.


To help you correct the false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome that slanders you and Vice President Cheney, I recommend reviewing my Criticism of Hal Brands's commentary on Iraq in Hand-Off: "Reassessing Bush's Legacy: What the Transition Memoranda Do (and Don't) Reveal" and my "Critical notes on the UK Iraq Inquiry Chilcot report" linked in the excerpt:

Brands:
A fully considered assessment of Bush's presidency will not be possible for many years. But the memoranda reproduced in this book, along with the accompanying postscripts, can allow historians to think more carefully about what Bush bequeathed to Obama—and what that tells us about his foreign policy record.

If not a "fully considered assessment of Bush's presidency", Professor Brands is fully able to critically assess every piece of commentary about OIF right now with a basic law-and-fact check to vet its fundamental validity. The bedrock law and facts that define the Iraq issue are straightforward, thorough, plain, and readily accessible. Impeachment by contradiction with OIF's primary sources is a litmus test: commentary on Iraq either credibly accords with the operative law and facts, which means it has a valid conception of the Iraq issue, or it contradicts the operative law and facts, which means it is misinformation.

For example, see my critical examination of the Chilcot report at Critical notes on the UK Iraq Inquiry Chilcot report. The Chilcot report is a primary embodiment of the Iraq Syndrome in America as well as in Britain. Chilcot's "lessons" have been instituted as a guiding premise of UK policy. Yet a basic law-and-fact check of the Chilcot report shows that it is specious, based on misrepresentation, cherry-picking, and omission. When the UK Iraq Inquiry's legal and factual misconceptions are corrected, the Chilcot report falls apart.

The importance of clarifying the Iraq issue to the public goes beyond your reputation and Vice President Cheney's legacy. As exemplified by 06NOV25 Fox News article, Iraq War vet running for US Senate says he won’t mourn Dick Cheney, Platner claimed Cheney 'wasted' American and Iraqi lives for 'nothing', America's leaders need to know OIF's justification to do their job properly, and our Iraq veterans deserve to understand, and for the public to understand, that their mission was justified and "Well done".

I invite your critical feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.