Dr. Hertling didn't respond to my e-mail, so I don't know whether he's read it.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Mark Hertling]; [The Bulwark]
date: Jun 8, 2026, 1:11 PM
subject: Answer and solutions for "Tell Me How the Iran War Ends: What are we fighting for?"
To Mark Hertling and The Bulwark,
I clarify and relitigate the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ using the law and facts that define the Iraq issue.
I am writing to you with an answer and solutions for Dr. Hertling's 04JUN26 The Bulwark article, Tell Me How the Iran War Ends: What are we fighting for?.
Dr. Hertling asks about the Iran war, "What political conditions are we trying to create, and how will we know when we have achieved them?"
Based on our demands of Iran in the pre-war and ceasefire negotiations, the answer to "what political conditions are we trying to create" with Operation Epic Fury is sufficient "leverage in negotiations" for President Trump to reinvent the rules and standards of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates for weapons of mass destruction and conventional disarmament (UNSCR 687), terrorism (UNSCR 687), aggression (UNSCR 949), and human rights (UNSCR 688) to apply to Iran. The Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) was sufficient for the Saddam regime's manifold threat, and the Saddam precedent is the apt model for solving Iran's analogous manifold threat.
Dr. Hertling asks, "How will leaders know when success has been accomplished?"
The answer is, first, when a working approximation of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates are formally established for Iran. And, second, when Iran is formally assessed to be in its mandated compliance. For Iraq, the Gulf War ceasefire mandates were formally established in 1991, and Iraq was formally assessed to be in its mandated compliance in 2010. For an analogous example of what success looks like, see the OIF FAQ epilogue answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory".
The Saddam precedent is well established. President Trump could clear up the confusion by simply stating to the public that "the desired end state" of Operation Epic Fury is an Iran in compliance with a working approximation of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates on par with Iraq's mandated compliance that was achieved with Operation Iraqi Freedom. The political problem with that simple solution is the Iraq Syndrome. Excerpt from Cure the Iraq Syndrome to win America back from postliberals and leftists:
[F]or the Saddam problem, Congress provided sufficient support to the HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations for the military enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates with multiple resolutions urging the President to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235), including redundant authorizations to use military force.
In contrast, the 'forever war' or "endless war" talking point that currently predominates among Democrats and Republicans has limited Congress's support for managing the Iran problem to less than the Congressional support that was necessary to resolve the analogous Saddam problem. It is not surprising then that President Trump has opted to work around Congress rather than work with a Congress that is corrupted by the Iraq Syndrome, albeit the President's own choices on Iran have been undermined by the Iraq Syndrome.
Nonetheless, Congress is not wrong to call on the President to work with Congress on the Iran problem. The Iran problem will last beyond the Trump administration like the Saddam problem lasted beyond the HW Bush administration. Rather than work around Congress, President Trump and Congress should lay a lasting law and policy foundation to deal with the Iran problem like the legal foundation that President HW Bush and Congress established for the Saddam problem, which was necessary and sufficient for the American leader of the free world to eventually resolve the Saddam problem two administrations later. But reprising Congress's sufficient support on Iraq for Iran requires curing the Iraq Syndrome and clarifying the actual justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom at the premise level of our politics and policy.
In contrast, the 'forever war' or "endless war" talking point that currently predominates among Democrats and Republicans has limited Congress's support for managing the Iran problem to less than the Congressional support that was necessary to resolve the analogous Saddam problem. It is not surprising then that President Trump has opted to work around Congress rather than work with a Congress that is corrupted by the Iraq Syndrome, albeit the President's own choices on Iran have been undermined by the Iraq Syndrome.
Nonetheless, Congress is not wrong to call on the President to work with Congress on the Iran problem. The Iran problem will last beyond the Trump administration like the Saddam problem lasted beyond the HW Bush administration. Rather than work around Congress, President Trump and Congress should lay a lasting law and policy foundation to deal with the Iran problem like the legal foundation that President HW Bush and Congress established for the Saddam problem, which was necessary and sufficient for the American leader of the free world to eventually resolve the Saddam problem two administrations later. But reprising Congress's sufficient support on Iraq for Iran requires curing the Iraq Syndrome and clarifying the actual justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom at the premise level of our politics and policy.
In contrast to Operation Epic Fury, Dr. Hertling's mission, "the 2007 surge in Iraq", had the advantages of "patience, trust, consistency, and shared purpose" because "the desired end state" of the Operation Iraqi Freedom peace operations had been implicit in US policy since 1991 and explicit in the US law and policy on Iraq since 1998. Excerpt from the OIF FAQ answer to "Was the invasion of Iraq perceived to be a nation-building effort":
Although President HW Bush stated he did not want US forces engaged in long-term nation building with Iraq when the Gulf War was suspended, he committed the US to fundamentally changing the "Government of Iraq" one way or another starting ipso facto with the comprehensive requirements of the ceasefire itself. Practically, HW Bush's invasive multifaceted enforcement of the UNSCR 688 humanitarian mandates set the path for humanitarian intervention in general and peace operations with Iraq in particular.
By the start of President Clinton's second term, while the preferred outcome remained for Saddam to reverse course and comply volitionally, it was plain that Iraq would continue to violate the Gulf War ceasefire. In conjunction with the August 1998 legal mandate to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L. 105-235), in October 1998, section 3 of Public Law 105-338 codified regime change as the solution for Iraq's material breach. At the same time, Congress made peace operations with post-Saddam Iraq a legal mandate with section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, which committed the United States to "support Iraq’s transition to democracy ... once the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power in Iraq" by whatever agency:
By the start of President Clinton's second term, while the preferred outcome remained for Saddam to reverse course and comply volitionally, it was plain that Iraq would continue to violate the Gulf War ceasefire. In conjunction with the August 1998 legal mandate to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (P.L. 105-235), in October 1998, section 3 of Public Law 105-338 codified regime change as the solution for Iraq's material breach. At the same time, Congress made peace operations with post-Saddam Iraq a legal mandate with section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, which committed the United States to "support Iraq’s transition to democracy ... once the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power in Iraq" by whatever agency:
SEC. 7. ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQ UPON REPLACEMENT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME.On December 19, 1998, President Clinton affirmed the American commitment to "help a new leadership in Baghdad that abides by its international commitments":
It is the sense of the Congress that once the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power in Iraq, the United States should support Iraq’s transition to democracy by providing immediate and substantial humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, by providing democracy transition assistance to Iraqi parties and movements with democratic goals, and by convening Iraq’s foreign creditors to develop a multilateral response to Iraq’s foreign debt incurred by Saddam Hussein’s regime.
[W]e will maintain a strong military presence in the area, and we will remain ready to use it if Saddam tries to rebuild his weapons of mass destruction, strikes out at his neighbors, challenges allied aircraft, or moves against the Kurds. ... And we will stand ready to help a new leadership in Baghdad that abides by its international commitments and respects the rights of its own people. We hope it will return Iraq to its rightful place in the community of nations.On October 7, 2002, President Bush reaffirmed the American commitment to help Iraq after Saddam:
If military action is necessary, the United States and our allies will help the Iraqi people rebuild their economy, and create the institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq at peace with its neighbors.In Public Law 107-243 (2002), Congress "expected" the peace operations with Iraq that Congress had mandated in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998:
Whereas in Public Law 105–235 (August 14, 1998), Congress ... declared Iraq to be in ‘‘material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations’’ and urged the President ‘‘to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations’’;On March 7, 2003, UNMOVIC reported "about 100 unresolved disarmament issues" to the UN Security Council, which confirmed, as Congress expected, "Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687" in Saddam's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441). Following the conclusion of the UNSCR 1441 inspections, the next stage of "actions taken pursuant to the exercise of authority granted in section 3" (P.L. 107-243) commenced on March 19, 2003. On March 21, 2003, President Bush notified Congress, "United States objectives also support a transition to democracy in Iraq, as contemplated by the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998". Then, on May 1, 2003, the "efforts that are expected to be required after such actions are completed, including those actions described in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998" (P.L. 107-243) commenced when President Bush marked the end of major combat operations and the start of peace operations[.]
... Whereas the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–338) expressed the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove from power the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime;
...
SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
(a) REPORTS.—The President shall, at least once every 60 days, submit to the Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution, including actions taken pursuant to the exercise of authority granted in section 3 and the status of planning for efforts that are expected to be required after such actions are completed, including those actions described in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–338).
The strategic problem with Operation Epic Fury is its air power-limited campaign is essentially Operation Desert Fox redux, and OEF is President Trump's coercive basis for the ceasefire negotiation with Iran.
Yet ODF's air power-limited campaign was not the coercive basis for the Gulf War ceasefire mandates. Operation Desert Storm's ground forces pressing into Iraq provided the sufficient coercive leverage for establishing the Gulf War ceasefire mandates. Moreover, Operation Desert Fox was strategically ineffective, even counterproductive, as a UNSCR 678 compliance enforcement measure. Saddam evaluated ODF as proof that America was a paper tiger, and reacted to ODF with the heightened noncompliance that broke the post-ODF ad hoc 'containment', compelled Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441), and necessitated Operation Iraqi Freedom to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235).
Iran's reaction to Operation Epic Fury has been markedly similar to Saddam's reaction to Operation Desert Fox. I say more about the OEF:ODF strategic comparison at Jakub Grygiel's "The Iran War and the Coming Global Struggle" comes of the Iraq Syndrome.
The key lesson from establishing the Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) with Operation Desert Storm, the twelve-year failure of air power alone to compel Iraq's mandated compliance, Iraq's heightened noncompliance in response to Operation Desert Fox, and achieving Iraq's mandated compliance with Operation Iraqi Freedom is the necessity of an effective ground element for deterrence, combat, and peace operations. The political and practical necessity of an effective ground element should have been an automatic premise in the strategy to solve the analogous Iran problem. Obviously, the key lesson was left out due to the Iraq Syndrome.
Dr. Hertling raises the problem of "the widening gap between the military and the society it serves" and "how fewer Americans have direct connections to military service, therefore fewer understand the military profession firsthand", which detracts from American society's understanding of the proper constructive use of the military.
For a solution to the problem, I recommend that Dr. Hertling and The Bulwark look into academic military groups such as the campus Military Veterans of Columbia University and alumni Columbia Veterans. By now, most of their members are likely 9/11-era veterans of Iraq, Afghanistan, and the War on Terror. Academic military groups focus primarily on veteran transition. But they have the potential to richly engage the "civilian–military divide" with a focus on Dr. Hertling's strategy and policy concerns as students and alumni of the universities, like Columbia, that create our nation's discourse and produce our nation's leaders. Some of these groups likely already do this on their own initiative, and those efforts could be enhanced by Dr. Hertling and The Bulwark.
I agree with Dr. Hertling that the Operation Iraqi Freedom counterinsurgency "surge" should be held up as the contemporary exemplar of "the real purpose of military power is to create conditions that advance political objectives and allow something better, more durable, to emerge" and "military force is only truly successful when the destruction makes room to build something better than what came before".
To Dr. Hertling's point that "resources matter, but so does will: public support, political determination, national resilience, alliance cohesion, and the willingness to sustain effort over time", I will add that the highest regarded successes in US military history came of adjustments to setbacks, often disastrous ones, from Valley Forge to Fredericksburg to Kasserine Pass to Chosin Reservoir. As part of that tradition, the OIF counterinsurgency "surge" should be an invaluable contemporary case study of resolute leadership, resilient mission, and adaptation in competition that should be taught in government and academia as the proven formula for US military success.
I agree with Dr. Hertling that "military force can eliminate threats, buy time, and create opportunities. But it cannot establish legitimacy, build institutions, foster trust, create economic opportunity, educate children, or sustain political stability" in terms of the direct benefits of US military presence. However, I believe he under-values the indirect benefits of long-term US military presence that should have been afforded to Iraq. Excerpt from my Review of Linda Robinson's "The Long Shadow of the Iraq War: Lessons and Legacies Twenty Years Later":
Robinson:
I agree with Ms. Robinson that "societies only evolve at a generational pace". The generations of American soldiers stationed in Germany, Japan, and Korea show the vital constructive effects of US forces in nation-building in their direct effect in the short term and indirect effect over the long term by securing the fundamental space, anchoring the bilateral relationship for the broader set of ties and exchanges, and enabling the progressive learning curve of everything else. The US forces in Iraq should have had the same direct and indirect constructive effects for Iraq's generational development, except President Obama chose to contravene the Eisenhower precedent and deny them to Iraq.
After a deadly delay, President Obama belatedly honored the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement by sending US forces back in 2014 to stop the Saddamists for a third time. However, Obama did not restore the presence of US forces that should have secured the fundamental space, anchored the bilateral relationship, and enabled the progressive learning curve of everything else for the good of Iraq's generational development. Instead, Iran accepted Obama's gift opportunity and has occupied the vital gap that Obama left behind.
. . .
In the generational context, if not for President Obama's radical deviation, US forces would have helped Iraq move in the right direction, like they have helped Germany, Japan, and Korea, by securing the fundamental space versus Saddamist and Iranian interference, anchoring the bilateral relationship for the "trade, cultural, and educational exchanges, with political and diplomatic ties" to positively influence Iraq's progress, and enabling the progressive learning curve of everything else for the "country's young population", protests and all.
We can only speculate how much healthier Iraq's nation-building development would be today if President Obama had not radically deviated from President Bush's course with Iraq.
... societies only evolve at a generational pace.
I agree with Ms. Robinson that "societies only evolve at a generational pace". The generations of American soldiers stationed in Germany, Japan, and Korea show the vital constructive effects of US forces in nation-building in their direct effect in the short term and indirect effect over the long term by securing the fundamental space, anchoring the bilateral relationship for the broader set of ties and exchanges, and enabling the progressive learning curve of everything else. The US forces in Iraq should have had the same direct and indirect constructive effects for Iraq's generational development, except President Obama chose to contravene the Eisenhower precedent and deny them to Iraq.
After a deadly delay, President Obama belatedly honored the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement by sending US forces back in 2014 to stop the Saddamists for a third time. However, Obama did not restore the presence of US forces that should have secured the fundamental space, anchored the bilateral relationship, and enabled the progressive learning curve of everything else for the good of Iraq's generational development. Instead, Iran accepted Obama's gift opportunity and has occupied the vital gap that Obama left behind.
. . .
In the generational context, if not for President Obama's radical deviation, US forces would have helped Iraq move in the right direction, like they have helped Germany, Japan, and Korea, by securing the fundamental space versus Saddamist and Iranian interference, anchoring the bilateral relationship for the "trade, cultural, and educational exchanges, with political and diplomatic ties" to positively influence Iraq's progress, and enabling the progressive learning curve of everything else for the "country's young population", protests and all.
We can only speculate how much healthier Iraq's nation-building development would be today if President Obama had not radically deviated from President Bush's course with Iraq.
Finally, Dr. Hertling's criticism of Operation Epic Fury is based on the lessons he learned and we all should have learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom, in particular the OIF counterinsurgency "surge". I agree with Dr. Hertling on the vital importance of upholding the hard-earned lessons of the Iraq intervention, which are analogous to the constructive lessons of the Korea intervention that set the baseline for American leadership of the free world in the Cold War.
The problem is the constructive lessons of Iraq have been obfuscated by the predominant yet demonstrably false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome and its "endless war" or 'forever war' talking point.
For a solution to the problem, I recommend that Dr. Hertling and The Bulwark adopt the OIF FAQ purpose of curing the Iraq Syndrome by relitigating the Iraq Syndrome's false narrative to the public and clarifying the actual justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom at the premise level of our politics and policy. To help with that purpose, I recommend the OIF FAQ base post which is purpose-designed to lay a proper foundation with a synthesis of the primary law and fact sources that define the Iraq issue. Realigning the Iraq issue with its primary sources is necessary to correct the endemic conjecture, distorted context, and misinformation that have obfuscated the Iraq issue.
At the same time, it is necessary to criticize President Obama's radical deviation with Iraq, and demarcate Iraq's constructive progress with the OIF counterinsurgency "surge" versus the degeneration that resulted from Obama's premature reduction and withdrawal of the vital OIF peace operations. For reference, see the sources and commentary at An irresponsible exit from Iraq.
It is necessary to clarify Operation Iraqi Freedom's actual justification on the front end, or else the false narrative of the Iraq Syndrome will continue to quarantine the constructive lessons of Iraq as aberrant fruit of a poisoned tree—an outlier, mistake, or conspiracy that is best forsworn. And, it is necessary to hold President Obama's premature reduction and withdrawal of the OIF peace operations to account on the back end, or else the cascading harms that have resulted from Obama's radical deviation with Iraq will continue to be conflated with the Iraq intervention overall and discredit the OIF counterinsurgency "surge" with a fallacious disproof of concept.
If Dr. Hertling and The Bulwark choose not to clarify the Iraq issue at either the front or back end framing the Iraq issue, then the Iraq Syndrome will continue to obfuscate the constructive lessons of Iraq, and we will "continue to reduce national security to strikes, slogans, battle damage assessments, and spectacle" and "risk confusing activity with achievement and tactics with strategy".
Dr. Hertling and The Bulwark, I invite your critical feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
Related: Apply the Saddam precedent to "finish the job and free Iran" (Lisa Daftari), Correct the Iraq War "story" to constructively "shape American foreign policy for years to come" (Jonah Goldberg), Cure the Iraq Syndrome to win America back from postliberals and leftists (Thomas Howes), The facts show Edward Feser was right on Iraq in the first place and changed his mind based on misinformation, Jakub Grygiel's "The Iran War and the Coming Global Struggle" comes of the Iraq Syndrome, The apt UN-based international law solution for Iran is the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent (Richard Epstein, John Yoo), The apt Iraq comparison for the Iran intervention is the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, not Desert Storm (Jonathan Allen), The Forward Party should reconceive the Iran issue with the premise that we were right on Iraq, which is the truth, and The Constitutional rule of law for war was skirted by President Clinton, reinforced by President Bush, and degraded by President Obama.