Ms. Toosi didn't respond to my e-mail, so I don't know whether she's read it.
from: [Eric LC]
to: [Nahal Toosi]
date: Sep 4, 2026, 11:20 AM
subject: The Iraq solution for Nahal Toosi's "The Iran War Is a Whole New Level of Quagmire for the US"
To Nahal Toosi and Politico,
I clarify and relitigate the Iraq issue at Operation Iraqi Freedom FAQ using the law and facts that define the Iraq issue.
I am writing to you in response to your 12AUG26 Politico article, The Iran War Is a Whole New Level of Quagmire for the US: There are three main camps emerging with proposals, all of which have downsides, with the Iraq solution to the Iran problem.
Toosi:
The echoes of Iraq make the situation in Iran even more maddening to foreign policy practitioners.
Ms. Toosi begins the article with "No one seems to have a solid strategy to win the war in Iran" and ends it with an ironic "surely some new ideas are forthcoming". Yet throughout "The Iran War Is a Whole New Level of Quagmire for the US", Ms. Toosi points to the only proven solution for the Iran problem, which is not "a large wooden horse". Our "foreign policy practitioners" already have the answer with the "echoes of Iraq". The necessary precedent to form "a solid strategy to win the war in Iran" is Operation Iraqi Freedom, which successfully solved Saddam's manifold threat by adapting to overcome the similar challenges that Iraq presented to the UNSCR 678 enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates.
But bringing to bear the real constructive lessons of Iraq that are needed to solve Iran's analogous manifold threat requires Ms. Toosi and Politico to discredit the degenerative Iraq Syndrome and its misguiding 'forever wars' talking point which currently predominate our politics and policy. The political frame needs to be reformed with the operative premise that America got it right on Iraq with President Bush's "extraordinary opportunity to show global leadership" before President Obama's radical deviation produced the "extraordinary mess on their hands" that President Trump is trying to solve.
The pivotal correction begins at the premise level by relitigating the Iraq Syndrome's demonstrably false narrative to the public. For example, see my Critical notes on the UK Iraq Inquiry Chilcot report. The Chilcot report is an ideal target to start the public correction since Chilcot is a primary embodiment of the Iraq Syndrome in America as well as in Britain, where it guides policy, yet the Chilcot report is a blatant fraud based on readily correctable false premises. For more examples, take your pick.
Toosi:
The situation is reminiscent of the darkest days of the Iraq war, in the mid-2000s, when the U.S. seemed unable to pull that country back from insurgency and civil war.
Equating the "situation" with Operation Epic Fury to Operation Iraqi Freedom "in the mid-2000s" is the wrong analogy.
Operation Epic Fury's air-limited bombing campaign actually resembles Operation Desert Fox in 1998, not Operation Iraqi Freedom's pre-surge peace operations in 2006. The current situation with Iran is "reminiscent of the darkest days" when the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement was failing between Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, in particular the toxic stalemate that followed Operation Desert Fox. Predictably, the Iran regime's emboldened, belligerent, and aggressive reaction to OEF has been markedly similar to the Saddam regime's reaction to ODF. (Although note that ODF was part of the UNSCR 678 enforcement continuum with ODS and OIF, which means ODF's legal basis was substantially superior to OEF's.)
The fundamental difference between the "situation" with Operation Epic Fury and Operation Iraqi Freedom "in the mid-2000s" is that OEF has been limited so far to the measures, namely air-limited bombing, sanctions, and naval blockade, that proved inadequate to compel Iraq's mandated compliance prior to OIF. In other words, President Trump is effectively recreating with Iran the toxic stalemate with Iraq that enabled the Saddam problem to fester between 1991 and 2003. In contrast, Operation Iraqi Freedom "in the mid-2000s" was in the midst of the competitive adjustment that defeated the Saddamist AQI insurgency, which represented the terrorist aspect of Saddam's manifold threat.
To that point, Ms. Toosi's "in the mid-2000s, when the U.S. seemed unable to pull that country back from insurgency and civil war" is a mischaracterization of the pre-surge peace operations with Iraq. The counterinsurgency adjustment and "persuading Sunni tribal leaders to join forces with the U.S." with the Sahwa 'awakening' did not magically materialize overnight. From the start of the post-war mission, American soldiers in Iraq adapted to the competition while working with the Iraqi people to develop the ways and means that defined the COIN 'surge'.
The Vietnam Syndrome had gutted the particular counterinsurgency capability we needed to secure the peace with Iraq against the Saddamist AQI insurgency, so the COIN adjustment effectively started from scratch. Counterinsurgency normally requires much strategic patience and a decade or more to run its course. Yet the COIN adjustment with Iraq was developed extraordinarily rapidly "in the mid-2000s" and succeeded in half the normal timeframe, which speaks to the dynamic character of the pre-surge peace operations contrary to Ms. Toosi's characterization, "in the mid-2000s, when the U.S. seemed unable to pull that country back from insurgency and civil war".
To solve the Iran problem, President Trump's leadership on Iran needs to match the gold standard of President Bush's historic leadership with Iraq "in the mid-2000s" that proved sufficient to solve the analogous Saddam problem.
Toosi:
For Iranians desperate for a freer life, it is devastating to think that the regime in Tehran may instead emerge from the current war more repressive to ordinary Iranians and more dangerous to the world at large.
See Apply the Saddam precedent to "finish the job and free Iran" where I explain to Iranian human rights advocates that they need to apply Operation Iraqi Freedom's paradigmatic human rights element per Public Law 102-190 and Public Law 105-338 pursuant to UNSCR 688 and UNSCR 1483 etc. as the necessary precedent for a sufficient pursuit of human rights with Iran.
Toosi:
President Donald Trump is further damaging America’s reputation by constantly vacillating about what to do in Iran and by fraying U.S. alliances with countries that could help, people on both sides of the aisle say.
“The moment is extremely dangerous, and the Trump administration is showing uncertainty and incompetence,” said Elliott Abrams, a longtime Middle East hawk who worked for Trump in his first term.
... When I asked current and former U.S. officials what had to be done to win, the most common first response was a primal scream of sorts that translated into, “We never should have started this war.” That was followed by: “What do you mean by ‘win’?”
It’s a fair question, and one the White House has failed to answer as it keeps shifting its goals. Trump launched the war bent on ending Iran’s nuclear program, destroying many of its military capabilities and hinting at regime change. Now he seems most intent on freeing the strait from Iran’s grip.
“The moment is extremely dangerous, and the Trump administration is showing uncertainty and incompetence,” said Elliott Abrams, a longtime Middle East hawk who worked for Trump in his first term.
... When I asked current and former U.S. officials what had to be done to win, the most common first response was a primal scream of sorts that translated into, “We never should have started this war.” That was followed by: “What do you mean by ‘win’?”
It’s a fair question, and one the White House has failed to answer as it keeps shifting its goals. Trump launched the war bent on ending Iran’s nuclear program, destroying many of its military capabilities and hinting at regime change. Now he seems most intent on freeing the strait from Iran’s grip.
The Bush administration was accused—falsely—of "shifting its goals" with Iraq, too. See the OIF FAQ answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom about WMD or democracy".
In fact, the goal with Iraq was always to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (Public Law 107-243) and "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235). The Bush administration "shifting its goals" with Iraq actually reflected the diversity of Gulf War ceasefire mandates which were purpose-designed to solve the diversity of the Saddam regime's Gulf War-established manifold threat.
Iran's manifold threat is analogous to Saddam's manifold threat, so to answer Ms. Toosi's "fair question, and one the White House has failed to answer", it behooves President Trump to adapt the articulation of the apt Gulf War ceasefire formula and apply it to the Iran problem. For example, I answered Ms. Toosi's "fair question" to Mark Hertling in Answer and solutions for Mark Hertling's "Tell Me How the Iran War Ends: What are we fighting for?". Excerpt:
Dr. Hertling asks about the Iran war, "What political conditions are we trying to create, and how will we know when we have achieved them?"
Based on our demands of Iran in the pre-war and ceasefire negotiations, the answer to "what political conditions are we trying to create" with Operation Epic Fury is sufficient "leverage in negotiations" for President Trump to reinvent the rules and standards of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates for weapons of mass destruction and conventional disarmament (UNSCR 687), terrorism (UNSCR 687), aggression (UNSCR 949), and human rights (UNSCR 688) to apply to Iran. The Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) was sufficient for the Saddam regime's manifold threat, and the Saddam precedent is the apt model for solving Iran's analogous manifold threat.
Dr. Hertling asks, "How will leaders know when success has been accomplished?"
The answer is, first, when a working approximation of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates are formally established for Iran. And, second, when Iran is formally assessed to be in its mandated compliance. For Iraq, the Gulf War ceasefire mandates were formally established in 1991, and Iraq was formally assessed to be in its mandated compliance in 2010. For an analogous example of what success looks like, see the OIF FAQ epilogue answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory".
The Saddam precedent is well established. President Trump could clear up the confusion by simply stating to the public that "the desired end state" of Operation Epic Fury is an Iran in compliance with a working approximation of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates on par with Iraq's mandated compliance that was achieved with Operation Iraqi Freedom. The political problem with that simple solution is the Iraq Syndrome.
Based on our demands of Iran in the pre-war and ceasefire negotiations, the answer to "what political conditions are we trying to create" with Operation Epic Fury is sufficient "leverage in negotiations" for President Trump to reinvent the rules and standards of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates for weapons of mass destruction and conventional disarmament (UNSCR 687), terrorism (UNSCR 687), aggression (UNSCR 949), and human rights (UNSCR 688) to apply to Iran. The Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) was sufficient for the Saddam regime's manifold threat, and the Saddam precedent is the apt model for solving Iran's analogous manifold threat.
Dr. Hertling asks, "How will leaders know when success has been accomplished?"
The answer is, first, when a working approximation of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates are formally established for Iran. And, second, when Iran is formally assessed to be in its mandated compliance. For Iraq, the Gulf War ceasefire mandates were formally established in 1991, and Iraq was formally assessed to be in its mandated compliance in 2010. For an analogous example of what success looks like, see the OIF FAQ epilogue answer to "Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory".
The Saddam precedent is well established. President Trump could clear up the confusion by simply stating to the public that "the desired end state" of Operation Epic Fury is an Iran in compliance with a working approximation of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates on par with Iraq's mandated compliance that was achieved with Operation Iraqi Freedom. The political problem with that simple solution is the Iraq Syndrome.
Solving the political problem of the Iraq Syndrome is key. President Trump is "showing uncertainty and incompetence" and "constantly vacillating about what to do in Iran" because he is caught in the same trap that misguided President Obama's choices that enabled and exacerbated the Iran problem. Like President Obama, President Trump's unexpected ascent from the political margins to the White House relied heavily on exploiting the Iraq Syndrome to marginalize the party establishment centrists, both Democrat and Republican, who responsibly supported Operation Iraqi Freedom pursuant to UNSCR 678. But also like President Obama, President Trump's choices as President have been corrupted by their shared obedience to the Iraq Syndrome and its 'forever wars' talking point.
Toosi:
Once again, the U.S. is dealing with a bitter Middle Eastern adversary; the fear of weapons of mass destruction; a U.S. president willing to take astonishing risks; and an administration that didn’t think far enough ahead.
“Like Iraq, this is a predicament of our own making and one that should have been anticipated and that could have been mitigated with better informed planning,” said Suzanne Maloney, an Iran analyst with the Brookings Institution in Washington.
... “I don’t see a way out of this,” one U.S. official familiar with the administration’s Middle East strategy told me. The official argued that the Trump team “fundamentally misunderstands” Iran’s rulers. Trump and his aides “have always felt like they can just keep applying pain and Iran will crumble, but the regime is not going to crumble.”
“Like Iraq, this is a predicament of our own making and one that should have been anticipated and that could have been mitigated with better informed planning,” said Suzanne Maloney, an Iran analyst with the Brookings Institution in Washington.
... “I don’t see a way out of this,” one U.S. official familiar with the administration’s Middle East strategy told me. The official argued that the Trump team “fundamentally misunderstands” Iran’s rulers. Trump and his aides “have always felt like they can just keep applying pain and Iran will crumble, but the regime is not going to crumble.”
Knowing what we know now about the Saddam regime's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441) and the toxic, broken 'containment' of Iraq, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair were right to determine that allowing the noncompliant Saddam problem to fester any longer was a greater risk than a strict enforcement of Iraq's "final opportunity to comply" (UNSCR 1441) with the Gulf War ceasefire mandates. To clarify, see the OIF FAQ answer to "What were President Bush’s alternatives with Iraq" and the OIF FAQ answer to "Why did Bush leave the ‘containment’ (status quo)".
Dr. Maloney's statement is correct. However, her statement is not correct in the way that Ms. Toosi interprets it, so the article fails to identify the lesson of Iraq needed to solve the Iran problem.
Dr. Maloney is correct that the situation with Iran, "Like Iraq, this is a predicament of our own making". The "U.S. official familiar with the administration’s Middle East strategy" could have leveled the same criticism against the HW Bush and Clinton administrations on Iraq. Like President Trump with Iran, President HW Bush, President Clinton, and Congress each determined that Iraqi regime change was needed to solve the noncompliant Saddam problem. Despite that judgement, the United States as the chief enforcer of UNSCR 678 employed measures between 1991 and 2003 that proved inadequate to compel Iraq's mandated compliance, which allowed the Saddam problem to fester into the "predicament of our own making" that necessitated Operation Iraqi Freedom to solve.
President Trump should have applied the lesson of Iraq to solve the Iran problem forthwith and not allow it to fester into "a predicament of our own making". Instead, President Trump is employing the same measures with Iran that failed to compel Iraq's mandated compliance, which is predictably enabling the Iran problem to turn into a "predicament of our own making" like the noncompliant Saddam problem.
President HW Bush and President Clinton have a valid excuse for not anticipating the "predicament...that should have been anticipated" with Iraq: Simply, the UNSCR 678 enforcement of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates was novel, the first of its kind. Therefore, while the HW Bush and Clinton administrations should be criticized for falling short of their own policy on Iraq, they can also be excused for not anticipating that the pre-OIF measures would fail to compel Iraq's mandated compliance, and that allowing the noncompliant Saddam regime to stay in power enabled the Saddamist adaptations that made the Saddam problem more harmful and dangerous and increasingly costly and difficult to solve.
However, the excuse for President HW Bush and President Clinton on Iraq is not valid for President Trump on Iran because the Iran problem is analogous to the Saddam problem, and therefore not the first of its kind. Dr. Maloney is correct that for President Trump the current "predicament...should have been anticipated and that could have been mitigated with better informed planning". Since the history of the Saddam precedent is readily available to the Trump administration, the United States should not be repeating the pre-OIF mistakes with Iran that were only excusable when we made them the first time with Iraq. President Trump should be approaching the analogous Iran problem with the knowledge of which measures compelled Iraq's submission to the purpose-designed threat-resolution Gulf War ceasefire mandates in 1991, which measures failed to compel Iraq's mandated compliance over the next twelve years, and which measures finally succeeded to "bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235) after 2003.
Regarding the Saddamist AQI insurgency, that was not "a predicament of our own making...that should have been anticipated and that could have been mitigated with better informed planning". Ms. Toosi is wrong to say the Bush administration "didn't think far enough ahead" in terms of the OIF occupation and peace operations. Knowing what we know now about the Saddam regime's adaptations that followed Operation Desert Storm, the only realistic way to mitigate that "predicament of our own making" would have been to force the Iraqi regime change a decade earlier, as soon as it became obvious that Saddam would not comply with the Gulf War ceasefire mandates.
The initial post-war plan was valid based on the prevalent pre-war conception of Iraq, and the OIF occupation began in May 2003 prepared to conduct peace operations that were state of the art in the context of Kosovo and Afghanistan. However, the initial post-war plan proved inadequate due to the international community's severe underestimation of the true extent of Saddam's UNSCR 687 terrorism violations, which preconfigured the Saddamist AQI insurgency, and UNSCR 688 human rights violations, which traumatized and corrupted Iraqi society more than we knew,—which prevented "better informed planning" for the actual state of Iraq in 2003.
In other words, the world knew that Saddam's rule had broken Iraq. But the international community, in particular Iraqi expats and UN humanitarian officials, did not know how much worse Iraq had been broken by Saddam's rule in the twelve years since Operation Desert Storm. In 2002-2003, we did not know that the initial post-war plan was based on a 1990s conception of Iraq that had been made obsolete by Saddam's rule since ODS.
The lesson of Iraq is that anticipating problems and planning for them are good and proper steps, but they should not be viewed as prophylactic like Dr. Maloney apparently does. Plan ahead as best we can, which the Bush administration did do for the OIF occupation and peace operations. But adjusting to setbacks, whether from surprise or competition, is the normal path to win any kind of real competition, such as the COIN adjustment to the Saddamist AQI insurgency. Just as important, the lesson of Iraq is to solve a malignant problem like Iran or noncompliant Saddam as soon as possible: We should not allow the analogous Iran problem to fester in ways seen and unseen like the Saddam problem did.
Toosi:
In mid-2000s Iraq, as the bodies kept piling up, Washington also struggled to devise a path forward. Ideas ranged from pulling U.S. troops out of population centers to partitioning the country into three regions. (The latter’s proponents included then-Sen. Joe Biden.) Ultimately, a surge in the number of U.S. troops combined with other measures, such as persuading Sunni tribal leaders to join forces with the U.S. against Al Qaeda, helped turn the tide.
"Pulling U.S. troops out of population centers" did not make sense since that idea contradicted the lessons that American soldiers were learning with the Iraqi people on the ground. "Partitioning the country into three regions" was a partisan stratagem that was never a serious idea given that preserving a unified Iraq was part of the basic code of the US law and policy and UNSC resolutions that defined the UNSCR 678 enforcement. As a senior Iraq hawk, then-Senator Biden knew as well as anyone that the partition idea was a non-starter.
That being said, adjusting to setbacks, especially the failure of an entering plan, is normal in any kind of real competition, including maximal contests of war and peace. The Iraq Study Group was a part of a normal competitive learning curve. The puzzle for the peace operators "in mid-2000s Iraq" was why "the bodies kept piling up" despite the scrupulous application of proven peace-building tactics with and contradictory positive indicators from the normal Iraqi populace. The puzzle was solved with the realization that the terrorism and mass murder were actually being generated by Saddamist insurgents from outside the normal Iraqi populace rather than from an illusory sectarian "civil war" among normal Iraqis.
The "systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror" (UN Commission on Human Rights, 19APR02) was how Saddamists ruled Iraq, and that was how they opposed the existential threat of a liberalized post-Saddam Iraq. The same can also be said for the Saddamists' Iran-driven counterpart.
Toosi:
But while the death rate in the Iran conflict has so far been lower, the stakes are much higher, current and former U.S. officials tell me.
The Iran fight is having a more global impact than the epic bloodshed in Iraq.
The Iran fight is having a more global impact than the epic bloodshed in Iraq.
The "death rate" and "epic bloodshed in Iraq" were not caused by the American mission in Iraq, which had a primary humanitarian focus per US and UN mandate. Rather, the "death rate" and "epic bloodshed in Iraq" were the strategic product of the genocidal Saddamists who specialized in terrorizing and mass-murdering Iraqis before, during, and after Operation Iraqi Freedom. The gigantic spike in "death rate" and "epic bloodshed in Iraq" from the Saddamist ISIS invasion was consequent to President Obama's callous removal of the American forces that at the time were proven necessary to defend Iraq from both Saddamists and Iran. The US military was the only force in the world that ultimately proved willing and able to stop the Saddamists from terrorizing and murdering Iraqis in either of their regime, AQI, and ISIS forms.
Blaming the Saddamist-generated "death rate" on the American intervention that was necessary to solve the Saddam problem is a perverse incentive for Saddamists and similar rogue actors to maximize "epic bloodshed" in order to deter the United States from undertaking the measures, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, needed to stop them.
Toosi:
Iran presents a different challenge. It’s a bigger country, the U.S. doesn’t have ground forces there, its regime remains in charge, and its retaliation affects America’s allies throughout the Middle East.
There are, roughly, three camps of ideas for what the U.S. should do — all of which seem grounded more in hope than reality:
... After enduring the fallout of the 2003 U.S. invasion, Iraq had to later survive the war against the Islamic State terrorist group. But today it is, in relative terms given its history, doing well, having held multiple elections.
There are, roughly, three camps of ideas for what the U.S. should do — all of which seem grounded more in hope than reality:
... After enduring the fallout of the 2003 U.S. invasion, Iraq had to later survive the war against the Islamic State terrorist group. But today it is, in relative terms given its history, doing well, having held multiple elections.
To Ms. Toosi's "hawks", "restrainers", and in-between "bunch", I would warn them all that as long as the wounded Iran regime is allowed to fester like the wounded Saddam regime was allowed to fester, we can predict that Iran will adapt like Saddam adapted to the insufficient Gulf War ceasefire enforcement from 1991 to 2003 in ways that were extremely harmful to the Iraqi people and increasingly dangerous to the world.
The "U.S. doesn’t have ground forces there" was the case with Iraq and Afghanistan, too, before we did. The lesson of Iraq, shared with the lessons of Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Gaza, take your pick from the history of civilization beyond the contemporary cases, is that a credible ground element is necessary to solve the Iran problem. The credible ground element need not be American-based, but as was the case with Iraq, it may have to be, especially if the "goals" of the solution for Iran include a human rights element on par with the solution for Saddam.
Unfortunately, our best chance to solve the Iran problem with diplomacy, without war was wasted by President Obama when he prematurely ended Operation Iraqi Freedom.
"After enduring the fallout of the 2003 U.S. invasion", President Obama inherited an improved situation with Iraq that, coupled with the Bush Freedom Agenda, set up the opportunity for a stronger Clinton dual containment of Iran, which would have been a better basis to diplomatically pursue a categorical and sufficient resolution of the Iran problem as it stood when Obama entered office in 2009.
As Peter Rodman explains, Operation Iraqi Freedom set up a better stable and ethical path to deal with Iran that relied on three prongs: stabilize Iraq as an American ally, increase sanctions pressure, and support civil reform in Iran. With the nation-building progress and regional political promise of post-Saddam Iraq that followed the COIN 'surge' and Sahwa 'awakening', Congress's support for strong sanctions against Iran, and the Green Revolution and Freedom Agenda, the three prongs were well within reach for President Obama when he entered office. Instead, as Michael Doran explains, President Obama did the opposite of all three.
Worse, President Obama's premature exit from Iraq in 2011, belated return to Iraq in 2014 only after Iraq was ravaged by Saddamist ISIS and rendered vulnerable to Iran, circumscription of the 2014 return to counterterrorism without restoring the essential nation-building mission, and the retraction of Obama's own pledge of American leadership in the Syria crisis specifically and the Arab Spring generally were a stack of gift invitations that Iran accepted to take over the vital gap in Iraq that President Obama left behind. Iran's heightened manifold threat in the region, including the growth of Iran's proxies in Iraq, broke out from there.
Toosi:
“I don’t believe that if you break it you necessarily own it,” one such hawk, a former U.S. official, told me when I asked if the U.S. would be responsible for fixing a failed Iran as it tried to do in Iraq.
Let’s put aside the morality of pushing a country into chaos.
Let’s put aside the morality of pushing a country into chaos.
See the OIF FAQ answer to "Was the invasion of Iraq perceived to be a nation-building effort".
To clarify, the nation-building aspect of Operation Iraqi Freedom was legally mandated by the standing law and policy on Iraq that the Bush administration inherited along with the general moral and strategic mandate that securing the long-term peace is an element of winning the short-term war, which was an essential lesson of World Wars One and Two.
The human rights element of Operation Iraqi Freedom responded to the Saddam regime's extreme violation of UNSCR 688, which was actually "far worse" (UN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, 18MAR04) than the world knew. Unfortunately, after the regime change, the Saddamist insurgents chose to push the country into chaos rather than submit to a post-Saddam Iraq that was rehabilitated from the Saddam regime's radical sectarian, terrorist, genocidal rule—in other words, an Iraq with no place for Saddamists.
Toosi:
The perils of walking away from a failed state, or perhaps a failed region in this case, is a lesson the U.S. was supposed to have learned from Afghanistan and the 9/11 attacks.
Actually, we learned that lesson from World Wars One and Two. We relearned the lesson "from Afghanistan and the 9/11 attacks". We would have relearned the lesson with Iraq, too, except the Iraq Syndrome's prevailing false narrative has twisted the real lessons of Iraq to their diametric opposite.
Even so, as Ms. Toosi points out, Iraq "is, in relative terms given its history, doing well, having held multiple elections". On that subject, excerpt from my Review of Linda Robinson's "The Long Shadow of the Iraq War: Lessons and Legacies Twenty Years Later":
Robinson:
I agree with Ms. Robinson that "societies only evolve at a generational pace". The generations of American soldiers stationed in Germany, Japan, and Korea show the vital constructive effects of US forces in nation-building in their direct effect in the short term and indirect effect over the long term by securing the fundamental space, anchoring the bilateral relationship for the broader set of ties and exchanges, and enabling the progressive learning curve of everything else. The US forces in Iraq should have had the same direct and indirect constructive effects for Iraq's generational development, except President Obama chose to contravene the Eisenhower precedent and deny them to Iraq.
After a deadly delay, President Obama belatedly honored the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement by sending US forces back in 2014 to stop the Saddamists for a third time. However, Obama did not restore the presence of US forces that should have secured the fundamental space, anchored the bilateral relationship, and enabled the progressive learning curve of everything else for the good of Iraq's generational development. Instead, Iran accepted Obama's gift opportunity and has occupied the vital gap that Obama left behind.
. . .
In the generational context, if not for President Obama's radical deviation, US forces would have helped Iraq move in the right direction, like they have helped Germany, Japan, and Korea, by securing the fundamental space versus Saddamist and Iranian interference, anchoring the bilateral relationship for the "trade, cultural, and educational exchanges, with political and diplomatic ties" to positively influence Iraq's progress, and enabling the progressive learning curve of everything else for the "country's young population", protests and all.
We can only speculate how much healthier Iraq's nation-building development would be today if President Obama had not radically deviated from President Bush's course with Iraq.
... societies only evolve at a generational pace.
I agree with Ms. Robinson that "societies only evolve at a generational pace". The generations of American soldiers stationed in Germany, Japan, and Korea show the vital constructive effects of US forces in nation-building in their direct effect in the short term and indirect effect over the long term by securing the fundamental space, anchoring the bilateral relationship for the broader set of ties and exchanges, and enabling the progressive learning curve of everything else. The US forces in Iraq should have had the same direct and indirect constructive effects for Iraq's generational development, except President Obama chose to contravene the Eisenhower precedent and deny them to Iraq.
After a deadly delay, President Obama belatedly honored the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement by sending US forces back in 2014 to stop the Saddamists for a third time. However, Obama did not restore the presence of US forces that should have secured the fundamental space, anchored the bilateral relationship, and enabled the progressive learning curve of everything else for the good of Iraq's generational development. Instead, Iran accepted Obama's gift opportunity and has occupied the vital gap that Obama left behind.
. . .
In the generational context, if not for President Obama's radical deviation, US forces would have helped Iraq move in the right direction, like they have helped Germany, Japan, and Korea, by securing the fundamental space versus Saddamist and Iranian interference, anchoring the bilateral relationship for the "trade, cultural, and educational exchanges, with political and diplomatic ties" to positively influence Iraq's progress, and enabling the progressive learning curve of everything else for the "country's young population", protests and all.
We can only speculate how much healthier Iraq's nation-building development would be today if President Obama had not radically deviated from President Bush's course with Iraq.
Iraq is not Afghanistan in terms of its social-political potential to evolve as a "multiethnic, multisectarian democracy...poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress" (President Obama, 19MAY11). As Ms. Toosi suggests, post-Saddam Iraq shares the nation-building promise of post-Nazi Germany, post-Imperial Japan, and post-Japan Korea. But realizing Iraq's potential needed, and still needs, American help on par with our military-anchored manifold nation-building assistance to Germany, Japan, and Korea since World War Two that continues today.
Unfortunately, we can only speculate what Iraq's progress would have been by now if President Obama had, instead of his radical deviation, faithfully pursued the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement, stayed the course from President Bush like President Eisenhower stayed the course from President Truman, and upheld President Eisenhower's cardinal precedent.
Toosi:
In the 2000s, the U.S. faced fewer challenges for global influence and could afford a major failure. Now, America’s credibility is sinking due to its Middle East missteps while China’s star is on the rise.
At the dawn of the post-Cold War in 1990-1991, the UNSCR 678 enforcement of Iraq's mandated compliance with the paradigmatic Gulf War ceasefire "governing standard of Iraqi compliance" (UNSCR 1441) set the reification baseline for the aspirational post-Cold War liberal international order. Iraq's mandated compliance was the primary test case for 'pax Americana' and American leadership of the free world. As such, until 2003, Saddam's intransigent noncompliance was a "major failure...sinking...America's credibility". With Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States passed the primary leadership test of Iraq.
China, along with Russia and France, should have been censured for their instrumental complicity in Iraq's "continued violations of its obligations" (UNSCR 1441), i.e., "The [Saddam] Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council" (Iraq Survey Group). The international failure to hold China and Russia (and France) to account for their complicity with Saddam has enabled their present complicity with Iran.
The problem is that almost as soon as the United States passed the primary leadership test of Iraq, President Obama radically deviated with Iraq and a series of "Middle East missteps" in obedience to the Iraq Syndrome. President Trump's struggle to solve the Iran problem is a downstream effect of President Obama's "Middle East missteps". America needs to work back to the pivot point of President Obama's radical deviation to get back on the right track of the principled, resolute, competitively sufficient American leadership of the free world that manifested with Iraq under President Bush.
Toosi:
And it isn’t clear to me that the current polarized U.S. body politic has the discipline to coalesce around a new defense strategy.
Right now both poles of the "current polarized U.S. body politic" are infected by the degenerative Iraq Syndrome and its misguiding 'forever wars' talking point. Developing the American "discipline to coalesce around a new defense strategy" depends on first curing the Iraq Syndrome in the "U.S. body politic" at the premise level of our politics and policy.
To begin solving the Iran problem, Ms. Toosi and Politico need to discredit the Iraq Syndrome and its 'forever wars' talking point that currently predominate the political frame, and replace them with the operative premise that America got it right on Iraq until President Obama's radical deviation. In the thusly reformed political frame, Ms. Toosi and Politico then need to hold President Trump's leadership on Iran to the proven standard of President Bush's principled, resolute, competitively adaptive leadership that accomplished the mission with Iraq.
I invite your critical feedback. If you have questions about my work, please ask.
Related: Solution for Andrew Miller's "Trump’s Failed War in Iran Echoes Bush’s Iraq Blunder", Apply the Saddam precedent to "finish the job and free Iran" (Lisa Daftari), Correct the Iraq War "story" to constructively "shape American foreign policy for years to come" (Jonah Goldberg), Answer and solutions for Mark Hertling's "Tell Me How the Iran War Ends: What are we fighting for?", Cure the Iraq Syndrome to win America back from postliberals and leftists (Thomas Howes), The facts show Edward Feser was right on Iraq in the first place and changed his mind based on misinformation, Jakub Grygiel's "The Iran War and the Coming Global Struggle" comes of the Iraq Syndrome, The apt UN-based international law solution for Iran is the Gulf War ceasefire formula of the Saddam precedent (Richard Epstein, John Yoo), The apt Iraq comparison for the Iran intervention is the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, not Desert Storm (Jonathan Allen), The Forward Party should reconceive the Iran issue with the premise that we were right on Iraq, which is the truth, and The Constitutional rule of law for war was skirted by President Clinton, reinforced by President Bush, and degraded by President Obama.
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